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Abstract 
This thesis is about the problems and the arguments presented in book Z of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In Z, Aristotle sets out an enquiry into the first genus of 
entities: substance. The solution is meant to contribute to the foundation of 
metaphysics. I suggest that metaphysics is conceived to be a demonstrative 
science and Z is the enquiry to establish its principle by answering what 
substance is. Accordingly, the most promising way to engage with Z is to 
establish a correspondence between substance and definition. Substance is the 
entity that grounds the existence of the other entities just as a definition is the 
statement that grounds the demonstrations conducted in a science. 
     Chapter One and Chapter Two outline a theory of definition for my discussion 
of Z. In the light of the logical works, I argue that Z’s enquiry is concerned with 
two issues about substance: primacy and unity. Chapter Three and Four are 
concerned with the primacy of substance. My contention is that Z.4-11 develops 
a formalist essentialism that is designed to ensure the primacy of substance. If 
substance is defined as essence and identified with form, then substance turns 
out to be primary. Chapter Five and Six are concerned with the unity of 
substance. My contention is that the difficulties raised in Z.13-14 lead to the 
failure of the enquiry. There is no way to ensure the unity of substance and thus 
to define it; consequently there is no way to establish the principle of metaphysics. 
This does not mean that Z fails to contribute to the foundation of the science of 
being. Its results enable the enquirer to give a derivative definition of some 
objects of metaphysics: sensible substances. In order to accomplish the project, 
the enquiry has to focus on some suprasensible substance, whose definition will 
posit the immediate principle of the totality of entities. 
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καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ζητούµενον  
καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορούµενον, τί τὸ ὄν, 
 τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἡ οὐσία. 
Metaphysica, Z.1, 1028b2-4.  
 
ἔδοξε δή µοι  
χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα 
ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 
Phaedo, 99e4-6 
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Introduction 
 
Philosophers are keen on definitions. On the one hand, this interest stems from 
their engagement in dialectical disputes; a definition represents a thesis to either 
attack or defend in order to establish cogent points about a certain subject. On 
the other, it stems from their engagement in the study of reality; a definition is the 
account of what an object is and, thus, the linguistic form taken by our knowledge 
of it. This work takes advantage of the philosophical significance of definitions in 
order to address book Z of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In Z, Aristotle sets out an 
enquiry into the first genus of entities: substance. This enquiry is meant to 
develop the science of being, which is the most eminent and universal knowledge 
of entities and traditionally labelled ‘metaphysics’. I intend to discuss the problems 
and the arguments of Z in the light of the views on definition held by Aristotle. The 
methodological insight behind this project is quite simple: since Z is conceived to 
establish the principle of a demonstrative science, the enquiry into what 
substance is corresponds to the enquiry into a definition. For substance is the 
entity that grounds the existence of other entities just as a definition is the 
statement grounding the demonstrations within a science. 
     There are two ways to undertake this project. At a general level of analysis, 
the correspondence obtains between substance and a general concept of 
definition. Substance is the genus of entities grounding the existence of the other 
entities studied by metaphysics; definition is the statement that grounds the 
demonstrations conducted in a science. A general concept of definition 
contributes to our understanding of the principles of every science and, thus, to 
our understanding of the principle of metaphysics, i.e. what substance is. Since 
a definition is the linguistic counterpart of the principle of a science, the salient 
traits of the former can be illustrative of the salient traits of the latter. At a less 
general level of analysis, the correspondence obtains between substance and 
its own definition. Since substance is an entity and definition is the statement 
accounting for it, they indicate one single thing: the principle of metaphysics. 
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Substance is an entity grounding the existence of other entities; its definition is 
the statement grounding the demonstrations conducted in metaphysics. 
Likewise, since the definition of substance is the linguistic counterpart of 
substance itself, the examination of the former contributes to our understanding 
of the latter. 
     For my discussion of Z’s enquiry, I will rely on the general version of this 
correspondence. Accordingly, I will address the problems and the arguments 
about substance on the basis of the concept of definition held by Aristotle and 
applying to every demonstrative science. In other words, I take definition to be 
the linguistic counterpart of substance qua genus studied by a science and not 
qua genus studied by metaphysics. The methodological value of this insight can 
be appreciated in the light of the structure of Aristotelian science. Every science 
studies a genus of entities and its demonstrable attributes. The knowledge of the 
genus of entities consists of the definitions of the primary objects of the science; 
the knowledge of their attributes consists of the demonstrations about the 
secondary objects of the science. The principle grounding the science 
corresponds to the definition of the genus studied.1 Metaphysics studies the 
genus of substances and its demonstrable attributes. Namely, substances are 
the primary objects, while non-substances (i.e. the entities belonging to other 
genera, such as quality, quantity, etc.) are the secondary objects of the science. 
Since the principle grounding a science corresponds to a definition accounting 
for a genus of entities, Z’s enquiry amounts to the enquiry into a definition; for it 
is the enquiry to answer what substance is and, thus, to establish the principle of 
metaphysics. My work engages with the treatment of substance by looking at the 
features of the linguistic counterpart of every principle: definition.2  
     This does not mean that the less general version of the correspondence is not 
relevant to Z’s enquiry. In several chapters, Aristotle easily shifts from the 
                                                          
1
 The other principles are axioms and hypotheses. Axioms are general laws applying to every 
science (e.g. the law of non-contradiction); hypotheses are assumptions of the existence of the 
subject of demonstration. Cf. Section 1.3. 
2
 As will be shown, Aristotle does not separate the use of ‘substance’ to refer to the genus from 
the use to refer to the primary objects in metaphysics (e.g. human, horse, etc. Cf. Section 2.2). 
To preserve this ambiguity, I will not use any article to refer to the substance enquired in Z and, 
thus, to the definition that corresponds to substance. My use of the article will be limited to the 
substances encompassed in the first genus of entities, this, however, implies neither that these 
substances are species (e.g. human, horse) nor that they are individuals (e.g. Socrates, 
Bucephalus). Accordingly, I will also avoid the use of the article to refer to the genus and to the 
primary objects studied by any science; for example, I will speak of ‘the definitions of celestial 
body and of moon’ rather than ‘the definitions of a celestial body and of the moon’. 
Introduction 
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examination of entities (ὄντα) to the examination of the statements (λόγοι) 
accounting for them. This tendency is in fact part of a logical strategy to answer 
what substance is. The key point is that the enquiry involves the examination of 
the entities belonging to the genus studied, i.e. substances. Since substances 
are the primary objects of metaphysics and are accounted for as by definitions, 
much of Z turns out to be an examination of the definitions of substances. In 
enquiring into the principle of metaphysics, Aristotle finds it reasonable to analyse 
the definitions of the objects studied by metaphysics. On a first step, his concern 
is to separate the definitions of substances from the definitions of non-
substances. This result is achieved in Z.4-6 by looking at the predicative relations 
held between these statements and thus corresponding to the relations held 
between the entities signified. On a second step, his concern is to spell out the 
parts of the definitions of substances. This mereological analysis is conducted in 
Z.10-16 and is expected to pave the way toward substance. In a nutshell, Z 
makes a logical turn in order to reach the definition grounding the whole science; 
namely to account for the genus grounding the existence of the other entities 
studied in metaphysics. 
     Therefore, whereas my strategy to engage with Z’s enquiry is to rely on the 
correspondence between substance and the concept of definition, Aristotle’s own 
strategy–in large portions of the book–is to rely on the correspondence between 
substance and its own definition. What is remarkable is that these strategies turn 
out to overlap. Indeed, since the definition of a substance not only does account 
for but also signifies the substance defined, the problems about definitions are 
the linguistic counterparts of the problems about substances. The treatment of 
unity is extremely illustrative of how the correspondence takes place. In order to 
explain why every substance is one entity and not a plurality of constitutive parts, 
Aristotle simultaneously attempts to explain why every definition is one statement 
and not a plurality of predicates, i.e. genus and differentia; despite consisting of 
many terms, a definition must be one statement as it signifies one object.3 In 
enquiring into the principle of metaphysics, Aristotle is then after the primary 
substance and the statement signifying it; the former grounding the existence of 
the other entities, the latter grounding the relevant demonstrations. 
                                                          
3
 See my treatment of Z.12 and H.6 in Section 6.2. 
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     In order to undertake this project, it is then essential to acknowledge the 
demonstrative character of the science of being. Metaphysics is a demonstrative 
science that articulates into principles and demonstrations. According to the 
guidelines of the Analytics, every science is demonstrative in that it studies a 
genus of entities, which is the subject of some demonstrable attributes. 
Arithmetic, for example, studies the genus of numbers (which is a sub-genus of 
quantity) and its demonstrable attributes (e.g. odd/even). Within a science, the 
demonstrations prove the belonging of the relevant attributes to the subject (i.e. 
that the subject is so-and-so characterized) on the basis of the principles 
concerning the subject: the hypothesis of its existence and its definition.4 To 
illustrate, within astronomy the demonstration of eclipse proves the belonging of 
being eclipsed to the moon (which is encompassed by the genus of celestial 
bodies) on the basis of the hypothesis that moon exists and the statement of what 
moon is. At a general level, the subject-matter of metaphysics is being, which 
encompasses the totality of the genera to which entities belong: the genus of 
substances (e.g. animal, human), the genus of quantities (e.g. number, three), 
the genus of qualities (e.g. colour, white), etc. At a less general level, the subject-
matter of metaphysics is substance, which is the first genus of being (i.e. the 
genus of substances); for non-substances ontologically depend upon 
substances. Accordingly, metaphysics is demonstrative in that it studies 
substance, which is the subject of the relevant demonstrations, and the other 
genera of entities, which are the demonstrable attributes of substance. Within 
metaphysics, the demonstrations prove the belonging of non-substances to 
substances (i.e. that a substance is so-and-so characterized) on the basis of the 
principles concerning substance: the hypothesis that substance exists and the 
statement of what substance is. 
     The key point is that the object of a science can be specified in terms of either 
its principle, or its subject, or the relevant demonstrable attributes. Physics is the 
science of nature (φύσις), which is the principle of its demonstrative knowledge. 
Besides, physics is the science of bodies, which are the subjects of the 
demonstrative knowledge and are encompassed by a sub-genus of substance. 
Finally, physics is the science of motion, that is of every demonstrable attribute 
characterizing natural bodies. Broadly, the term being (τὸ ὄν) indicates the 
                                                          
4
 Demonstrations are also grounded in axioms, the general laws applying to every science. See 
Section 1.3. 
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subject and the demonstrable attributes studied in metaphysics; the term 
substance (οὐσία), instead indicates both the subject and the principle.5 Like any 
other science, metaphysics consists of hypotheses and definitions about the 
genus of substances and of the demonstrations about the remaining genera. 
Remarkably, the primacy of the principles grounding the demonstrations perfectly 
corresponds to the primacy of substance grounding the existence of other 
entities. To illustrate, the existence of a quality is grounded in a substance just as 
the demonstration that there is such-and-such a quality is grounded in the 
hypothesis and definition of a substance. Indeed, the demonstration does prove 
that there is such-and-such a qualified substance. Z’s enquiry attempts to 
establish the principle of metaphysics by answering the question ‘What is 
substance?’. The solution will lead Aristotle to account for the entity grounding 
the existence of other entities and thus to accomplish the foundation of the 
demonstrative science of being.6 
     Given that, the most promising source to engage with Z’s enquiry is Aristotle’s 
Organon. The logical works provide us with the theoretical basis to exploit the 
correspondence between substance and definition. This collection of treatises is 
concerned with the formal features of statements and arguments about any 
object. Since substance is the object of a demonstrative science, and since 
definition is the statement accounting for the object of demonstrative sciences, 
the logical works are likely to outline the ‘theory of definition’ against which to 
address Z’s enquiry. Rather than a coherent system of ideas, they offer an 
overview of Aristotle’s concept of definition; each methodological context is 
indeed illustrative of some features and functions that pertain to definitions. If my 
approach is sound, the logical works can give us an insight into those issues that 
are central in Z’s enquiry. That is, the problems about substances in Z can be 
discussed by looking at the problems about their linguistic counterparts. 
     Two contexts, I contend, are salient for my project: dialectic and science. 
Dialectic is the procedure to deliver arguments on the basis of common opinions. 
                                                          
5
 The identity of οὐσία as principle and οὐσία as genus and subject of demonstrations follows 
from the identity between definiens and definiendum. The principle indicated by the definition and 
the subject indicated by the genus must be one and the same thing. Cf. note 2 above. 
6
 This is the reason why the argument of the Metaphysics does not possess the features of a 
demonstrative science yet. The developmental character of the project has salient implications. 
Whilst Aristotle makes it clear that the genus of substances is prima facie co-extensive with the 
genus of bodies (i.e. sensible substances) studied by physics, its demonstrable attributes are still 
obscure. These cannot be the motions studied by physics; for they do not belong to sensible 
substances qua sensible substances, but to substances qua substances.  
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Much of this procedure is devoted to the examination of argumentative theses, 
such as definitions. Thus, it provides us with a formal characterization of the 
statement that accounts for the objects of metaphysics. Science is the set of 
guidelines for the systematic organization of demonstrative knowledge 
expounded in the Posterior Analytics. As already suggested, it is illustrative of the 
role of definition for knowledge; for definition is one of the principles of a science 
and the statement accounting for its objects. Overall, Aristotle is concerned with 
two fundamental issues: the primacy and the unity of definition. The primacy of 
definition is the immediate character of the statement; since definition must be 
the principle of demonstrative knowledge, it cannot be mediated by another 
statement and thus be object of demonstration itself. The unity of definition is 
the predicative oneness of definition; since there must be identity between the 
definiens and the definiendum, definition must be one statement of some 
predicate(s) signifying one object and not many. In Z’s enquiry, Aristotle is bound 
to deal with the counterparts of these issues; for he is attempting to establish a 
principle that must be credited with the corresponding primacy and unity. 
     In this work, I shall start with defending the demonstrative character of 
metaphysics and the conception of substance as the cause of other entities.7 
Subsequently, I shall engage with Z’s enquiry in the light of my theory of definition. 
I will argue for the following theses: 
I. Aristotle endorses a formalist essentialism to solve Z’s enquiry: 
substance is defined as essence and identified with the form of 
substances. 
II. Aristotle acknowledges the failure of Z’s enquiry: there is no way to 
define substance and to establish the principle of metaphysics. 
III. Aristotle acknowledges the contribution of Z’s enquiry: the definition 
of sensible substances enables the enquirer to envision the 
principle of metaphysics. 
Chapter Three and Four argue for (I) by connecting the development of 
essentialism with the treatment of primacy. In particular, I will focus on Z.4-6 and 
                                                          
7
 These are the themes treated in Chapter One and Chapter Two. 
Introduction 
14 
 
Z.10-11, in which Aristotle examines the definition of substance as essence by 
looking at the definitions in metaphysics. My contention is that the definition as 
essence is a promising solution to Z insofar as it ensures the primacy of 
substance. This leads to identifying the principle of metaphysics with the form of 
substances. Chapter Five and Six argue for (II) and (III) by connecting the 
problems of the enquiry with the treatment of unity. In particular, I will focus on 
Z.13-14 and Z.17, in which Aristotle questions and restores the possibility of 
metaphysics by looking at the possibility of definitions in metaphysics. My 
contention is that the failure of Z’s enquiry is tied to the failure to ensure the unity 
of substance. This leads to dismissing the formalist essentialism and to use the 
results of Z to envision the principle of metaphysics. 
     At the end of the day, Z’s enquiry turns out to be a philosophical exercise in 
metaphysics. Different views about the principles grounding the existence and 
the nature of the totality of objects are examined, defended, and rejected. In this 
context, hylomorphic essentialism perhaps represents the most interesting 
conception to ground the science of being and still a partial, if not invalid, solution. 
Accordingly, Z is neither a fully-fledged science nor a purely dialectical argument. 
It is not a fully-fledged science in that it does not reach the principle and thus 
complete the foundation of metaphysics; it is not a dialectical argument in that its 
examinations are meant to develop a demonstrative knowledge. 
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Chapter One 
The Logic of Definition 
In Metaphysics Z, Aristotle sets out an enquiry to answer a definite question: what 
is substance? (τίς ἡ οὐσία). This enquiry is part of the larger project outlined in 
book A, in which Aristotle announces that he will pursue some knowledge of 
principles and causes. Later commentators and philosophers called this 
knowledge ‘metaphysics’.1 The purpose of Chapter One is to set up the 
theoretical basis for my discussion of Z’s enquiry. The most promising approach 
to Z is, I will argue, to establish a correspondence between substance and 
definition. Substance is the principle of the objects studied by metaphysics just 
as definition is the principle of the demonstrations conducted within a science. 
Hence, the problems and the arguments about definition are the linguistic 
counterparts of the problems and the arguments about substance.2 
     In so arguing, I will firstly defend the demonstrative understanding of Aristotle’s 
project. In accordance with the guidelines of the Analytics, metaphysics is a 
demonstrative science (ἐπιστήµη) that articulates into principles and 
demonstrations about its subject-matter. Therefore, Z’s enquiry is neither 
dialectical nor aporematic; for its aim is to ground a demonstrative science by 
establishing its principle, i.e. what substance is. Secondly, I will take advantage 
of the correspondence between substance and definition to outline the framework 
of Z. In the light of the treatment of definition found in the Organon, I shall suggest 
that Aristotle is bound to deal with two issues: primacy and unity. Primacy is the 
immediate character of definition; since a definition must be the principle of 
demonstrative knowledge, it cannot be mediated by another statement and be 
the object of demonstration itself. Unity is the predicative oneness of definition; 
since there must be identity between the definiens and the definiendum, definition 
                                                          
1
 Henceforth, I shall use ‘metaphysics’ to mean the form of knowledge Aristotle labels ‘wisdom’ 
(A.1, 982a1-2) and ‘first philosophy’ (E.1, 1026a29-31). 
2
 For this methodological insight, see also the Introduction. 
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must be one statement of some predicate(s) signifying one object and not many. 
If my hypothesis is correct, the ‘theory of definition’ gathered from the logical 
works is crucial to Z’s enquiry; for Aristotle is attempting to establish a principle 
that must be credited with the corresponding primacy and unity. 
1.1 Metaphysics: the Demonstrative Science of Being 
This section will be focused on the nature of the philosophical project to which 
Z’s enquiry belongs. Contrary to the majority of the interpreters, I shall argue that 
Aristotle conceives his metaphysics as a demonstrative science. In other words, 
metaphysics is designed to be a systematic knowledge articulated into 
demonstrations about a definite subject-matter. This does not mean that the work 
named Metaphysics presents us with a fully-fledged science. The Metaphysics is 
aimed to develop such a science by investigating some principles and causes; 
for these will ground the demonstrations conducted within metaphysics. Given its 
epistemic framework, I contend that Z’s enquiry into substance is to be 
understood as the enquiry to establish the principle of a demonstrative science. 
On this basis, it is possible to adopt the innovative approach to Z I outlined in the 
Introduction. Since definitions are the principles of demonstrative sciences, and 
since what substance is is the principle of metaphysics, the problems concerning 
what substance is will be the counterparts of the problems concerning definitions. 
There are two major contributions with this approach. Firstly, I will make a fruitful 
use of Aristotle’s views on definitions within metaphysics. Definitions will not only 
be treated as accounts of what an entity is, but also as the statements of which 
metaphysics consists. That is, I will shed light on their function within the relevant 
science. Secondly, I will offer an enlightening way to address book Z. My 
approach will enable us to make sense of the relationship between this work and 
the logical treatises of the Organon, which has been widely recognized by 
commentators, though not sufficiently examined. 
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1.1.1 What is Metaphysics? Some Interpretations 
As outlined in the initial chapters of book A, the project undertaken in the 
Metaphysics is to illustrate the highest form of knowledge. This must be a science 
concerning the first principles and causes and is the knowledge to which I will 
refer as ‘metaphysics’. The turning point of this project is considered to be at Γ.1-
2. The science of first principles is identified with the science of being qua being. 
Basically, metaphysics studies the totality of entities without limiting its study to 
any definite genus. This marks the peculiarity of metaphysics. Every other 
science is concerned with a genus of entities. For example, mathematical 
sciences are concerned with quantities. Metaphysics, by contrast, is concerned 
with no genus of entities in particular, but with being as a whole. 
     Being divides into a plurality of different genera that hinders its treatment as a 
unified object of study. This multiplicity of being can be understood in terms of 
two categorial classifications:  
 Substance Quality Quantity Place Etc. 
What-it-is      
What-it-is-like      
How-much-it-is      
Where-it-is      
Etc.      
On the horizontal bar, the ontological categories classify entities by indicating the 
most universal genus to which they belong. On the vertical column, the 
predicative categories classify predications by indicating the most universal 
genus according to which a predicate is attributed to a subject.3 The study of an 
                                                          
3
 This distinction is established in Topics I.9, in which Aristotle suggests that the items in the 
predicative categories can signify any of the items in the ontological categories. For example, the 
predicate ‘colour’ belongs to the category of what-it-is and signifies a quality, such as white. For 
this distinction see Ackrill (1963: 77-81), and Frede (1981). As observed by Ackrill, Aristotle tends 
to conflate the two classifications (cf. Mansion, 1946: 49-61). This is evident in Z.1 (1028a13-15), 
in which every predicative category simply signifies the corresponding ontological category (what-
it-is/substance; how-much-it-is/quantity, etc.; cf. Bostock, 1994: 52-55; 65-66). My analysis will 
explain why in metaphysics the two classifications end up with overlapping. 
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object is confined to a definite genus of entities. That is, it is concerned with what 
can be predicated of the object within the same vertical column. For example, the 
study of number is confined to the genus of quantities and is concerned with what 
number is, what number is like (e.g. odd/even), etc. The possibility of metaphysics 
is then tied to a key problem: how can being be the genus studied by a science? 
The study of being looks impossible because it could not be confined to any 
genus of entities. Since an entity can be a substance, or a quality, or a quantity, 
etc., its study ranges over the horizontal bar. To illustrate, while the object of 
arithmetic is studied within the genus of quantities, the object of metaphysics is 
immediately pluralized into different genera. Likewise, ‘to be’ or ‘is’ can be 
attributed to a subject to signify either what it is, or what it is like, or how much it 
is, its study ranges over the vertical bar. To illustrate, while the attribute ‘odd’ is 
predicated of number to signify what it is like, ‘is’ is predicated of everything to 
signify any of the senses of ‘to be’. 
     Commentators have widely debated about the solution given by Aristotle to 
override the multiplicity of being. Besides guaranteeing the possibility of 
metaphysics, this solution will also be illustrative of the nature of this science. 
That is to clarify whether metaphysics is a standard type of science consisting of 
demonstrations about its subject-matter or it represents a special form of 
knowledge. 
     Let me proceed with a review of the main positions held in the recent past. In 
the 1960s, Gwil Owen proposed a first interpretative line according to which 
metaphysics is not a demonstrative science, such as mathematics, biology, etc. 
Rather, it is a general study of being that Aristotle develops from his dialectic. 
Dialectic is the procedure to deliver arguments on the basis of common opinions. 
In order to conduct the study of such a heterogeneous object, metaphysics offers 
a dialectical treatment that does not aim at scientific proofs; it simply attempts to 
make cogent points by examining common views. In a nutshell, metaphysics 
turns out to be a dialectical science. At the core of this thesis is the doctrine of 
the focal meaning to explain how being can be treated as a genus by 
metaphysics. In Metaphysics Γ.2, Aristotle suggests that the science of being is 
still possible by virtue of the common dependence of its object upon substance 
(1003a33ff.). This is the πρὸς ἕν relation of every entity to substance. Basically, 
although being is not a genus, it can be treated as a genus because the nature 
of substance is the focus of the studies of the differentiated natures of the 
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remaining entities (henceforth, non-substances). To use Aristotle’s example, the 
study of quality is related to the study of substance in the same way as the study 
of something healthy (e.g. a tool, an action) is related to the study of health. 
     It is important to highlight that there are two ways to understand this doctrine. 
Owen takes the πρὸς ἕν relation to apply to the senses of ‘to be’. This approach 
presupposes an interpretation of the multiplicity of being in terms of predicative 
categories. Thus, ‘to be a substance’ means something different from ‘to be a 
quality’ and ‘to be a quality’ means something different from ‘to be a quantity’ and 
so on. However, the sense according to which a non-substance ‘is’ depends upon 
the sense according to which a substance ‘is’. Owen takes then Aristotle to 
introduce the πρὸς ἕν relation to restrict the analysis of the many senses of being 
to the analysis of ‘being a substance’. Alternatively, the πρὸς ἕν relation is taken 
to apply to the genera of entities that are found in reality.4 This approach 
presupposes an interpretation of the multiplicity of being in terms of ontological 
categories. Thus, substances, qualities, quantities etc. belong to different genera 
and possess different natures. However, every non-substance is either a quality, 
or a quantity etc. of a substance and thus depends upon its nature. Accordingly, 
the πρὸς ἕν relation is introduced to highlight the core dependence of each non-
substantial genus upon the genus of substances. 
     Be that as it may, the conception of metaphysics as dialectical science 
gathered large currency in the scholarship.5 In his Aristotle’s First Principles, 
Terrence Irwin argues that metaphysics consists of the study of the principles of 
being, which can only be developed through ‘strong dialectic’. Unlike ‘pure 
dialectic’, the strong dialectic is a systematic discussion of common beliefs 
achieving scientific truths. In this way, Aristotle is able to provide an objective 
foundation for his knowledge of principles without appealing to any demonstrative 
argument and thus triggering an epistemic regress. Thanks to the πρὸς ἕν relation 
of every entity to substance, it is possible to achieve the principles of and the 
axiomatic conditions on the totality of the genera of being. 
     In the 1980s, some commentators proposed an alternative interpretative line. 
What separates metaphysics from demonstrative sciences is not its nature but its 
method. Basically, since metaphysics adopts dialectic for the examination of its 
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 See Irwin (1988: 154-161), Loux (1991: 17ff.), and Bostock (1994: 45-48), Galluzzo (2013a: 21-
27). 
5
 See especially Aubenque (1972) and Irwin (1988). 
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subject-matter, it turns out to be completely different from any other science. 
However, this does not undermine the scientific character of the project set out 
by Aristotle. To begin with, Michael Frede suggests that the science of being 
consists of a series of studies that possess only generic continuity.6 These 
studies concern everything that there is and are part of a genuinely scientific 
project, in which the study of the divine entities (i.e. theology) represents the most 
important section because it concerns the kind of entities with reference to which 
every other kind has to be studied. Similarly, Charlotte Witt attempts to show that 
while metaphysics is not a dialectical science, it still uses a dialectical method.7 
This procedure is meant to work out the materials that would be later arranged 
scientifically. In this way, metaphysics turns out to be science that investigates 
the key concepts in each science. A salient development in this phase of the 
scholarship comes with Burnyeat’s A Map of Metaphysics Zeta.8 Despite being 
mostly focused on the seventh book, this monograph offers interesting 
observations about the nature and the method of metaphysics. In particular, 
Burnyeat defends the positive task fulfilled by the enquiry into substance. Within 
this treatment, Aristotle makes abundant use of dialectical remarks that enable 
him to discard the invalid theses about substance and to offer a pre-scientific 
picture of the knowledge of entities. 
     Finally, it is interesting to consider two more interpretative lines advocated by 
scholars in the recent years. Both Code and Menn propose to illustrate Aristotle’s 
project from its original viewpoint.9 The metaphysics has to be primarily 
understood as the science of principles and secondarily as science of being. As 
argued by Code, this general study is conducted by examining the causes of 
being qua being and provides a system of formal conditions that govern the most 
basic entities. The possibility of treating being as a genus is still the focal relation 
to substance. Substance is indeed the cause of the being of the other entities and 
Z’s enquiry is aimed at specifying this cause.10 In a similar vein, Menn takes the 
Metaphysics to offer an analysis of the principles that are dialectically tested and 
mostly rejected. Aristotle is then committed to challenging and refuting the views 
on primary causes held by previous philosophers. The argument of Z attempts to 
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 See Frede (1987: 84-85). Cf. Patzig (1960). 
7
 See Witt (1989: 7-14; 25-31). 
8
 See Burnyeat (2000). 
9
 See Code (1997) and Menn (2001). 
10
 See Code (1997: 369). 
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demonstrate that no substance – neither the substance defended by Pre-
Socratics’ nor the substance defended by Platonists’ – is a valid principle. 
1.1.2 Textual Evidence 
As mentioned, I intend to show that Aristotle’s metaphysics has to be conceived 
as a demonstrative science. My first concern is then to prove that the nature of 
metaphysics is not dialectical. To this effect, let me start with recalling some 
salient textual evidence. At Metaphysics Γ.2, 1004b22ff., Aristotle explicitly 
opposes dialectic to philosophy, i.e. metaphysics.  
Dialectic and sophistry turn on the same class of things as philosophy. However, 
philosophy differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty required and from 
sophistry in respect of the purpose of life. Dialectic is indeed tentative (peirastic) 
where philosophy is true knowledge (Metaph. Γ.2, 1004b22-26).11 
περὶ µὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, 
ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς µὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάµεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει· 
ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική. 
 
Both dialectic and metaphysics consists of arguments about the same object: the 
totality of entities. Consequently, their treatments are not confined to a single 
genus of being, but concern whatever can be categorially classified. The point is 
that whereas the arguments of metaphysics do express some form of knowledge, 
the arguments of dialectic do not. Dialectic is a procedure to test and examine 
theses by looking at reputable opinions and, as such, does not produce any 
knowledge about its object. To use Aristotle’s terminology, dialectic is peirastic. 
Metaphysics, by contrast, is primarily ‘true knowledge’ of something. Therefore, 
it cannot be a test about its object of study; for a test does not represent any truth, 
but either corroborates or rejects a given thesis. On a first level of reading, 
Aristotle separates two methods to conduct a certain intellectual activity: the one 
involves testing theses, the other does not. On a second level of reading, dialectic 
and metaphysics turn out to be separated in nature. While there is no definite 
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content that can be dialectically organized into a permanent body of knowledge, 
this does not apply to metaphysics. Arguably, the content of metaphysics can be 
organized into definitions and demonstrations expressing some true knowledge. 
     However, Aristotle does not make this explicit in the passage. Following 
Owen’s reading, some scholars propose reconsidering the text by contrasting two 
forms of dialectic, rather than dialectic and science.12 Irwin, for example, takes 
Aristotle to oppose the pure dialectic of the Organon to the strong dialectic of the 
Metaphysics. While the pure dialectic is the traditional treatment of arguments by 
means of attacking and defending schemes, the strong dialectic is a procedure 
to establish indisputable truths. The distinction lies in the fact that metaphysics 
studies the totality of entities insofar as it studies the first principles. Since no 
principle of a science can be established by the very same science (on pain of 
circularity), Aristotle conceives his metaphysics as a refined treatment of the 
totality of entities by which to ground scientific knowledge. It does not test 
reputable opinions, but delivers cogent arguments applying to every genus of 
being. There are a couple of passages that prevent us from endorsing this 
reading. 
1) From this it is clear too that those people are silly who think they get their 
principles correctly if the premise is reputable and true […] For it is not what 
is reputable or not that is a principle, but what is primary in the genus about 
which we demonstrate something (An. Post. I.6, 74b21-25). 
δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὅτι εὐήθεις οἱ λαµβάνειν οἰόµενοι καλῶς τὰς ἀρχάς, 
ἐὰν ἔνδοξος ᾖ ἡ πρότασις καὶ ἀληθής […] οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἔνδοξον ἡµῖν ἀρχή ἐστιν, 
ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ γένους περὶ ὃ δείκνυται. 
2) It is also clear that the question ‘what is it?’ is not dialectical either. For the 
question must give one the choice of stating whichever side of the 
contradiction one wishes. However, the questioner must specify further and 
ask whether human is this or not this (De Int. 11, 20b27-30). 
ἅµα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἐρώτησίς ἐστι διαλεκτική·  δεῖ γὰρ δεδόσθαι 
ἐκ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἑλέσθαι ὁπότερον βούλεται τῆς ἀντιφάσεως µόριον 
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 See Owen (1960), Irwin (1988). For a different reading based on the same approach see Bolton 
(1990). For some criticism on these positions see Smith (1997: 52-55) and Fraser (2002: 50-58). 
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ἀποφήνασθαι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα προσδιορίσαι πότερον τόδε ἐστὶν ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος ἢ οὐ τοῦτο. 
Aristotle is making the same point in both passages. Consider text (1). Since 
every dialectical procedure starts from common opinions, and since no common 
opinion can ground any scientific knowledge, metaphysics cannot be a dialectical 
science. Even if metaphysics were a dialectical science, it could at best establish 
the principles of other sciences, while it could not establish its own principles; for 
these must not be common opinions. What could then be the principles of 
metaphysics? How metaphysics could ground its own knowledge without relying 
on the common opinions grounding dialectical analysis? At a closer look, Aristotle 
turns out to be calling into question the general attempt to establish principles 
through dialectic. In the Analytics, Aristotle tells us that the principles of a science 
are the definition and the assumption of the existence of the genus studied.13 
Remarkably, both of these cannot be achieved through dialectic; for there is no 
dialectical test to be carried out. Consider text (2). A dialectical procedure 
consists in examining whether something is the case or not. For example, 
‘whether the statesman is an expert or not’. Accordingly, a dialectical procedure 
can be employed to either strengthen or reject definitions by testing their content. 
On the contrary, it will not be employed to investigate such a definitional content. 
     The textual evidence against the dialectical nature of metaphysics is enriched 
by the textual evidence in favour of its apodeictic character. On different 
occasions, Aristotle insists on the importance of the education in the theory of 
demonstrative science for the development and the study of metaphysics. 
Consider texts (3) and (4) below:  
3) Therefore, one must be already trained to know how to demonstrate, since it 
is absurd to seek at the same time knowledge and the way of attaining 
knowledge; and neither is easy to get. (Metaph. α.3, 995a12-16) 
διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ἄτοπον ἅµα ζητεῖν 
ἐπιστήµην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήµης·  ἔστι δ’ οὐδὲ θάτερον ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν. 
 
4) And the attempts of some who discuss the terms on which truth should be 
accepted are originated from the ignorance in the Analytics. For they should 
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possess preliminary knowledge about these things and not to enquire into 
them while listening to these lectures. (Metaph. Γ.3, 1005b2-5) 
ὅσα δ’ ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τρόπον δεῖ 
ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι’ ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν·  δεῖ γὰρ περὶ 
τούτων ἥκειν προεπισταµένους ἀλλὰ µὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν. 
 
In passage (3), Aristotle points out that some expertise in the method of 
demonstration is essential before investigating metaphysics; for it looks 
impossible to conduct a simultaneous investigation about a science and its own 
method. In arguing so, Aristotle separates the content of the science from its 
formal structure. The enquirer who intends to develop the science of being and 
thus to become a metaphysician has to know in advance how to present such a 
knowledge. What is salient to us is that the content of the science of being has to 
be presented by means of demonstrations. Likewise, in passage (4) Aristotle 
connects the treatment of truth – conducted by metaphysics – with some 
preliminary study of the Analytics. In order to avoid any failure with her studies, 
the student of metaphysics has to keep in mind the guidelines about 
demonstrations. The key point is that the truth is not only the object of 
metaphysics, but of any scientific knowledge. In order to successfully understand 
the content of metaphysics, it is then essential to be acquainted with the 
apodeictic method. 
     I shall conclude this analysis of textual sources with a passage from book Z. 
In a few lines at the start of Z.15, Aristotle indirectly provides some remarks that 
strongly support my interpretation of the demonstrative character of metaphysics.  
5) For this reason, also, there is neither definition nor demonstration of sensible 
individual substances; for they have matter that is such that they are capable 
both of being and of not being. Thus every individual substance is corruptible. 
If then demonstration is only of necessary truths and if definition is scientific, 
and if, just as science cannot be sometimes science and sometimes 
ignorance (this is the nature of opinion), so too demonstration and definition 
cannot vary thus, but it is opinion that deals with that which can be otherwise 
than as it is, clearly there can neither be definition nor demonstration of 
sensible individuals. (Z.15, 1039b28-1040a1). 
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διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα οὔτε ὁρισµὸς 
οὔτε ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν, ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὕλην ἧς ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη ὥστ’ ἐνδέχεσθαι 
καὶ εἶναι καὶ µή·  διὸ φθαρτὰ πάντα τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἥ τ’ 
ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ ὁ ὁρισµὸς ἐπιστηµονικόν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, 
ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐπιστήµην ὁτὲ µὲν ἐπιστήµην ὁτὲ δ’ ἄγνοιαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δόξα τὸ 
τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οὕτως οὐδ’ ἀπόδειξιν οὐδ’ ὁρισµόν, ἀλλὰ δόξα
 
ἐστὶ τοῦ 
ἐνδεχοµένου ἄλλως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν οὔτε ὁρισµὸς οὔτε 
ἀπόδειξις.  
 
The aim of the chapter is to show the impossibility to achieve knowledge of 
individuals. More precisely, Aristotle rejects the possibility of defining corruptible 
and particular substances (as will be shown, this is the genus of being with which 
metaphysics is concerned). The argument contrasts the liability to change that is 
characteristic of particular substances (e.g. Socrates, Bucephalus) with the 
necessary nature that is the object of metaphysical knowledge. What is 
remarkable is that this form of knowledge is exclusively identified with 
demonstrative science. Aristotle repeatedly points out that the impossibility of 
knowing particular substances amounts to the impossibility of defining and 
conducting demonstrations about them. As argued in the Analytics, a 
demonstration proves that a certain fact stated in the conclusion necessarily 
obtains in virtue of a certain cause stated in the premises. The content of such a 
demonstrative knowledge is necessary in that it is impossible to be otherwise. 
Given their corruptibility, there is no fact about particular substances that is 
necessary and thus provable by a demonstration. Accordingly, there is no 
demonstrative knowledge of particular substances. 
     In arguing so, Aristotle assumes the demonstrative nature of metaphysics as 
a fundamental premise of his argument. Just like other sciences, metaphysics 
appears to be organized into definitions and demonstrations about one genus of 
entities. Z.15 makes it clear that particular and sensible substances are not 
included in this genus. In Chapter Five, I will argue that the argument of Z.15 is 
part of Aristotle’s own plan to show the impossibility of achieving knowledge of 
any substance and thus the impossibility of developing metaphysics in general. 
This will mark the necessity of a new start of the enquiry.14 At present, it 
represents a key piece of evidence in favour of my approach. Aristotle comes to 
reject the demonstrative knowledge of particular substances on the basis of the 
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demonstrative character of metaphysics. Hence, metaphysics is conceived to be 
as a science that articulates into definitions and demonstrations about the genus 
studied.  
1.1.3 The Science of Substances and of Non-Substances 
The passages reviewed above call into question the dialectical nature of 
metaphysics. On the contrary, they provide us with some evidence in favour of 
my demonstrative reading. In this section, I will illustrate how metaphysics can be 
conceived as a demonstrative form of knowledge. Since metaphysics is the 
science of being, my focus will be to spell out the features that make of the genus 
studied the subject-matter of a demonstrative science; for the multiplicity of being 
hinders its treatment as genus and thus prevents its study from being a unified 
science. This involves two things: on the one hand, I will show the limits of the 
alternative interpretations advanced by scholars; on the other, I will illustrate the 
advantages of the demonstrative reading. 
     Let me give a different insight into the problem of the multiplicity of being. The 
reason why being cannot be treated as a genus is also expounded in the logical 
works.15 According to the guidelines of the Analytics, the study conducted by 
every demonstrative science must be confined to one genus of entities that is the 
subject of some demonstrable attributes. For example, astronomy studies the 
genus of celestial bodies that is the subject of some demonstrable attributes, such 
as eclipse (i.e. being eclipsed).16 The reason is quite simple: an argument is 
scientific insofar as its conclusions necessarily obtains in virtue of a cause stated 
in its premises. If a science were not limited to one genus, its arguments could 
not guarantee such a necessity; for they could be grounded in heterogeneous 
causes from which their conclusions would follow only incidentally. The causes 
in virtue of which the conclusion ‘moon is eclipsed’ obtains (i.e. ‘being eclipsed 
belongs to moon’) lies in the nature of celestial body, which is the genus studied 
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 See An. Post. I.7, 75b2-12 (cf. I.9, 76a4-30; I.32). 
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 More precisely, the subject is either the genus or a sub-genus. For example, a lunar eclipse is 
a demonstrable attribute of the subject moon and, indirectly, of the genus to which moon belongs, 
i.e. celestial body. Celestial body is the genus with which the demonstrations of astronomy are 
concerned, and these include those about the moon. On the different senses of ‘genus’ see 
Mignucci (2007: 176) and Mckirahan (1992: 50-63). 
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by astronomy. This is the condition of homogeneity: for each science, there is 
one genus of entities that is the subject-matter of its study.17 Since being is a 
plurality of different genera, its study cannot be confined to a single genus of 
entities. In other words, there is no such a unitary subject-matter that makes of 
its study a demonstrative science. By missing the condition of homogeneity, 
metaphysics appears to be a general treatment of the heterogeneous nature of 
being. 
     In this regard, it is common to contrast the synonymous nature of a genuine 
subject-matter with the homonymous nature of being. A subject-matter 
possesses a synonymous nature insofar as there is one single nature to which 
its study refers. Every object within the subject-matter is then defined according 
to the univocal nature (καθ’ ἕν) of the genus of entities with which the study is 
concerned. To illustrate, every object studied by astronomy is defined according 
to the nature of the genus of celestial bodies (i.e. what a celestial body is). In the 
light of the categorial classifications above, the nature of a genus is synonymous 
in that the predicative relations of which the study consists obtain within the same 
vertical category.18 To use our example, the predicative relations of which 
astronomy consists obtain within the category of substance because they 
express the nature of one of its sub-genera, i.e. celestial body. The possibility of 
setting out a demonstrative science is bound to the possibility of studying its 
subject-matter with reference to a univocal nature. 
     This possibility is not granted while studying being. Since its study concerns a 
plurality of different genera, being appears to possess a homonymous nature. 
Namely, its subject-matter encompasses objects sharing a common name but no 
common nature. Thus, every object within the subject-matter cannot be defined 
according to a univocal nature (καθ’ ἕν). In metaphysics, every object is named 
‘being/entity’ and is defined according to one of the natures ascribed to the many 
genera of being (e.g. what a quality is, what a quantity is, etc.). In the light of the 
categorial classification above, the nature of being is homonymous in that the 
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 This condition regulates the communication among autonomous sciences, especially the 
transferability of principles. Namely, a science can apply some principles from another science 
insofar as the genus of the former is a sub-genus of the genus of the latter. For example, the 
principles of arithmetic are not transferable to geometry, because arithmetic studies discrete 
magnitude, whereas geometry studies continuous magnitudes. This is instead possible between 
geometry and optics because optics studies a sub-genus of continuous magnitudes. Cf. Mignucci 
(2007: 174-176; 178-179; 244). 
18 A study indeed consists of the statements that make up its arguments and each statement amounts to 
a predicative relation in which a predicate belongs to a subject.  
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predicative relations of which the study consists obtain within every vertical 
category. Therefore, it looks impossible to conceive metaphysics as a 
demonstrative science that is concerned with one unitary genus of objects. 
     Traditionally, the solution is taken to be the introduction of the πρὸς ἕν relation 
in place of the καθ’ ἕν relation. Whilst there is no nature according to which the 
objects within the subject-matter can be defined, there is one nature with 
reference to which they can be studied: the nature of substance. The πρὸς ἕν 
relation to substance marks the common dependence of every object upon the 
nature of the first genus of being. Although the study of being concerns a plurality 
of objects belonging to different genera and thus definable according to the 
different natures, it primarily concerns a genus that is the ‘focus’ of the others. 
Quality, quantity etc. are what they are inasmuch as there is the substance of 
which they are quality, quantity etc. Since the objects within the subject-matter 
do not simply share the name but also hold the common dependence upon the 
genus of substances, the nature of being can be considered neither purely 
homonymous nor purely synonymous. What kind of study does metaphysics turn 
out to be then? 
     As already seen, this solution is a key element in the dialectical reading of 
Aristotle’s metaphysics. With the introduction of the πρὸς ἕν relation, Aristotle 
seems to conceive the study of being as a peculiar form of knowledge that must 
be separated from regular demonstrative sciences. Whereas demonstrative 
sciences are concerned with objects that are καθ’ ἕν λεγόµενα (i.e. defined 
according to the nature of their genus), metaphysics is concerned with objects 
that are πρὸς ἕν λεγόµενα (i.e. defined with reference to the nature of the genus 
of substance). From this perspective, being can be treated as a genus because 
of the special relation held among its objects. Despite the intrinsic multiplicity, it 
is then possible to conduct a unitary study of entities. The point is that such 
knowledge does not fulfil the condition of homogeneity. The study of substance 
does not seem to provide the metaphysician with the principles grounding the 
demonstrations about the entire subject-matter. Rather, it enables the 
metaphysician to conduct parallel studies about the genera into which being 
divides. This general treatment of heterogeneous natures is proper to a dialectical 
science that must be separated from regular demonstrative sciences. 
     In order to avoid this conclusion, some commentators have recently proposed 
an alternative reading of Aristotle’s views. The central idea is that the argument 
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in Γ.1-2 does not classify metaphysics as a special science because of some 
feature of its subject-matter. On the contrary, it shows that metaphysics conforms 
to model of demonstrative knowledge presented in the Analytics. Basically, its 
objects constitute a unitary genus that must be treated as a genuinely scientific 
subject-matter. Kyle Fraser has offered the most convincing argument in favour 
of this interpretative line.19 The possibility of metaphysics, he argues, is not 
guaranteed by the introduction of the πρὸς ἕν relation in place of the καθ’ ἕν 
relation; for both of them work within every demonstrative science. In other words, 
the πρὸς ἕν relation is not a special form of dependence that is exclusively held 
in case of non-substances and substance. By καθ’ ἕν and πρὸς ἕν, Aristotle 
indicates two relations to one same nature that is ascribed to the genus with 
which the relevant demonstrative science is concerned. For example, the objects 
studied by arithmetic hold both καθ’ ἕν and πρὸς ἕν relations to the nature of 
number; likewise, the objects studied by metaphysics hold both καθ’ ἕν and πρὸς 
ἕν relations to the nature of substance. In sum, the πρὸς ἕν relation marks the 
genuinely scientific character of the subject-matter of the metaphysics and thus 
the demonstrative organization of its knowledge. 
     I take lines 1003b10-15 to confirm the alternative reading of the argument 
suggested by Fraser.  
As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same 
applies in other cases also. For not only the study of the objects defined 
according to one nature does pertain to one science, but also the study of the 
objects defined with reference to one nature; for even these in a sense are 
defined according to one nature. It is clear then that it is the work of one science 
also to study all entities qua entities (Metaph. Γ.2, 1003b10-15). 
καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἁπάντων µία ἐπιστήµη ἔστιν, καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν 
ὑγιεινῶν ἁπάντων µία ἐπιστήµη ἔστιν, ὁµοίως τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ γὰρ 
µόνον τῶν καθ’ ἓν λεγοµένων ἐπιστήµης ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι µιᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρὸς 
µίαν λεγοµένων φύσιν·  καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον τινὰ λέγονται καθ’ ἕν. δῆλον οὖν 
ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὄντα µιᾶς θεωρῆσαι ᾗ ὄντα. 
Aristotle does not distinguish between two types of sciences. His concern is to 
separate the καθ’ ἕν λεγόµενα from the πρὸς ἕν λεγόµενα. Remarkably, these are 
presented as the objects of one single science. The distinction is not immediately 
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evident, says Aristotle, because the πρὸς ἕν λεγόµενα can be treated as καθ’ ἕν 
λεγόµενα and thus assimilated to other objects studied by the science. How this 
assimilation is possible will be clear later. What is salient to us is that Aristotle 
makes here a general claim about scientific knowledge: every subject-matter 
includes both objects defined according to and objects defined with reference to 
the nature of the relevant genus. The study of being is the case of a science in 
which the distinction between καθ’ ἕν and πρὸς ἕν λεγόµενα is less plain. 
     If the πρὸς ἕν relation characterizes every subject-matter, then this feature 
has to be treated in the guidelines about the structure of demonstrative sciences. 
Therefore, the key to supporting Fraser’s interpretation is a detailed revision of 
the doctrine of the Analytics. Indeed, Aristotle does not seem to take into 
consideration the πρὸς ἕν in the logical works. In point of fact, it suffices to 
articulate the content of any demonstrative science to realize that the καθ’ ἕν 
relation could never apply to the totality of the objects studied by a demonstrative 
science. That is, every genuinely scientific subject-matter could never be 
exhausted by καθ’ ἕν λεγόµενα. Consider the following demonstration:  
A) Loss of light belongs to B) screening of Sun by Earth 
B) Screening of Sun by Earth belongs to C) Moon 
A) Loss of light belongs to C) Moon.20 
This demonstration is a piece of the knowledge that constitutes astronomy, the 
science of celestial bodies. In particular, this demonstration proves that the moon 
undergoes a certain loss of light, i.e. an eclipse. On the basis of the traditional 
reading, the nature of the genus studied should be expressed by the predicative 
relations that make up this demonstration. Basically, if every object within the 
subject-matter is καθ’ ἕν related to the nature of the genus studied, then the 
conclusion AaC should follow from AaB and BaC insofar as B expresses the 
nature of celestial bodies. But this is not the case. The conclusion AaC follows 
insofar as B expresses the nature of eclipse (or at least part of it).21 Since the 
demonstration concerns the moon, it still constitutes the science of celestial 
bodies. The point is that whereas moon is known in terms of the nature of celestial 
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 See An. Post. I.8, 93a15-b14. Cf. Mignucci (2007: 268-273). 
21 The definition of eclipse is indeed ‘loss of light caused by screening of sun by earth’. 
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bodies, eclipse is not. Since the subject-matter of astronomy includes both moon 
and eclipse, there must be different ways in which the objects studied are related 
to the nature of the genus. Arguably, there must be different types of objects 
holding different relations to the nature of the genus: the καθ’ ἕν λεγόµενα and 
the πρὸς ἕν λεγόµενα. Is this distinction available in the Analytics? 
    As suggested by Fraser, the answer is given at the beginning of the Posterior 
Analytics. More precisely, the distinction between the objects of a science can be 
established in light of the distinction between the statements of which the science 
consists; for the former are signified by the latter. At I.4, Aristotle tells us that 
demonstrative knowledge consists of statements in which a predicate belongs 
per se to a subject. In a first sense, a predicate belongs per se1 to a subject if the 
predicate is stated in the account of the subject (i.e. its τί ἐστιν, I.4, 73a34-37). 
For example, animal belongs per se1 to human because animal occurs in the 
account of human.22 In a second sense, a predicate belongs per se2 to a subject 
if the subject is stated in the account of the predicate (I.4, 73a37-b1). For 
example, odd belongs per se2 to number because number occurs in the account 
of odd. Both the per se1 belonging and the per se2 belonging indicate a relation 
to the nature of the genus studied. However, while the per se1 belonging indicates 
the relation between a genus and a sub-genus, the per se2 belonging indicates 
the relation between a genus and an attribute. The distinction between these 
relations corresponds to the distinction between the objects within a scientific 
subject-matter. For one thing, a demonstrative science is the knowledge of the 
sub-genera of the genus studied. For example, arithmetic is firstly the knowledge 
of what number and its species (e.g. three) are. Such objects are καθ’ ἕν 
λεγόµενα in that they are known by stating the nature of the genus in their account 
(i.e. by the statement of a per se1 belonging). For another thing, a demonstrative 
science is the knowledge of the demonstrable attributes of those sub-genera. For 
example, arithmetic is also the knowledge of odd/even. What is salient to us is 
that the attributes are not the sub-genera of the genus studied and thus cannot 
be καθ’ ἕν λεγόµενα. To illustrate, the genus number is not divided into odd and 
even; consequently, odd and even are not known according to the nature of 
number. Rather, odd and even are known according to the cause in virtue of 
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 As noticed by commentators, Aristotle’s examples are slightly puzzling; a triangle does not 
seem to be point and line (cf. McKirahan, 1992: 86-19; Mignucci, 2007: 164-165). We can perhaps 
soften the difficulties if we think that Aristotle has in mind a constitutive relation between the 
statements of ‘point’ and of ‘line’ and the statement of what triangle is.   
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which they belong to the species of number. Put it more generally, the 
demonstrable attributes, like odd and even, are not καθ’ ἕν related to the nature 
of the genus studied. 
     Such objects are the πρὸς ἕν λεγόµενα that parallel the καθ’ ἕν λεγόµενα 
within a subject-matter. Although the demonstrable attributes are not defined 
according to (καθ’ ἕν) the nature of the genus, they are in fact known with 
reference to it (πρὸς ἕν). The knowledge of what an attribute is is scientific only if 
it explains the necessary belonging of the attribute to a genus (i.e. the existence 
of the attribute) in virtue of a cause. Therefore, the attribute turns out to be related 
to the nature of the genus without being one of its sub-genera. For example, the 
knowledge of what eclipse is is scientific insofar as it explains the necessary 
belonging of loss of light to moon (i.e. the existence of the eclipse) in virtue of the 
screening of sun by earth. The account of eclipse does not state the nature of the 
genus of celestial bodies, though it refers to moon and to a further 
characterization of some celestial bodies (i.e. the screening of sun). Hence, every 
scientific subject-matter consists of the genus and the sub-genera studied and 
their demonstrable attributes; the former being καθ’ ἕν and the latter being πρὸς 
ἕν related to the nature of the genus. 
     In sum, a demonstrative science consists of statements of both per se1 and 
per se2 belonging. Whereas the statement of per se1 signifies a sub-genus 
studied by the science, the statement of per se2 signifies an attribute 
characterizing the sub-genus. Accordingly, sub-genera and attributes hold 
distinct relationships with the nature of the genus. I will expand upon 
demonstrable attributes in Section 1.3. At present, we are pressed by a different 
question: why does Aristotle not speak of πρὸς ἕν in the Analytics? He speaks of 
per se2 belonging of a predicate to a subject and this corresponds to the relation 
between a demonstrable attribute and a genus/sub-genus. Since this is not a καθ’ 
ἕν relation, we propose to identify it with the πρὸς ἕν relation introduced in the 
Metaphysics. In all likelihood, Aristotle did not need to separate the καθ’ ἕν from 
the πρὸς ἕν λεγόµενα before coping with being as the subject-matter of a science. 
The concepts of καθ’ ἕν and πρὸς ἕν do not simply separate the objects within a 
subject-matter, but separate these objects in relation to one genus. The project 
to set out the science of being starts with realizing that being is a plurality of 
genera. Consequently, it is impossible to study every genus/sub-genus into which 
being divides because these are defined according to different natures. 
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     The problem lies in the assumption that each genus and sub-genus of being 
is the subject of demonstrable attributes. If it were so, metaphysics would 
exclusively consist of statements of predicates that per se1 belong to the many 
genera of being (i.e. substance, quality, etc.). The result is that each genus is 
assumed to be καθ’ ἕν related to one single nature. The introduction of the πρὸς 
ἕν enables Aristotle to clarify the treatment of being: the genus of substance is 
the only genus that is the subject of demonstrable attributes. The nature of 
substance is then the nature to which some objects, i.e. substances, are καθ’ ἕν 
related. Firstly, the science of being turns out to consist of statements of 
predicates that per se1 belong to the genus of substances. The remaining genera 
instead are the demonstrable attributes of the genus of substances. The nature 
of substance is then the nature to which some objects, i.e. non-substances, are 
πρὸς ἕν related. Thus, the science of being also consists of statements of 
predicates that per se2 belong to the genus of substances. In a nutshell, 
metaphysics studies the whole being insofar as it studies substances and non-
substances. The former are καθ’ ἕν λεγόµενα in that they are defined according 
to the nature of substance; indeed, every substance is the subject of some 
demonstrable attributes. The latter are πρὸς ἕν λεγόµενα in that they are defined 
with reference to the nature of substance; indeed, every non-substance is a 
demonstrable attribute characterizing a substance. 
     In the passage 1003b10-15, Aristotle remarks that the πρὸς ἕν λεγόµενα tend 
to be assimilated to the καθ’ ἕν λεγόµενα. For in a sense the πρὸς ἕν λεγόµενα 
can be defined according to (καθ’ ἕν) one nature. This might prevent us from 
missing the unity of the science studying heterogeneous objects (e.g. the many 
healthy things, the many entities). The assimilation is possible because a 
demonstrable attribute holds different relations with different natures. On the one 
hand, the attribute is πρὸς ἕν related to the nature of the genus studied. On the 
other, the attribute is καθ’ ἕν related to the nature of the genus to which it belongs. 
To illustrate, odd is πρὸς ἕν related to the nature of number, while it is καθ’ ἕν 
related to the nature of numerical qualities. Basically, the definition of a 
demonstrable attribute does refer to the genus studied by the relevant science, 
although it states the nature of a dependent genus of entities. 
     With the introduction of the πρὸς ἕν, Aristotle is able to reconsider the 
apparent multiplicity of the subject-matter. Metaphysics does not study distinct 
genera, but one genus, substance, of which the other genera, quality, quantity 
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etc., are demonstrable attributes. This solution can be even more clear through 
a distinction between the notions of ‘genus’ and ‘subject-matter’. So far, I have 
employed these concepts to equally refer to the objects studied by a science. The 
case of being compels us to be more rigorous. The concept of genus is to be 
limited to the objects that are subjects of the demonstrative knowledge of a 
science. Such objects are not known by demonstrations; for a demonstration 
assumes the existence and the nature of the genus and proves the belonging of 
some attributes. For example, the genus of celestial bodies encompasses planets 
and stars, though not eclipse and twinkling, which are not instances of celestial 
body. The concept of subject-matter is then very useful to refer to every object 
with which a demonstrative knowledge is concerned: the genus/sub-genus and 
the relevant attributes. Namely, the subjects and their characterizations. 
     On the basis of this asymmetry, we are in a better position to understand the 
treatment of being. If being is taken to be a genus, metaphysics turns out to be 
impossible; for being is immediately pluralized into different natures. On the 
contrary, if being is taken to be a subject-matter, metaphysics turns out to be 
possible because being is just a name to refer to the totality of the objects studied 
by the science. The point is that some of these objects make up the genus that 
is subject of the demonstrative knowledge, while the remaining objects make up 
distinct genera that are attributes of the genus. Hence, metaphysics as 
demonstrative science consists of the knowledge of the genus, whose existence 
and nature ground every demonstration, plus the knowledge of the remainder of 
the subject-matter, which is the existence and the nature of the attributes 
characterizing the genus. The former being substance, the latter being non-
substances. 
1.1.4 Advantages and Possible Objections 
I shall conclude with some remarks on the possible objections to my 
demonstrative reading and on the advantages for our understanding of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics. To start with, metaphysics is often paralleled with mathematics and 
physics.23 More precisely, each of them occupies the first level in the hierarchy of 
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 See De An. I.1, 403b7-16; Metaph. E.1, 1025b1; Eth. Nic. VI.8, 1142a19. 
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the sciences that are concerned with more specific subject-matters. Basically, 
mathematics, physics and metaphysics study the causes and the principles of a 
genus, while their subordinate sciences study the respective sub-genera. To 
illustrate, mathematics studies the principles of the genus of quantities, while 
geometry studies extensive quantities. What matters to us is that in order to 
establish this parallel, Aristotle must be assuming the common nature of 
mathematics, physics and metaphysics. In other words, these studies exemplify 
the same kind of knowledge and their epistemic contents are organized in the 
same way. 
     In view of this, the majority of commentators argue in favour of the dialectical 
nature.24 Since these sciences study the highest principles of a genus of entities, 
they are to be conceived as dialectical analyses. They consist in testing common 
views in order to yield stronger theses. After all, no demonstrative sciences can 
ever establish principles; for every principle is the starting point of the 
demonstrative arguments within a science and thus is not the subject of 
demonstration itself. If it were, the demonstrative science would turn out to be a 
regressive form of knowledge.25 Admittedly, this seems to be the case with 
metaphysics and physics. Aristotle devotes much of his works to investigating the 
relevant principles. That is, the principles of being in the Metaphysics and the 
principles of motion in the Physics. In doing so, he never proceeds with genuine 
demonstrations in these treatises. Rather, he often employs dialectical 
arguments in order to either discard or strengthen views about his object of study. 
     There are a couple of things that can help us to resist this approach and to 
defend the demonstrative reading. Firstly, every science must be separated from 
its preliminary enquiry. Whereas a science is a fully-fledged body of knowledge, 
an enquiry is a procedure to develop a certain epistemic content in a 
demonstrative form. Accordingly, an enquiry represents a preliminary phase of 
study in which the enquirer attempts to establish the principles that will ground 
the relevant demonstrative knowledge. Once these principles are established, the 
enquirer is able to complete the development of the science by articulating its 
demonstrations. It could be said that the enquiry develops into science just like 
the enquirer turns into scientist. From this perspective, it is not difficult to explain 
the absence of demonstrations in the Metaphysics and in the Physics. Unlike 
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mathematics, these sciences are not fully-fledged bodies of knowledge. In his 
works, Aristotle is indeed conducting two phases of enquiry that will lead to 
developing the science of being and the science of motion. The key point is that 
the argument of the Metaphysics does not correspond to the fully developed 
science that is labelled ‘metaphysics’. Within the Metaphysics, Aristotle sets out 
a project to develop the science of being and this project consists of an enquiry 
to establish its principles. The enquiry, if successful, will provide the basis to 
articulate the relevant demonstrations and thus to present the knowledge of being 
in its complete form. Clearly, no demonstration can be part of this phase of 
enquiry. To make a comparison with mathematical sciences, if there were a work 
labelled Geometry in which the author investigates the principles of extensive 
quantities (i.e. point and line), we could hardly find Pythagoras’ theorem; for 
Pythagoras’ theorem is part of the fully-fledged science that develops from the 
enquiry conducted in the Geometry. 
     Secondly, the nature of a science must not be confused with the method to 
develop it. Whereas the nature of a science corresponds to the organization of 
the knowledge after its full development, the method to develop a science 
corresponds to the procedure to establish the principles by which the knowledge 
will be organized. Accordingly, the procedure to establish the principles of a 
science can hardly be demonstrative; for no principle is the subject of 
demonstration itself. As suggested at Topics I.2, such a procedure is likely to 
consist of dialectical arguments that contribute to achieving the principles of a 
demonstrative knowledge.26 This distinction help us to make sense of the 
dialectical character of Aristotle’s discussions. In the Metaphysics, dialectic 
contributes to the enquiry to establish the principles of the science of being. 
Nevertheless, it does not represent the nature of this very science. As will be 
seen in the next Chapters, most of the arguments about substance are based on 
the attack and defending schemes introduced in the Topics. The point is that 
these schemes will not be the epistemic content of metaphysics. 
     While the dialectical reading fails to make sense of the project set out in 
Aristotle’s work, the demonstrative reading sheds light on the different ways to 
present the nature of the science. At different times, metaphysics is understood 
in terms of ‘study of principles’, ‘study of being’, and ‘study of substance’. In order 
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to preserve the connection between these accounts, the dialectical reading 
makes of metaphysics a special science. Its goal is to investigate the principles 
of the genera of being by investigating the principles of substance; for the 
knowledge of non-substances is possible only with reference to the knowledge of 
substance. The demonstrative reading preserves the connection between the 
accounts of metaphysics without turning it into a special science. When Aristotle 
embarks on his project, he is after the highest form of knowledge, which must be 
a science concerning some principles. In this attempt, the key step is to select 
the genus that is grounded in these principles, i.e. the genus studied by 
metaphysics. Thanks to the demonstrative reading, we can explain why in a 
broad sense metaphysics is the science of being and in narrow sense 
metaphysics is the science of substance. Substance is indeed the genus of which 
the remaining genera of being are demonstrable attributes. In accordance with 
the guidelines of the Analytics, metaphysics turns out to consist of the knowledge 
of a genus and the knowledge of its attributes. Therefore, its development 
consists of an enquiry to establish the principles grounding the genus studied 
and, consequently, the demonstrations in which the attributes are proved to 
belong to the genus. 
     This reconstruction of the project does not presuppose any special relation 
among entities to explain how metaphysics is both the science of being and the 
science of substance. Rather, it employs the apodeictic model of science to 
illustrate how the enquiry conducted by Aristotle is expected to develop. In this 
regard, it is interesting to note that one peculiarity of demonstrative sciences is 
the possibility of being accounted for in different ways. A science can be defined 
in terms of either its principles, or the genus studied, or the attributes 
characterizing the genus. Physics, for example, is often defined as the science of 
nature (φύσις), which is the principle grounding its demonstrative knowledge. 
Moreover, physics is defined as the science of bodies, which make up the genus 
that is the subject of the demonstrative knowledge In particular, the genus of 
natural bodies is in fact the genus of the substances that undergo motions. 
Finally, physics is defined as the science of motion insofar as its demonstrations 
prove that a natural body is characterized by some motion, i.e. that some motion 
belongs to a natural body. Likewise, metaphysics is defined as the science of 
being insofar as its demonstration proves that a substance is characterized by a 
non-substance, e.g. that a substance is so-and-so qualified, so-and-so quantified 
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etc. Strictly speaking, however, metaphysics is defined as the science of 
substances, which make up the genus that is the subject of the demonstrative 
knowledge. The goal of the enquiry conducted in the Metaphysics is to achieve 
the principles of the genus of substance, because this will lead to the 
development of the highest form of knowledge by grounding the knowledge of 
the genus and the knowledge of the relevant demonstrable attributes. The 
enquiry to establish this principle is the enquiry into what substance is. 
1.1.5 The Enquiry into the Principle 
In the previous four sections, I argued that metaphysics is conceived as a 
demonstrative science. This is the science of being insofar as it studies substance 
and non-substances. Substance is the genus of entities that is the subject of 
demonstrative knowledge, while non-substances are the genera of entities 
characterizing the genus. On the basis of the appropriate principles, the 
metaphysician can demonstrate the belonging of a non-substance to a substance 
(e.g. ‘that a substance is so-and-so qualified’) and this is nothing but 
demonstrating the existence of the relevant non-substance (e.g. ‘that there is a 
quality’). Remarkably, this is not the content of the Metaphysics. In his work, 
Aristotle sets out a project that, if successful, will evolve into a fully-fledged 
science. The key phase of this project is to investigate the principles grounding 
metaphysical knowledge. 
     My contention is that Z’s enquiry to answer ‘What is substance?’ is an enquiry 
to establish one of the principles of metaphysics. As already mentioned, every 
demonstrative science is grounded in two proper principles: the assumption of 
the existence of the genus and the definition of the genus. Since substance is the 
genus studied by metaphysics, the enquiry into what substance is is aimed to 
establish the principle grounding the science of being. In this section, I will defend 
this interpretation of book Z. To this end, I will first argue that the primacy of 
substance over non-substances is to be addressed against the demonstrative 
character of metaphysics. Namely, non-substances depend upon substance in 
that the latter is the genus of which the former are demonstrable attributes. 
Secondly, I will spend some words on the type of answer to be provided in Z. 
Throughout the book, there is a fundamental uniformity between the analysis of 
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the concept of substantiality and the analysis of the entities that are substances. 
In enquiring into what substance is, Aristotle is not simply concerned with what 
being a substance means. He is attempting to establish the definition of the genus 
encompassing every substance (especially its most reputable cases: sensible 
substances, such as human, horse, etc).27 Clearly, these ways to understand the 
object of Z are not mutually exclusive. The answer  to ‘what is the genus 
substance?’ and the answer to ‘what does substantiality mean?’ are equivalent 
ways to signify the cause in virtue of which every instance of the genus is a 
substance. 
 
Earlier on I pointed out that the multiplicity of being is apparent insofar as every 
non-substance depends upon substance. Accordingly, substance is the genus 
encompassing the subjects of metaphysical knowledge, while non-substances 
are the genera encompassing the attributes of substance. In order to show that 
Z’s enquiry is aimed to establish the principle of metaphysics, I will analyse the 
ontological dependence at work in Z. Not only does this form of dependence 
correspond to the form of dependence at work in demonstrative science; it also 
highlights the causal role played by substance in grounding the knowledge of 
non-substances. 
     In this regard, Z.1 represents a valuable source for our understanding of Z’s 
enquiry. In the first half of the chapter, Aristotle recalls the multiplicity of being 
and hints at its solution. Substance is the first genus of being because every other 
entity is a characterization of a substance: a quality is a qualified substance, a 
quantity is a quantified substance etc.28 Since there are no clear boundaries of 
the genus studied, our examples can hardly be more enlightening than those 
mentioned. In fact, the science of being has still to be developed. However, we 
can borrow an example from astronomy to illustrate how an attribute is a 
characterization of the genus studied: eclipse is nothing but an eclipsed moon, 
i.e. the moon undergoing a certain loss of light. 
     In the second half of the chapter, Aristotle turns to specify the ontological 
dependence upon substance. At 1028a31-b1, he separates three forms of 
primacy: i) primacy in definition, ii) primacy in knowledge, iii) primacy in time. His 
goal is to show that non-substances depend upon substance in all of these forms. 
                                                          
27
 See Section 2.1.1. 
28
 See Z.1, 1028a6-20. 
The Logic of Definition 
 
40 
 
Therefore, the study of being can be reduced to the study of substance. If my 
hypothesis is correct, non-substances depend upon substance in the same way 
as demonstrable attributes depend upon the subject of a science.  
Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be primary; but substance 
is primary in every sense: in definition, in knowledge, and in time. For none of the 
other categorial predicates is separated, while substance is. Moreover, this is 
primary in definition (for in each definition the definition of substance is 
necessarily included). And we think we know each thing most fully when we 
know, for example, what human is or what fire is, rather than when we know either 
the quality, or the quantity, or the place. (1028a31-b1, Bostock’s translation 
slightly modified) 
πολλαχῶς µὲν οὖν λέγεται τὸ πρῶτον·  ὅµως δὲ πάντως ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον, καὶ λόγῳ 
καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ. τῶν µὲν γὰρ ἄλλων κατηγορηµάτων οὐθὲν χωριστόν, αὕτη 
δὲ µόνη·  καὶ τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἑκάστου λόγῳ τὸν τῆς 
οὐσίας ἐνυπάρχειν)· καὶ εἰδέναι δὲ τότ’ οἰόµεθα ἕκαστον µάλιστα, ὅταν τί ἐστιν 
ὁ ἄνθρωπος γνῶµεν ἢ τὸ πῦρ, µᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ πού, ἐπεὶ καὶ 
αὐτῶν τούτων τότε ἕκαστον ἴσµεν, ὅταν τί ἐστι τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποιὸν γνῶµεν. 
Plainly, the first two forms of primacy concur with the scientific reading of the 
ontological dependence. Substance is prior to non-substances in definition and 
in knowledge insofar as the definition and the knowledge of the former are 
presupposed by the definition and the knowledge of the latter. Since the definition 
and the knowledge of an object are the statement and the knowledge of what the 
object is, we can reformulate the ontological dependence as follows: 
Ontological 
Dependence*: 
every non-substance depends upon 
substance because what a non-substance 
is presupposes what a substance is. 
Basically, it is impossible to define and to know a non-substantial entity unless 
we define and know a substance. For example, the definition and the knowledge 
of the quality of a human is possible only by assuming what a human is.29 The 
assumption of the definition of an object is central to the development of a 
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 Admittedly, Aristotle specifies the primacy of definition in terms of ‘constitution’: what a 
substance is is constitutive of what an entity is. In Z, however, this stronger sense will only apply 
to the relations between substances (e.g. what animal is is constitutive of what human is). The 
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demonstrative science; for every science is a hierarchical system in which some 
statements are grounded in others. To illustrate, the definition of eclipse is 
grounded in the definition of moon because the nature of the former implies the 
nature of what is so affected (i.e. eclipsed). Likewise, the assumption of the 
knowledge of an object enables the scientist to achieve knowledge of other 
objects. To illustrate, the demonstrative knowledge of eclipse is grounded in the 
definitional knowledge of moon. 
     What is at work in these contexts is the form of dependence that obtains 
between a genus and its demonstrable attributes. The genus (or a sub-genus) is 
the subject of which the scientist proves some characterizations. In order to 
define and to know the demonstrable attribute, the scientist has to assume the 
definition and the knowledge of the genus; that is, the definition and the 
knowledge of the subject studied. With the primacy in definition and the primacy 
in knowledge, Aristotle is introducing the same form of dependence among the 
totality of entities. Basically, the ontological dependence of entities upon 
substance is the dependence of some demonstrable attributes upon the genus 
studied by a science. In order to define and to know an entity, the metaphysician 
has to assume the definition and the knowledge of a substance; for the nature of 
the former implies the nature of the latter.30 
     The picture looks quite different with the primacy in time. Aristotle offers an 
elliptical formulation in terms of separation: substance is prior to non-substances 
in time insofar as the former is separate from the latter (and not conversely). In 
all likelihood, Aristotle has in mind the primacy in existence discussed in the 
Categories and widely endorsed in his works.31 This primacy introduces the 
following form of dependence: 
Ontological Dependence**: every non-substance depends upon 
substance because the existence of a 
non-substance is not separate from the 
existence of a substance. 
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 This conception of ontological dependence is outlined by Bostock (1994: 51-52; 60-63). Given 
the traditional reading of the πρὸς ἕν relation to substance, some commentators suggested that 
this is the form of primacy favoured by Aristotle in the metaphysics (cf. Frede, 1985; Frede-Patzig, 
1988: 21; Halper, 1989: 21-25; Rapp, 1996a: 31ff. Unless otherwise noted, every reference to 
Frede-Patzig, 1988, and to Ross, 1924, are to volume II). 
31
 This is what he labels primacy in nature (cf. Cat. 14, 14b11-21; Metaph. ∆.11, 1019a1-11). This 
conception is outlined by Bostock (1994: 52; 57-60). 
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The idea is that a non-substance, unlike a substance, cannot be credited with 
separate existence. For example, the existence of a quality is impossible unless 
there is a subject that is qualified, i.e. a substance. This ontological dependence 
of non-substances upon substances appears to be less likely to work within a 
demonstrative science; for it regulates the relations between concrete objects 
rather than between their definitions. To illustrate, the existence of the wisdom of 
Socrates depends upon the existence of Socrates, while the existence of 
Socrates does not depend upon the existence of any specific quality.32 On the 
one hand, this guarantees the realism of metaphysics; metaphysical knowledge 
must be concerned with the objective facts concerning the totality of entities. On 
the other, this hinders any scientific understanding of metaphysics; metaphysical 
knowledge does not seem to be concerned with the definitions of entities. 
     My approach to Z’s enquiry offers a unitary conception of the primacy of 
substance. More precisely, it harmonizes the primacy in definition and in 
knowledge with the primacy in existence. In this way, it is possible to introduce a 
form of dependence that regulates a demonstrative science.33 The core idea is 
that to enquire into what substance is is to enquire into the principle of 
metaphysics. In the attempt to account for substance, Aristotle is after both the 
nature of a genus and its definition. What is crucial to notice is that these are in 
fact one single principle. The definition grounding metaphysics is indeed the 
linguistic counterpart of what the genus substance is. From this perspective, we 
can conjecture that the primacy in definition and in knowledge is the counterpart 
of the primacy in existence. At 1028a25, Aristotle hints at how this can be the 
case. 
These things (i.e. non-substances) more clearly are because there is some 
determinate thing which underlies them. Namely, the substance and the 
particular, which is implied in such a predication; for one cannot account for a 
good thing or a sitting thing apart from this. Evidently, then, it is in virtue of this 
(i.e. substance), that each of those is. Therefore what primarily is and is without 
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 For the debate about the asymmetry of the existential separation and its modal reading in terms 
of separability see Burnyeat et al. (1979: 4-5), Bostock (1994: 58-60; 63-65). 
33
 The overarching primacy of substance in Z.1 is remarked by Rapp (1996a) and sketched by 
Witt (1989: 58-62). An alternative view is defended by Peramatzis (2011), who proposes to 
establish a correspondence between the primacy in definition and the primacy in being (i.e. 
nature); for the primacy in being does not express the existential independence of its subject, but 
its essential independence (i.e. being the thing that it is). 
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qualification (not is something) must be substance. (1028a25-31, Bostock’s 
translation slightly modified) 
ταῦτα δὲ µᾶλλον φαίνεται ὄντα, διότι ἔστι τι τὸ ὑποκείµενον αὐτοῖς ὡρισµένον 
(τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον), ὅπερ ἐµφαίνεται ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ 
τῇ τοιαύτῃ·  τὸ ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἢ τὸ καθήµενον οὐκ ἄνευ τούτου λέγεται. δῆλον οὖν 
ὅτι διὰ ταύτην κἀκείνων ἕκαστον ἔστιν, ὥστε τὸ πρώτως ὂν καὶ οὐ τὶ ὂν ἀλλ’ ὂν 
ἁπλῶς ἡ οὐσία ἂν εἴη. 
Aristotle argues that the existence of any entity is ‘caused’ by the existence of the 
subject that is characterized by the entity (διότι ἔστι τι τὸ ὑποκείµενον αὐτοῖς 
ὡρισµένον). For example, the fact that there is the action of sitting amounts to 
the existence of a subject that sits and thus is caused by the existence of the 
subject, i.e. a substance. In metaphysics, everything is something ‘that is’ in virtue 
of being either a quality of substance, or a quantity of substance, etc.34 In so 
arguing, he introduces the form of dependence in terms of primacy in existence; 
namely, ontological dependence**. What is remarkable is that Aristotle spells it 
out in terms of primacy in definition: an entity depends upon substance because 
the definition of an entity is impossible without the definition of a substance 
(1028a28). This is the form of dependence at work in a demonstrative science, 
namely, ontological dependence*. 
     The possibility of shifting from one form of dependence to another is granted 
by the causal role (διὰ ταύτην) played by substance. Whereas its existence 
grounds the existence of other entities, its definition grounds the statements of 
what other entities are. The primacy of substance can then be absolutely 
conceived as follows: substance is prior to non-substances insofar as substance 
is the cause of why non-substances are. Since the scientific knowledge of an 
object is the knowledge of its cause, the primacy of substance must introduce a 
form of dependence at work in demonstrative science.35 The greatest advantage 
of my interpretation is that there is no need to separate the existence from the 
nature of the object. In every demonstrative science, the fact that ‘there is such 
an object’ (existence) and ‘what the object is’ (nature) are the focus of the same 
knowledge. In astronomy, for example, the knowledge of what an eclipse is is the 
demonstration that there is an eclipse.36 This knowledge must be grounded in 
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 See Z.1, 1028a13-20. Cf. Burnyeat et al. (1979: 2); Frede-Patzig (1988: 16-19). 
35
 Cf. An. Post. I.2, 71b9-12. 
36
 I.e. Loss of light from moon because of the screening of sun by earth. On the definition produced 
by re-arranging demonstrations see Section 1.3. 
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some cause of the demonstrable fact. Again in astronomy, moon grounds the 
existence of eclipse and its definition grounds the statement of what eclipse is. In 
order to develop the knowledge of the totality of entities, the metaphysician has 
to study the causes of the demonstrable facts with which metaphysics is 
concerned. Initially, these causes are identified with substances. A substance 
grounds the existence of other entities and its definition grounds the statement of 
what other entities are; the former is the subject of the science, while the latter 
are its demonstrable attributes. 
     In Z’s enquiry, Aristotle introduces the form of dependence that is at work in 
the demonstrative science of being:  
Ontological Dependence 
(Z): 
every non-substance depends upon 
substance because substance is the 
cause of why a non-substance is. 
This form of ontological dependence holds both among real entities and among 
their definitions. Since substance is the genus of entities grounding the existence 
and the nature of the other genera of entities, the enquiry into ‘what substance is’ 
turns out to investigate the primary cause in being. This will indeed be the cause 
in virtue of which a substance is the subject of the demonstrable attributes studied 
by metaphysics. What solutions does Aristotle consider to answer this question? 
     Commentators tend to distinguish between the extensional treatment and the 
intensional treatment of the question.37 The extensional treatment of ‘What is 
substance?’ consists in answering what substances there are. Aristotle is then 
engaged with giving an inventory of those entities that ground the existence of 
other entities. In Z.2, for example, bodies are evident cases of substance 
detected in sensible reality; for other entities (e.g. colours, weights, etc.) 
characterize and depend upon them. The intensional treatment of ‘What is 
substance?’ consists in answering what ‘being a substance’ amounts to. Aristotle 
is then interested in determining the substantial nature that is shared by all 
instances of the genus studied by metaphysics. In Z.3, he seems to indicate four 
ways to express the concept of substantiality: subject, essence, universal, and 
genus. If this reading is correct, Z is mainly devoted to an intensional analysis by 
evaluating whether each item on the agenda indicates the source of substantiality 
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 See Witt (1989: 7-14); Burnyeat (2001: 13-14); Galluzzo (2013a: 28-35). Cf. Lewis (2013: 16-
20). 
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of substances. The strategy at work seems to swing between these two 
approaches to Z. Aristotle thinks that a full understanding of substance implies 
reflecting upon the uncontroversial cases of substance and illustrating their 
nature. To that end, he offers a preliminary extensional solution before embarking 
on the intensional analysis. On the other hand, the intensional solution 
contributes to reconsidering the range of substances established by the survey. 
In particular, the parts of living entities, simple elements, and Platonic Ideas will 
cease to be considered as substances.38 In other words, the enquiry can be 
accomplished only through a revision of the extensional analysis in the light of 
the results of the intensional analysis. 
     It is dubious, however, that the enquiry is designed to develop these two 
treatments of substance.39 The problem is that Aristotle can easily shift from one 
to the other and places no signpost to mark the distinction. In Section 2.2, I will 
expand upon the uniformity between the analysis of the concept of substantiality 
and the analysis of the entities that are substances. At present, we need to bear 
in mind that Z’s enquiry is concerned with the nature of the genus studied by 
metaphysics. This is the principle and the first cause grounding the knowledge of 
substances and non-substances. 
 
 
1.2 Dialectic: The Unity of Definition 
The correspondence between substance and its definition gives us the 
framework against which to address Z’s enquiry. In the logical works, Aristotle 
offers a detailed treatment of definition that spans from its technical features to 
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 See Z.16, 1040b5-16; H.1, 1042a21-24. 
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 On this point see Galluzzo (2013a: 32-35). 
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its scientific functions. In the remainder of this Chapter, I will take into 
consideration the two main contexts in which Aristotle expounds this ‘theory of 
definition’: dialectic and science. Dialectic provides us with a formal 
characterization of definition; science gives us an insight into its role for 
knowledge. At the centre of the manifold of views presented in the Organon are 
the unity and the primacy of definition. These ideas will represent the theoretical 
basis to map the argument of Z. 
 
Dialectic, Aristotle tells us, is a procedure to deliver arguments on the basis of 
common opinions.40 This µέθοδος enables the dialectician to tackle a problem 
and to either defend or attack one of its argumentative theses. To illustrate, the 
problem ‘whether the statesman is an expert or not’ is treated by arguing in favour 
of either ‘the statesman is an expert’ or ‘the statesman is not an expert’. Namely, 
the dialectician attempts to infer either the endorsement or the rejection of a 
statement.41 Overall, dialectic is not a structured body of knowledge, such as a 
science, but is a formal analysis of the features that make a thesis more or less 
acceptable.42 
    Although it is not clear to what extent Aristotle’s dialectic is a Platonic legacy, 
there is little doubt about the common engagement with definitions.43 In the late 
dialogues, Plato conceives his dialectic as a procedure to deliver definitions by 
which the dialectician accomplishes her enquiry into the nature of an object. In 
particular, it is the analysis of the connections between Forms through 
dichotomous division. The dialectician firstly subsumes the object under its most 
general kind, and, secondly, divides such a kind into two sub-kinds; the division 
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 See Top. I.1, 100a18-21. 
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 A statement is a linguistic formula in which some predicate(s) belongs to or is separated from 
a subject; thus, it is a bearer of a truth-value (De Int. 5-6, esp. 17a2-0-24). A problem is a 
composition of two alternative statements; it posits the question about which the dialectician 
formulates her deduction (Top. I.4 and 11, esp. 101b15-18). Cf. Smith (1997: xxviii-xxx); 
Brunschwig (2003: xxxvi-xxxvii; 118-119). 
42
 Some scholars have defended the scientific character of Aristotle’s dialectic, either generally 
(cf. Bolton, 1990; Deslauriers, 2007: 182-187) or limited to ontology (cf. Irwin, 1988). Bolton, in 
particular, distinguishes between gymnastic dialectic for training debates and peirastic dialectic 
with genuine scientific purport. As highlighted by Devereux (1990), peirastic is not a sub-kind of 
dialectic but a function to unmask false claims of knowledge (cf. Brunschwig, 1990). An opposite 
approach according to which dialectic, though not merely eristic (as argued by Moraux, 1968), is 
alien to scientific enquiry is held by Solmsen (1968) and Owen (1968a).  
43
 The debate mainly revolves around the ontological commitment of Aristotle’s dialectic and 
represents a more specific way to address its scientific character (see note 37 above). Whereas 
Plato’s dialectic is a fully-fledged science of the true nature of entities, it is unclear whether 
Aristotle’s dialectic is engaged with reality, and goes beyond formal linguistic accounts. 
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is reiterated for each kind to which the object belongs until the object is separated 
from anything else. The network analysed through division represents the real 
connections among Forms and, thus, what the object is.44 In his Topics, Aristotle 
lists definition among the types of predicative relations that are treated by 
dialectic (i.e. accident, genus, and property). Each of these relations holds 
between a subject and a predicate and is expressed by the statement examined 
by the dialectician. Aristotle explicitly remarks that every argumentative scheme 
is ultimately linked to the treatment of definitions (I.6, 102b27-35); for the 
dialectician has to consider any predicative relation about an object that is implied 
by and, thus, relevant to the statement of what the object is.45 That is, the 
schemes to evaluate accident, genus, and property apply to definition, but not 
conversely.46 In sum, whereas Plato’s dialectician is engaged in the discovery of 
definitions, Aristotle’s is engaged with their examination. 
1.2.1 A Technical Analysis 
In Topics I.5, Aristotle argues that ‘a definition is the statement signifying the 
essence’ (101b38). More precisely, a definition is meant to replace either a term 
or a statement in order to spell out the essence of the object that is signified by 
such a term or statement. For example, the definition ‘rational animal’ is the 
statement that indicates the essence of the object signified by the term ‘human’. 
The predicative relation established between the definiens and the definiendum 
is classified in the category of the τί ἐστιν. Put it simply, a definition answers the 
Socratic question ‘What is it?’. There is a salient feature on which Aristotle insists: 
in accounting for an object, a definition articulates meaningful parts. If these parts 
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 See Phaed. 265c-266a and Phil. 16c-17a. According to Crivelli (2013: 15-20), the model is 
designed to produce sub-kinds that are i) immediate, ii) disjoint, and iii) exhaustive (cf. Gill, 2016). 
For example, in the enquiry into angling the kind expertise–to which angling belongs–is firstly 
divided into two sub-kinds, acquisitive expertise and productive expertise; then, acquisitive 
expertise–to which angling belongs–is divided into acquisitive expertise by exchange and 
acquisitive expertise by subduing and so on and so forth (Soph. 218e-219b). 
45
 So far I have been employing the term ‘object’ both in the sense of ‘object of 
statement/knowledge’ and in the sense of ‘entity/body’. Henceforth, my use will be confined to the 
first sense (cf. Top. I.5, 101a18-20; 8, 103b8; VI.7, 146a3-7; An. Post. I.2, 71b11; 22, 72a25; 6, 
74b33-36). This is closer to Aristotle’s use of πρᾶγµα, which indicates a variety of items not 
necessarily corresponding to a real entity, such as i) subject (An. Post. I.1, 71b9-12; 2, 73b28; 6, 
74b7; 22, 84a12; II.8, 93a22), ii) a characterization of the subject (De Int. 1, 16a6-8; An. Post. II.6, 
91b14; 16, 98b29-31), iii) the counterpart of a predication (De Int. 7, 17a38ff; An. Pr. I.27, 43b1-
14; 30, 46a24ff.). Cf. Mignucci (1975: 17-18). 
46
 See Top. VII.5, 155a2-22. 
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are appropriately selected and combined, the definition successfully states what 
its object is, i.e. the what-it-is. 
     What is the content of such a statement? The answer is given in the treatment 
of definition undertaken in book VI. Besides applying the schemes on accident, 
genus, and property, the dialectician has to evaluate i) whether a definition is 
correct, and ii) whether a definition states the essence of the object (VI.1, 139a6-
7). In this context, Aristotle makes it clear that the definition is the statement of 
the genus and the differentiae of its object. The genus is the predicate that 
separates the object from other kinds to which the object does not belong; e.g. 
animal separates human from courage, which is a virtue. The differentia is the 
predicate that separates the object from other objects within the same kind; e.g. 
biped separates human from horse, which is quadruped. To use Aristotle’s words, 
the genus and the differentia constitute the definition of an object insofar as they 
are ‘prior and more intelligible elements’ among those predicated of the object in 
the category of τί ἐστιν (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούµενον, I.5, 102a32-34; 8, 103b14-
19).47 
     From this perspective, the Platonic inheritance of Aristotle’s dialectic becomes 
more perspicuous. For the review of the schemes appears to rely on a structured 
system of kinds that is reminiscent of the network of Forms scanned in Plato’s 
late dialogues. Basically, the dialectician has to test a statement with reference 
to the relations holding between the terms stated.48 These terms are predicative 
kinds identified through the procedure of division. To illustrate, the genus animal 
is divided into sub-kinds, like terrestrial animal and aquatic animal, until its 
indivisible kinds, like the species human, are reached. However, while Plato’s 
dialectic is based on the division of a genus into its inferior genera, Aristotle’s is 
based on the division of a genus into its inferior genera by means of differentiae. 
The innovative step taken by Aristotle lies in the introduction of the means of 
division, which must be separated from the results of the same procedure. In this 
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 The core idea is that the statement of genus and differentia is absolutely more explanatory of 
what the object is than the term signifying the object (Top. VI.4, 141b22f.). 
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 A typical example of this strategy is to ensure the subordinate inclusion of two genera of the 
same object; e.g. science and virtue cannot be both the genus of justice, because none of them 
is the genus of the other (Top. IV.2, 121b24-30; VI.4, 143b11-19). Likewise, for contrary objects 
the dialectician has to ensure their inclusion in a common genus or in contrary genera (Top. IV.3, 
123b1ff.). Predictably, the endorsement of the network becomes perspicuous with the schemes 
on opposites (cf. Top.  II.8, 113b15-26; VII.3, 153a28-b24). 
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way, the dialectician is able to specify the essence of a kind by effectively 
narrowing the genus.49 
     There is another salient feature of definitions that can help us to make sense 
of these technical aspects. Aristotle remarks that much of the treatment of 
definitions revolves around securing the identity between the predicates and the 
subject of the statement (I.5, 102a6-13). At Topics I.7, he lists three senses of 
identity that are relevant to the discussion: 1. numerical identity; 2. specific 
identity; 3. generic identity (103a6-25). The identity that obtains between the 
predicates and the subject of a definition can hardly be specific or generic identity. 
Specific identity applies to individuals (e.g. Socrates and Callias are the same in 
species), thus they are not objects of definition; generic identity applies to sub-
genera (e.g. human and horse are the same in genus), thus they must be different 
objects within the same genus. On the contrary, numerical identity could be the 
appropriate sense in which a subject is the same as its definitional predicates. 
     Numerical identity applies to one single object and takes place in three 
different forms: 
1a. numerical identity in definition (a25-27); 
1b. numerical identity in property (a27-29); 
1c. numerical identity in accident (a29-39). 
Since numerical identity holds between two expressions signifying one and the 
same object, the three forms are distinguished on the basis of the predicative 
relations that introduce them. What is relevant to us is that the genus does not 
introduce any form of numerical identity. Indeed generic identity does not entail 
that there is one single object, but two distinct objects sharing the genus. It is then 
reasonable to infer that the introduction of the differentia is thought to secure the 
numerical identity in definition.50 For example, biped and terrestrial are meant to 
restrict the genus animal to the species human. In a nutshell, the identity in 
definition obtains when a definiendum is one and the same as its definiens; 
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 Mariani (1997) has interestingly pointed out that the verb διαιρέω can be constructed with either 
a) κατὰ plus accusative or b) the simple dative. Whereas in Plato’s dialectic (a) and (b) are totally 
equivalent (cf. Soph. 220b9-13; Pol. 258e4ff.; Phil. 10c1ff.), in Aristotle’s (a) indicates the results 
of the division, i.e. the species into which the genus is divided, and (b) indicates the criterion for 
dividing, i.e. the differentia according to which the genus is divided. It is worth noting indeed, that 
Aristotle divides a genus into its differentiae only in the Postpredicamenta (Cat. 13, 14b32-15a7), 
which is believed to be among his earliest Platonizing writings. 
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 Cf. Top. I.18, 108b1-6. 
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namely, when the definiens is the combination of the appropriate genus and 
differentia of the definiendum. 
     At this point, we can shed light on a central idea in Aristotle’s treatment: the 
unity of definition. As a matter of fact, the notion of identity is just a way to cast 
the notion of unity; for there is a correspondence between the different senses in 
which identity and unity are said.51 The common insight is that, despite 
articulating some elements that make up the essence of its object, a definition 
concerns one single thing. To rephrase: 
Unity of 
Definition: 
a definition is one statement signifying one object 
and not many. 
For one thing, there must be unity among the predicates stated in the definition. 
The genus and the differentia must signify one single thing, namely the essence 
of the definiendum. For another thing, there must be unity between the subject 
and the predicates. The definiendum and the definiens must signify one single 
thing. To put it in a different way, an object is one and the same as its essence. 
1.2.2 A Categorial Distinction 
There is a thorny issue that arises with the treatment of definitions. In several 
passages, Aristotle insists on separating the genus from the differentia: the genus 
is the predicate that signifies the τί ἐστιν; the differentia, instead, is the predicate 
that signifies the ποιόν τι (Top. IV.2, 122b16-17; IV.6, 128a26-29; VI.6, 144a19-
21).52 Both predicates are stated in the definition and belong to the object. To 
rephrase the distinction: the genus indicates what the object is, while the 
differentia indicates what the object is like. For example, number signifies what 
three is, whereas odd and prime signify its qualitative attributes. On what basis 
does Aristotle establish this separation? The notions of τί ἐστιν and ποιόν τι invite 
us to think of a categorial distinction.53 Namely, the two predicates are to be 
distinct insofar as each of them is differently classified. In particular, since they 
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 In Metaphysics ∆.9 (1017b27-1018a9), Aristotle argues that the senses of accidental and per 
se identity correspond to the senses of accidental and per se unity reviewed in ∆.6.  
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 At Top. IV.6, 128a26-29, the differentia is presented as a quality of the genus in that it indicates 
one of its instances with a certain quality. Cf. Metaph. ∆.14, 1020a33-b2; b13-17. 
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 The terminology is from Granger (1984). 
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are distinct in the light of what they signify, Aristotle is taken to refer to different 
ontological categories.54 Basically, the genus must be separated from the 
differentia because, despite both stating what the object is, they signify distinct 
kinds of entities. The genus is a fully-determined substance, while the differentia 
is a certain attribute.55 
     At this point, the treatment of definition gets slightly complicated. On the one 
hand, definition is the statement of genus and differentiae and signifies the 
essence of the object; on the other hand, the statement of a genus and the 
statement of a differentia signify categorially distinct entities. Consequently, 
definitions turn out to state an ontologically mixed content in which the substantial 
nature of the object is coupled with some qualitative attribute. It is perhaps after 
having realized this inconsistency that Alexander (contrary to Aristotle) firmly 
argues that every predicate in the definition must signify what the object is.56 The 
traditional strategy for tackling this tension is based on a chronological 
reconstruction of Aristotle’s views. In a first Platonizing phase of thought, the 
concept of what-it-is (τί ἐστιν) might have narrower scope than the concept of 
essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι);57 thus, the former could not be exhaustive of the content 
of definitions. In a later phase, Aristotle extends the former concept so as to 
encompass both the genus and the differentia and, thus, identifies what an object 
is with its essence.58 Alternatively, Marko Malink proposes a highly technical 
solution. Definitions state an ontologically uniform content because genus and 
differentia always signify the essence of the object that is entitled to a definition. 
That is, if the object possesses an essence, the content stated in the definition 
will always consist of its genus and its differentiae, independently of any 
categorial distinction.59 
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 On the ontological and the predicative categories see Section 1.1.1 above. 
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 This reading of the categorial distinction presupposes that Aristotle uses τί ἐστιν to refer to the 
ontological class of οὐσία. 
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 See Alexander (In Top. 504.4-12) and Simplicius (In Cat. 99.19ff.), who credits Alexander with 
having raised the problem of the differentia. 
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 On the expression τί ἦν εἶναι see Frede-Patzig (1988: Einleitung, 18-19). I take ‘essence’ to be 
the modern term that best preserve the meaning of the Greek term (compared to ‘what-was-being’ 
or ‘what-being-signifies’). 
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 Indeed the qualitative character of the differentia is mostly defended in the central books of the 
Topics, which are often taken to represent his early views on dialectic. See Evans (1977: 112-
114), Morrison (1993), and Mariani (1997: 12-13) who point out the priority that Aristotle ascribes 
to the genus over the differentia (cf. Top. IV.6, 128a24-26; VI.1, 139a29-31; 5, 142b28-29; 11, 
149a14-27). 
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 Malink (2007) credits Aristotle with a rigorous distinction between τὸ τί ἐστι σηµαίνειν and τὸ τί 
ἐστι λέγειν; the former indicating the membership in a category, the latter indicating the predicable 
at work. As predicable, the differentia states the essence of its object, yet, as a categorial item, it 
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     I am inclined to think that neither of these approaches successfully removes 
the tension. The point is that the categorial distinction is embedded in Aristotle’s 
theory of predication. Hence, it is meant to apply in predicative contexts. Both 
genus and differentia are two predicates that belong to the species to which the 
definition pertains. More precisely, each of them is involved in a synonymous 
predication. Thus, their subject receives the name and the definition of the terms 
predicated; to illustrate, ‘human is animal’ and ‘human is biped’ are synonymous 
predications because a human is named ‘animal’ and ‘biped’ and is accounted 
for as animal and biped. The remaining predicates, instead, are involved in a 
paronymous predication. Thus, their subject receives neither the name nor the 
definition of the term predicated, but is named through an inflexion; to illustrate, 
‘human is courageous’ is a paronymous predication because human is named 
after an inflexion of ‘courage’.60 What is salient to see is that synonymous 
predicates belong to their subject within the same category, whereas 
paronymous predicates belong to their subject across different categories. To 
illustrate, in stating what human is like, ‘courageous’ is predicated from the 
category of quality, to which courage belongs, to the category of substance, to 
which its subject, human, belongs. Unlike synonymous predicates, paronymous 
predicates seem to be accidentally related to their subject. This means a couple 
of things. Since Aristotle subscribes both to the qualitative nature and to the 
synonymous character of the differentia, his conception does not undergo any 
relevant development. Whilst stating differentiae, a definition never implies 
paronymous predication.61 Hence, the differentia is assumed to be a quality and 
to constitute the essence of the object. Nevertheless, it would be reasonable for 
the differentia to be paronymously predicated of the object of which the genus is 
synonymously predicated; for the differentia seems to belong to its subject across 
different categories. 
                                                          
is a quality. However, this solution does not apply absolutely: i) at Top. IV.6, 128a23ff. the genus 
showing (δηλοῖ) the τί ἐστιν is contrasted with the differentia stating (λέγει) a ποιόν; ii) likewise, 
since δηλοῖ is likely to be equivalent to λέγει, the differentia seems to fail to τί ἐστι λέγειν; iii) at 
VI.6, 139a29-31 Aristotle argues that the genus is more fitted to signify the substance (οὐσίαν 
σηµαίνειν). 
60
 See Cat. 1, 1a6-15. 
61
 It is relevant to notice that in the Categories Aristotle warns us against the multiplicity of ‘quality’ 
(8, 8b25-26). In order to oppose primary and secondary substances, he points out that genera 
and species also signify a quality, despite being predicated synonymously (5, 3a33-b15). In so 
arguing, Aristotle does not specify what a differentia signifies but only that it is a synonymous 
predicate. At that point, indeed, he lacks terms to preserve the categorial distinction. 
Chapter One 
53 
 
     Given this tension in the treatment of definition, we can conjecture that the 
categorial distinction is firstly conceived to fit the predicative framework of 
Aristotle’s dialectic. As suggested by Porphyry, the difficulty lies in the fact that a 
differentia can be assimilated neither to a genus nor to an accident. It cannot be 
assimilated to a genus because its predication contributes to establishing identity 
between the subject and its definition; it cannot be assimilated to an accident 
because its predication always applies to the subject. With this in mind, it is worth 
noting that Aristotle himself struggles with illustrating the relation between genus 
and differentia. In book IV of the Topics, he points out that the genus always 
implies the differentia, while the converse is not the case (IV.6, 128a38-b9). With 
a similar approach, Aristotle says that the differentia is ‘ascribed to’, ‘added to’, 
or ‘true of’ the genus (προσάπτειν, VI.1, 139a29-30; ἀληθεύειν, προστιθέναι, VI.6, 
143b2-7), and, correspondingly, that the genus is ‘imported’ by the differentia 
(ἐπιφέρειν, VI.6, 144b16-30). This imprecise terminology is totally unsurprising. If 
differentia is neither a genus nor an accident, its relation to the genus cannot be 
clearly specified in terms of predication; for it can be neither synonymously nor 
paronymously related to the genus. The reason for this attitude is the reason to 
separate the two predicates stated in definition.62 
     My suggestion is that the categorial distinction follows from the unity of 
definition. Should genus and differentia be predicated of one another, some 
dialectical difficulties would undermine the statement of the essence of the object. 
Aristotle considers these dialectical difficulties in his review of the schemes on 
the essentiality of definition. One difficulty is triggered (I) if the differentia is 
predicated of the genus; the other difficulty is triggered (II) if the genus (or the 
species) is predicated of the differentia. Let us start with (I).  
Moreover, see if one divides the genus by a negation, as those do who define a 
line as ‘length without breadth’; for this means simply that the line has not any 
breadth. Ia) The genus will then be found to participate in its own species; for, 
since of everything either the affirmation or the negation is true, length must 
always be either ‘without breadth’ or ‘with breadth’, so that ‘length’ as well, i.e. 
the genus of line, will be either ‘without breadth’ or ‘with breadth’. But ‘length 
without breadth’ is the definition of a species, as also is ‘length with breadth’; for 
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 I agree with Granger (1981) that the differentia is likely to be a per se accident of the genus. 
This can explain in what sense the differentia indicates a quality, though not why it is meant to do 
so. 
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‘with breadth’ and ‘without breadth’ are differentiae, and the genus and differentia 
constitute the definition of the species. Hence the genus will receive the definition 
of its species. Likewise, also, Ib) the genus will receive the definition of the 
differentia, seeing that one or the other of the aforesaid differentiae is of necessity 
predicated of the genus (κατηγορεῖται τοῦ γένους). […] For one assertion or the 
other will have to be true of length universally, if it is to be true of the genus. And 
this is contrary to the fact; for there exist both lengths without breadth and lengths 
with breadth. Hence the only people against whom the rule can be employed are 
those who assert that every genus is numerically one. (Top. VI.6, 143b11-30, 
Pickard-Cambridge’s translation slightly modified) 
Ἔτι ἐὰν ἀποφάσει διαιρῇ τὸ γένος, καθάπερ οἱ τὴν γραµµὴν ὁριζόµενοι µῆκος 
ἀπλατὲς εἶναι·  οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο σηµαίνει ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει πλάτος. συµβήσεται οὖν 
τὸ γένος µετέχειν τοῦ εἴδους·  πᾶν γὰρ µῆκος ἢ ἀπλατὲς ἢ πλάτος ἔχον ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ 
κατὰ παντὸς ἢ ἡ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπό ἔχον ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ κατὰ παντὸς ἢ ἡ κατάφασις 
ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀληθεύεται, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γένος τῆς γραµµῆς, µῆκος ὄν, ἢ ἀπλατὲς ἢ 
πλάτος ἔχον ἔσται. µῆκος δ’ ἀπλατὲς εἴδους ἐστὶ λόγος·  ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ µῆκος 
πλάτος ἔχον. τὸ γὰρ ἀπλατὲς καὶ τὸ πλάτος ἔχον διαφοραί εἰσιν·  ἐκ δὲ τῆς 
διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ γένους ὁ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ λόγος, ὥστε τὸ γένος ἐπιδέχοιτ’ ἂν τὸν 
τοῦ εἴδους λόγον. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν τῆς διαφορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἑτέρα τῶν εἰρηµένων 
διαφορῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κατηγορεῖται τοῦ γένους. […] δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ παντὸς µήκους 
τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθεύεσθαι, εἴπερ κατὰ τοῦ γένους ἀληθεύεσθαι µέλλει. τοῦτο 
δ’ οὐ συµβαίνει·  ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἀπλατῆ καὶ πλάτος ἔχοντα µήκη. ὥστε πρὸς 
ἐκείνους µόνους χρήσιµος ὁ τόπος οἳ πᾶν γένος ἓν ἀριθµῷ φασιν εἶναι.  
 
The scheme is focused on the definition of objects that consists of one genus and 
one of two contradictory differentiae. Namely, the genus is divided into its species 
by means of two exhaustive and mutually exclusive differentiae. Nevertheless, 
Aristotle’s main concern is the participation of the genus Ia) in its species, and Ib) 
in its differentiae. In its technical use, the notion of ‘participation’ (µέθεξις) 
amounts to the reverse of a synonymous predication: A participates in B iff B is 
synonymously predicated of A (i.e. A receives the definition of B).63 What Aristotle 
has then in mind is the relation between a definiendum and the constituents of its 
definiens. 
     Ia) and Ib) stem from the fact that there is one single differentia that truly 
applies to the genus. To illustrate, if length is divided into two species via ‘with 
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 See Top. IV.1, 121a10-12; V, 133a1-2. Aristotle makes use of a technical term from Plato’s 
metaphysics to indicate the relation between an object (i.e. definiendum) and its essential 
elements (i.e. definiens). Cf. Brunschwig (2007: 159-161). 
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breadth’ and ‘without breadth’, then either with breadth or without breadth will 
truly apply to length; that is, length must be either with breadth or without breadth. 
Since ‘length without breadth’ is the definition of one species of length, it will be 
the case that the genus length receives the definition of one of its species. 
Consequently, Ia) the genus participates in its own species. Likewise, since 
‘length without breadth’ is constituted from a genus and a differentia, it will be the 
case that the genus length receives the definition of one of its differentiae. 
Consequently, Ib) the genus participates in its own differentiae. At a general level, 
Ia) and Ib) clash with the network of kinds on which the dialectician relies; species 
and differentiae are necessarily less extended than the genus and, consequently, 
are never predicated of it.64 The dialectical difficulty lies in the pluralization of 
the definition. More precisely, the participation of the genus in its species and 
differentiae entails that any definition includes opposite characterizations of the 
same object; for the reception of the definition of the genus means the reception 
of its opposite definitions through opposite differentiae. In a nutshell, the definition 
does not state the essence of the object because it fails to signify one object 
rather than many. That is, there is no unity of the definition. 
     Let us move to (II).  
Again, see if the genus is predicated (κατηγορεῖται) of the differentia; for it seems 
that the genus is predicated, not of the differentia, but of the objects of which the 
differentia is predicated. For example ‘animal’ is predicated of human and cow 
and other terrestrial animals, not of the differentia itself, which we predicate of the 
species. For if ‘animal’ is to be predicated of each of its differentiae, then many 
animals will be predicated of the species; for the differentiae are predicated of the 
species. (Top. VI.6, 144a31-b3, Pickard-Cambridge’s translation slightly 
modified)65 
πάλιν εἰ κατηγορεῖται τὸ γένος τῆς διαφορᾶς·  οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ 
καθ’ ὧν ἡ διαφορά, τὸ γένος δοκεῖ κατηγορεῖσθαι, οἷον τὸ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ 
ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ βοὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πεζῶν ζῴων, οὐ κατ’ αὐτῆς τῆς διαφορᾶς 
τῆς κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους λε γοµένης. εἰ γὰρ καθ’ ἑκάστης τῶν διαφορῶν τὸ ζῷον 
κατηγορηθήσεται, πολλὰ ζῷα τοῦ εἴδους ἂν κατηγοροῖτο·  αἱ γὰρ διαφοραὶ τοῦ 
εἴδους κατηγοροῦνται. ἔτι αἱ διαφοραὶ πᾶσαι ἢ εἴδη ἢ ἄτοµα ἔσονται, εἴπερ ζῷα·  
ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ζῴων 
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 See Top. IV.2, 122a2-10; 122b25-36; 123a6-10; VI.6, 144a18-30. 
65
 See Top. VI.6, 144b4-11 for a subcase of this scheme. 
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Aristotle is here concerned with the cases in which the genus is predicated of the 
differentia. Namely, the definition fails to state the essence of an object if the 
differentia participates in the genus. The basic idea is that for one genus there is 
a plurality of differentiae. Thus, if the genus were predicated of each differentia, 
the genus would then be multiplied by the number of its differentiae. Indeed, each 
differentia would receive the definition of the genus separately. To illustrate, since 
‘human’ is defined as ‘terrestrial biped animal’, if ‘animal’ were predicated of 
‘terrestrial’ and ‘biped’, then there would be two distinct accounts of ‘animal’: 
‘terrestrial animal’ and ‘biped animal’.66 
     What is puzzling is that the species receives distinct definitions of the genus, 
one for each of the differentiae in which the species participates. Again, the 
dialectical difficulty lies in the pluralization of the definition. The participation 
of the differentia in its genus entails that any definition includes repeatable 
characterizations of the same object; for the reception of the definition of the 
differentiae implies the reception of distinct definitions of the genus. In other 
words, since such a repetition of the genus amounts to accounting for an object 
through a plurality of distinct predicates, the definition fails to signify one object 
rather than many.67 That is, there is no unity of definition. Therefore, the definition 
does not state the essence of the object. 
     These schemes on definition are indicative of the reasons behind the 
categorial distinction. In view of the unity of definition, Aristotle prevents genus 
and differentia from being predicated of one another. That is, the predicates must 
not pluralize the definition by either stating opposite attributes or multiplying their 
object. To this effect, he requires that the predicates be separate on the basis of 
the category to which they belong. The genus is the predicate that indicates the 
general nature of the subject, while the differentia is the predicate that specifies 
this nature in a qualitative way. It could be said that Aristotle introduces the 
differentia in definitions because there must be one single object signified by 
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 Cf. Brunschwig (2007: 228). 
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 As argued at Top. VI.3, 140b27-14, the difficulty turns out to be pressing if the predication 
entails not simply saying twice the same term, but attributing the same characterization to the 
same object twice. On the forms of repetition see Top. V.2, 130a29-130b10. 
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definiendum and definiens; likewise, he categorially separates the differentia 
because there must be one single object signified by definiendum and definiens. 
1.3 Science: The Primacy of Definition 
An Aristotelian science, I said, is a body of demonstrative knowledge.68 Each 
demonstration proves that a certain fact stated in the conclusion necessarily 
obtains on the basis of a certain cause stated in the premises. The fact is the 
belonging of a demonstrable attribute to a subject (i.e. explanandum), while the 
cause is the term that mediates such belonging (i.e. explanans). To illustrate, 
C) Non-twinkling belongs to B) celestial bodies near to the earth 
D) Nearness to the earth belongs to C) planets 
B) Non-twinkling belongs to C) planets. 
The astronomer explains why AaC obtains on the basis of two premises, AaB 
and BaC, in which a further term, nearness to the earth, causes the belonging of 
non-twinkling to planets.69 In other words, non-twinkling is a per se attribute of 
planets and, more generally, of celestial bodies (which is the genus of the objects 
studied by astronomy). 
     Earlier, I remarked that a science is a hierarchical system articulated into 
principles and demonstrations.70 Some demonstrations are directly grounded in 
the principles of the science. Their results are the starting point of other 
demonstrations, which are indirectly grounded in the principles. In one word, the 
system is regulated by a form of dependence: the knowledge of some objects 
depends upon the knowledge of other objects because the former is grounded in 
                                                          
68
 The term ἐπιστήµη indicates both the cognitive state of the knower (Eth. Nic. VI.3, 1139b31-
34) and the formal system to present it (1139b25-31). I will use ‘demonstrative knowledge’ to 
stress the first sense and ‘science’ to stress the second sense. In point of fact, there is no 
distinction. ἐπιστήµη is the type of γνῶσις that is possessed by the expert scientist and presented 
in a formal way. See Mckirahan (1992: 23) and Bronstein (2016: 16-21); for a slightly different 
treatment see Burnyeat (1981). 
69
 See An. Post. I.13, 78a39-b4. The syllogism BaA, AaC ˫ BaC, instead, is not a demonstration 
insofar as it does not reveal the reason why the conclusion obtains. See Lennox (1987). 
70
 Barnes (1994: xii; 1981: 25-27) and Scholz (1975) speak of a formal axiomatized system. 
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the latter.71 For example, the knowledge that non-twinkling belongs to planets is 
grounded in the knowledge that nearness to the earth belongs to planets because 
the nearness to the earth is presupposed by our knowledge of planets, in 
particular, and of celestial bodies, in general. As already seen, this dependence 
can be cast in epistemic, definitional, or existential terms. The key point is that in 
a science what is more basic in the system grounds what is higher. Aristotle 
places definition among the principles at the basis of this hierarchical body of 
demonstrations. My concern is to spell out what a definition is in such a context. 
1.3.1 At the Foundations of Demonstrative Science 
Within a demonstrative science, there are two kinds of principles: axioms and 
theses.72 Axioms are common principles that apply in any subject-matter. Indeed, 
they ground any demonstration about any genus of objects. These take the form 
of general laws to which every scientist is committed, such as the law of non-
contradiction.73 Theses, by contrast, are principles that are proper to the subject-
matter treated by the relevant science. Namely, they ground the demonstrations 
about a specific genus of objects. Aristotle divides the theses into hypotheses 
and definitions. A hypothesis states the existence of the elements of a science; 
for example, the geometer grounds her demonstrations upon the statement that 
point and line exist. A definition states the essence of the elements of a science; 
for example, the geometer grounds her demonstrations upon the statements of 
what point and line are. 
     In Posterior Analytics I.2, Aristotle gives us a general insight into the nature of 
scientific principles and at 72a7-8 seems to summarise his views. 
A principle of a demonstration is an immediate premise (πρότασις), and a premise is 
immediate if there is no other premise prior to it. (Barnes’ translation slightly modified) 
ἀρχὴ δ’ ἐστὶν ἀποδείξεως πρότασις ἄµεσος, ἄµεσος δὲ ἧς µὴ ἔστιν ἄλλη προτέρα. 
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 That is the ontological dependence regulating metaphysics. See Section 1.1.2 above. 
72
 See An. Post. I.2, 72a14-24. Cf. I.10, 76a37-b11. 
73
 Since the application of axioms in a science is always relevant to the genus studied by the 
science, their common character does not clash with the autonomy of sciences. 
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The passage sounds slightly circular. Aristotle argues that a certain premise is a 
scientific principle because of its immediacy and explains its immediacy in terms 
of priority, which is an intrinsic feature of principles. Perhaps we can make a virtue 
of necessity by casting light on the connections between these philosophical 
concepts. In general, it is worth noting that a principle is not simply the premise 
of a demonstration. A premise can be assumed on the basis of other 
demonstrations within the same science and its priority is understood in relation 
to the conclusion inferred by the scientist; roughly, a premise is more knowable 
than and the cause of the conclusion. A principle holds absolute priority, instead. 
It is the priority of the principles, I contend, that must be understood in terms of 
immediacy.74 
     An important suggestion is given by commentators. The notion of πρότασις is 
not to be rigidly identified with the premise of a syllogistic demonstration. 
Aristotle’s usage is often fluid and concerns statements in which one term is 
predicated of another; in particular, it is the statement that is the true branch of a 
contradiction.75 Therefore, principles, like definitions, are statements that are 
assumed to ground demonstrative knowledge. This makes sense within the loose 
conception of science in which a definition fulfils its function of principle. In the 
Analytics, demonstrative knowledge is not exclusively presented in a syllogistic 
form with a conclusion obtaining in virtue of two premises. Aristotle devotes much 
attention to the presentation of the same epistemic content through deductive 
chains of statements.76 To illustrate, a conclusion (C) necessarily follows from a 
sequence of statements (S1; S2; […] Sn) in which every statement is chained to 
another through the predicative relations holding between the terms stated. 
Syllogistic demonstrations are just a pattern to display the demonstrative 
knowledge that a per se attribute belongs to an object. The same demonstrative 
knowledge is displayed by a chain of statements of per se1 and per se2 
predications.77 
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 The basic condition for every element of science is, of course, its truth.  
75
 On the senses of πρότασις, see Barnes (1994: 98-99); Mignucci (1975: 32-33; 2007: 155). Cf. 
Ross (1949: 288-289) and Brunschwig (2003: 118). 
76
 ‘A science is no more than a coherent sequence of propositions, beginning with a set of ἀρχαί 
or axioms, and proceeding thence from theorem to theorem’ Barnes (1981: 27). Cf. Barnes 
(1969). 
77
 See An. Post. I.15-22, in which Aristotle attempts to reject infinite chains of predications in order 
to prove the impossibility of infinite demonstrative knowledge. 
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     What is relevant to us is that the function of definition is to provide the starting 
point of such deductive chains in science. Since a definition accounts for an 
object by stating its essence, its immediacy amounts to the impossibility of 
demonstrating such an essential characterization. In other words, the definition 
of an object is immediate insofar as its statement cannot be mediated by any 
other statement about the object. For example, the definition of the moon is 
immediate insofar as its statement cannot be mediated by any other statement 
about moon; by contrast, every other statement about moon (e.g. eclipse belongs 
to moon) is subject to be mediated (e.g. screening of sun by earth). Since a 
definition is an immediate statement, it grounds the deductive chain displaying 
scientific knowledge. 
     We are now able to illustrate the absolute priority that makes definitions the 
principles of demonstrative science. 
Primacy of Definition: a definition is an immediate statement of what 
an object is. 
The primacy of definitions is equivalent to their indemonstrable status as 
principles. If definitions were demonstrable, they would not ground any 
demonstrative science; for it would be possible to mediate their statement. 
Namely, the definiens and, thus, an essential characterization would be proved 
to belong to the definiendum and to the object, respectively. Whereas there is no 
cause for a definition, there are always causes why other statements obtain. 
Hence, the scientific knowledge of an object is expressed either by an immediate 
statement or by other statements. The former hold primacy, while the latter do 
not.78 
1.3.2 Demonstrating a Definition 
It is a common tendency to think that book I of the Posterior Analytics describes 
the organization of a fully-fledged science, whereas book II is mainly concerned 
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 Once again, Aristotle appears to depart from the Platonic treatment of definition. For a definition 
is primary in virtue of being not a result of a scientific argument, but its indemonstrable starting 
point. This earns Plato’s science the methodological charge of petitio principii (cf. An. Pr. I.31, 
46a31ff.; II.16, 64b28-65a5; II.5, 91b12-27; b36-92a5). See Cavini (1995) and Castagnoli (2013). 
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with the enquiry to develop such knowledge. Arguably, an enquirer becomes a 
scientist after having completed some research on her subject-matter and, thus, 
achieved full understanding of its principles and demonstrations.79 It is then 
reasonable to say that, if book I gives us an insight into the function ascribed to 
definition within a demonstrative science, book II might give us an insight into 
how definition comes to perform this function. This, however, means making 
sense of the aporematic and widely debated discussion of book II. For our 
purposes, I will focus on the difficulty that is most significant for the issue of 
primacy: the possibility of demonstrating a definition. Although the difficulties 
presented in II.3-7 broadly range over the relation between demonstration and 
definition, Aristotle turns out to be chiefly interested in whether a definition can 
somehow be proved. His arguments will expand on the idea of primacy of 
definition I just outlined. 
 
At the start of II.3, Aristotle concentrates his aporematic discussion on how to 
prove the τί ἐστιν (90a35-38). This notion, I remarked, indicates both the 
predication accounting for an object and the content of definitions. It is then 
straightforward that the possibility of proving the τί ἐστιν is nothing but the 
possibility of proving a definition. This sounds puzzling to the reader of book I. 
Indeed, a definition is the principle of a demonstrative science and is not subject 
to being demonstrated itself.80 Why does Aristotle take this possibility into 
consideration? 
     The answer lies in II.1-2 in which Aristotle sets out the framework of the 
enquiry that will develop into a fully-fledged science. Roughly, there are two 
central points. First of all, to know something is to account for either what an 
object is (τί ἐστιν) or why there is an object (διότι/διὰ τί); that is, the knowledge of 
some objects is displayed by definition and the knowledge of some others by 
demonstration. Secondly, to enquire is to look for the cause in virtue of which the 
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 For the interpretation of science as the pure presentation of data in a pedagogical context 
(mostly based on book I) see Barnes (1969; 1993: xi-xxii). For the connection between the 
practice of scientific enquiry and the theory of book II see Bolton (1987), Lennox (1987), Charles 
(2000: 23-77), Deslauriers (2007: Ch. 2-3). Interestingly, Bronstein (2016: 69-80) argues that II.1-
13 is a discussion of the non-demonstrative knowledge that will serve in the practices of 
demonstrative knowledge presented in book I (e.g. didactic learning). 
80
 Aristotle is clearly playing on the senses of δεικνύναι, conveying both the idea of ‘showing’, 
‘revealing’ and the idea of ‘demonstrating’, which is properly expressed by adding the suffix ἀπό 
(cf. Chantraine, 1968: 257-258) 
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definiendum and the explanandum exist (εἰ ἔστι and ὅτι, respectively).81 To 
illustrate, the enquirer into centaur and eclipse has to account for what centaur is 
and for why there is an eclipse; this means indicating the cause in virtue of which 
there are a centaur and an eclipse, respectively. The knowledge of an object, 
either by definition or by demonstration, requires the enquirer to establish a 
middle-term. In other words, the enquirer has to mediate a certain fact about the 
object (either εἰ ἔστι or ὅτι) through some cause that will provide her with 
knowledge (either of τί ἐστιν or of διότι). 
     The aporematic step is that Aristotle considers definition and demonstration 
to be equivalent forms of knowledge (90a31-33).82 In either case, the enquirer 
achieves knowledge of an object insofar as she discovers the cause to be stated 
in the account of either the τί ἐστιν or the διότι. Despite being clearly able to 
separate the objects of definition from the objects of demonstration, Aristotle is 
then relying on an absolute notion of knowledge as the statement of a causal 
middle-term. Now, since the enquiry achieves knowledge only if it indicates a 
causal middle-term, the enquiry will always lead to demonstrative knowledge; for 
the identification of a cause mediating a certain fact amounts to the demonstration 
that the fact occurs. To illustrate, the identification of nearness to the earth to 
mediate the belonging of non-twinkling to planets amounts to demonstrating that 
planets do not twinkle. Given this framework, the demonstration of a definition is 
not simply a possibility, but the unique procedure to state what an object is.83 
     Let me spell out the aporetic consequences of this reasoning. In order to 
achieve knowledge, it is necessary to demonstrate a definition. However, 
Aristotle reminds us that a demonstration presupposes the statement of what an 
object is. Since every demonstration is grounded in a definition, the 
demonstration of a definition must itself be grounded in a definition; therefore, the 
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 Again, I take εἶναι to indicate (i) the existence of an object that is the subject of a science (i.e. 
the genus or a sub-genus, like moon), and (ii) the existence of a per se characterization of the 
object (i.e. the fact that a per se attribute belongs to a genus, like eclipse). In either case, what 
Aristotle has in mind is the statement ‘there is such a thing’ (see Section 1.1 above). It could be 
said that existence is not fully disentangled from the sortal sense according to which the subject 
is object of knowledge. On this point see Owen (1965). 
82
 Cf. Goldin (1996: 3ff.) and Deslauriers (2007: 48-55). For a different view see Charles (2000: 
248-249). 
83
 This may sound less unreasonable if we think that in book I Aristotle postpones his analysis of 
whether the knowledge of principles, such as definitions, is other than demonstrative knowledge 
(I.2, 71b16-19); rather, he often introduces definitions as resulting from some sort of assumption. 
See An. Post. I.1, 71a11-16 (προγινώσκειν); 2, 72a21-24 (τίθηµι); 3, 72b13-15 (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, 
cf. 84a4-6); 10, 76a31-b5 (λαµβάνειν cf. 78a10-12).  
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enquirer will achieve a regressive form of knowledge. Basically, if there were 
demonstrative knowledge of definitions, there would be a regressive assumption 
of a further definition to ground such knowledge (II.3, 90b25-33). From chapter 4 
to 6, Aristotle examines different methods to prove a definition and illustrates their 
regressive character. The point is that every attempt to demonstrate a definition 
is to mediate the belonging of the definiens to the definiendum through some 
cause; but nothing prevents such a cause from being mediated itself. In Aristotle’s 
words, ‘it is always possible to ask why’, for example, human is such-and-such 
an animal (II.7, 92b19-25).84 
     These consequences undermine Aristotle’s conception of science. The 
enquirer is supposed to achieve demonstrative knowledge of her object on the 
basis of a definition. This is hindered by the absence of any definitional 
knowledge. Since a definition cannot be demonstrated, there is no knowledge of 
definienda. From the absence of definitional knowledge, Aristotle infers the 
absence of demonstrative knowledge too; for there is no knowledge to ground 
the demonstrations of the explananda. In the end, there is no knowledge 
achievable. One possibility could be to appeal to the notion of nominal definition 
to introduce some form of definitional knowledge. Nominal definitions do not 
establish the existence of their object, thus the enquirer has still the possibility of 
achieving demonstrative knowledge on the basis of some definition. The problem, 
Aristotle reminds us, is that a nominal definition does not state what an object is, 
but what a name signifies (λόγος τοῦ τί σηµαίνει τὸ ὄνοµα); thus, it will ground 
scientific explanations as much as arbitrary explanations. Its definienda range 
from real necessary objects to unreal and accidental objects. For example, the 
definition of a goatstag and the definition of a wise human could be employed to 
ground demonstrations about a non-existent and an accidental object, 
respectively. In brief, the knowledge grounded in nominal definitions would fail to 
be genuinely scientific (II.7, 92b25-34). 
     Aristotle proposes a complex argument in order to solve these puzzles. Since 
the source of the difficulty lies in an absolute notion of knowledge, his ultimate 
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 At a more technical level, Aristotle also points out that definition cannot be demonstrated 
because a demonstration proves that something belongs to something else, while no belonging 
is stated in a definition (II.3, 90b33-37); for predication among its terms would undermine the unity 
of the statement (see Section 1.2.2 above). Plainly, Aristotle is here identifying a definition with 
the definiens. Indeed, no definiens is fully stated in deductive arguments, but only the element 
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goal is to disentangle knowledge by definition and knowledge by demonstration 
and clarify how these two are interconnected in scientific enquiry. Each 
argumentative step, I contend, pivots on the immediate character of definition. 
Hence, the demonstration of a definition will be possible only if it does not 
undermine the primacy of scientific principles.   
     The first argumentative step is to re-establish the distinction between 
objects of knowledge. This move enables Aristotle to separate two senses of τί 
ἐστιν, for which the cause applies differently: in some cases, the τί ἐστιν of an 
object is indicated by a cause within a definition and is indemonstrable; in other 
cases, the τί ἐστιν of an object is indicated by a cause within a demonstration and 
is somehow demonstrable. The distinction is hinted at the beginning of II.8 and 
fully expounded in II.9. 
For some objects the cause is something different, while for others it is not. 
Consequently, it is evident that (A) in some cases what an object is is immediate 
and principle […]; whereas (B) in those cases which have a middle-term and of 
which there is a cause other than their substance, it is possible, as we said, to 
reveal what an object is through demonstration, but not to demonstrate it. (II.9, 
93b21-28, Barnes’ translation slightly modified)85 
Ἔστι δὲ τῶν µὲν ἕτερόν τι αἴτιον, τῶν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι 
τὰ µὲν ἄµεσα καὶ ἀρχαί εἰσιν, ἃ καὶ εἶναι καὶ τί ἐστιν ὑποθέσθαι δεῖ ἢ ἄλλον 
τρόπον φανερὰ ποιῆσαι (…)· τῶν δ’ ἐχόντων µέσον, καὶ ὧν ἔστι τι ἕτερον αἴτιον 
τῆς οὐσίας, ἔστι δι’ἀποδείξεως, ὥσπερ εἴποµεν, δηλῶσαι, µὴ τὸ τί ἐστιν 
ἀποδεικνύντας. 
 
Basically, there are two objects of knowledge: (A) objects identical with their 
cause; (B) objects other than their cause. Aristotle argues that the what-it-is of A-
objects is immediate because its statement does not refer to any other cause but 
itself; the what-it-is of B-objects is not immediate because it is shown through a 
demonstration stating the cause of the object. According to some commentators, 
Aristotle has in mind an ontological distinction to separate substances from non-
substances, such as events. Whereas substances are caused by themselves, 
events are caused by something else; for example, whereas a human is caused 
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by her specific essence, a thunder is caused by some external factor.86 According 
to others, the distinction is conceived to separate primitive terms and derived 
terms in science. Whereas primitive terms are not analysable, derived terms are 
analysable with reference to more primitive terms. Unity, Aristotle seems to 
suggest, is a primitive term in arithmetic because every other term is analysable 
with reference to unity.87 
     What things is Aristotle separating? The key point is that the immediacy of 
what an A-object is marks the primacy of its statement. The what-it-is of A-objects 
is stated by immediate definitions that ground demonstrative science. Therefore, 
an A-object is either the genus or a sub-genus studied by a science. The what-it-
is of B-objects is instead stated by derivative definitions and does not ground 
demonstrative science; for it requires some other cause for its statement. 
Therefore, a B-object is a demonstrable attribute of the genus studied by a 
science.88 If this is correct, Aristotle attempts to solve the aporetic discussion by 
introducing the following distinctions: 
A-Objects B-objects 
Identical with their cause Other than their cause 
Immediate definitions Derivative definitions 
Knowledge by Definition Knowledge by Demonstration 
Admittedly, his argument to disentangle knowledge by definition and knowledge 
by demonstration is just to assume the primacy of the definitions of A-objects. 
Definitions hold primacy because they are immediate statements of a what-it-is 
(τί ἐστιν); therefore, they ground the demonstrations about the object of science. 
To illustrate, the definition of moon is the immediate statement of what moon is 
(say, moon is such-and-such a celestial body) and grounds the demonstration of 
eclipse (i.e. that eclipse belongs to moon). These definitions imply the existence 
of their objects; for there is identity between an A-object and the cause of the fact 
that there is such-and-such an object. There are, however, other definitions that 
are derivative statements of a what-it-is; that is, they are derived from some 
mediating cause. Accordingly, they do not hold primacy. To illustrate, the 
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 Cf. Ross (1949: 629); Goldin (1996: 101-136). 
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 Cf. Scholz (1975: 60f.); Barnes (1994: 221-222); Charles (2000: 24-56; 197-204). 
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 For a similar view, see Deslauriers (2007: 55-65) and Bronstein (2016: 131-138). 
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definition of eclipse is a derivative statement of what eclipse is (i.e. loss of light 
from moon because of the screening of sun by earth). In fact, these definitions 
correspond to demonstrations in which the terms are non-syllogistically arranged; 
for example, the definition of eclipse corresponds to the demonstration of eclipse 
(i.e. that eclipse [loss of light] belongs to moon). I shall call them demonstrative 
definitions.89 
     In sum, every demonstrative science consists of the knowledge of some 
objects by definitions and the knowledge of some objects by demonstration. The 
A-objects that are known by immediate definition are the subjects of scientific 
knowledge, whereas the B-objects that are known by derivative definitions are 
the demonstrable attributes of the subjects. On this score, the distinction 
introduced in the Analytics turns out to separate the primary objects from the 
secondary objects of a science. 
A-Objects B-objects 
Primary objects Secondary objects 
 
The primary objects are the subjects of which the scientist assumes definition 
and existence. The secondary objects are the demonstrable attributes of which 
the scientist delivers a demonstration (or a demonstrative definition). This is the 
form of dependence that regulates demonstrative sciences, including 
metaphysics.90 Therefore, every definition represents a principle to ground a 
demonstration within the relevant science. Since definitions account for the 
genera that are the subjects of some demonstrable attributes, their statement is 
immediate and does not refer to other causes.91 
     Given this overarching distinction, Aristotle is able to reconceive the relation 
between definition and demonstration. His main task is to show how a 
demonstration of a definition is possible and, thus, how an enquirer achieves 
demonstrative knowledge of an object. The point is that Aristotle will not focus on 
the account of A-objects (i.e. immediate definitions), but only on the account of 
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 See An. Post. II.10, 94a11-14. My use of definition will always be confined to the immediate 
definitions of A-objects, unless otherwise noted. 
90
 In metaphysics, substances are A-objects that are the subject of the study, while non-
substances are the B-objects that are the demonstrable attributes of the subject. I will expand this 
insight in Chapter Three. 
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 Nonetheless, the ultimate principle of a science is what holds primacy within the genus itself, 
i.e. the definition of the genus. See An. Post. I.6, 74b24-25. 
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B-objects (i.e. derivative definitions). The procedure is expounded in II.8 and 
works within the framework of II.1-2: the knowledge of an object must be 
grounded in the knowledge of the existence of the object. To that end, Aristotle 
tells us that the enquirer has firstly to know ‘something of the object’ (93a22); for 
example, the enquirer into eclipse has to know that eclipse is a loss of light.92 
Such partial knowledge of the object enables the enquirer to achieve either i) 
knowledge that the object exists, or ii) knowledge why the object exists. On route 
(ii), the enquirer directly establishes a middle-term that is the cause of the 
existence of the object. Thus, she achieves demonstrative knowledge of her 
object (e.g. there is an eclipse because of screening of sun by earth). On route 
(i), the enquirer establishes a middle-term that is not the cause of the existence 
of the object. Thus, she is merely able to deduce the existence of her object (e.g. 
there is an eclipse because of the moon’s impossibility of shadowing). 
     Since the τί ἐστιν of the object is partially stated in the conclusion and 
completed with the statement of the cause, the enquirer turns out to perform the 
demonstration of a definition. For her enquiry reveals the definition by stating the 
cause of why the definiendum exists. In Aristotle’s words, the demonstration of 
an object can be rearranged in a syllogistic way to produce a statement of what 
the object is. In the demonstration of eclipse, for example, what an eclipse is is 
revealed by stating its existence, ‘that loss of light belongs to moon’, and its 
cause, ‘screening of sun by earth’. In a nutshell, such demonstrative definitions 
are derivative and must be grounded in immediate definitions, just as 
demonstrable attributes are posterior and must be grounded in their subject.93 
1.4 A Theory of Definition 
Aristotle’s metaphysics is the demonstrative science of being and Z is the enquiry 
to establish its principle: what substance is. My approach to Z is to establish a 
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 The partial knowledge of the object is regarded as either i) a grasp of some definitional attributes 
(Ackrill, 1981: 368-376; Barnes, 1994: 218-219; Goldin, 1996: 108-118) or ii) a nominal definition 
to launch the search for the existence of the object (DeMoss-Devereux, 1988: 134-135; Charles, 
2000: 23-56). For a different view see Bolton (1976: 523-525). 
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correspondence between the enquiry into substance and the enquiry into 
definition. Indeed, what substance is is the principle of other entities just as 
definition is the principle of the demonstrations in a science. In order to discuss 
the problems and the arguments about substance in Z, we need to examine their 
linguistic counterparts, namely the problems and the arguments about definition. 
Such a ‘theory of definition’ is expounded in the logical works. I focused my 
analysis on two chief contexts: dialectic and science. Aristotle’s dialectic provides 
us with a technical treatment of definition: a definition is a statement of the genus 
and the differentia of an object signifying its essence. The innovative aspects of 
this treatment (such as the introduction of the differentia and the categorial 
distinction) are to be understood with reference to the unity of definition: a 
definition is one statement signifying one object and not many. The unity of 
definition is indeed required to avoid some dialectical difficulties undermining the 
statements about the object. Aristotle’s science gives us an insight into the 
epistemic function of definition: a definition is the principle grounding the 
demonstrations about an object. This role can be understood with reference to 
the primacy of definition: a definition is an immediate statement of what an 
object is. The primacy of definition is assumed to articulate the scientific 
knowledge of an object, which consists of the definitional knowledge of the 
subject studied and the demonstrative knowledge of its per se attributes. The 
remainder of this work is a discussion of Z’s enquiry in the light of this theory of 
definition. For Aristotle is attempting to establish a principle that must be credited 
with the corresponding unity and primacy. 
69 
 
Chapter Two 
Argumentative Strategies for the Enquiry 
This work argues for three theses. First, the most promising solution to Z’s 
enquiry appears to be the formalist essentialism of Z.4-11; namely, substance is 
the essence and, thus, the form of substances. Second, Z’s enquiry turns out to 
fail; namely, there is no way to establish the principle of metaphysics. Third, Z’s 
enquiry contributes to the foundation of metaphysics; namely, its results enable 
the enquirer to envision–though not to establish–the principle of metaphysics. 
The presence of both positive and negative aspects is a salient trait of Aristotle’s 
discussion in the central books. My concern in Chapter Two is to illustrate the 
argumentative strategy at work in Z. In particular, I aim to offer a unitary 
understanding of the argument in order to make sense of its role for a 
demonstrative science. Commentators have proposed a variety of philosophical 
strategies that revolve around a basic idea: in Z Aristotle plays with different 
notions of substance. Each strategy tends to emphasize either the dialectical or 
the pre-scientific character of the book in the light of the senses of substance 
detected. The strategy I am going to propose lines up with my approach to Z’s 
enquiry. There is an absolute notion of substance that drives the enquiry to 
ground the demonstrative science of being: substance is the cause of why other 
entities are. Aristotle is attempting to define the genus of entities that grounds the 
existence and the nature of the entities in other genera.1 What substance is is the 
principle of metaphysics, whose definition grounds the demonstrations about 
other entities. Aristotle considers four ways to define this entity: subject, essence, 
universal, and genus. The enquiry is designed to see whether they define 
substance in sensible reality and, thus, whether they lead us to identify substance 
with one of the principles of physics, form, matter, or the composite of both. 
     At the start of Z.4, there is a fundamental turn in the method to effect this 
strategy: Aristotle drives his examination from the objects of metaphysics to their 
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linguistic counterparts; that is, from entities (ὄντα) to their statements (λόγοι). This 
logical turn marks neither a linguistic nor a dialectical discussion; rather, it 
consists in inspecting the predicative relations among the terms stated in order 
to establish conclusions about the actual objects of metaphysics. Predictably, 
Aristotle ends up with focusing on the content of definitions; for every conclusion 
about definitions is corresponded to by a conclusion about substances. In the 
end, most of Z’s enquiry turns out to be logically oriented.2 
2.1 A General Overview: Some Answers 
Before considering the potential strategies of Z, let me start with a general 
overview of the book. In the first three chapters, Aristotle offers some 
methodological remarks that are recalled at later stages of the enquiry. 
Undoubtedly, the most relevant observations concern how to answer the question 
of Z; that is, the solution to establish the principle of metaphysics. Aristotle seems 
to consider at least three different ways to spell out what substance is. 
2.1.1 The Domain of the Enquiry 
A first group of answers is given in Z.2, in which Aristotle reviews the most 
reputable solutions that have been endorsed in philosophy. In other words, he 
offers a survey of the entities that are traditionally regarded as ‘substance’. The 
survey reports three main views: 
i. Bodies 
Complex Bodies (e.g. animals, plants, and their parts) 
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 It is important to emphasize the difference between my approach to Z’s enquiry and Aristotle’s 
logical procedure. My strategy is to rely on the correspondence between what substance is and 
the concept of definition, while Aristotle’s own strategy–at least in large portions of the book–is to 
rely on the correspondence between substance and its own definition. In particular, since Aristotle 
takes sensible substances (i.e. the primary objects of physics) to be included in the genus of 
substance and, thus, the starting point of his examinations in Z, his strategy is to rely on the 
correspondence between these substances and their own definitions in order to identify the 
principle of metaphysics: the primary substance and its own definition. See the Introduction. 
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Simple Bodies 
ii. Mathematicals (e.g. point, line) 
iii. Platonic Forms 
According to the first view, the most evident case of ‘substance’ is represented 
by bodies. Although this solution could be peculiar to some Pre-Socratic 
thinkers,3 Aristotle clearly acknowledges its promising character. He himself 
subscribes to this conception in On the Heavens III.1.4 What is crucial to notice 
is that in On the Heavens bodies are regarded as substances because they are 
the object of physics and of its subordinate sciences. For example, animals and 
plants are the object of the science of living entities and celestial bodies are the 
object of astronomy. Consequently, the definitions of such bodies ground the 
demonstrations about the relevant subject-matters; the definition of moon, we 
noticed, grounds the demonstration of eclipse. Put it simply, bodies are 
substances insofar as they are the subject of some per se attributes (e.g. 
memory, leaf-shedding, being eclipsed). Thus, they are primary objects in each 
physical science and belong to the genus whose definition is principle. 
     While the first view is based on the assumption that metaphysics is confined 
to sensible reality (which is the domain of physics, indeed), the second and the 
third views follow an alternative approach. Substances are not found among 
bodies, but among some other entities such as mathematicals and Platonic 
Forms.5 As partly made explicit, Aristotle has in mind Pythagoreans and 
Academics.6 Again, this could look reasonable with mathematicals. Since 
mathematicals are the object of mathematics and of its subordinate sciences, 
their definitions ground the relevant demonstrations. For example, the definition 
of triangle grounds the demonstration of the property of 2R (i.e. having internal 
angles equal two right angles). As with bodies, mathematicals are subject of 
some per se attributes (e.g. odd, 2R). The point is that mathematicals are unlikely 
to be substances because they are characterizations of bodies and are obtained 
by abstraction.7 Therefore, within metaphysics mathematicals turn out to be per 
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 Such as the Milesians. Cf. Ross (1924: 162); Bostock (1994: 70).  
4
 See De Cael. III.1, 298a24-b5. Cf. I.1, 268a1-6. 
5
 Aristotle considers different possibilities as to where substances are to be found. A review of 
these options is offered by Frede-Patzig (1988: 28). 
6
 See also A.4 and Z.2, 1028b21-27. 
7
 For example, the sphere is a shape and, thus, a quality of celestial bodies. Cf. Phys. II.2, 193b22-
194a12. 
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se attributes of the substances from which they are abstracted. In brief, 
mathematicals are entities that are ontologically dependent upon substances. 
     At the end of the survey, Aristotle considers some pressing puzzles. 
We must consider which of these views is right and which wrong; and what 
substances there are; and whether there are or are not any substances beside 
those that are sensible, and in what way these latter are; and whether there is or 
is not any separate substance, apart from the sensible ones, and if so why and 
in what way. (1028b27-31, Bostock’s translation slightly modified) 
περὶ δὴ τούτων τί λέγεται καλῶς ἢ µὴ καλῶς, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ πότερον 
εἰσί τινες παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἢ οὐκ εἰσί, καὶ αὗται πῶς εἰσί, καὶ πότερον ἔστι τις 
χωριστὴ οὐσία, καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς, ἢ οὐδεµία, παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητάς, σκεπτέον, 
ὑποτυπωσαµένοις τὴν οὐσίαν πρῶτον τί ἐστιν. 
 
Z’s enquiry will put us in a position to answer two questions about the principle of 
metaphysics. One question corresponds to the fifth aporia of book B: whether 
there are only sensible substances or others beside these.8 This puzzle 
summarizes the reasoning of the chapter. Whereas the existence of sensible 
substances, such as bodies, is widely accepted, the existence of non-sensible 
substances, such as Platonic Forms, is more controversial. Therefore, to 
establish the principle of metaphysics entails shedding light on the possibility of 
substances beyond the sensible ones; and this includes examining whether 
Platonic Forms are valid solutions to Z’s enquiry. The other question seems to 
expand on the previous one:9 whether there is a non-sensible substance that is 
separate. Commentators take Aristotle to be referring to the divine substance. 
Although this is certainly the case (for the principle of metaphysics will be 
ultimately achieved by answering what God is, namely pure actuality), the 
question must be treated in the course of Z. The problem is that such entities 
never feature in the entire enquiry.10 Conceivably, what Aristotle intends to do is 
to elaborate on the answer to B#5 and this means considering whether non-
sensible substances are separate or not. More precisely, his goal is to ensure 
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 See B#5, 996b13-18; 997a34-998a19. 
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 Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: 32). For a different reading see Ross (1924: 163). 
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that such non-sensible substances are ontologically independent of the 
remaining entities in reality.11 
     Behind these observations, there is a fundamental insight into the domain of 
Z: the principle of metaphysics must be primarily enquired by looking at sensible 
substances. Indeed, the enquirer has to start with the examination of the 
substances whose existence is uncontroversial.12 This does not mean ruling out 
the existence of non-sensible substances. What Aristotle has in mind is that the 
enquiry conducted among sensible substances is likely to lead to some further 
substance besides the sensible ones. This is indeed the result achieved by 
Platonists and Pythagoreans. However, this further substance could hold primacy 
only if it is separate. For its separate status would mark the absolute primacy over 
the other entities in reality.13 
2.1.2 Defining Substance 
A second group of answers is offered straight after Z.2’s survey in the well-known 
agenda of Z.3. Substance, says Aristotle, can be defined in four different ways: 
essence, universal, genus, and subject (1028a33-36). Each of them is initially 
presented as a promising and not exclusive solution to the enquiry; namely, they 
are alternative ways to specify what substance is. Two other signposts in Z.13 
and H.1 confirm that Aristotle organizes the enquiry around these four solutions:14 
the subject is examined in Z.3; the essence is examined in Z.4-6 and its treatment 
is completed with the analysis of definition in Z.10-11; the universal is discussed 
in the course of Z.13-16, which, presumably, include the examination of the 
genus.15 It is then standard to believe that Z’s enquiry breaks down into at least 
three distinct sections. His main results are summarized in H.1: whereas essence 
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 This is indeed the notion of separation at work in Z.1. See Section 1.1.2. 
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 On different occasions, Aristotle spells out the methodological basis of this strategy. Since any 
knowledge is achieved by going from more familiar things to less familiar things, the science of 
being will develop from the understanding of familiar substances (which are sensible) to the 
understanding of less familiar substances (which are, predictably, non-sensible). See Z.3, 
1029a33-b12; Z.11, 1037a10-17; Z.16, 1040b5-6; H.1, 1042a24. 
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 A similar view is defended by Menn (2001: 87ff.). 
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 See Z.13, 1038b1-3; H.1, 1042a11-24. 
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 Z.17 marks a new start of the enquiry. Instead, Z.7-9 and Z.12 are traditionally regarded as 
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and subject are valid solutions, universal and genus are entirely discarded.16 
Roughly, the problem with universal and genus is that they can be assimilated to 
Platonic Forms; consequently, they suffer from the same difficulties as Plato’s 
solution. 
     What is the relationship between Z.2’s and Z.3’s answers? Commentators 
often connect them with two ways to address the enquiry into what substance 
is.17 The first way is to address an extensional treatment of substance by 
answering what substances there are. Accordingly, Aristotle is partly engaged in 
giving an inventory of those entities that ground the existence of other entities. 
Thus, Z.2 surveys the solutions in extensional terms. Bodies are evident cases 
of substance detected in sensible reality; for other entities (e.g. colours, weights, 
etc.) characterize and depend upon them. Mathematicals, instead, are not cases 
of substance; for, despite being primary objects in mathematics, they are per se 
attributes of bodies and thus entities depending upon some substances. The 
second way is to address an intensional treatment of substance by answering 
what ‘being a substance’ amounts to. Accordingly, Aristotle is also interested in 
determining the substantial nature that is shared by all instances of the genus 
studied by metaphysics. The agenda of Z.3 lists the solutions in intensional terms. 
Subject, essence, universal, and genus are taken to illustrate what ‘being a 
substance’ means for bodies (on which the enquiry is mainly concerned). If this 
reading is correct, Z is mainly devoted to an intensional analysis by evaluating 
whether each item on the agenda indicates the source of substantiality of sensible 
substances. The strategy at work seems to swing between these two approaches 
to Z. Aristotle thinks that a full understanding of substance implies reflecting upon 
the uncontroversial cases of substance and illustrating their nature. To that end, 
he offers a preliminary extensional solution before embarking on the intensional 
analysis. On the other hand, the intensional solution contributes to reconsidering 
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 Devereux (2003) argues that H was written before the final revision of Z. His main argument is 
that Z.3 represents a refined version of H.1-2, while Z.17 represents a refined version of H.3. 
Admittedly, Aristotle was able to modify his works and I agree that Z.17 is likely to be posterior to 
H. However, this does not prove Devereux’s thesis that Z represents Aristotle’s final word on the 
enquiry into substance. Firstly, in H.1 Aristotle does claim that substance is subject, but this 
conclusion is not supported by the argument of Z.3; presumably, it requires the account of 
substance in terms of potentiality that is expounded in H.4-5. Likewise, the conclusion that 
substance is essence requires the account of substance in terms of actuality, which is expounded 
in H.2-3 and at which Z.17 seems to drive. I find totally reasonable to suppose that the argument 
of H will accomplish Z’s enquiry as Aristotle himself suggests in H.1. 
17
 See Witt (1989: 7-14); Burnyeat (2001: 13-14); Galluzzo (2013a: 28-35). Cf. Lewis (2013: 16-
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the range of substances established by the survey; in particular, the parts of living 
entities, simple elements, and Platonic Ideas will cease to be considered as 
substances.18 In other words, the enquiry can be accomplished only through a 
revision of the extensional analysis in the light of the results of the intensional 
analysis. 
     It is dubious, however, that the enquiry is designed to develop these two 
treatments of substance.19 The problem is that Aristotle can easily shift from one 
to the other and places no signpost to mark the distinction. Later on, I will argue 
that Z offers a unitary treatment of substance that requires no distinction between 
the population of substances and their nature. At present, I want to insist on the 
role played by Z.3’s agenda. Aristotle suggests that the four answers are inferred 
from the survey of the reputable cases of substance. To illustrate, the first view 
in Z.2 could rest on the ideas that substance is subject and essence. A body is a 
substance because it is the subject upon which other entities depend and its 
essence is presupposed by what other entities are.20 The third view in Z.2, 
instead, could rest on the idea that substance is not only essence, but also 
universal. Platonic Forms are indeed taken to be the reference of definitions and 
to be participated in by a plurality of individuals.21 Since Z’s enquiry must be 
conducted among reputable substances, in Z.3 Aristotle is considering different 
ways to spell out what this genus of entities is. In a nutshell, Z.3 presents four 
definitions of substance. To define substance as either subject, essence, 
universal, or genus is to indicate the fundamental nature that will ground the 
demonstrative science of being. Basically, the enquirer has to examine 
substances (e.g. human, animal, etc.) and the different ways in which they can 
be defined; for one of these definitions indicates the principle of metaphysics. 
This does not reduce the items on the agenda to some criteria that a substance 
has to satisfy; for their role is to define the object of Z, i.e. what substance is.22 
Of course, each definition imports some requirements that must be applied to 
every substance. The point is that in Z Aristotle attempts to establish his principle 
                                                          
18
 See Z.16, 1040b5-16; H.1, 1042a21-24. 
19
 On this point see Galluzzo (2013a: 32-35). 
20
 Namely, subject and essence articulate the two forms of dependence of entities upon 
substance: ontological dependence* and ontological dependence**, respectively. See Section 
1.1.2. 
21
 See A.6, 987a32ff. 
22
 For the idea that Z.3 lists four criteria on substance see Irwin (1988: 200-203). In this regard, 
my view is closer to Lewis’ (2013: 16-23), who speaks of ‘role-properties’. 
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by examining the definition of substance as subject, as essence, and as 
universal. This means spelling out the distinctive character of every substance in 
metaphysics (thus of bodies in the first place) and stating what the genus studied 
by metaphysics is. 
2.1.3 Metaphysics and Physics: Hylomorphism 
A third group of answers is represented by the doctrine of hylomorphism. 
According to hylomorphism, sensible substances, such as bodies, are 
composites resulting from some matter organized by a certain form. For example, 
a bronze statue is a composite substance resulting from a lump of bronze in the 
shape of a statue. Since Z’s enquiry has to start with examining sensible 
substances, and since in physics sensible substances are defined in hylomorphic 
terms, Aristotle attempts to specify what substance is in terms of either the form, 
or the matter, or the composite of both. 
     The application of hylomorphism in Z is not uniform. In Z.3, Aristotle makes 
abundant use of these notions, while they are almost entirely absent in Z.4-6. 
From Z.7 to Z.11, hylomorphism is central in the discussion before almost 
disappearing in the remaining chapters.23 Interestingly, the application of 
hylomorphism appears to be designed to complete the examination of the 
definitions of substance. In Z.3, the definition as subject leads to identifying the 
principle of metaphysics with a certain notion of matter.24 In Z.10-11, Aristotle 
takes up an examination of the parts of a definition and thus of an essence that 
leads to identifying substance with form. On the contrary, the definitions as 
universal and as genus lead to Plato’s Ideas and are rejected. Traditionally, the 
enquiry is taken to give a formalist solution: the principle of metaphysics is form, 
which is the ‘primary substance’ upon which the totality of entities depends.25 To 
                                                          
23
 In Z.4-6 there are very few occurrences of εἶδος and Aristotle seems to have in mind a general 
notion of species (cf. Burnyeat, 2001: 19-29; Driscoll, 1981. For a different view see Wedin, 2000: 
Ch. 6). Z.15-16 are respectively focused on the impossibility of defining particulars and on the 
dismissal of simple bodies and summa genera. The use of hylomorphic notions is indeed 
marginal. In Z.17, hylomorphism seems to play a key role in the fresh account of substance; 
however, there is no explicit use of the notion of form, except for a disputed occurrence at 1041b8. 
24
 This is unlikely to be an Aristotelian notion of matter (cf. Gill, 1989: 13-82), but could be 
reminiscent of the receptacle described in the Timaeus. 
25
 Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: Einleitung, 33-47); Irwin (1988: 199-247); Witt (1989: 143-179); Loux 
(1991: 147-196); Scaltsas (1994b); Bolton (1995); Code (1997); Wedin (2000); Burnyeat (2001); 
Charles (2010a); Peramatzis (2011); Galluzzo (2013a); Lewis (2013). 
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put it as some commentators do, form is the best candidate to fulfil the conditions 
on substance imported by each definition. The overall idea is that matter and 
composite depend upon the form; for a form is the cause in virtue of which a 
matter and a composite are a certain kind of substance. To illustrate, the 
existence of the lump of bronze of a statue depends on the shape that makes 
such a lump of bronze a statue; likewise, the composite statue resulting from 
bronze and shape depends upon the shape that makes this composition a statue. 
     What is the role of the hylomorphic answer within Z’s enquiry? According to 
the majority of commentators, Z’s hylomorphism is meant to advance the 
understanding of substance achieved in the Categories. In the fifth chapter of the 
treatise, Aristotle offers an analysis of the category of οὐσία and concludes that 
individual objects (e.g. Socrates, Buchephalus) are primary substances, while 
general objects (e.g. human, horse) are secondary substances. Whereas in the 
Categories the hylomorphic analysis is either neglected or not fully developed, in 
the Metaphysics Aristotle is keen to identify substance with one among form, 
matter, and composite.26 From this perspective, hylomorphism enables Aristotle 
to move from an analysis of the entities that are substances in reality to an 
analysis of their inner structure. Since a human is a composite resulting from 
flesh&bone and a human soul, the enquiry has to establish what constituent is 
the causal principle of human. On this traditional view, Z’s enquiry is meant to 
explore the nature of the entities in the category of substance. Since these entities 
are sensible substances, the enquiry has to examine their hylomorphic 
constitution. 
     What is unconvincing about this interpretation is that hylomorphism in Z is not 
applied in terms of constitution. When Aristotle recalls it in the preliminaries of his 
examination of the subject, the notions are introduced as senses of subject and 
not of substance. In the Physics, form and matter are introduced as principles of 
physics according to the same approach. The matter (ὕλη) is the subject that 
undergoes change, while form (µορφή, εἶδος) may indicate the subject either 
before or after the change. The composite (τὸ ἐκ τούτων, σύνολον) is to be 
                                                          
26
 In the debate about the relationship between Categories 5 and Metaphysics Z commentators 
split into two broad camps. Some hold that in Z Aristotle concludes that the primary substance in 
reality is the form of sensible substances and not the individual object (cf. Averroes, In Metaph.; 
Frede, 1985; Frede-Patzig, 1988); some others hold that in Z Aristotle is in fact addressing a 
different question about the nature of individual substances and, thus, do not see any contrast 
between the two doctrines (cf. Aquinas, Expositio; Wedin, 2000; Burnyeat, 2001). For a general 
presentation of the debate, see Galluzzo-Mariani (2006: 83-88). 
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understood as the subject resulting from the generation of a sensible substance; 
that is, when the form determines anew what the underlying matter is.27 The direct 
link between hylomorphism and substance is established in Z.10, in which form 
and matter are said to be ‘parts’ of substance. However, Aristotle does not 
present form and matter as two constituents of the same composite; rather, he 
contrasts the constitution from formal parts with the constitution from material 
parts; the former pertains to forms, while the latter pertains to composites 
(1035a1-22).28 For example, a human soul divides into formal elements 
(presumably, its genus, animal, and its differentia, biped), while a human divides 
into material elements (such as flesh&bone). 
     I am inclined to think that the role of hylomorphism in Z can be better 
understood in the light of its role in physical sciences. Physics is the science of 
sensible entities and, in particular, of bodies. This means that physics and its 
subordinate sciences are concerned with the demonstrable attributes of bodies: 
motions. As already said, bodies are substances because they constitute a genus 
of entities (i.e. a sub-genus of substances) about which the physicist conducts 
relevant demonstrations. The principle that grounds such demonstrations is 
nature (φύσις). In order to establish this principle, Aristotle sets out a discussion 
that clearly parallels Z’s enquiry. While in metaphysics Aristotle attempts to 
answer ‘What is substance?’, in his physics he is concerned with ‘What is 
nature?’. The solution given in Physics II.1 consists in his hylomorphism. For one 
thing, nature is matter because it is the primary underlying element of a body 
(193a9-31); for another thing, nature is form because it is the kind of thing a body 
is (193a28-b5). The crucial point is that form and matter are two principles that 
ground the science of bodies and their demonstrable attributes (i.e. motions). 
Therefore, hylomorphism is introduced not to spell out the constitution of sensible 
substances, but to develop our demonstrative knowledge about them. For 
example, the demonstration that human is capable of learning requires the 
assumption of the definition of human soul; since the soul is the form of living 
bodies, the demonstration is grounded in the notion of form. Likewise, the 
demonstration that the sea is salty requires the assumption of the definition of 
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 The application of these notions in Z.7-9 is also tied to a theory of generation and corruption 
and not immediately linked to the identification of substance. 
28
 I will focus on this hylomorphic analysis of substance in Chapter Four. 
Chapter Two 
 
79 
 
water; since water is the matter of the sea, the demonstration is grounded in the 
notion of matter. 
     In Z, Aristotle is attempting to establish the principle of metaphysics. Since his 
enquiry starts with examining sensible substances, it is then totally reasonable to 
resort to hylomorphism. For one of the principles of physics is likely to be the 
principle of metaphysics too.29 In examining the definitions of substance, Aristotle 
expects the answer to ‘What is substance?’ to match the answer to ‘What is 
nature?’.30 Consequently, his application of hylomorphism is meant not to 
advance our understanding of the category of substance, but to identify one of 
the items that are listed in the category of substance. In Metaphysics Z, Aristotle 
is accounting for what the genus substance is because the answer will ground 
the demonstrative knowledge of any other entity, both in sensible reality and, 
possibly, in suprasensible reality. Given the focus on sensible reality, this 
principle is likely to be one of the principles that ground the demonstrative 
knowledge of the same entities, when characterized by motions. 
2.2 Senses of Substance 
On the basis of the observations gathered from the first chapters of Z, it is 
possible to set out a variety of philosophical strategies for the enquiry into 
substance. There is a fundamental insight behind the strategies suggested by 
commentators: in Z Aristotle plays with different senses of substance. In some 
versions, the multiple conception of substance puts emphasis on the dialectical 
character of the enquiry; the solution lies in a stronger notion of substance that 
emerges from the contrast among the plurality of senses. In other versions, the 
multiple conception casts light on the pre-scientific intent of the book; the enquirer 
moves from preliminary senses of substance to the definition of substance as 
                                                          
29
 A similar approach is found in Rapp (2016). Basically, although to enquire into the principles of 
change (i.e. motion) is different from enquiring into the principles of existence (i.e. being), since 
the subjects of both are sensible substances, these principles must somehow be the same. 
30
 This does not make Z part of his physics. Although the enquiry is mainly focused on sensible 
entities and, thus, its domain is co-extensive with physics, Aristotle is concerned with entities qua 
entities and not with entities qua moving entities (which are the object of physical sciences). For 
this reason, Z is open to admit substances beyond sensible reality (cf. Section 2.1.1 above). 
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principle. In accordance with Chapter I, I contend that the argument of Z is driven 
by an absolute notion of substance: substance is the cause of why other entities 
are. On this score, I will propose a unitary understanding of Aristotle’s strategy 
that makes sense of its role for the development of metaphysics. 
2.2.1 Dialectical vs Pre-scientific Strategies 
A classic way to exploit the plurality of senses of substance is suggested by Gwyl 
Owen.31 The enquiry, he argues, is structured around two notions introduced in 
Z.1: τόδε τι and τί ἐστιν. τόδε τι is often taken to refer to the individual items in the 
first ontological category.32 In the Categories, τόδε τι is a label for any object that 
is an indivisible subject of characterizations; for example, Socrates is a τόδε τι 
inasmuch as it is the subject of ‘human’, ‘wise’, etc. τί ἐστιν is employed to refer 
to the first predicative category. In particular, it labels the predicates (or the 
predication) stated to define an object; for example, animal is a τί ἐστιν inasmuch 
as it is what a human is. Each notion represents a requirement on substance and 
Z is designed to press the contrast between them. To use Owen’s words, Aristotle 
follows a pincer-movement strategy ‘to pull the argument in opposite directions 
and to show that either direction, if single-mindedly pursued, leads to intolerable 
results’. In this way, the enquiry will achieve a stronger conception of substance 
holding the two senses in one focus.33 
     What is interesting is that Owen takes the notions of τόδε τι and of τί ἐστιν to 
reveal two metaphysical inclinations. On the one hand, an object is understood 
as the subject of predicates and thus of attributes. This is reminiscent of a 
Kripkean approach to metaphysics according to which an object must be a 
particular item independently of its characterizations.34 On the other, an object is 
understood as the member of a general class. This is reminiscent of a Fregean 
approach according to which an object must always be referred to as the instance 
                                                          
31
 Owen (1978-79: esp. 1-13). Cf. Owen (1961). 
32
 The expression τόδε τι results from the combination of two pronouns, which can be credited 
with different functions. A first option is to take τόδε to indicate the object and τι to qualify it; the 
result could be expressed by ‘a this-something’. An alternative option is to take τι to indicate any 
object whatsoever and τόδε to qualify it; the result could be expressed by ‘a certain-something’. 
Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: 15); Burnyeat (2001: 49 n. 99). 
33
 Owen (1978-79: 12). 
34
 However, Kripke (1980: esp. 114 n. 57) acknowledges some essential characterizations that 
can be employed to refer to the object. 
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of a certain kind. Within this framework, it is possible to map the argument of Z in 
the following way. Firstly, Aristotle insists on the requirement of τόδε τι through 
the examination of the subject in Z.3. The idea is to consider as substance every 
object that is a fixed subject as opposed to its attributes. The result is a 
controversial notion of indeterminate matter. Consider a bronze sphere, which is 
a sensible substance. Although the lump of bronze is the subject of ‘being 
spherical’, some other entity must be the subject of ‘being bronze’; consequently, 
the entire process turns out to be regressive.35 Aristotle insists on the requirement 
of τί ἐστιν through the examinations of the essence in Z.4-6 and of the universal 
in Z.13-16. The idea is to consider as substance the intrinsic nature of an object. 
This attempt faces the difficulties that prevent universal objects from being 
substances.36 To illustrate, the common nature animality must always belong to 
a plurality of individual humans that are all fixed subjects in their own right. 
     The model outlined by Owen is reformulated in other versions of Z’s strategy. 
The enquiry is designed to hold that substance must be both a fully determined 
subject and an essential characterization. The requirement of τόδε τι is expressed 
by the definition of substance as subject; for individual substances perfectly 
exemplify a τόδε τι and are the ultimate subject of their attributes. The 
requirement of τί ἐστιν is expressed by the definition of substance as essence; for 
a common nature indicates what an individual substance is and thus is the 
content stated by a definition. Within Z’s enquiry, the contrast between 
subjecthood and essentiality marks the separation of Z.3 from Z.4-16. The 
interpretations defended by Gill and Halper are developed along these lines. In 
their views, Z’s enquiry is firstly concerned with the unity of substance and this 
can be ensured either by its subjecthood or by its essential nature. The task of 
the enquirer is to harmonize these senses of unity in favour of a single notion.37 
                                                          
35
 For the so-called stripping-away argument against the solution of Z.3 see Loux (1991: 54-64), 
Lewis (2013: 53-61), Galluzzo (2013a: 47-54). 
36
 A similar strategy is presented by Code (1984), who identifies Z with the treatment of the last 
aporia of B: whether principles are universal or particular (B#12, 996a9-10; 1003a5-17). 
According to Code, Aristotle is in fact contrasting the individual status (τόδε τι) with the definable 
status (τί ἐστιν) of a substance. 
37
 According to Gill (1989), Aristotle attempts to harmonize the horizontal and the vertical unity of 
an object. The horizontal unity is the status ascribed to sensible substances in the Physics and 
rests on the idea of persistence (ontological primacy); the vertical unity is the status ascribed to 
substances in the Metaphysics and rests on the idea of basic predication (definitional primacy). It 
is only with the new understanding of form and matter of organic composites that from Z.17 
Aristotle is able to ensure the absolute unity of substance achieved in H.6. Contrary to Gill, Halper 
(1989: esp. 227-229) considers Z’s enquiry to be a positive argument driving toward a definite 
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     It is not difficult to see that these versions emphasize the dialectical character 
of the enquiry. The senses of substance appear to be reminiscent of the 
metaphysical doctrines advocated by other philosophers, in particular Pre-
Socratics and Academics.38 In order to establish what substance is, Aristotle 
starts with collecting the reputable views on the matter treated. This function is 
performed by the survey of Z.2 and the agenda of Z.3. Subsequently, he moves 
to explore the puzzles raised by each view and to show their limits. In doing so, 
the examinations conducted in the book lead to a stronger solution that does 
justice to the truth contained in the initial views. In Z.17, the conception of 
substance as cause is often understood to signpost the end of the dialectical 
treatment.39 
 
In order to play down the aporematic and dialectical character of the enquiry, 
some commentators consider a different strategy for Z’s enquiry. The central idea 
is to insist on the application of hylomorphism. Since form and matter are the 
principles of sensible substances, Z is designed to answer what substance is in 
terms of these notions. Thus, the enquiry seems to carry out a pre-scientific 
project; for it is supposed to match the principle of metaphysics with one of the 
principles of physics. There is a complication with this picture. I have already 
noted that hylomorphism is traditionally understood in terms of constitution: a 
sensible substance is the composite resulting from a portion of matter and a 
specific form.40 Since Z seems to offer a formalist solution, it is unclear how both 
a composite substance and its form can be the primary entity enquired. 
Throughout the book, Aristotle tends to regard both of them as substances. 
     Consequently, the pre-scientific character of the enquiry can be defended only 
if there is a way to ensure the substantiality of both composites and their forms. 
                                                          
solution: substance is form. In his reconstruction, unity represents the criterion to investigate the 
different ways of being (per se being; being in actuality and in potentiality; being true and false). 
38
 Rorty (1974) proposes a reconstruction of the argument of Z that foreshadows Owen’s in many 
respects. Z is designed to disentangle two senses of substance: the determinable and the self-
reliant object. The notion of determinability is at work in the Pre-Socratic reductionism to matter, 
while the notion of self-reliance is at work in the Platonic-Pythagorean reductionism to form. The 
final target of Z is then to show the limits of these forms of metaphysics. 
39
 Irwin (1988: esp. 200-203), for example, argues that the four accounts serve as four criteria for 
the strong dialectic performed in metaphysics. The positive solution will be the individual form of 
sensible substances, which combines the status of τόδε τι and the status of τί ἐστιν. 
40
 See Section 2.1.3. 
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To this end, commentators often propose a distinction between two senses of 
substance. 
i. Substance: the primary entity in reality (οὐσία); 
ii. Substance-of: the cause of being a substance (οὐσία ἑκάστου). 
The monadic sense of substance indicates the items that are classified in the 
ontological category of substance. A substance is any entity on which any non-
substance depends for its existence.41 For example, Socrates is a substance 
insofar as there are non-substances, such as his paleness, that cannot be 
separated from Socrates. Thus, the Categories and Z.2’s survey are taken to 
work with a monadic sense of substance; for Aristotle is concerned with 
ontologically independent objects as opposed to their attributes. The dyadic 
sense of substance indicates the causal principle in virtue of which a monadic 
substance is a substance. To illustrate, the substance of Socrates is the cause 
that makes Socrates a substance, i.e. his human nature. The examinations of 
Z.3’s definitions are taken to work with the dyadic sense of substance; their task 
is to explain why sensible substances are instances of the genus substance.42 
On this score, commentators take the substance of a sensible substance to be 
the form that constitutes a composite. In other words, the primary entity studied 
in Z is the composite if substance is understood in a monadic sense, while it is 
the form if substance is understood in a dyadic sense. The crucial point is that Z 
is the enquiry into the substance of sensible substances. In examining composite 
substances, Aristotle attempts to establish the principle of metaphysics, which is 
either form, matter, or the composite itself. Accordingly, Z turns out to play a pre-
scientific function for the development of the science of being. At the end of the 
day, form turns out to be the substance of sensible substances; for form is 
the cause in virtue of which a composite substance is a substance.43 
                                                          
41
 This is the form of ontological dependence** that is traditionally based on the primacy in 
existence. See Section 1.1.2. 
42
 For this distinction of senses see Burnyeat et al. (1977: 7), Loux (1991: 49-53); Bostock (1994: 
43-44), Code (1997: 357-362); Burnyeat (2000: 13); Lewis (2013: 10-20). 
43
 Loux (1991: 2-12 and Ch. 4) employs the monadic and dyadic senses of substance to separate 
two distinct metaphysical levels. One is the metaphysical level of the Categories: a substance is 
the indivisible instance of a kind (e.g. Socrates is a human). The other level concerns the 
hylomorphic constitution of sensible substances introduced in the Metaphysics: a substance is a 
specific form belonging to a portion of matter (e.g. a human soul belongs to these flesh&bone). 
The distinction between monadic and dyadic sense is also employed by Bolton (1995), who firmly 
argues in favour of the scientific procedure of Z. His view is that form is the substance of sensible 
substances because it gives the cause of the facts to be explained; for example, form explains 
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     In his A Map of Metaphysics Z, Myles Burnyeat provides an interesting version 
of these strategies. The enquiry, says Burnyeat, is characterized by two features: 
non-linearity and two-level analysis. The non-linearity of Z lies in the fact that after 
Z.1-2 Aristotle sets out independent sections about each definition of 
substance.44 Accordingly, every time Aristotle takes up the examination of a new 
definition, the enquiry makes a fresh start and does not develop the results 
achieved in the previous section. For example, whilst Z.3 concludes that form and 
composite are better solutions to the enquiry compared to matter, Z.4 does not 
pursue this analysis but begins a new discussion about substance as essence. 
Nevertheless, each section argues in favour of the same conclusion: substance 
is form. The two-level analysis lies in the idea that Z’s examinations are twofold. 
At a first level, Aristotle advances formal observations which help the enquirer to 
familiarize with a given definition; these phases, however, are not genuinely 
scientific and tend to raise dialectical difficulties. At a second level, Aristotle 
develops his formal views in the light of the principles that are proper to 
metaphysics, i.e. form and matter.45 
     Whilst the non-linearity has been often criticized, many commentators 
organize Z’s strategy in light of the two-level procedure.46 With the hylomorphic 
treatment of substance, Aristotle is conducting a partisan and genuinely pre-
scientific enquiry that is expected to establish positive results.47 What is salient to 
see is that this reconstruction makes Z an enquiry into the substance of sensible 
substances. For this project, Aristotle considers four definitions–subject, 
                                                          
that a certain object is a substance, or that a certain object is a τόδε τι. A weaker interpretation is 
suggested by Charles (2000: esp. 282-283; 2010), who considers Z a successful project to 
uniform the account of substance to the demonstrative model of the Analytics, which is achieved 
in Z.17. Whilst I agree with Charles about the turning point reached in Z.17, I will argue that the 
application of the demonstrative account marks the failure of Z’s enquiry. 
44
 See Section 2.1.2 above. 
45
 Burnyeat (2001: 4-8) labels the first level ‘logical’ and the second level ‘metaphysical’. I will go 
into the details of his interpretation in Section 2.3.1 below. 
46
 I agree with Wedin (2000) and Lewis (2013: 32-37) that Z is more likely to follow a linear 
argument. If we assume the non-linearity, we accept the possibility of embarking on the enquiry 
at each new start, namely, at Z.4, Z.13, and Z.17 (according to Burnyeat’s map). But it would be 
absurd to start with the examination of the universal without having examined essence; Aristotle 
himself criticizes this account insofar as a universal can be substance neither as essence nor as 
part of an essence (Z.13, 1038b16-23).  
47
 Similar strategies can be found in Code (1997) (who foreshadows Burnyeat’s two-level 
analysis), and in Lewis (2013: 28-32). However, Lewis takes each account to represent a 
philosophical view received from other philosophers (Pre-Socratics and Academics) or from other 
Aristotelian works. This view is tested through Aristotle’s partisan conception of substance in 
hylomorphic terms. In his view, then, Z’s enquiry is largely a dialectical treatment of other 
conceptions that concludes in favour of form through an abductive reasoning in Z.17. 
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essence, universal, and genus–that must lead to the solution to the enquiry: form. 
The form is indeed the ultimate principle that is responsible for the existence and 
the nature of sensible substances and of the other dependent entities. 
2.2.2 A Univocal Conception of Substance 
In Chapter One, I pointed out that Aristotle is committed to two categorial 
classifications: the predicative categories and the ontological categories.48 The 
predicative categories classify the predications (what-it-is; how-much-it-is, etc.) 
that are referred to a subject; the ontological categories classify entities 
(substances, quantities, etc.). Arguably, the multiple conception of substance in 
Z can be reduced to this distinction. For the concept of substance (οὐσία) is 
understood both as an instance of the first genus of being (substance) and as the 
signification of the first genus of predication (substance-of).49 Let me expand on 
this point. The notion of subjecthood and the monadic sense refer to the first 
ontological category; for they indicate the entities that are individual substances 
as opposed to other dependent entities. Thus, they concern the population of the 
genus substance (e.g. humans, horses, plants, etc.). The notion of essentiality 
and the dyadic sense, instead, refer to first predicative category; for they indicate 
the counterparts of the statements of what a substance is. Namely, they concern 
the what-it-is of substances. In the case of sensible substances, this is identified 
with their constitutive form (e.g. human soul for humans, equestrian soul for 
horses). 
     If this insight is correct, there are major consequences for every version of Z’s 
strategy. Unless the enquiry works with the categorial classifications separately, 
it is not designed to exploit the multiple conception of substance. But in Z.1, we 
learned, Aristotle does not apply any distinction between ontological and 
predicative categories.50 He takes up the enquiry into what substance is because 
of the dependence upon substance: every entity depends upon substance 
because substance is the cause of why an entity is. For one thing, this form of 
dependence holds among the items classified by the ontological categories; for 
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 See Section 1.1.1. 
49
 As a matter of fact, the Greek term οὐσία amounts to the nominalization of the expression τί 
ἐστιν. Cf. Menn (2001: 89). 
50
 See Section 1.1.2. 
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the existence of an entity presupposes the existence of a substance. To illustrate, 
that there is an eclipse (i.e. an eclipsed moon) is grounded in the existence of 
moon. For another thing, this form of dependence holds among the items 
classified by the predicative categories; for how a substance is affected 
presupposes what a substance is. To illustrate, that moon is eclipsed is grounded 
in what moon is. Not only does this explain how Aristotle can shift from the 
ontological to the predicative categories, it also proves the uniformity between the 
two classifications. The metaphysician has to prove the existence of some entities 
(i.e. that there is a non-substance) by inferring the demonstrable 
characterizations of substances (i.e. a predication about a substance). Therefore, 
since both ontological and predicative categories underpin the same 
classification, no multiple conception of substance can be at the basis of the 
enquiry. 
     There are other elements that concur with this conclusion.51 First of all, 
commentators tend to infer the plurality of senses of substance from Metaphysics 
∆.8. Aristotle offers the following distinction: 
A) Substance as subject; 
B) Substance as cause of being; 
Bi) Substance as essence; 
Bii) Substance as defining parts. 
(A) substance as subject and (B) substance as cause of being represent the two 
chief notions. In addition, substance as cause of being encompasses (Bi) 
substance as essence and (Bii) substance as defining parts. In all likelihood, (A) 
and (Bi) are the two definitions treated between Z.3 and Z.11.52 Interestingly, 
Aristotle remarks that substance as subject is the sense in which bodies are 
substances (1017b10-14). On the contrary, in Z.3 subject and essence are 
alternative ways to spell out what substance is; that is, they are accounts of 
bodies, which are indeed instances of substance. If Z were meant to contrast the 
senses in ∆.8, Aristotle would not specify that substance, such as a body, 
grounds the existence of other entities and that it can be defined both as subject 
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 For other forms of criticism see Frede-Patzig (1988: Einleitung 36-42) and Menn (2001: 87ff.). 
52
 Arguably, (Bii) corresponds to the accounts as universal and as genus treated in Z.13-16; for 
the defining parts of an object are likely to be universal and generic characterizations, such as 
humanity and animality. On this suggestion see Menn (2001: 96-102). 
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and as essence. Regardless of the definitions, the enquiry is initially designed to 
pursue one single notion. This does not mean that Aristotle separates a monadic 
notion of substance ascribed to bodies from a dyadic notion of substance to be 
enquired. Rather, he tends to refer to the four definitions both in the monadic and 
in the dyadic sense. In other words, his examinations do not simply test whether 
a definition signifies the substance of sensible substances, but whether it signifies 
a substance at all. For example, in Z.13 Aristotle contrasts the universal with both 
the monadic and the dyadic notion of substance and comes to an absolute 
conclusion: no universal is substance.53 Likewise, the summary of H.1 makes it 
explicit that the subject and the essence are substances, while the universal and 
the genus are not; again, there is no trace of a distinction between substance and 
substance-of. The very same approach characterizes his application of 
hylomorphism in Z. Form, matter, and composite are not simply regarded as the 
substance of sensible substances, but also as substance tout court.54 
     In sum, Z’s enquiry does not seem to rest on any multiple conception of 
substance. I contend, by contrast, that the argument is driven by the univocal 
notion we gathered from Z.1: substance is the cause of why other entities are. 
Indeed, this is nothing but the core sense in which an entity is the principle of a 
demonstrative science. Since Aristotle is attempting to ground the demonstrative 
science of being, Z’s enquiry must rest on the univocal conception of the genus 
studied. This becomes clear as soon as we notice that all other senses of 
substance are unified into such a notion. 
     To start with, if substance is the cause of why other entities are, then it will be 
substance in a monadic sense. Namely, substance turns out to be any object, 
such as bodies, that is the subject of other attributes. In Posterior Analytics II.9, 
Aristotle reminds us about a distinction between two objects. The A-objects are 
the genera and the sub-genera studied by a science (e.g. numbers in arithmetic; 
bodies in physics) and are identical with their cause; the B-objects are the 
demonstrable attributes of the relevant genus and are different from their cause. 
The former are accounted for as by an immediate definition, the latter are 
accounted for as by a derivative definition. Importantly, the definition of a 
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 For the attack to the monadic sense see Z.13, 1038b9-16; for the dyadic sense see Z.13, 
1038b16-23. 
54
 See Z.10, 1035a1-4. Also in Z.3 Aristotle concludes that the subject is not a valid solution to 
the enquiry because it identifies οὐσία with an indeterminate matter (Z.3, 1029a26-30) 
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demonstrable attribute is derivative insofar as it presupposes the statement of the 
subject to which the attribute belongs. In metaphysics, substances are A-objects, 
while non-substances are their demonstrable attributes. Therefore, the monadic 
sense of substance is conveyed by the causal function performed by the subject 
of the demonstrations in metaphysics; for substance is the cause in virtue of 
which there is a demonstrable characterization. To use our example from 
astronomy, moon is the cause in virtue of which there is eclipse.55 Among the 
totality of entities, some entities are substances in a monadic sense insofar as 
they are the cause in virtue of which other entities exist. 
     Secondly, if substance is the cause of why other entities are, then it will be 
substance in a dyadic sense. Namely, substance turns out to be the source of 
substantiality. To see this point, we need to return to the causal function 
performed by the principles of a science. When a substance is the cause of other 
entities, the statement of the former grounds the account of the latter; that is, 
substance contributes to accounting for what another entity is. Accordingly, if a 
substance is the cause of other substances, its definition must somehow ground 
their definitions. This causal relationship can be explained in terms of constitution. 
For example, in astronomy the statement of what a celestial body is is constitutive 
of the definition of the moon; thus, celestial body turns out to be the cause of 
moon. In metaphysics, a substance is not only the cause of some non-
substances, but can also be the cause of other substances. In such a case, a 
substance is part of what another entity is and the source of its substantiality. 
Among the totality of entities, some entities will be substances in a dyadic sense 
insofar as they are the cause of what other non-substances and substances are. 
     All senses of substance are then conveyed by the notion of cause of other 
entities. Given this univocal conception, we are finally able to outline the 
argumentative strategy of the enquiry. Metaphysics is the science of being 
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 Some may object that the monadic sense of substance imports the individual status of τόδε τι. 
Consequently, the only substances that could be the cause of why other entities are would be 
particulars, such as Socrates and Bucephalus, and not their species and genera. However, the 
notion of τόδε τι does not necessarily indicate an individual entity. Aristotle employs τόδε τι to refer 
to what is signified by ‘something indivisible and numerically one’ (Cat. 5, 3b10-13) and this could 
be a specific characterization (An. Post. I.4, 73b7-8) or a genus (Top. III.1, 116a23; VI.6, 144a20-
23; Metaph. Z.13, 1038b3-6). Since in scientific contexts individuals are not objects of study, τόδε 
τι turns out to indicate any subject of demonstrable attributes (such as human or horse) that is 
credited with the unity of a scientific principle; for this will be the cause of why there is a 
demonstrable characterization of the subject studied (e.g. capability of learning, or whinnying). 
What matters is that Aristotle embarks on Z’s enquiry without equating being a τόδε τι with being 
an individual. 
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because it studies the genus of substances and its demonstrable attributes, the 
entities in other genera. Z is the enquiry to define substance and thus to establish 
the principle of metaphysics; for substance is the cause of other entities. It could 
be said that to answer what substance is in metaphysics corresponds to 
answering what nature is in physics and what unity is in mathematics; for these 
are the principles grounding the totality of objects studied by the relevant science 
(both primary and secondary objects).56 The principle of metaphysics is not a 
second-order substance beyond the other substances; rather, it is the genus of 
substances listed in Z.2. To use Aristotle’s words, this is the primary substance 
in the hierarchical system of metaphysics. Since the enquiry is focused on 
sensible substances, the principle is initially expected to match the cause of 
sensible substances (i.e. nature in physics); nevertheless, if this domain extends 
to non-sensible reality, the principle will be the cause of suprasensible 
substances too.57 
     In order to identify this primary substance, Aristotle considers four definitions: 
subject, essence, universal, and genus. Unless there are non-sensible 
substances, each definition is expected to indicate either form, matter, or the 
composite of both. In Z.3, the examination of substance as subject fails to 
establish the principle of metaphysics. If substance is defined as subject, 
substance is opposed to any scientific characterization; basically, not only is 
substance opposed to its demonstrable attributes (what-substance-is-like, how-
much-substance-is, etc.), but also to the signification of its definition (what 
substance is). The primary substance is initially identified with an indeterminate 
matter, which can hardly be the cause of other entities. The examination of 
substance as essence in Z.4-6 appears to be more promising. Every substance 
is indeed a primary object of metaphysics and possesses an essence and a 
definition; more precisely, every substance is one and the same as its essence. 
Aristotle carries out this examination by focusing on the constitution of a definition 
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 To illustrate, nature is the principle of physics grounding its primary objects, bodies, and its 
secondary objects, motions. Correspondingly, substance is the principle of metaphysics 
grounding its primary objects, other substances, and its secondary objects, non-substances. 
57
 A univocal conception of substance is also proposed by Frede-Patzig (1988) and Menn (2001). 
Frede-Patzig take substance to be the individual form that constitutes every sensible object, e.g. 
Socrates’ soul. Menn argues that substance is absolutely understood as a further principle beyond 
the sensible objects. Contra Menn, I agree with Frede-Patzig that substance is a certain item in 
the category of substance and form is the solution suggested in Z.10-11. Contra Frede-Patzig, I 
agree with Menn that substance will ultimately be a substance beyond the sensible objects, which 
cannot be identified in Z, i.e. God. 
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in Z.10-11; for this can be illustrative of the essential elements constituting a 
substance. Since a definition is the statement of an essence, and since a 
definition seems to signify only the form of a substance, the primary substance is 
then identified with the form. Form is the cause of other entities insofar as it is 
presupposed by the definitions of non-substances and constitutes the definition 
of substances. Hence, form is the principle of metaphysics. 
     There is a problem with this solution, however. When Aristotle takes up the 
examination of substance as universal in Z.13-16, his criticism undermines the 
entire enquiry; for it is impossible to define any substance in terms of the 
constitution expressed by its definition. Indeed, every substance turns out to be 
either composite or non-composite. If it is composite, it will depend upon its 
constituents; thus, it will fail to hold primacy and unity. If it is non-composite, it will 
not be knowable; thus, it will fail to ground a demonstrative science. The point is 
that the study of the genus of substances leads to identifying the primary 
substance with their ultimate essential element. For example, human will be 
constituted by animal, animal will be constituted by body, body will be constituted 
by continuum and so on until the genus itself. This procedure marks the failure of 
the enquiry insofar as on this account no entity can be the cause of other entities. 
Indirectly, Aristotle is then able to infer that the principle of metaphysics cannot 
be established by looking at sensible substances. Rather, it is necessary to admit 
the existence of a suprasensible substance that, if correctly defined, will ground 
the totality of entities. By looking at sensible substances it is merely possible to 
envision this principle through a derivative definition. This account is provided in 
Z.17. The chapter sets out a demonstrative definition according to which a 
sensible substance is such-and-such a matter in virtue of such-and-such a cause. 
On the one hand, Z’s enquiry fails to establish the principle of metaphysics; on 
the other, it answers what substance is within sensible reality.  
2.3 A Logical Analysis 
The last issue I want to address in this Chapter concerns how Aristotle effects his 
strategy in the course of the enquiry. In other words, we need to clarify the method 
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to establish the primary substance within sensible reality. The key signpost, I 
maintain, is found in the preamble of Z.4. Having discarded the definition as 
subject, Aristotle announces he will undertake the examination of the definition 
as essence ‘in a logical way’ (λογικῶς). Much of Z’s argument is shaped by this 
logical turn; for the enquiry is driven from the direct analysis of entities toward the 
analysis of the statements accounting for them. Aristotle will thus inspect the 
relations among the terms stated in order to establish conclusions about the 
actual objects of metaphysics (i.e. substances and the dependent entities). 
     Let us start with an analysis of the signpost.  
At the beginning we distinguished the several ways in which substance is 
accounted, and one of these appeared to be the essence. Accordingly, we must 
now investigate this. And first let us discuss about it in a logical way. (1029b1-13, 
Bostock’s translation slightly modified) 
Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν ἀρχῇ διειλόµεθα πόσοις ὁρίζοµεν τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τούτων ἕν τι ἐδόκει 
εἶναι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ. καὶ πρῶτον εἴπωµεν ἔνια περὶ αὐτοῦ 
λογικῶς. 
Commentators tend to raise two main questions about the notion of λογικῶς: i) 
What does λογικῶς mean? ii) What is the extension of the ‘logical analysis’?58 As 
for (ii), we can make some preliminary observations. First of all, the logical 
analysis appears to be suitable for the forthcoming discussion. Since Aristotle 
claims to take up this procedure in conjunction with the examination of the 
essence, we could suppose that the adverb λογικῶς is meant to separate the new 
phase of enquiry from the examination of the subject. The same idea is suggested 
by Z.17, in which Aristotle argues that substance as cause amounts to substance 
defined as essence in a logical way (1041a27-28). Again, the logical analysis 
seems to separate the examination of the essence from the discussion conducted 
in Z.17. 
2.3.1 Some interpretations 
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 Cf. Burnyeat (2000: 19); Galluzzo (2013a: 57-59). 
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The debate about the notion of λογικῶς reproduces the general debate about Z’s 
strategy. Some commentators insist on its dialectical character, some others 
defend its preliminary role for the science of being. According to the traditional 
interpretation, λογικῶς designates a dialectical analysis that is excessively based 
on universal and abstract considerations about its object. Within a science, a 
logical analysis yields an empty reasoning in that it lacks the accuracy ensured 
by the application of the relevant principles. A classic example is given in On the 
Generation of Animals I.8: a logical explanation about the sterility of mules is 
rejected in favour of explanations based on the coldness at the conception 
(747b28ff.). Thus, λογικῶς amounts to a pejorative synonym of διαλεκτικῶς.59 In 
this light, Ross reduces the logical analysis of Z.4 to some linguistic observations 
about the concept of essence; this analysis would terminate at 1030a27, in which 
the observations about ‘how we speak of things’ are superseded by the 
observations about ‘how things are’.60 Since the concept of essence is initially 
spelled out in terms of common ideas (such as ‘what is said per se’) and 
abstracted from empirical facts, this turns out to be a dialectical investigation that 
is merely plausible and not scientifically true.61 What is unconvincing about the 
dialectical interpretation is that λογικῶς can hardly be limited to general linguistic 
observations as opposed to proper scientific arguments. In On the Generation of 
Animals I.8, for example, the logical explanation is not deemed to be empty 
because it falls outside the scope of the science; rather, it is empty because of its 
generality, which prevents it from indicating the appropriate cause. Admittedly, 
such a general character is shared with dialectic, though it does not make it a 
procedure for testing theses.62 Moreover, at 1030a27 Aristotle argues that 
essence belongs to substances either exclusively or primarily, regardless of the 
focus of our examination. Since his conclusion has already been established in 
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 For other negative uses of λογικῶς see Metaph. Γ.3, 1005b22; N.1, 1087b20; Eth. Eud. I.8, 
1217b16-21. 
60
 See Ross (1924: 168-171). Owen (1960: n.32) points out that the linguistic analysis marked as 
logical is meant to show through linguistic devices (i.e. addition and subtraction) the primacy of 
substance that is later proved through the focal analysis of being. This makes it an auxiliary 
argument. Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: 59). 
61
 Irwin (1988: 210-213), considers the logical analysis of Z.4 to be an instance of the pure dialectic 
that must be contrasted with the scientific method of metaphysics, the strong dialectic. Similarly, 
Bolton (2002: 163; n. 5) argues that λογικῶς introduces a Topics style discussion that must be 
contrasted with the method of the Analytics. See also Lewis (2013: 76-83), who identifies the 
logical analysis with the data of the received views on the subject, i.e. how philosophers have 
been treating essence. 
62
 For a review of the passages that witness the neutral use of λογικῶς see Lemarie (2016) 
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the text, there is no need to contrast the logical analysis with the subsequent 
remarks.63 
     A sample of the alternative interpretation is given in Burnyeat’s A Map of 
Metaphysics Z. His starting point is the review of the senses of λογικῶς offered 
by Simplicius in his commentary on the Physics.64 The term, says Simplicius, 
conveys the following ideas:  
a) Based on reputable premises; 
b) Not based on empirical facts; 
c) Based on general rather than proper principles in a science. 
In the dialectical interpretation of λογικῶς, (c) is subordinate to (a) and (b). On 
the contrary, Burnyeat takes (c) to be at the core of Aristotle’s usage. The notion 
of λογικῶς designates an analysis that abstracts from the principles that are 
proper to the subject-matter of a science. For example, a logical analysis 
conducted in physics does not rely on the principles of sensible entities, i.e. form 
and matter. Since Z’s enquiry is primarily concerned with sensible entities too, 
the logical analysis of Z.4 is a discussion that abstracts from the same 
hylomorphic principles. Indeed, these principles appear to contribute to the 
treatment of essence only in Z.10-11. In a logical context, the arguments are not 
conceived to state the cause of a fact and, thus, to articulate a demonstration 
within the relevant science. This is the sign of their general character.65 
     According to Burnyeat, there is another salient sense conveyed in Aristotle’s 
usage. The notion of λογικῶς designates an analysis that draws on the materials 
of the so-called logical works. In other words, a logical analysis consists in 
applying doctrines and conceptual tools that are found in the Organon. For 
example, in Z.3 Aristotle starts from the doctrine of the ultimate subject of 
predication defended in the Categories; in Z.4, the concept of essence is firstly 
defined with reference to the notion of per se elaborated in Posterior Analytics 
I.4; in Z.13, Aristotle addresses his criticism against the idea of universal outlined 
in De Interpretatione 7 (17a38-b1). The fundamental insight is that the logical 
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 For this criticism see Woods (1974-75: 170-171), Burnyeat (2000: 19-25), and Galluzzo (2013a: 
60-61). Woods, in particular, considers the logical analysis to cover the initial section in which 
Aristotle defines essence as ‘what is said per se’ (Z.4, 1029b13-22). On this passage see Section 
3.3.2. 
64
 See Simplicius (In Phys., 440.19-441.2). 
65
 In Burnyeat’s terminology, this is Simplicius’ sense of λογικῶς. 
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analysis plays a pedagogic function in the study of metaphysics; for it recalls 
argumentative patterns that must be familiar to the metaphysician.66 At the same 
time, the logical analysis can hardly exhaust a metaphysical discussion because 
it is alien to the hylomorphic principles; rather, Burnyeat suggests that a logical 
analysis raises conceptual difficulties that are to be solved through the application 
of form and matter. These combined senses of λογικῶς help Burnyeat to defend 
his two-level procedure of Z.67 In the enquiry, every examination of the candidates 
starts with a logical analysis and is completed by a discussion in hylomorphic 
terms. 
     Undoubtedly, Burnyeat is able to vindicate the preliminary role of the logical 
analysis without missing the provisional and general character that makes it 
closer to a dialectical discussion. The problem with this reading is that Aristotle 
does not seem to follow such a rigid plan in alternating logical and hylomorphic 
phases of enquiry. The examinations of the subject and of the universal can be 
divided up into two sections less easily than the examination of the essence.68 
Rather, it is evident that form and matter are pivotal in some logical arguments. 
For example, in Z.10-11, Aristotle identifies the primary substance with form on 
the basis of an analysis of definitions, which turn out to be exclusively constituted 
of formal parts; similarly, in Z.17 the Analytics model of demonstration is 
employed through the notions of matter and form. Besides, we can make little 
sense of two facts highlighted above: for one thing, the notion of λογικῶς 
introduces a phase of the enquiry that breaks from the previous examination of 
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 In Burnyeat’s terminology, this is Andronicus’ sense of λογικῶς. Clearly, this reading 
presupposes that Aristotle conceives the Organon as a unified set of treatises with common 
objects and scopes. For this view see Burnyeat (2001: Ch. 5). 
67
 See 2.2.1 above. Similar views are suggested by Averroes and Aquinas in their commentaries. 
However, unlike Burnyeat, they consider Z to be logical in its entirety. Averroes (In Metaph. VII, 
2.153 K-L) offers a reading that is close to Andronicus’ sense: Z is logical because its starting 
points are dialectical theses (definition, predication). Since metaphysics and dialectic are both 
concerned with the same subject-matter, these doctrines represent the appropriate basis of the 
science of being. Aquinas (Expositio, L.3: 1306), instead, takes Z to be logical because form and 
matter represent the results of its enquiry and not its starting points (like in H). The starting points 
of Z are common arguments that are functional to a conceptual treatment of substance as 
opposed to a fully realist treatment. On this topic see Galluzzo (2013a: 146-150; 237-241). 
68
 With the subject, Aristotle would confine the logical analysis to three lines only (Z.3, 1028a36-
1029a1), while with the essence it would cover the whole Z.4-6. With the universal, the 
hylomorphic analysis is supposed to take place in Z.15, but the core thesis of the chapter is the 
impossibility of defining and to know particular entities.   
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the subject; for another thing, the logical analysis seems to be suitable to treating 
the essence. 
2.3.2 Logical Problems, Logical Discussions, and Logical Arguments 
To isolate the different senses of λογικῶς does not seem to achieve any definite 
result, neither by insisting on its dialectical character nor by insisting on its 
preliminary role. This prevents us from understanding the meaning and the 
extension of the logical analysis and from showing how Z’s strategy is put into 
effect. Presumably, we can gather more elements from answering not ‘What does 
λογικῶς mean?’, but ‘What does λογικῶς refer to?’. By looking at the items that 
are qualified as ‘logical’ we will be able to give a preliminary insight into the notion 
and, thus, to establish the extension of such an analysis in Z. 
     In Aristotle’s works, it is possible to detect three kinds of items to which 
λογικῶς is referred. 
i) Problems; 
ii) Discussions; 
iii) Arguments. 
The adjective form λογικός is generally applied to problems and arguments,69 
while the adverbial form λογικῶς qualifies the way in which a discussion can be 
conducted.70 The logical characterization of arguments does not look very 
explanatory. The term is employed to separate a type of reasoning from other 
types, such as genuine demonstrations and enthymemes. Arguably, in the first 
case the deduction is not scientific because it does not state the cause of the fact 
inferred; in the second case, the deduction is not rhetorical because it does not 
state a possibility through persuasion. What is interesting is that the logical 
argument can be both contrasted with and placed alongside the other types of 
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 As for arguments see An. Post. II.8, 93a15 (συλλογισµός); Top. VIII.12, 162b27 (λόγος); De 
Gen. An. I.8, 747b28 (ἀπόδειξις); Rhet. I.1, 1355a13 (συλλογισµούς). As for problems, see Top. 
I.14, 105b20ff.; V.1, 129a30-31 (πρόβληµα, προτάσεις); Phys. 3.3, 202a22 (ἀπορίαν); Metaph. 
Γ.3, 1005b22 (δυσχερείας); N.1, 1087b20 (δυσχερείας).  
70
 See An. Post. I.21, 82b35 (θεωροῦσιν); I.22, 84a7, b2 (πιστεύσειε, δέδεικται); I.24, 86a22 
(εἰρηµένων); I.32, 88a19 (θεωροῦσιν); Phys. 3.5, 204b4-10 (σκοπουµένοις); De Cael. I.7, 275b12 
(ἐπιχειρεῖν); De Gen. et Cor. I.2, 316a11 (σκοποῦντες); Metaph. Z.4, 1029b13 (εἴπωµεν); 
1030a25 (φασί); Z.17, 1041a28 (εἰπεῖν); Λ.1, 1069a28 (ζητεῖν); Eth. Eud. I.8, 1217b16-21 
(διασκοπεῖν, λέγεται). 
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arguments. This, however, does not enable us to separate the negative from the 
neutral sense. In a science, a logical argument can be totally inappropriate, as 
with the explanation of mules’ sterility, and yet parallel to genuine demonstrations, 
as suggested in the Analytics.71 
     The logical characterizations of problems and discussions are definitely more 
illustrative. First of all, Aristotle seems to suggest that in a science a non-logical 
problem can be treated either logically or non-logically. Both cases are 
exemplified in On Generation and Corruption I.2, which examines indivisible 
magnitudes as principles of absolute motion (i.e. change). These principles are 
identified with surfaces by Platonists and with atoms by Democritus. Aristotle tells 
us that the Platonist solution, unlike Democritus’, follows from a logical treatment 
(λογικῶς σκοποῦντες) that blatantly fails to explain generation and corruption of 
non-solid things. Thus, the negative value of such a logical analysis stems from 
its inappropriate application to physical matters, for which atoms represent a 
better, albeit still invalid, solution.72 Things look different with the treatment of 
genuinely logical problems. In Physics III.3, Aristotle raises a logical difficulty 
(ἀπορίαν λογικήν): how can there be one single actuality for two distinct objects, 
the mover and the moved? There is no suggestion of a fully physical treatment to 
tackle the problem; rather, Aristotle concludes that the actualities of mover and 
moved must be distinct in formula (τῷ λόγῳ), although they indicate one single 
object, the motion itself. 
     In a science, logical problems and discussions can feature in an appropriate 
way. The point is that since what is logical is not relevant to an explanatory 
procedure, it must be relevant to other contexts. What is the context that is 
common to these applications of the term? The answer I submit is quite obvious: 
logical problems and logical discussions are concerned with statements (λόγοι). 
Basically, what is qualified as logical is not focused on scientific facts, but on the 
statements accounting for the objects of the science. Consider Physics III.5, 
in which Aristotle logically denies the existence of an infinite body (204b1-10). 
This conclusion is established by examining the statement accounting for what 
body is. Since a body is ‘whatever is limited by a surface’, the statement 
accounting for an infinite body would consist of contradictory elements: ‘limited’ 
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 Cf. An. Post., I.21, 82b35; I.22, 84a7; b2. 
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 Just as in the case of De Gen. An. I.8. Cf. De Cael. III.1, 298b15-25. 
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and ‘unlimited’ (i.e. infinite).73 This discussion is indeed closer to the treatment of 
the logical difficulty of III.3, which deals with the distinction between the 
statements accounting for the mover and the moved. The central idea is that in a 
science a scientist can be concerned not only with the relevant explananda, but 
also with issues about statements. A set of passages in the Posterior Analytics 
concur with this reading. At I.21-22, Aristotle claims to show the impossibility of 
infinite chains of predications both logically and analytically.74 Whereas the 
analytical discussion is focused on the explanatory tie between predications, the 
logical discussion is focused on the relations between the statements of such 
predications.75 In particular, Aristotle argues that every predication comes to an 
end with the statement of a definitional predication; namely, a chain of predicates 
(e.g. endowed with memory, capable of learning etc.) ends with the predicates 
that are stated to account for the subject (e.g. what human is). 
     Let us go back to Z’s enquiry. Clearly, the enquirer is not concerned with 
explanations, but with the principle to ground explanations about the totality of 
entities, i.e. substance. In Z.4, Aristotle intends to show that essence effectively 
defines substance. What is remarkable is that this conclusion is established by 
looking at the statements that account for entities. More precisely, Aristotle infers 
that substances possess and are identical with their essence from the fact that 
every substance possesses a definition (1030a6-17; a28ff.). Since a definition is 
the statement of an essence, and since there is identity between the definiens 
and the definiendum, every substance turns out to be its own essence (Z.6).76 On 
the contrary, non-substances do not possess definitions; for they are accounted 
for as by derivative statements. For example, ‘pale’ is accounted for as by adding 
‘pale’ to ‘human’ so that ‘pale human’ is the definiens of ‘pale’. Basically, a non-
substance is always accounted in relation to the essence of a substance. 
Therefore, a non-substance is not an essence.77 Now, there are reasons to think 
that the analysis of the statements accounting for substances and non-
substances is at the core of the remainder of Z. The examination of Z.4-6 
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 The same conclusion can be established in a physical way (III.5, 204b10ff.). 
74
 Cf. An. Post. I.21, 82b34-35; I.22, 84a6-7; 84b1-2. 
75
 The idea is that if there were infinite predications, there would be infinite explanatory 
deductions; for it would be possible to infinitely mediate the premises through an additional 
predication. Consequently, knowledge would be either circular or infinite. 
76
 For the reconstruction of the argument of Z.4-6 see Chapter Three. 
77
 This discussion is expanded in Z.5, in which Aristotle is concerned with the derivative 
statements in which two terms are coupled to account for an entity, e.g. snub is a concave nose. 
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represents the basis for the discussion of the parts of definition in Z.10-11. Having 
concluded that the principle of metaphysics is an essence, Aristotle attempts to 
identify the primary substance through his hylomorphism. Again, the enquiry is 
driven toward statements, in particular definitions. In order to establish what entity 
is the principle of metaphysics, we need to establish what parts of a substance 
are stated in its definition; for the primary substance will be the ultimate element 
that is constitutive of the definitions of substances.78 
     From this perspective, Z.12 looks to be wisely incorporated into the book. At 
1037b9-14, Aristotle tells us that the explanation of the unity of the parts of 
definition, genus and differentia, will contribute to the enquiry into substance. The 
reason is that the unity of those parts will prove to be the unity of the 
corresponding entity. It is widely agreed that the issue receives a final answer in 
H.6.79 Remarkably, there is a salient change of approach between these 
chapters: while Z.12 is conceived to explain the unity of substance by arguing for 
the unity of definition, H.6 is conceived to explain the unity of definition by arguing 
for the unity of substance.80 The same focus can be recognized in the criticism of 
the universal in Z.13-14. In order to show that the universal is not the principle of 
metaphysics, Aristotle addresses the universal not simply as an entity, but also 
as an element that is constitutive of the definition of a substance (1038b17-23; 
1039a26-30). Namely, the universal is a notion that is constitutive of a plurality of 
other statements accounting for entities. For example, the notion of animal (i.e. 
the statement of what an animal is) is constitutive of the statements accounting 
for human and horse. The criticism ends with a dilemma that is indeed centred 
on the impossibility of definitions of substances and, thus, of the primary 
substance; namely, the impossibility of grounding metaphysics.81 
     At this point, we are in a good position to demarcate the extension of the 
logical analysis. Undoubtedly, the term employed in Z.4 is meant to qualify the 
treatment of the essence, which is signification of a definition and is identified with 
substance. This discussion includes Z.4-5 and, probably, Z.6. Nevertheless, the 
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 Since the parts of a definition are only the formal parts, Aristotle concludes that the principle of 
the totality of entities is the form itself. 
79
 It is matter of dispute whether H.6 develops or breaks with the solution in Z.12. See Gill (2010) 
and Code (2010a) for two different readings. See also Chapter Six. 
80
 Compare Z.12, 1037b8-14 with H.6, 1045a7-20. 
81
 See Z.13, 1039a14-22 (cf. Z.16, 1041a3-4). Contrary to many commentators, I will argue that 
the aporia at the end of Z.13 is a serious obstacle to any positive solution to Z’s enquiry. See 
Chapter Five. 
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discussion of Z.10-16 is oriented in the same direction; for Aristotle is mainly 
interested in the content of the statements that account for substances: the 
definitions of the primary objects of metaphysics.82 As a matter of fact, from Z.4 
to Z.16 the enquiry shares the focus of the logical analyses conducted within a 
science. Aristotle is primarily concerned with the statements that account for the 
objects of metaphysics, i.e. entities.83 It could be said that Z’s enquiry offers a 
unitary argument that, after the dismissal of the subject in Z.3, leads first to a 
formalist solution through essentialism and second to the difficulties flowing from 
that solution. 
 
2.3.3 The Platonist Roots of λογικῶς 
In light of its peculiar ‘subject-matter’, we were able to understand how far Z’s 
enquiry is logically oriented. Now, we need to give an answer about the meaning 
of λογικῶς; that is, to understand how such a shift from entities to statements 
affects the enquiry. To this end, I want to call the attention to a sense of the term 
that has never been considered to be relevant to Z.4: the notion of λογικῶς often 
qualifies a Platonic treatment of a question. This use of the term has already 
emerged in the previous sections. In On Generation and Corruption, the Platonic 
argument for indivisible surfaces is qualified as logical and compared to the 
Atomists’ solution, which is more appropriate to a physical problem. What is 
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 This reconstruction concurs with Menn’s interpretation of Z. In Z.10-16, Aristotle seems to tackle 
B#6, whether the principles are the genera (i.e. formal) or material elements, and the other aporiai 
(B#7-9) that follow from the assumption of genera as principles. The advantage of my reading is 
that Z.10-11 completes the examination of essence in Z.4-6, as can be inferred from their 
argument. 
83
 I am inclined to think that Z.7-9 is an interpolation, possibly due to a later editor. In general, Z.7-
9 clashes with other chapters about salient issues. Firstly, the incorruptible character of the form 
is advocated in Z.10-11 in order to show that the form does not dissolve into materials; in Z.8, 
instead, this is advocated to bring the process of change to an end (Z.8, 1033a28-b11). Secondly, 
Z.7 argues that the bronze of a bronze sphere is part of its definition (Z.7, 1032b31-a5), while 
Z.10-11 seems to discard this option (Z.10, 1035a9-22). Thirdly, at Z.8, 1033b29-33 Aristotle 
exploits the numerical unity of substances to rule out Plato’s Forms, but this move does not yield 
the impossibility of establishing definitions as indicated in Z.13. Fourthly, at Z.7, 1032a20-21 
Aristotle relies on a notion of matter as potentiality that is alien to the rest of Z (in Z.3 the notion 
of matter is indeed opposed to its potentialities). 
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interesting is that this is the prevalent use of the notion in the Metaphysics. The 
beginning of book Λ represents a clear example. 
The thinkers of the present day tend to posit universals as substances; for the 
genera are the universals, and these they tend to describe as principles and 
substances on the basis of purely logical investigations (διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ζητεῖν). 
The old thinkers, instead, used to posit particulars as substances, such as fire 
and earth, and not what is common, i.e. the body. (Λ.1, 1069a25-30, The Revised 
Oxford Translation slightly modified) 
οἱ µὲν οὖν νῦν τὰ καθόλου οὐσίας µᾶλλον τιθέασιν (τὰ γὰρ γένη καθόλου, ἅ φασιν 
ἀρχὰς καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι µᾶλλον διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ζητεῖν)· οἱ δὲ πάλαι τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, 
οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ κοινόν, σῶµα. 
Aristotle informs us about two traditions of studies in metaphysics. Whereas the 
Pre-Socratics used to identify the first principles with simple material bodies (e.g. 
fire, earth, etc.), Platonists tend to identify the first principles with the universals 
(i.e. the genera). The solution endorsed by Platonists is a modern advancement 
in metaphysics; for principles are now credited with a common existence as 
opposed to the individual existence of entities. The point is that the Platonist 
solution is the result of their ‘logical investigating’. If the above observations are 
correct, the enquiry into substance conducted by Platonists is logical in that it 
diverts the attention from entities to the statements that account for them. 
     The review of past philosophical positions given in book A confirms this 
insight. In A.5-6, Aristotle reports a similar turn in methods and contents. 
Pythagoreans are the first to take up the procedures of defining and accounting 
for objects (987a19ff.). It is only with Plato, however, that the focus on definitions 
is effectively employed in metaphysical discussions. The first principles can be 
detected through a study of the definitions, which are referred to some entities 
separated from sensible reality, the Forms. Thus, the introduction of the Forms, 
says Aristotle, is the result of an examination conducted among statements (διὰ 
τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγένετο σκέψιν, 987b31-32). The statements turn out to be the 
most valuable means understanding the separated status of the principles; for 
the metaphysician can accomplish this task through pure reasoning and without 
the contribution of sense perception.84 In this respect, the Platonist metaphysics 
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resembles the logical analysis set out in Z.4. There are a couple of things to bear 
in mind. The notion of λογικῶς does not necessarily mark a discussion as 
‘Platonist’. With this use of the term, Aristotle is highlighting some aspects that 
characterize Platonist arguments, namely the subject-matter and the method of 
investigation. Although the logical analysis of Z.4 also leads to a formalist 
solution, it does not have to be assimilated to a Platonist treatment of substance. 
More plausible is that their common approach might be responsible for the same 
ontological limitations, which emerge in the criticism of universal. Nevertheless, 
this sense of λογικῶς is crucial to identifying the methodological features that the 
logical analysis of Z shares with the Platonist arguments. For these will illustrate 
in what sense Aristotle reconceives his enquiry into substance. 
     There is a specific trait that must characterize every discussion that is focused 
on statements: the inspection of the predicative relations held by the terms 
stated. In a science, a conclusion about a demonstrable fact is obtained from the 
analysis of the relations among the elements that constitute the fact. For example, 
the conclusion that there is an eclipse (i.e. loss of light from moon) is obtained 
from the relations between moon, eclipse, and the screening of sun by earth. 
Indeed, the scientist proves that the subject under study is characterized by a per 
se attribute. What matters to us is that demonstrable facts correspond to 
statements. The characterization of a subject by some attribute corresponds to 
the statement that some predicate belongs to the subject. If the enquiry is focused 
on statements, the scientist has then to analyse the relations among the 
predicates that constitute such statements. For example, the conclusion that 
‘there is an eclipse’ (i.e. ‘loss of light belongs to moon’) is obtained from the 
analysis of the relations between the predicates ‘moon’, ‘eclipse/loss of light’, and 
‘earth screening’. Accordingly, the metaphysician has to analyse the relations 
among the predicates that constitute such statements; these are the statements 
that correspond to the objects of metaphysics, entities. For example, the 
conclusion that ‘there is a quality Q’ (i.e. ‘Q belongs to substance S’) is obtained 
from the analysis of the relations between the predicates ‘Q’ and ‘S’; that is, the 
existence and the nature of a quality are in relation to the substance that is 
qualified. In Z.4, Aristotle exploits these relations to argue that essence belongs 
to substances either exclusively or primarily. Basically, it is possible to separate 
substances from non-substances through an examination of the statements 
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accounting for these objects.85 For such a logical discussion, the enquirer must 
rely on a structured system of kind terms that are stated to account for 
demonstrable facts. 
     In Chapter One, I pointed out that Aristotle relies on such a system of kinds 
for his exposition of the schemes of dialectic. More importantly, I noticed that this 
system is reminiscent of the network of Forms at the basis of Plato’s late 
metaphysics; the knowledge of principles is achieved by scanning the 
connections among the predicates that indicate each Form.86 In the Topics, 
Aristotle formulates the schemes to attack and to defend a thesis with reference 
to the system of kinds inherited from Plato. In the Metaphysics, he attempts to 
establish the principle of a demonstrative science with reference to the same 
system. There is a fundamental difference in these pictures. With the logical 
analysis of Z.4, Aristotle relies on the system of kind terms not to test the 
predicative relations stated in plausible theses, but to study the predicative 
relations to be stated in a science; for these predicative relations correspond with 
the real connections among entities. Accordingly, the notion of λογικῶς does not 
mark the dialectical character of the discussion. It indicates a procedure to 
establish the principle of metaphysics by inspecting the same relations that are 
tested in dialectic. 
    Though indirectly, the Platonist sense of λογικῶς makes a salient contribution 
to our understanding of the analysis of Z.4. Since Aristotle tends to qualify as 
logical every discussion that is focused on statements, his use to refer to Platonist 
discussions sounds very appropriate; for Platonist metaphysics is focused on the 
statements that account for the connections among Forms. In order to examine 
the statements that account for the objects of metaphysics, Aristotle bears in mind 
the system of kind terms that also grounds Platonist metaphysics. From a cursory 
overview of Z, we can recognize at least three major predicative relations. A first 
relation is the identity between two terms insofar as if they signify one and the 
same object. Aristotle insists on this predicative relation at the start of Z.4 and 
throughout Z.6. To illustrate, a substance is identical with its essence because 
there is one single object that is signified by a definition. A second relation is the 
immediacy that characterizes a definition in that cannot be deduced from other 
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statements. Aristotle insists on this predicative relation in the main body of Z.4 
and in Z.5. An essence belongs to a substance primarily because there is no 
further statement to mediate a definition. A third relation is the essential parthood 
that characterizes the elements of a definition, i.e. genus and differentia. Aristotle 
insists on this predicative relation in Z.10-16. The parts of a definition are the 
constitutive cause of what the definiendum is. 
     To sum up, the logical turn of Z’s strategy consists of a type of analysis that is 
reminiscent of Platonist metaphysics. Rather than focusing on entities, Aristotle 
examines their corresponding statements and, thus, the predicative relations 
involved. This move looks very suitable for the examination of the essence, which 
is the content signified by a definition. The formalist solution to Z’s enquiry (i.e. 
form is the principle of metaphysics, the primary substance) is indeed inferred 
from a logical analysis. In this light, we can confirm the pre-scientific value of the 
enquiry beyond the application of hylomorphism; for Z is not a dialectical 
treatment of statements but an analysis of their content insofar as it signifies an 
ontological fact (e.g. the existence of a quality and, thus, that ‘a quality belongs 
to a substance’). 
 
2.4 Interim Conclusions 
In order to establish the principle of metaphysics, Z’s enquiry examines different 
definitions of substance. In other words, Z’s enquiry is concerned with the first 
genus of entities and its definition. This makes it neither a dialectical nor an 
aporematic discussion. Z is part of the project to develop the demonstrative 
science of being, consisting of the definitional knowledge of substances (i.e. the 
primary objects of metaphysics encompassed by the genus substance) and the 
demonstrative knowledge of non-substances (i.e. the secondary objects of 
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metaphysics encompassed by other genera). Four definitions of substance are 
examined in the book–subject (Z.3), essence (Z.4-6, Z.10-11), universal and 
genus (Z.13-16). Since the enquiry is focused on the domain of sensible reality, 
each definition is expected to identify substance with either form, matter, or the 
composite of both; for the principle of metaphysics has to match one of the 
principles of physics. 
     In conducting his examinations, Aristotle shifts from the analysis of entities to 
the analysis of their statements, namely the statements accounting for them. This 
logical turn is found in Z.4 and orientates most of the enquiry. In order to establish 
the principle of metaphysics, Aristotle examines the predicative relations that are 
involved in accounting for entities; above all, this means examining definitions, 
which are the statements accounting for substances. It is not surprising then that 
essentialism turns out to be the most promising solution to Z’s enquiry: the 
definition of a substance is the statement of an essence that grounds the 
existence and the nature of other entities just as the definition grounds the 
demonstrations conducted in metaphysics. However, this leads the enquiry to 
identify substance with the constitution of a definition and, thus, to raise some 
difficulties for essentialism itself. At the end of the day, there is no way to define 
substance but by a derivative definition. This marks the failure of Z’s enquiry. 
     What is interesting in this picture is that Aristotle’s strategy lines up with my 
approach to Z. The enquiry into substance corresponds to an enquiry into a 
definition. For one thing, Aristotle is after the entity grounding the existence and 
the nature of other entities; for another thing, Aristotle is after the definition that 
grounds the demonstrations conducted in metaphysics. In the next four chapters, 
I will discuss the major problems about substance in the light of the ‘theory of 
definition’ outlined earlier on. Since the treatment of definition revolves around 
the primacy and the unity of the statement, Aristotle’s enquiry into substance will 
revolve around the primacy and the unity of substance. For this will make the 
entity and its definition the principle grounding the demonstrative science of 
being. 
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Chapter Three 
Definition and Primacy (I) 
In the previous Chapters, I argued that Z’s enquiry aims to establish the principle 
of metaphysics by answering what substance is. The most promising approach 
to this enquiry is to take advantage of the correspondence between substance 
and definition: substance is the entity grounding the existence of other entities 
just as definition is the statement grounding demonstrations in a science. As a 
matter of fact, Z’s strategy overlaps with my approach: Aristotle drives his enquiry 
from examining entities to examining the statements accounting for them. 
Consequently, much of Z is focused on definitions, which are the statements 
accounting for substances. There are two issues about definition that, we can 
expect, will emerge in Z: primacy and unity. In metaphysics, Aristotle is bound to 
deal with the corresponding primacy and unity of substance. The next two 
Chapters are concerned with primacy. Chapter Three explores the doctrine of 
essentialism developed in Z.4-6; Chapter Four explores the application of 
hylomorphism in Z.10-11. My contention is that Aristotle endorses a formalist 
essentialism in order to ensure the primacy of substance. More precisely, his 
solution to Z’s enquiry is that the principle of metaphysics can be appropriately 
spelled out as essence and identified with the form of substances. 
     In what follows, I discuss two central ideas behind Aristotle’s essentialism: the 
identity thesis and the essential dependence. Both these ideas, I shall argue, 
contribute to securing that substance holds absolute primacy over the other 
entities. The identity thesis establishes that a substance is one and the same as 
its essence. Aristotle attempts to infer it in Z.6: the identity between an object and 
its essence is the identity in definition; this is possible only in the case of the 
primary objects of a science, such as substances in metaphysics. Therefore, the 
endorsement of the identity thesis reveals the primacy of substance. However, 
the argument of Z.6 is not cogent because it is not supported by a distinction 
between primary objects and secondary objects in metaphysics. This task is 
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accomplished in Z.4, in which Aristotle assumes the identity thesis. By separating 
primary and secondary objects of metaphysics, Aristotle comes to the following 
conclusion: essence belongs to substances either exclusively or primarily. In 
either way, I contend, Aristotle aims to ensure the primacy of substance in terms 
of essential dependence: an entity depends upon substance because the 
essence of the latter is the cause of the essence of the former. This form of 
ontological dependence establishes a distinction between primary and secondary 
objects in metaphysics; for it separates the immediate definition accounting for 
substances from the derivative definition accounting for non-substances. If this is 
correct, the essentialism developed in Z.4-6 is conceived to ensure the primacy 
of substance. Indeed, the identity thesis and the essential dependence enable 
Aristotle to ground the demonstrative science of the totality of entities, in which 
the principle is essence. 
3.1 What is Aristotelian Essentialism? 
In modern philosophy, essentialism is a metaphysical doctrine according to which 
every object possesses the intrinsic source of its being what it is. This source is 
the essence of the object and is traditionally understood in two ways. An essence 
can be a set of attributes characterizing the object; for example, the essence of 
Socrates is the collection of features, such as rational, biped etc., that make up 
his human nature.1 From a different perspective, an essence can be a constitutive 
element of the object; for example, the essence of Socrates is the constituent that 
is causally responsible for his human nature.2 The common insight is that an 
essence reveals the core identity of an object and is the principle of any fact 
related to its identity. Accordingly, the commitment to essentialism involves the 
commitment to metaphysical realism; for the essence of an object is not simply 
an abstract idea associated to the object by a linguistic community, but is the real 
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 This is the form of essentialism described by Quine (1953) and defended by Kripke (1980) and 
Putnam (1973; 1983). 
2
 Both these views are construed and developed in a variety of ways. For example, the idea of 
constituent is found in ‘hylomorphic’ essentialism, in which essence is identified with the union of 
matter and form (see Loux, 2006, and Oderberg, 2007), and in ‘scientific’ essentialism, in which 
essence is identified with the ultimate physical structure of the object (see Ellis, 2001). 
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entity that is signified by our account of the object.3 More controversial but still 
widespread is the commitment to the knowability of essence; since an essence 
is an objective fact in reality, our metaphysics is an effective account of reality 
only if essences are knowable. In sum, essentialism is a system that provides a 
metaphysical analysis of real entities and of their mutual relations on the basis of 
the essences they possess. 
     The ancestor of this metaphysical doctrine is identified with the form of 
essentialism expounded by Aristotle in the central books of the Metaphysics and, 
in particular, in Z.4-6. In order to explore the arguments there advanced, I deem 
it crucial to remark on some peculiarities of Aristotle’s view compared to its 
modern counterparts. To start with, Aristotelian essentialism represents a 
solution to establish the principle of a science. More precisely, it is the doctrine 
emerging from the examination of substance as essence. Since its goal is to 
ground a demonstrative science, Aristotelian essentialism does not immediately 
concern individuals; for the essence of an object is not conceived as the intrinsic 
principle of an individual entity, but as the characterization of an object of 
science.4 To spell out this point, let me recall the distinction between the 
ownership and the content of an essence. To specify an essence in terms of 
owner is to indicate the concrete objects possessing the essence, e.g. the 
essence of Socrates; to specify an essence in terms of content is to indicate the 
characterization that is shared by a plurality of objects, e.g. the essence as of 
human (i.e. being human).5 Whilst being present in modern essentialism, this 
distinction is not explicit in Aristotle’s metaphysics. In Z.4-6, an essence is always 
specified as the essence of an entity (eclipse, human, etc.), and every entity is 
firstly regarded as the object of a science. Whereas Aristotle resorts to essence 
to discuss the objects of a science that are real entities, modern essentialists 
resort to essence to discuss real entities that are somehow objects of knowledge. 
     The main conclusions established in Z.4-6 confirm this approach. Aristotle tells 
us that every substance possesses an essence and is identical with it. In the light 
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 To use Locke’s terminology, essentialism is not merely concerned with nominal essences but 
with real essences (cf. Essay: III.iii, 18; vi, 6) 
4
 I use the term ‘characterization’ to indicate what is signified by the belonging of some 
predicate(s) to a subject. This is meant to avoid identifying essence with some attributes, despite 
being something belonging to an object. In general, every attribute is a characterization of an 
object, though not conversely; for some characterizations will be one and the same as their 
objects: essences indeed. 
5
 For this distinction, see Lewis (2013: 74-76). 
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of this, it is totally ineffective to separate the ownership from the content of an 
essence; if a substance is one and the same as its essence, the possessor and 
its characterization can be reduced to one single thing.6 Moreover, we need to 
bear in mind that in Z.4-6 Aristotle has not yet examined substance as universal. 
Thus, his development of essentialism does not tackle the problems about the 
concrete existence of universal entities, such as species and genera.7 Aristotle is 
in fact able to elaborate his concept of essence without any concern for the 
ontological status of the items to which essence pertains because these are, 
firstly, objects of science and, secondly, objects of concrete reality. 
     A second peculiar aspect is that Aristotelian essentialism is conceived in 
connection with the concept of definition. Aristotle remarks that the essence of an 
object is the content stated by its definition; for example, the essence of human 
is being rational animal, which answers the question ‘What is human?’. 
Admittedly, this idea is central in modern metaphysics; the foundational character 
of essence in reality can be understood only in connection with the role of 
definition in our language. Just as a definition reveals the meaning of a term in 
virtue of which the term can be explicated, an essence reveals the identity of an 
object in virtue of which the object can be characterized (e.g. a human is rational 
animal and, consequently, capable of learning).8 The point is that modern 
metaphysicians make an analogical use of definition; whilst definitions serve to 
illustrate the primacy of certain facts in our ontology, they are not employed to 
signify them. Aristotle, by contrast, takes definitions to indicate the items 
investigated by the metaphysicians, i.e. entities. For example, the definition of 
human as rational animal must signify some entity/-ies that constitute(s) the 
essence of human. This concurs with the possibility of developing essentialism 
without any concern about the ontological status of the items to which essence 
pertains; indeed, in Z.4-6 Aristotle is not interested in analysing the real content 
signified by definitions, such as genera and differentiae. These are the concerns 
of modern essentialists, who tend to confine definitions to the domain of language 
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 One may argue that ownership is concerned with the monadic sense of substance and content 
is concerned with its dyadic sense. For my unitary understanding of the concept of substance in 
Z see Section 2.2. 
7
 Consequently, one cannot argue that ownership and content introduce a conception of individual 
essences and substances. As a matter of fact, Z.4-6 do not consider the difficulties connected 
with the possibility of knowledge of individuals. 
8
 Fine (1994; 1995a) contrasts the ‘definitional’ conception of essence with the modal conception. 
This move can help the metaphysician to set out an account of objects that does not involve 
irrelevant ontological claims (e.g. being member of a singleton is essential to Socrates). 
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and classification. For Aristotle, instead, the treatment of definitions can be an 
insightful approach in metaphysics; for a definition represents an alternative form 
to cast the scientific facts studied by the metaphysician. Nevertheless, this is just 
to postpone the treatment of the ontological problems about the concrete 
existence of genera and differentiae. 
     Having clarified these aspects, we can turn to the conclusions of which 
Aristotelian essentialism consists: I) essence belongs to substances either 
exclusively or primarily (Z.4-5); II) a substance is one and the same as its essence 
(Z.6). By moving from (I) to (II), Aristotle appears to answer what substance is. In 
the traditional reading, Z.4 is firstly devoted to elucidating the concept of essence. 
This intensional phase is followed by the analysis of the entities possessing an 
essence, which occupies Aristotle for the rest of the chapter. The possession of 
essence is initially confined to substances and, subsequently, extended to non-
substances. It is only in Z.6 that Aristotle accomplishes his task by proving the 
identity between substance and essence.9 I will offer a different reconstruction. 
Aristotle is not examining whether essence simply accounts for substance (which 
is in fact suggested in Z.3), but whether essence is a valid account of substance; 
that is, whether essence is a promising solution to establish the principle of 
metaphysics. The examination is successful because the account as essence, I 
contend, ensures the primacy of substance. Since primacy is one of the central 
issues concerning the principles of demonstrative sciences, the account as 
essence will lead Aristotle to establish the principle of metaphysics. In a nutshell, 
Aristotelian essentialism is conceived to ensure the primacy of substance and, 
thus, to ground the demonstrative science of the totality of entities. 
     To see this point, it is important to recognize that Z.6 does not represent an 
appendix to finally infer that substance amounts to essence. For Aristotle 
promotes the identity thesis to introduce in metaphysics a condition applying to 
every science: a primary object is one and the same as the cause stated to 
account for it. Accordingly, a substance is one and the same as its essence 
insofar as it is a primary object studied by metaphysics. Therefore, the identity 
thesis reveals the primacy of substance independently of Z.4-5. However, the 
argument of Z.6 is too weak to ensure the primacy of substance; for it does not 
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 See, for example, Frede-Patzig (1988: 58), Loux (1991: Ch. 3), Bostock (1994: 118). This 
circuitous treatment induces Ross (1924: 172) to doubt about Aristotle’s accomplishment of his 
task. 
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separate between the primary and the secondary objects in metaphysics. I will 
argue that the same form of identity is assumed in Z.4. In this context, Aristotle 
supplies his argument with an appropriate distinction between substances and 
non-substances in terms of essential dependence: the essence of a non-
substance depends upon the essence of a substance. The result is a doctrine, 
Aristotelian essentialism, which ensures the primacy of substance and, thus, the 
possibility of grounding metaphysics. 
3.2 The Identity Thesis 
The argument of Z.6 is originally designed to see whether an object is the same 
as or different from its essence. This essential identity is firstly examined in the 
case of ‘things that are said by accident’ (κατὰ συµβεβηκὸς λεγόµενα, 1031a19-
28), and subsequently in the case of ‘things that are said in themselves’ (καθ’ 
αὑτὰ λεγόµενα, 1031a28-1032a11). This is totally in line with the logical strategy 
of Z’s enquiry. In the first case, Aristotle is examining the objects that correspond 
to the statements in which some predicate(s) accidentally belongs to a subject, 
e.g. pale human. In the second case, he is examining the objects that correspond 
to the statements in which some predicate(s) belongs per se to a subject. 
Substances exemplify the second case of objects and are proved to enjoy 
essential identity. In so arguing, Aristotle endorses the following thesis:  
Identity Thesis: a substance is one and the same as its essence. 
Most of the chapter is a survey conducted on a reputable case of substances: 
Plato’s Forms. Roughly, it consists of an indirect proof: it is impossible for Forms 
not to be one and the same as their essences; therefore, the essential identity 
must obtain for every substance.10 Contrary to some interpretations, the purpose 
of Z.6 is not to overcome some difficulties of Plato’s metaphysics, like the Third 
Man Regress.11 From the start, Aristotle makes it clear that his discussion will 
                                                          
10
 Aristotle does not consider the move to be fallacious because the arguments would be valid 
‘even if they [i.e. substances] were not Forms’. See Z.6, 1031b14-15. 
11
 For this reading, see Owen (1966: 133-139) and Woods (1974-75). A different interpretation is 
advocated by Frede-Patzig (1988: 87-103) and Irwin (1988: 219-222), who take Z.6 to prepare 
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contribute to the enquiry into substance; for to specify the cases of essential 
identity can contribute to the examination of substance as essence and, thus, to 
establish the principle of metaphysics. To show that this contribution is to reveal 
the primacy of substance, I will firstly explore the notion of identity at work in Z.6. 
This will be illustrative of a scientific condition that Aristotle is trying to posit in Z.6 
and assumes in Z.4 in order to carry out his project of demonstrative science.12 
3.2.1 Identity in Z.6 
The examination of the accidental objects has been a matter of an intense debate 
among scholars. Aristotle advances two arguments to demonstrate that an 
accidental object, pale human, is not identical with its essence. The central idea 
is that such an identity would lead to two absurd consequences: 
i) being pale human = being human; 
ii) being pale = being musical. 
Basically the essences of pale human and of pale turn out to be identical with the 
essences of human and of musical, respectively. What is odd is that Aristotle 
resorts to two fallacious deductions to infer (i) and (ii). The first fallacy is to infer 
essential identity from two different forms of identity: accidental identity (pale 
human = human) and essential identity (human = being human).13 The second 
fallacy is to infer essential identity from two cases of accidental identity (musical 
human = human; pale human = human).14 These moves seem to invalidate his 
                                                          
for the identity between an individual form and its essence; for the only case in which an object is 
identical with its essence is the numerically distinct form of the member of a species. For a 
different approach see Wedin (2000). 
12
 Menn (2001) suggests that the identity thesis is functional to showing that substance is not a 
further item beside the object, such as Plato’s Forms, and that this conclusion is finally achieved 
in Z.7-9. My point is instead that Z.6 is not concerned with the identity between an object and its 
substance, but with the identity that an object (i.e. a substance) holds with the content signified 
by its definition. My reconstruction is then closer to Code (1985) and Loux (1991: 90-108). (Loux, 
however, stresses the theoretical role of the identity thesis for the development of a proper 
metaphysics and neglects its significance for metaphysics qua science. Cf. Lewis, 2013:145-146). 
13
 His first argument can be illustrated as follows:  
  i) pale human = human (accidental identity); 
 ii) human = being human (essential identity); 
iii) being pale human = being human (absurd identity). 
On this fallacy, see Soph. El. 5, 166b29-36. 
14
 i) musical human = being musical human; 
 ii) musical human = human (accidental identity); 
iii) pale human = human (accidental identity); 
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conclusion. How can Aristotle hope to reject the identity between such objects 
and their essence? I confine myself to a quick answer: given his awareness of 
the fallacies, Aristotle seems to believe that our understanding of the absurdities 
presupposes our understanding of the forms of identity involved in the arguments; 
this indeed enables us to unmask the fallacies. In view of this, he prioritizes the 
examination of other objects, which can be illustrative of the notion of essential 
identity. Namely, he urges us to look at the case of per se objects.15 
     This new task is undertaken through the survey on Plato’s Forms. Six 
arguments are advanced to prove that it is impossible for a Form not to be one 
and the same as its essence.16 As already said, the case of Forms is functional 
to the discussion inasmuch as they are substances. Within the argument of Z.6, 
however, Forms do exemplify per se objects. In conducting his survey, Aristotle 
is in fact concerned with whether there is identity between a per se object and its 
essence. What is remarkable is that this entails focusing on substances, such as 
Plato’s Forms (1031a28-31). Given this picture, there are two interesting things 
to notice. First of all, Aristotle does not rely on any distinction between senses of 
per se. The identity between an object and its essence is supposed to obtain in 
every case in which the object corresponds to a per se statement. Accordingly, 
the object and its essence are the same thing that is signified by the per se 
statement. This makes an essence the per se characterization of its object. But 
not every per se characterization of an object is its essence. Aristotle makes this 
explicit in Z.4 and often separates the per se predicates that essentially belong 
to a subject from those that do not.17 A second interesting thing is that Aristotle 
restricts his argument to substances. It could be said that in Z.6 to prove the 
essential identity in the case of per se objects is equivalent to proving the 
                                                          
iv) pale human = being pale human; 
v) pale human = musical human; 
vi) pale = musical (essential identity). 
On this fallacy, see Soph. El. 24, 179b1-4. 
15
 A technical version of this reading is suggested by Dahl (2003), who argues that Aristotle’s 
conclusion does not follow from the arguments but from the diagnosis of their invalidity. In doing 
so, Aristotle realises that the substitution fails in referentially opaque contexts; namely, pale 
human can be identical with its essence only under the description ‘pale human’. Lewis (2013: 
130-141), by contrast, argues that Aristotle simply fails to make his case. A different 
reconstruction is proposed by Halper (1989: 76-80), who contends that pale human is in fact 
identical with its essence (i.e. being human in Halper’s view). This view is unsupported by the 
text. 
16
 i) 1031a31-b3; ii) 1031b3-10; iii) 1031b11-18; iv) 1031b18-28; v) 1031b28-1032a2; vi) 1032a2-
5.  
17
 See Z.4, 1029b13-22 and Section 3.2.3 below. Cf. An. Post. I.4, 73a34-b32; Metaph. ∆.18, 
1022a25-35. 
Chapter Three 
113 
 
essential identity in the case of substances, i.e. the identity thesis.18 In this way, 
the notion of per se turns out to be implicitly narrowed. For Aristotle has in mind 
the per se characterization that is signified by the statement accounting for a 
substance. 
     These observations are crucial to spell out the form of identity that is at work 
in Z.6. Indeed, the essential identity is the identity obtaining between a substance 
and one of its per se characterizations. On this score, it can be insightful to match 
this conception with the forms of identity reviewed in Topics I.7. In Z.6, Aristotle 
can hardly have in mind specific and generic identity; for neither of them applies 
to an object that is one and the same as its per se characterization. Specific 
identity applies to two distinct individuals (e.g. Socrates and Callias are the same 
in species); generic identity applies to two distinct species (e.g. human and horse 
are the same in genus). In all likelihood, Aristotle has in mind some sense of 
numerical identity: identity in accident, identity in property, identity in definition. 
The point is to isolate the sense in which the numerical identity obtains between 
a substance and its per se characterization. Arguably, Aristotle has already 
rejected the sense of identity in accident at the start of the chapter; for this is the 
form of identity obtaining between either i) an object and its accidental 
characterizations (e.g. human = pale), or ii) two accidental characterizations of 
the same object (e.g. pale = musical). It is also easy to reject the sense of identity 
in property. Indeed, this form of identity obtains between an object and a 
characterization that is not its essence; for example, the triangle is one and the 
same as what is 2R because 2R is proper, though not essential, to every triangle. 
By way of exclusion, the form of identity that obtains between a substance and 
its per se characterization must be the identity in definition.19 
     If this is correct, the purpose of Z.6 is to show when a definiendum is one and 
the same as its definiens. This is the case in which the definiendum is a substance 
and the definiens is its per se characterization, namely, its essence. I already 
remarked that the identity in definition is just a way to cast the unity of definition: 
a definition is one statement signifying one single object and not many.20 For one 
thing, this is a technical feature of definitions, which the dialectician has to 
examine; if a definition fails to be one, some dialectical difficulties will question its 
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 On this point see also Frede-Patzig (1988: 89). 
19
 A suggestion of this insight is found in Code (1985; 1986). 
20
 See Section 1.2.1 and Metaph. ∆, 1018a4-9. 
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validity. For another thing, this can be a central issue for the treatment of the 
principles of a science; if a definition fails to be one, it will not ground the 
demonstrations about its object. Indeed, a scientist always assumes her 
definitions and, thus, their unity. It is then reasonable to say that the endorsement 
of the identity thesis is linked to the function of substance within a demonstrative 
science. More precisely, since the identity between a substance and its essence 
must be understood in terms of identity in definition, and since the identity in 
definition is assumed for the primary objects of a science, Z.6 is the treatment of 
a condition needed to ground metaphysics. 
3.2.2 From Identity to Primacy 
My contention is that the purpose of Z.6 is to introduce in metaphysics a condition 
that applies to every demonstrative science. This is the condition according to 
which essential identity obtains in the case of the primary objects of a science. 
Since substance is the genus of the primary objects of metaphysics, Aristotle 
comes to endorse the identity thesis. In fulfilling a condition for the foundation of 
metaphysics, the identity thesis reveals the primacy of substance. 
     Let us closely look at Aristotle’s arguments. A passage at 1031b3ff. reports 
the main argumentative lines in favour of the identity between a substance and 
its essence. 
And if substances and their essence are separated from one and another, then 
(I) the former will be unknowable, and (II) the latter will not be an entity. […] for 
first, we know each object when we know its essence; and second, the case of 
Good itself is no different from any other, so that if the essence of Good is not 
good, nor will the essence of Being be an entity, nor the essence of One be one 
(1031b3-9, Bostock’s translation slightly modified). 
καὶ εἰ µὲν ἀπολελυµέναι ἀλλήλων, τῶν µὲν οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήµη τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἔσται 
ὄντα (…)· ἐπιστήµη τε γὰρ ἑκάστου ἔστιν ὅταν τὸ τί ἦν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι γνῶµεν, καὶ 
ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁµοίως ἔχει, ὥστε εἰ µηδὲ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ 
τὸ ὄντι ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ ἑνὶ ἕν·  
The first argumentative line is centred on the impossibility of the knowledge of 
substances, whereas the second argumentative line is centred on the non-
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existence of essences. Since Z.6 is supposed to contribute to the examination of 
substance as essence, we can better understand the endorsement of the identity 
thesis in the light of the first argumentative line. On the contrary, the secondary 
argumentative line appears to be tailored to Plato’s Forms. The idea is that to 
question the identity between Plato’s substances and their essences is to 
question the existence of the latter; for anything that is other than the Form of 
Being would not exist at all.21 But not only does Aristotle believe that an essence 
is an entity, he also thinks that it is the entity treated in Z, i.e. substance. 
     More interestingly, Aristotle argues that since the knowledge of an object is 
the knowledge of its essence, there will be no knowledge of substances, unless 
these are identical with their essences. At first sight, this does not seem to prove 
the identity between a substance and its essence; it only suggests that a 
substance possesses an essence. In order to infer the identity thesis, Aristotle 
must be thinking that the only way in which a substance possesses an essence 
is by being identical with it; thus, this identity means its knowability. Since the 
identity thesis is conceived as identity in definition, Aristotle appears to assume 
that the knowledge of a substance is knowledge by definition. Consequently, the 
identity thesis must be presupposed for the knowledge of a substance just as the 
identity between the definiens and the definiendum is presupposed for the 
knowledge of the definiendum. There is another interesting aspect in the 
argument. Aristotle makes it explicit that the knowledge of a substance is 
scientific; namely, for a substance to be knowable means being object of a 
demonstrative science (ἐπιστήµη).22 We could then rephrase the argument as 
follows: there will be no demonstrative science of substances, unless these are 
identical with their essences. Remarkably, since the demonstrative science of 
being is reduced to the demonstrative science of substance, the identity thesis 
turns out to be presupposed for the possibility of metaphysics itself. 
     In sum, the endorsement of the identity thesis is inferred from the fact that i) 
the knowledge of a substance is knowledge by definition, and that ii) the 
knowledge of substance implies the possibility of the demonstrative science of 
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 That is, something that does not participate in the Form of Being. Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: 95-
96). 
22
 Cf. Z.6, 1031b4; b6; b20-21. 
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the totality of entities.23 Therefore, the identity between a substance and its 
essence is a condition for the foundation of metaphysics. In what does this 
condition consist? To answer this question, it is crucial to see that the knowledge 
of substance does not exhaust the demonstrative science of the totality of entities. 
The reason is simple: substance is the subject-matter, while the remaining 
entities are its demonstrable attributes; indeed, metaphysics is the demonstrative 
science consisting of the knowledge of substance and the knowledge of other 
entities. In this way, metaphysics conforms to the general structure of the other 
sciences. The knowledge of a definition does not exhaust any demonstrative 
science; indeed, a demonstrative science consists of knowledge by definitions 
and knowledge by demonstrations. Aristotle establishes this separation in 
Posterior Analytics II.9. He distinguishes between two objects of knowledge: the 
A-objects and the B-objects.24 The A-objects are identical with the cause that 
accounts for them; the B-objects instead are other than their cause. For example, 
in astronomy the A-objects are celestial bodies, while the B-objects are their 
demonstrable attributes, such as eclipse. Aristotle tells us that the A-objects are 
known by definition because their account is immediate; namely it does not refer 
to any other cause but to the object itself (e.g. the account of moon does not refer 
to anything but to what moon is). The B-objects, instead, are known by 
demonstration because their account is mediated; namely, it refers to a cause 
that is other than the object itself (e.g. the account of eclipse refers to the 
screening of sun by earth). What is relevant to us is that the Analytics’ distinction 
implies the possibility of any demonstrative science just as Z.6’s identity thesis 
implies the possibility of metaphysics. At a general level, the enquirer is able to 
develop a demonstrative science only if her knowledge by definition is separated 
from her knowledge by demonstration; that is, some objects are one and the 
same as their cause. At a specific level, the Z’s enquirer is able to develop 
metaphysics only if her knowledge of substances is separated from her 
knowledge of other entities; that is, substances are one and the same as their 
essences. 
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 With the first ‘substance’, I refer to any instance in the genus of substances; with the second 
‘substance’, I refer to the genus itself and, thus, to the principle of metaphysics. In fact, the 
difference lies only in the position occupied within the hierarchy of substances in the genus. 
24
 See Section 1.3.2. 
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      In the light of this parallel, we can easily explain the endorsement of the 
identity thesis. In order to secure the possibility of a demonstrative science, the 
knowledge by demonstration must be grounded in the knowledge by definition. 
Basically, the separation between A-objects and B-objects is the separation 
between primary and secondary objects studied by a science; the former being 
the genus and the sub-genera studied, the latter being their demonstrable 
attributes. Aristotle endorses the identity thesis because substances must be the 
primary objects of metaphysics; for the knowledge of substance will be the 
knowledge of the definition grounding the knowledge of the demonstrations. 
Therefore, the identity thesis turns out to reveal the primacy of substance. That a 
substance is one and the same as its essence can be inferred from the fact that 
metaphysics includes knowledge of some primary objects and such primary 
objects are identical with the cause accounting for them. This condition applies 
independently of what substances are, whether Platonic Forms, or bodies, or 
some suprasensible substances. 
     There is a complication in this picture. In Z.6, Aristotle connects the identity 
thesis with the function played by substance in metaphysics. Thus, Z.6 fulfils a 
condition for the development of metaphysics: in the sciences there is identity 
between the primary objects and the cause stated to account for them. From this 
perspective, the endorsement of the identity thesis is subordinate to the 
assumption that substance is a principle. It could be said that the identity thesis 
reveals but does not ensure the primacy of substance. To that end, Aristotle 
needs to effectively separate the primary from the secondary objects of 
metaphysics. This result is not achieved in Z.6. In the case of accidental objects, 
essential identity does not obtain; in the case of per se objects, essential identity 
obtains and this is proved by assuming their primacy. What Aristotle lacks is a 
procedure to distinguish between substances and non-substances. Before 
arguing that this distinction is established in Z.4, I will show that his analysis of 
the concept of essence relies on the same notion of identity at work in Z.6. 
3.2.3 Identity in Z.4 
Much of the argument of Z.4 is a treatment of essence in terms of per se. The 
notion of per se, I noted, designates some of the predicates that belong to a 
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subject.25 The statement of such a predication signifies a characterization of an 
object; for example, odd belongs per se to number and the statement ‘a number 
is odd’ signifies a characterization of number. In Z.6, the essence is the per se 
characterization signified by the statement accounting for a substance. In Z.4, 
Aristotle holds a similar approach: the essence of an object, says Aristotle, is 
‘what is said in itself [of the object]’ (1029a13-14). Again, this is totally in line with 
the logical strategy of the enquiry. For his treatment of the essence Aristotle shifts 
from examining objects to examining their corresponding statements. This means 
examining the belonging of some predicate(s) to a subject that is stated to 
account for the object. However, while the argument of Z.6 does not rely on any 
distinction among senses of per se, the argument of Z.4 is firstly designed to spell 
out the notion according to which a per se characterization is the essence of 
an object (henceforth per se*).26 
The essence for each object is what is said in itself. [1] For being for you is not 
being for the musical; for you are not musical in yourself. So your essence is what 
you are in yourself. But not everything in itself is essence. For example, [2] what 
is in itself in this way, like pale for surface, as being for the surface is not being 
for the pale. [3] Nor again is it the composite of both, i.e. pale surface, for here it 
itself is being added on. Wherever then the formula expressing an object does 
not include the object itself, this is the formula of the essence for the object. 
Consequently, if being for a pale surface is the same as being for a smooth 
surface, then being for a pale thing and being for a smooth thing will be one and 
the same. (1029b13-22, Bostock’s translation slightly modified) 
ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστου ὃ λέγεται καθ’ αὑτό. οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σοὶ εἶναι τὸ 
µουσικῷ εἶναι·  οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν εἶ µουσικός. ὃ ἄρα κατὰ σαυτόν. οὐδὲ δὴ 
τοῦτο πᾶν·  οὐ γὰρ τὸ οὕτως καθ’ αὑτὸ ὡς ἐπιφανείᾳ λευκόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ 
ἐπιφανείᾳ εἶναι τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀµφοῖν, τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ λευκῇ, 
ὅτι πρόσεστιν αὐτό. ἐν ᾧ ἄρα µὴ ἐνέσται λόγῳ αὐτό, λέγοντι αὐτό, οὗτος ὁ λόγος 
τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥστ’ εἰ τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ λευκῇ εἶναί ἐστι τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ εἶναι 
λείᾳ, τὸ λευκῷ καὶ λείῳ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν. 
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 See Section 1.1.1. 
26
 Aristotle offers two reviews of senses of per se: Posterior Analytics I.4 and Metaphysics ∆.18. 
Unfortunately, these lists do not perfectly match with one another. Moreover, Aristotle tends to 
illustrate some of the senses of per se with reference to the concept of essence (cf. Metaph. ∆.18, 
1022a25-26). 
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Aristotle proceeds with discarding three types of characterizations. The idea is 
that in the statements of [1], [2], and [3] the predicates do not belong per se* to 
the subject. Correspondingly, these statements are not definitions. 
     To start with, Aristotle contrasts the per se characterization with the accidental 
characterization (1029b14-16). The essence of an object is not what is said 
accidentally of the object. To illustrate, 
‘You are not per se musical’, therefore Not [1] you =def being musical 
In the statement of an accidental characterization, the predicates do not belong 
to the subject in any sense of per se. The fact that you are musical does not 
indicate anything of what you are in yourself; for musical is an attribute that may 
or may not characterize you.27 Therefore, [1] fails to be the essence of an object 
and, correspondingly, its statement fails to be a definition. It is important to note 
that the accidental characterization rejected here is not the characterization of the 
accidental objects in Z.6. Whereas in Z.6 Aristotle implicitly restricts the sense of 
per se in order to oppose the objects so characterized to accidental objects, in 
Z.4 he attempts to refine the restriction. The characterization of accidental objects 
in Z.6 is wider than the accidental characterization treated in Z.4. 
     Having rejected [1], Aristotle makes another remarkable point: ‘Not everything 
in itself is an essence’ (1029b16). More simply, there is an asymmetry between 
the notion of per se* and the notion of per se. Although what is said per se* of X 
must be said per se of X, the converse is not the case. Thus, there can be per se 
characterizations that are not the essence of an object. Namely, there can be a 
per se statement about an object that is not its definition. This possibility is 
exemplified by [2]. The text admits two readings: 
i) ‘Surface is per se pale’, but Not [2i] surface =def being pale 
or, 
ii) ‘Pale is per se surface’, but Not [2ii] pale =def being surface 
The problem that leads commentators to endorse either [2i] or [2ii] is that Aristotle 
does not make it explicit of which object he intends to discard the per se 
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 Cf. ∆.30, 1025a14-25. Bostock (1994: 87) remarks that since there is no definition of particular 
entities, it is awkward to talk about ‘your essence’ and takes it to be an unnecessary complication. 
For a slightly different approach see Peramatzis (2010). 
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characterization. According to [2i], surface is the subject of the statement and 
Aristotle rejects being pale as the essence of surface.28 Namely, the statement 
‘surface is per se pale’ is not the definition of surface. This option is certainly 
closer to Aristotle’s common way of phrasing this idea.29 It is unclear, however, 
why being pale could be mistaken for the essence of surface. According to [2ii], 
pale is the subject of the statement and Aristotle rejects being surface as the 
essence of pale.30 Namely, the statement ‘pale is per se surface’ is not the 
definition of pale. Despite its unusual formulation, this option offers a better sense 
of the passage: since whatever is pale must be a surface, being surface could be 
a per se characterization of pale. The point is that being surface is not the 
essence of pale. An interesting solution is to consider the statement ‘surface is 
pale’ as a case of per se2 predication. Aristotle is then admitting that pale belongs 
per se2 to surface; thus, being surface occurs in the definition of pale, while being 
pale does not occur in the definition of surface.31 Hence, [2] being pale fails to be 
the essence of surface. 
     At 1029b18, Aristotle considers those characterizations that result from 
coupling the subject and its predicate, such as [3] being pale surface. Again, there 
are two readings available:  
Not [3i] surface =def being pale surface 
or, 
Not [3ii] pale =def being pale surface 
Aristotle tells us that [3] fails to be the essence of the object because it results 
from an addition (πρόσεστιν). Intuitively, since either surface or pale is added to 
the definiens, the statement is not the definition of the object. Commentators take 
this move to cause the circularity of the definition. Since the definiendum occurs 
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 For this option see Aquinas (Expositio: L.3, 1311), Ross (1924: 168) and the Burnyeat et al. 
(1979: 17-20). 
29
 If pale were the subject of the statement, it would be reasonable to read ὡς ἐπιφανείᾳ τὸ λευκόν. 
Cf. An. Post. I.22, 83a1-14. 
30
 For this option see Frede-Patzig (1988: 59-61). A third option is suggested by Woods (1974-
75), who takes Aristotle to be rejecting being pale as the essence of pale surface. 
31
 See An. Post. I.4, 73a36-b2. Gill (1989: 116ff.), for example, argues that to discard the sense 
of per se2 will be functional to removing the matter of a composite from the essence. In her view, 
Aristotle is comparing the case of pale to the case of sensible composites, such as snubness. 
Surface must be mentioned in the account of pale because surface is the proper subject in which 
pale is realized (∆.18, 1022a29-31). 
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in the definiens, the statement fails to be a correct definition of the object; 
therefore, [3] fails to be an essence. 
     Given this reconstruction, what is the most promising reading of the 
argument? According to [3i], the definition is rejected because of the addition of 
surface to pale in defining surface. But this implies that pale occurs in the 
definition of surface and, thus, contradicts the rejection of [2]. Undoubtedly, [3ii] 
looks more reasonable. The definition is rejected because of the addition of pale 
to surface in defining pale. Since pale belongs per se2 to surface, one may think 
that the essence of pale is being pale surface; namely, that pale should be 
defined as pale surface. Given its circularity, the statement is not a definition and, 
correspondingly, the characterization is not an essence. There is still something 
puzzling in this reconstruction. Aristotle seems to conclude that being surface is 
the essence of pale, though the definition of pale is not exhausted by surface. 
More generally, it is unclear why Aristotle focuses on the circularity of definition 
after having discarded the notion of per se2? How does the rejection of [3] 
contribute to elucidating the notion of per se*? 
     Arguably, the final lines can shed some light on the motives behind the overall 
argument. Aristotle warns us that being pale and being smooth turn out to be one 
and the same thing, if the essence of the former is being pale surface and the 
essence of the latter is being smooth surface (1029b21-22). First of all, we can 
confirm the general reading of pale as the object of which [2] and [3] fail to be the 
essence. Since being pale surface and being smooth surface exemplify the 
incorrect essence, pale and smooth must be the objects to which the two 
characterizations pertain. What is more interesting is that Aristotle does not 
motivate the rejection of [3] with the circularity of the definition. The absurd 
character of the conclusion lies in the identity between two distinct objects, pale 
and smooth; for their alleged essences are found to be one and the same 
characterization. Therefore, it is not the addition of pale in the definition of pale 
that leads to rejecting being pale surface. It is the addition of surface in the 
definition of both pale and smooth that lead to rejecting their characterizations, 
such as being pale surface. 
     Let me reformulate the argument. Aristotle rejects being pale surface as the 
essence of pale because its statement results from the addition of surface to the 
definiens of pale. A consequence of this move is that, since being surface is 
common to both pale and smooth, the essences of pale and smooth are one and 
Definition and Primacy (I) 
 
122 
 
the same characterization; therefore, pale and smooth turn out to be one and the 
same object.32 In rejecting [3], Aristotle is then concerned with the cases in which 
a per se characterization fails to be an essence in that it is not one and the same 
as its object; that is, the cases in which there is no identity between the object 
and its essence. Clearly, this is the essential identity that is conceived in terms of 
identity in definition in Z.6; there must be identity between an object and its 
essence just as there is identity between a definiendum and its definiens. In Z.4, 
Aristotle relies on the identity in definition in order to reject some per se 
characterizations. Accordingly, what he summarizes at b19-20 is not a 
requirement of non-circularity, but a requirement of appropriate identity: the 
definition of an object is a statement in which nothing other than the object itself 
is included.33 If a statement results from an addition, it fails to be a definition 
because there is no identity between the definiendum and its definiens; for 
example, pale cannot be defined as pale surface because something other than 
the definiendum, i.e. surface, is added to the definiens. Correspondingly, being 
pale surface fails to be an essence because there is no identity between pale and 
its per se characterization. 
     What is remarkable is that Z.4’s treatment of essence is initially based on the 
identity in definition. Aristotle rejects [1], [2], and [3] because their statements, 
more or less manifestly, fail to be identical with their object. In [2], there is no 
identity between being surface and pale; in [3], there is no identity between being 
pale surface and pale. In order to elucidate the concept of essence, Aristotle 
insists on the identity that must obtain between the object and its per se 
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 My reconstruction concurs with the criticism of this Democritean conclusion found in the De 
Sen. 4, 442b4-17. Since Democritus takes the sensations that are common to different senses 
as proper to those senses, he ends up with identifying distinct sensations, such as pale and 
smooth. However, despite being common to both, smooth is proper to touch and pale is proper 
to sight. Arguably, in Z.4 the case of [3] is rejected because being surface is taken to be proper 
to pale and smooth, whilst being only common. 
33
 This reading however requires two textual emendations. At b19, αὐτό (transmitted by Ab) must 
be replaced with αὕτη (transmitted by J). At b20, the first αὐτό (transmitted by J and E and omitted 
in Ab) must be replaced with ἄλλο. Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: 61) 
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characterization. And this is nothing but examining the identity that must obtain 
between the definiendum and its definiens. 
3.3 The Essential Dependence 
In the previous section, I argued that the identity thesis is conceived in terms of 
identity in definition. Its endorsement enables Aristotle to introduce a condition 
that applies to every demonstrative science: there must be identity between the 
primary objects of a science and their causes. The primary objects are indeed 
known by definition (i.e. definienda) and are identical with the essence stated to 
account for them (i.e. its own definiens). Hence, a substance is one and the same 
as its essence insofar as it is a primary object in metaphysics. The argument of 
Z.6, however, reveals but does not ensure the primacy of substance; for the 
identity thesis is not supported by an effective separation of the primary objects 
from the secondary objects of metaphysics. I suggested that this task is 
accomplished in Z.4. From the start, Aristotle rejects those characterizations that 
are not stated by definitions and, thus, fail to be the essences of their objects. In 
doing so, he relies on the identity in definition that is at work in Z.6. The argument 
of Z.4, I shall argue, ensures the primacy of substance because it separates 
substances from non-substances in terms of essential dependence. 
     The essential dependence is the form of ontological dependence that is 
elaborated in the main body of Z.4. This phase is traditionally understood as an 
extensional treatment of the concept of essence. Basically, commentators take 
Aristotle as shifting from asking ‘what is essence?’ (1029b13-22) to asking ‘what 
things do have an essence?’ (1029b22-1030b13). On this reading, the intensional 
treatment is merely provisional and superseded by an attempt to delimit the range 
of the objects having an essence. In particular, Aristotle is taken to consider three 
types of objects:  
1. Substances 
2. Non-substances 
2a. Attributes 
2b. Composites 
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Substances are the instances of the first genus of being and correspond to 
sensible substances studied in physics, such as human and horse. Attributes are 
non-substances that belong to other genera of being, such as pale. Composites 
are non-substances that consist of an attribute plus a substance, such as pale 
human. 
     At 1029b22, Aristotle interrupts his intensional phase to examine whether 
composite objects possess an essence. However, nothing in the text suggests 
that the two treatments are to be kept separated. Not only does the transition 
happen very smoothly, but the ἐπεί at b22 links the new phase to the latest 
conclusion achieved: essence is not a composite characterization. Presumably, 
Aristotle turns to see whether there is an essence for a composite object because 
this is expected to possess some composite characterization. There are further 
reasons to defend the argumentative unity of Z.4. Our analysis showed that 
Aristotle attempts to spell out the concept of essence on the basis of the identity 
obtaining between an object and its per se* characterization; that is, the identity 
between a definiendum and its definiens. In this attempt, he rejects [2] being 
surface, and [3] being pale surface as essences of pale. I am inclined to think that 
the extensional treatment of essence will pursue this examination; for it is meant 
to separate the objects whose characterization is per se* from the objects whose 
characterization is only per se. This is the distinction that is not embodied in the 
argument of Z.6 and that will complete Z.4’s examination. From this perspective, 
the traditional division into two phases conceals the continuity of the argument. 
To ask what essence is and to ask what objects possess an essence is a matter 
of one single examination that has to spell out the per se* characterization. 
     The essential dependence enables Aristotle to complete this picture. The 
argument of Z.4 presents two versions of his essentialism: 
Austere view: essence belongs to substances exclusively (1029b29-
1030a17); 
Liberal view: essence belongs to substances primarily (1030a17-
1030b13). 
According to the austere view, essence is a per se characterization that is 
exclusive to substances; thus, non-substances do not possess an essence at all. 
According to the liberal view, essence is a per se characterization of both 
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substances and non-substances, though in different ways; for substances 
possess an essence absolutely, while non-substances possess an essence in a 
qualified way. My contention is that in either case Aristotle attempts to secure the 
dependence of the non-substances upon the essence of substances (essential 
dependence). Given this separation, Aristotle is able to set out his essentialism 
and to ensure the primacy of substance. The central idea is that if substance is 
essence, substance turns out to be primary. This is a promising result to ground 
the demonstrative science of the totality of entities. 
     There is a capital issue to consider. What are the objects treated in the 
argument of Z.4? It is common to think that the austere and the liberal views 
separate different things. Whereas the austere view separates substances from 
composite objects (e.g. pale human), the liberal view separates substances from 
attributes (e.g. paleness). The result is an ontological hierarchy in which the first 
level is occupied by substances, the second level is occupied by attributes, and 
the third level is occupied by composites; for essence is possessed by 
substances primarily, by attributes secondarily, and by composites through the 
composition of the others.34 The distinction between attributes and composites, I 
will argue, is not genuinely ontological. Both attributes and composites 
correspond to a per se characterization of a substance. To use our example from 
astronomy, both the attribute eclipse and the composite eclipsed moon 
correspond to the same entity that is a per se characterization of moon. Aristotle 
is simply separating substances from non-substances. The point is that non-
substances can be defined as attributes and not as composites; for example, we 
can define an eclipsed moon only in terms of eclipse. What is salient is that non-
substances–regardless of how these are accounted for as–are the entities 
essentially dependent upon substances. 
3.3.1 The Austere View 
The remainder of Z.4 is also in line with the logical strategy inaugurated at the 
start of the chapter. In order to discuss the objects possessing an essence, 
Aristotle focuses on the objects that are accounted for as by the statement of an 
essence; namely, the objects of definitions. His conclusion is that essence and 
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 See Loux (1991: 75-77; 104-108; Ch. 7) and Halper (1989: 49-74). 
Definition and Primacy (I) 
 
126 
 
definition belong to substances either exclusively or primarily.35 In examining 
whether a composite object can ever have an essence, he is then examining 
whether a composite object can ever have a definition.  
For example, [we must see whether there is an essence of] pale human. Suppose 
‘cloak’ to be a name for this; what, then, is the essence of cloak? It may be said 
that this is still not one of the things that are said in themselves (τῶν καθ’ αὑτὸ 
λεγοµένων). On the one hand, what is not said in itself is in two ways: one is what 
is from addition and the other is from not addition [i.e. subtraction]. In the one 
case, 1) what is being defined is accounted for as by being added to something 
else, as for instance would happen if the definer expressed the essence of pale 
through the statement of pale human; in the other case, 2) what is being defined 
is accounted for as not by being added to something else, as for instance would 
happen if cloak were to signify pale human, but the definer defines it as pale. (In 
fact a pale human is pale, but pale human is not the essence of pale). (1029b27-
1030a1, Bostock’s translation slightly modified) 
οἷον λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ [τί ἦν λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ]. ἔστω δὴ ὄνοµα αὐτῷ ἱµάτιον. τί 
ἐστι τὸ ἱµατίῳ εἶναι; ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδὲ τῶν καθ’ αὑτὸ λεγοµένων οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ἢ τὸ 
οὐ καθ’ αὑτὸ λέγεται διχῶς, καὶ τούτου ἐστὶ τὸ µὲν ἐκ προσθέσεως τὸ δὲ οὔ. τὸ 
µὲν γὰρ τῷ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ προσκεῖσθαι λέγεται ὃ ὁρίζεται, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι 
ὁριζόµενος λέγοι λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον·  τὸ δὲ τῷ ἄλλο αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰ σηµαίνοι 
τὸ ἱµάτιον λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ δὲ ὁρίζοιτο ἱµάτιον ὡς λευκόν. τὸ δὴ λευκὸς 
ἄνθρωπος ἔστι µὲν λευκόν, οὐ µέντοι <τὸ> τί ἦν εἶναι λευκῷ εἶναι.  
The aim of the passage is to argue that there is no per se* characterization to 
account for composite objects. Thus, these objects possess neither an essence 
nor a definition. I already mentioned that a composite object is traditionally 
believed to consist of two categorially distinct entities: a substance and a non-
substance; for example, pale human consists of human and pale. It is important 
to note that Aristotle does not have in mind cases of accidental composition (i.e. 
pale accidentally belongs to human).36 First of all, the treatment of accidental 
objects could hardly be relevant to a demonstrative science. Its body of 
knowledge is constituted by the statements of some per se predicate(s) belonging 
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 Cf. Z.4, 1030a4-7; b4-7; Z.5, 1031a12-14.  
36
 Since Z.4 is concerned with the per se* belonging of an essence to an object, commentators 
are not explicit on what belonging underlies composite objects. Cf. Aquinas (Expositio: L.3, 1318); 
Bostock (1994: 88); Loux (1991: 80-81); Peramatzis (2010); Galluzzo (2013a: 68-69); Lewis 
(2013: 83-84). 
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to a subject. Moreover, the treatment of accidental objects undermines the 
argumentative continuity of the chapter. Aristotle is still concerned with the sense 
of per se* according to which a characterization is an essence. In the intensional 
phase, he rejected composite characterizations of an object (i.e. pale =def pale 
surface); in the extensional phase, he intends to see whether a composite object 
(i.e. pale human) can have a per se* characterization rather than the composite 
characterization, as one could expect.37 
     If this is correct, the shift from the extensional phase to the intensional phase 
is merely a change of perspective. Aristotle is still trying to clarify when a per se 
characterization is not per se*; namely, when a characterization fails to be the 
essence of an object.38 Interestingly, this is equivalent to clarifying when an object 
does not possess an essence; namely, when an object is not accounted for as 
by a definition, but by the statement of some other per se characterization. To 
this end, the passage introduces a twofold criterion: a statement fails to be the 
definition of an object because it is obtained either by addition or by subtraction 
(τὸ µὲν ἐκ προσθέσεως τὸ δὲ οὔ).39 In other words, addition and subtraction are 
two procedures to state a per se characterization of an object that is not an 
essence. Correspondingly, the objects that are accounted for as in this way 
possess neither essence nor definition. 
     Let me start with a brief sketch. Aristotle begins with the procedure of addition, 
which is thus exemplified, 
1) pale =def pale human by addition. 
In defining pale, pale is added to human so that pale human is the definiens of 
pale. Thus, being pale human is the per se characterization that is supposed to 
be the essence of pale. The procedure by subtraction is slightly more obscure. 
                                                          
37
 The choice of ‘pale human’ as example can be deceptive. It is important to realize that Aristotle 
employs it to postulate its identity with ‘cloak’. As often happening with Aristotle’s examples, the 
use of ‘pale human’ is arbitrary and may not exemplify a real case of per se characterization 
(though black and white could be per se attributes of the species human). In the absence of any 
certainty about the subjects of metaphysics (i.e. substances), there cannot be any certainty about 
the demonstrable attributes (i.e. the attributes of substances qua substances). 
38
 Indeed, the meaning of καθ’ αὑτὸ at 1029a29-30 is limited to the notion of per se*. 
39
 Literally, Aristotle speaks of addition and non-addition. As will be clear, the negation of addition 
is nothing but what is labelled subtraction (ἀφαίρεσις) in the rest of Z.4 and elsewhere (cf. Z.4, 
1030a33; Topics, III.3, 118b10-19; VII.1, 152b10-15; Metaph. I.1, 1052b35f.). On this point, see 
Ross (1924: 169), Frede-Patzig (1988: 63), and Bostock (1994: 89). Cf. Bonitz (1870: 539). 
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Aristotle assumes that ‘cloak’ indicates the composite object ‘pale human’.40 
Thus,  
2) cloak [pale human] =def pale by subtraction. 
In defining cloak, pale is not-added to human so that pale exhausts the definiens 
of cloak. Namely, human is subtracted from cloak. Thus, being pale is the per se 
characterization that is supposed to be the essence of cloak. 
     In general, the idea is that a statement fails to be a definition because it either 
does or does not include something in accounting for the object. This sounds very 
familiar. At 1029b18-20, Aristotle rejects the composite characterization because 
its statement results from the addition of something other than the object; in 
particular, being pale surface fails to be the essence of pale because its 
statement results from the addition of surface to pale. Since this undermines the 
identity between the definiendum and its definiens, there is no identity between 
the per se characterization and its object; therefore, the per se characterization 
is not an essence.41 Arguably, at b31 Aristotle is specifying the very same case 
of a composite characterization failing to be an essence. Since something other 
than pale is added in its definition, there is no identity between pale and either 
pale human or pale surface; therefore, neither pale human nor pale surface is 
stated by a definition and is the essence of pale. In this regard, there are a couple 
of things to notice. Firstly, the procedure of addition is illustrative of cases in which 
a definition is rejected; thus, we can conjecture that its application requires some 
expertise in the dialectical treatment of definitions found in the Topics. Since in 
Z.4 the procedure of addition is effective on fake cases of identity in definition, 
Aristotle is likely to have in mind the dialectical schemes on identity; for these will 
help to indicate those characterizations that are not stated by a definition and, 
thus, fail to be an essence. 
     The schemes on which Aristotle relies in Z.4 are presented in Topics VII.1.42 
One scheme is to consider whether in a statement something is added to its 
                                                          
40
 Aquinas (Expositio: L.3, 1317) suggests that the identity cloak = pale human can be compared 
to the identity human = biped animal. See also Ross (1924: 169) and Frede-Patzig (1988: 62), 
who insist that this manoeuvre is to ensure the ontological import of the discussion (i.e. cloak and 
pale human are not arbitrarily but ontologically related).  
41
 See Section 3.2.3 above. 
42
 See Top. VII.1, 152b1011 for addition and VII.1, 152b11-16 for subtraction. Since Aristotle is 
insisting on the identity between the object and its essence, it is not relevant to ask whether the 
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object; for this prevents the statement from being identical with the object. Clearly, 
the subject of the addition is the object whose definiens includes something 
identical with the object plus something different. In Z.4’s example, pale is defined 
as being pale plus human (which is different from pale). The procedure by 
addition can then be summarized as follows: the statement accounts for its 
object by adding the object to something else (1029b31-33). 
Correspondingly, the characterization stated is not an essence in that it ‘exceeds’ 
what the object is. The other scheme is to consider whether the same thing can 
be subtracted from two statements; if the remainders signify two different objects, 
there is no identity between the statements. For example, ‘the double of half’ and 
‘the multiplication of half’ are not identical because, given the subtraction of ‘half’, 
being double is not identical with being multiple. In Z.4, Aristotle is not concerned 
with the identity between two statements, but with the identity between an 
definiendum and its definiens. This requires him to assume that the term ‘cloak’ 
signifies pale human and is defined as being pale minus human (which still 
constitutes what cloak is); consequently, the subtraction prevents the statement 
from being identical with the object. The procedure by subtraction can then be 
summarized as follows: the statement accounts for its object by subtracting 
something from what the object is (1029b33-34).43 Correspondingly, the 
characterization stated is not an essence in that it ‘shrinks’ the object. What is 
salient to see is that in Topics VII.1 the schemes are employed to test statements, 
while in Z.4 they are employed to indicate the objects possessing no essence. 
These will be the objects that are accounted for as by statements obtained by 
either addition or subtraction. 
     In view of this map of non-per se* statements, Aristotle is now in the position 
to spell out the concept of essence. This will be the characterization that is stated 
by neither addition nor subtraction, but by definition. In doing so, he endorses the 
austere view.  
But is the essence of cloak an essence at all? Or maybe not? Indeed an essence 
is just what a thing is. And when a thing is predicated of another, this is not what 
a this-something is; for example, pale human is not what a this-something is, if 
                                                          
failures of the statements are due to the definiens (Ross, 1924: 169) or to the definiendum 
(Halper, 1989: 56-59); for statements by addition and by subtraction will correctly account for 
objects that do not possess definitions. 
43
 This requires the addition of οὔ at 1029b33. Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: 63).  
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indeed thisness belongs only to substances. (1030a1-6, Bostock’s translation 
slightly modified) 
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἱµατίῳ εἶναι ἆρά ἐστι τί ἦν εἶναί τι [ἢ] ὅλως; ἢ οὔ; ὅπερ γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ τί 
ἦν εἶναι·  ὅταν δ’ ἄλλο κατ’ ἄλλου λέγηται, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ τόδε τι, οἷον ὁ λευκὸς 
ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ τόδε τι, εἴπερ τὸ τόδε ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπάρχει µόνον. 
Given that the essence is the content signified by a definition, Aristotle is in fact 
refining his previous criterion: a statement fails to be the definition of an object 
because it accounts for something predicated of something else (ἄλλο κατ’ ἄλλου 
λέγεσθαι). Correspondingly, a characterization is not an essence when it consists 
of something in relation to something else. In all likelihood, the criterion applies 
to any statement rejected so far; that is, to the characterizations indicated by 
addition and subtraction. To illustrate, both pale and cloak do not possess an 
essence and a definition because they are accounted for as pale in relation to 
human; accordingly, neither being pale human nor being pale is an essence. 
Since the criterion applies to every object in metaphysics but substances, 
Aristotle is able to conclude in favour of the austere view: essence belongs to 
substances exclusively. 
     At the core of this reasoning is the notion of τόδε τι. In a science, I observed, 
τόδε τι indicates any object that is one indivisible subject of demonstrable 
attributes; thus, its existence is not grounded in anything else. On the contrary, 
the existence of other objects is grounded in the existence of a τόδε τι.44 In 
metaphysics, the objects that are τόδε τι are substances. Aristotle has indeed 
explicated that the science of the totality of entities can be reduced to the science 
of substance insofar as every non-substance depends upon substance; namely, 
the existence and the nature of the latter is grounded in the former. On this score, 
Z.4 shows that the statement accounting for a τόδε τι does not account for 
something in relation to something else; that is, it is obtained neither by addition 
nor by subtraction. The point is that there is no other statement to mediate the 
statement accounting for a τόδε τι just as there is no other object to ground its 
existence and nature. The statements of being pale human and being pale, for 
example, are mediated by the relation of their object with what is added to or 
subtracted from the statement. What matters to us is that the statement 
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 See Section 2.2.1, esp. note 55.  
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accounting for a τόδε τι is a definition and the characterization signified is an 
essence. Therefore, substances are the only entities to possess definition and 
essence; for they are not accounted for as something in relation to something 
else. 
     At this point, it is not difficult to show that the austere view is conceived to 
ensure the primacy of substance. The argument of Z.4 enables Aristotle to 
effectively separate substances from non-substances. This separation is 
established through a form of ontological dependence, which I label essential 
dependence:  
Essential Dependence: an entity depends upon a substance 
because the account of the former is related 
to the essence of the latter by either addition 
or subtraction. 
In other words, the fact that there is an entity can be stated either by adding a 
substance to or by subtracting a substance from the statement itself. By looking 
at the procedures of addition and subtraction, Aristotle attempts to establish the 
Analytics’ distinction between objects of knowledge. A substance is an object of 
definition because its account is immediate; namely, it does not require implicit 
reference to any other cause but to the substance itself. A non-substance is an 
object of other statements because its account is mediated; namely, it requires 
implicit reference to a substance. Since non-substances depend upon 
substances insofar as the account of the former depends upon the definition of 
the latter, substances turn out to be the primary objects of metaphysics. 
     This point was totally missed by the examination of the subject in Z.3. If 
substance is accounted for as subject, substance fails to be primary; for it must 
be accounted for as in terms of some characterization.45 Consequently, the 
subject does not represent a valid solution to establish the principle of 
metaphysics. This solution is instead offered by the examination of substance as 
essence. If substance is accounted for as essence, substance turns out to be 
primary; for it is accounted for as by a definition and, thus, as an immediate 
characterization. Basically, the statement accounting for a substance and the 
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 Indeed the hylomorphic analysis leads to identifying substance with an indeterminate matter 
(Z.3, 1029a20-30). 
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characterization signified are not related to any other object; by contrast, the 
statements accounting for non-substances and the characterizations signified are 
always related to a substance. 
     But what exactly are the primary and the secondary objects of metaphysics? 
That is, what does the metaphysician account for by definition and by 
addition/subtraction, respectively? Unfortunately, Aristotle is not very explicit on 
this point. The austere view establishes that substances are the primary objects 
accounted for as by definition. Since Z’s enquiry is focused on (though not 
necessarily confined to) sensible substances, these are likely to be the primary 
objects of physics, i.e. bodies. In Z.4, Aristotle refers to these entities as the εἴδη 
of a genus (1030a11-12). Given the ambiguity of the term, there are two options 
available.46 On one reading, the εἴδη are identified with either the forms of 
sensible substances, such as human soul, horse soul, etc.; after all, Aristotle will 
identify substance and essence with form in Z.10-11. Alternatively, the εἴδη are 
identified with the species into which a genus divides; these are then kinds of 
sensible substances, such as human, horse, etc. Be that as it may, it is not 
unrealistic to think that Aristotle is playing with the ambiguity of the term.47 The 
central point is that the εἴδη will be the objects of the definitions to which the 
statements accounting for other objects are related. Nothing prevents these items 
from being identified with the forms of sensible substances in Z.10-11 and 
examined as universal species in Z.13-14. As already highlighted, Aristotle is 
indeed able to develop his essentialism without any concern for the ontological 
status of the possessors of the essences; for these are primarily regarded as 
objects of scientific knowledge.48 
     Things are more complicated in the case of the secondary objects of 
metaphysics. Commentators, I noticed, tend to identify them with composites and 
attributes. The composites are the objects accounted for as by addition. Since a 
composite results from two entities, it is accounted for as by composing two 
essences; for example, pale human is accounted for as by composing the 
essence of the subject plus the essence of the attribute. The attributes are the 
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 Driscoll (1981: 141-158) argues that εἶδος is ambiguous and that Aristotle is able to separate 
the εἶδος as constitutive cause from εἶδος as species. This, however, does not mean that Aristotle 
wants to separate the two senses here. 
47
 The first option is favoured by Frede-Patzig (1988: 66) and Wedin (2000: 230-236), while the 
second option is favoured by Ross (1924: 170-171), Bostock (1994: 91-92), Burnyeat (2001: 25). 
Loux (1991: 82) suggests that the ambiguity is functional to Aristotle’s argument.  
48
 See Section 3.1 above. 
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objects accounted for as by subtraction. Although an attribute is an entity that 
depends on its subject, it is accounted for as by separating its essence from that 
of the subject; for example, pale is accounted for as being pale despite pale 
depending on human (or surface).49 The nature of such an object, however, is 
likely to be clarified in the second half of Z.4. For Aristotle will offer a liberalized 
version of his essentialism in which non-substances can be defined. Thus, we 
can postpone the treatment of this issue and wait for the details that Aristotle 
provides through his liberal view. 
3.3.2 The Liberal View 
The austere view ensures the primacy of substance. In the first half of Z.4, 
Aristotle works out a concept of essence that enables him to introduce a form of 
ontological dependence separating substances from non-substances. Non-
substances are accounted for as by either addition or subtraction and, thus, their 
characterization is related to something else. Substances, by contrast, are 
accounted for as by definition and their characterization is not related to 
something else; namely, they possess an essence. This means that substances 
hold primacy over the other objects of metaphysics. From 1030a17, Aristotle 
proposes an alternative version to the austere view. The concept of essence is 
not to be restricted to the characterization of substances, but can be extended to 
the characterizations of other entities. His following discussion will yield the liberal 
view: essence belongs to substances primarily and to other entities secondarily. 
Arguably, the endorsement of the liberal view is linked to a general difficulty of 
his previous treatment. Within the austere view, metaphysics appears to be 
exhausted by the definitional knowledge of substance. In other words, since the 
knowledge of an object is mainly the knowledge of what the object is (τί ἐστιν), 
and since what an object is is stated by a definition, there seems to be no 
knowledge of non-substances; for these are not accounted for as by definition. 
Yet, metaphysics is not supposed to be the knowledge of substances exclusively, 
but the knowledge of the totality of entities. Arguably, the liberal view is meant to 
revise the examination of the essence in a way that is more functional to 
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 According to Gill (1989: 116-120), addition is the procedure to account for composites, while 
subtraction is the procedure to account for attributes. The reverse view is advocated by Halper 
(1989: 64-74). 
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grounding metaphysics. In this attempt, Aristotle reconceives the essential 
dependence in order to separate substances from non-substances. The result is 
again a doctrine that ensures the primacy of substance. 
     Admittedly, the argument for the liberal view is highly controversial. Following 
his initial suggestions, commentators connect the multiplicity of what-it-is (τί ἐστιν) 
with the multiplicity of being. The idea is that the account of an object in 
metaphysics is multiple because the object of metaphysics is itself multiple; being 
is indeed a genus that is pluralized into different kinds (substance, qualities, 
quantities, etc.). Accordingly, since the statement of the τί ἐστιν of an object is the 
definition signifying its essence, and since the object of metaphysics is the totality 
of entities, Aristotle finds it reasonable to account for every entity by stating its τί 
ἐστιν; consequently, every entity is entitled to have a definition and an essence.50 
To illustrate, not only are there definitions of substances, such as human and 
horse, but also of qualities and of quantities, such as pale and double. The 
enquiry to ground metaphysics will ultimately be concerned with what substance 
is, what quality is, what quantity is, and so on for the remaining kinds of being. If 
this is so, the liberal view is conceived to supersede the austere view.51 The early 
examination turns out to lack accuracy because it neglects the intrinsic feature of 
the object of metaphysics. This reconstruction is often coupled with the idea that 
Z.4 alternates a dialectical treatment and a scientific treatment of essence. In the 
second half of the chapter, Aristotle hastens to revise his results by looking at 
‘how things are’ rather than ‘how we speak of things’.52 
     Nevertheless, Aristotle does not seem to contrast the austere and the liberal 
views. His main conclusion is that essence belongs to substances either 
exclusively or primarily; in fact, both views are regarded as valid attempts to 
examine substance as essence.53 Moreover, we should bear in mind that Z.4 can 
hardly contrast a dialectical with a scientific discussion.54 Since Z’s enquiry is 
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 See Bostock (1994: 92-94). Loux (1991: 77-90) insists on these semantic observations and 
argues that Aristotle is recognizing the ambiguity of the ‘is’ that is part of every statement of what-
it-is. 
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 According to Halper (1989: 64), for example, Aristotle is bound to the liberal view because it is 
simply unreasonable to believe that an object can be accounted for as by a statement without 
having an essence. 
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 See Z.4, 1030a27-28. Cf. Owen (1960: n. 189); Irwin (1988: 211-212). 
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 See Z.5, 1031a12-14. The structure of Z.4 concurs with this insight. After his introductory phase 
on the concept of essence, the examination divides into two branches by the disjunctive 
conjunction ἢ at 1029b29 and 1030a17. 
54
 See the observations on the notion of λογικῶς in Section 2.3.1. 
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aimed at establishing the principle of a demonstrative science, Z.4 can be neither 
dialectical nor purely scientific; for dialectic is not meant to establish anything, 
and science is to be based on the results of the ongoing enquiry. Rather, there is 
another aspect that can help us to understand the shift. Despite recalling the 
multiplicity of being, Aristotle focuses on two senses in which an object is defined: 
on the one hand, the τί ἐστιν signifies a substance and a this-something (τόδε τι); 
on the other, the τί ἐστιν signifies either qualities, or quantities, etc. (1030a18-
20).55 Presumably, the first sense is that at work in the austere view. Aristotle is 
indeed able to infer that substances possess an essence from the fact they are 
not accounted in relation to something else and, thus, their characterization is 
immediate. The second sense, instead, is supposed to emerge from the liberal 
view, in which every entity possesses an essence. The crucial point is that the 
characterization stated to account for substances must be separated from the 
characterizations stated to account for non-substances. From this perspective, 
the new examination is not thought to supersede the previous results. Its central 
task is to shed light on the peculiar way in which a non-substance can be defined 
and possesses an essence. 
     Let me speculate more on this. If Aristotle intends to clarify the second sense 
of τί ἐστιν as opposed to the first one, he is likely to look for a statement that is 
not immediate; for its object is not a τόδε τι and the characterization stated is not 
the per se* characterization presented in the austere view. Thus, Aristotle is 
looking for a statement that is derivative; for its object is accounted in relation to 
something else. In a science, I argued, the distinction between immediate 
statements and derivative statements does separate immediate definitions from 
demonstrative definitions; the former accounting for the subjects of scientific 
knowledge (e.g. human, moon), the latter accounting for their demonstrable 
attributes (e.g. capable of learning, eclipse).56 My contention is that in Z.4 Aristotle 
distinguishes two senses of τί ἐστιν in order to separate the primary from the 
secondary objects of metaphysics. Whereas the primary objects are those 
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 According to Frede-Patzig (1988: 67), κατηγορουµένων refers to the predicates that can be 
attributed to a substance. Given the uniformity between ontological and predicative categories in 
metaphysics (cf. Section 1.1.1), I agree with them. The point is that in the absence of this 
uniformity Aristotle would be separating an entity (i.e. substance) from its predicates, (what-it-is-
like, how-much-it-is, etc.) and this can hardly be the case. 
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 See Section 1.3.2. Capable of learning and eclipse are secondary objects in physical sciences 
because they are per se attributes of human and moon, which are two sensible substances 
studied qua sensible substances. 
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possessing immediate definition and essence, the secondary objects are those 
possessing derivative definition and essence. In Z’s enquiry, the primary objects 
are substances, while the secondary objects are non-substances. The reasons 
to connect the multiplicity of what-it-is with the multiplicity of being are then rooted 
in the scientific character of metaphysics. The totality of entities is the object of a 
demonstrative science because substances are the subjects of scientific 
knowledge and the remaining entities are their demonstrable attributes. 
Therefore, the knowledge of substances is expressed by definitions, while the 
knowledge of non-substances is expressed by demonstrations (i.e. 
demonstrative definitions, if re-arranged). If this hypothesis is sound, Aristotle 
endorses the liberal view in order to ensure the primacy of substance within the 
scientific project of metaphysics. 
     At 1030a21, Aristotle introduces his distinction between statements of the τί 
ἐστιν of an entity. 
Like the ‘is’ belongs to everything, though not in the same way, but for one thing 
primarily and for the others secondarily, in this way also the what-it-is belongs to 
substance absolutely and in some other way to the other entities. (1030a21-23, 
Bostock’s translation slightly modified) 
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁµοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ µὲν πρώτως τοῖς 
δ’ ἑποµένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἁπλῶς µὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ πὼς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις. 
In Z.1, metaphysics turns out to be the demonstrative science of the totality of 
entities because it is the study of substance, which is the cause of why other 
entities are. Therefore, substance is expected to hold primacy over the other 
entities. In the passage, we can see a correspondence between the separation 
established in Z.1 and the separation to be established in Z.4. For one thing, 
Aristotle pairs the primacy of substance with the absolute character of its τί ἐστιν; 
for another thing, he pairs the posteriority of non-substances with the 
indeterminate character of their τί ἐστιν. Given the logical strategy of the chapter, 
Aristotle is in fact opposing the statement of what a substance is to the statement 
of what a non-substance is. 
     What does it mean that some statements are absolute and others are 
indeterminate? In On Generation and Corruption I.3, Aristotle tells us that 
‘absolute’ (ἁπλῶς) indicates ‘what is primary in each predication of being’; in 
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other words, what is absolute is the primary subject to which some predicates 
belong within the same genus of being.57 This could be a substance, as in 
physics, or a quantity, as in mathematics, etc. In metaphysics, what is absolute 
is a substance, which is the primary subject to which some per se predicates 
belong. In Z.4, Aristotle is then remarking that the definition of a substance is 
absolute insofar as it is the statement that accounts for the primary subject of 
predicates in metaphysics. The statements accounting for non-substances, 
instead, are not absolute, but in some other way (πὼς ). As conjectured above, 
the remainder of the Z.4 is meant to clarify the second sense of τί ἐστιν listed at 
1030a18-20. 
     To that end, Aristotle moves to reconsider the procedures to account for the 
objects of metaphysics. Unfortunately, this review is expounded in one of the 
most debated passages of the corpus. 
In these cases [i.e. non-substances], it will not be essence in absolute, but 
essence of quality or of quantity. For we must say that these are said to be entities 
either by homonymy or by addition and subtraction, like the unknown is said to 
be known. And in fact what is right is neither said by homonymy nor in such a 
way, but like medical is said with reference to one and the same thing, and it does 
not mean one and the same thing, and nor yet by homonymy. Indeed a body, an 
operation or an instrument are said to be medical neither by homonymy nor in 
virtue of one thing but with reference to one thing (1030a31-b3, Bostock’s 
translation slightly modified) 
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς τί ἦν εἶναι ἀλλὰ ποιῷ ἢ ποσῷ τί ἦν εἶναι. δεῖ 
γὰρ ἢ ὁµωνύµως ταῦτα φάναι εἶναι ὄντα, ἢ προστιθέντας καὶ ἀφαιροῦντας, ὥσπερ 
καὶ τὸ µὴ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπεὶ τό γε ὀρθόν ἐστι µήτε ὁµωνύµως φάναι µήτε 
ὡσαύτως ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ τὸ ἰατρικὸν τῷ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ µὲν καὶ ἕν, οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ 
ἕν, οὐ µέντοι οὐδὲ ὁµωνύµως·  οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικὸν σῶµα καὶ ἔργον καὶ σκεῦος 
λέγεται οὔτε. 
Firstly, Aristotle points to two procedures to account for non-substances: a) by 
homonymy; b) by addition/subtraction. Homonymous is the predicative relation 
that obtains between two objects sharing the name and differing in what they 
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 That is within the same vertical category. See De Gen. et Cor. I.3, 317b5-8 and Rashed (2005: 
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are.58 Thus, if we account for a non-substance by homonymy, our statement 
signifies two different natures. To illustrate, 
a) picture of a human =def human by homonymy. 
Although a picture of a human and a human can be both named ‘human’, the 
statement of what a picture of a human is must be different from the statement of 
what human is. One possibility to account for non-substances is to state their τί 
ἐστιν homonymously; for each of them, despite being named ‘entity’, possesses 
one nature that can be studied independently of any other nature. 
     Addition and subtraction are clearly the procedures introduced by Aristotle 
earlier in the chapter. These procedures enable the metaphysician to indicate the 
characterizations that are not essence; for these characterizations consists of 
something in relation to something else. To illustrate,  
b.1) pale =def pale human by addition; 
b.2) pale human =def pale by subtraction; 
As already seen, pale can be accounted for as pale plus human, while pale 
human can be accounted for as pale minus human. In either case, the objects 
are accounted in relation to something else; therefore, their statements are not 
definitions and their characterizations are not essences. This possibility amounts 
to stating the τί ἐστιν of non-substances by either adding a substance to or by 
subtracting a substance from the statement. 
     What is the appropriate procedure to account for non-substances? In the 
passage, Aristotle compares the procedures of addition/subtraction with a 
procedure to deliver an apparent syllogism. The non-substances are accounted 
for as by addition/subtraction just ‘as the unknown is known’ (1030a33-34). 
Aristotle has in mind is a classic fallacy examined in the Rhetoric and in the 
Sophistical Refutations:59 
The unknown is known to be unknown, 
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 On homonymy see Ackrill (1963: 71-72). 
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 See Soph. El. 25, 180a32-38 and Rhet. II.24, 1402a2-6. Ross (1924: 171) and Frede-Patzig 
(1988: 68) take it to be a reference to Plato’s Sophist. 
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Therefore, 
The unknown is known. 
The syllogism is fallacious because the absolute belonging of a predicate to a 
subject is inferred from the belonging of the same predicate to the same subject 
in a qualified way. The confusion between absolute and qualified belonging 
follows from the omission of something in the statement about ‘the unknown’. In 
order to illustrate the indeterminate character of the τί ἐστιν of non-substances, 
Aristotle refers to this fallacy at 1030a25-27 too. The account of what a non-
substance is is ‘as some logically speak of what is not that is what is not, and not 
absolutely’. To illustrate: 
 
What is not is what is not, 
Therefore, 
What is not is. 
What Aristotle seems to suggest is that, unlike homonymy, the procedure of 
addition/subtraction enables the metaphysician to state the τί ἐστιν of non-
substances. The reason is quite simple: if non-substances are accounted for as 
by homonymy, the statement is related to a name; by contrast, if non-substances 
are accounted for as by addition/subtraction, the statement is related to a 
substance. Therefore, the statement of the τί ἐστιν by addition/subtraction is not 
absolute, but qualified. By recalling the two fallacies, Aristotle intends to illustrate 
the contrast between absolute statements and qualified statements; for this is 
akin to the contrast between the definition of substances and the definition of non-
substances in metaphysics. 
     Nevertheless, at 1030a34 Aristotle urges the metaphysician to consider a key 
fact: the πρὸς ἕν relation to substance. According to the traditional reconstruction, 
Aristotle is abandoning the previous procedures in favour of an account based on 
his solution to the multiplicity of being. Basically, it is possible to state the τί ἐστιν 
of a non-substance insofar as this is related to the τί ἐστιν of a substance; for 
example, the τί ἐστιν of pale is related to the τί ἐστιν of paleness just as the τί 
ἐστιν of a medical thing (e.g. an operation, a tool, etc.) is related to the τί ἐστιν of 
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medicine (1030b2-3).60 The metaphysician will not account for a non-substance 
unless she relies on the πρὸς ἕν relation to substance over both homonymy and 
addition/subtraction. Earlier, I showed that the πρὸς ἕν relation is not conceived 
to solve the multiplicity of being. Rather, it is one of the predicative relations 
constituting a demonstrative science; in particular, it is the relation obtaining 
between the subject of knowledge and its demonstrable attributes. With the πρὸς 
ἕν relation to substance, Aristotle is remarking the demonstrative character of 
metaphysics; for substance is the subject of knowledge, while non-substances 
are its demonstrable attributes.61 
     There are two salient things to notice. Firstly, a demonstrative science consists 
of καθ’ ἕν relations and πρὸς ἕν relations to one single nature. Accordingly, 
metaphysics consists of καθ’ ἕν relations and πρὸς ἕν relations to substance; the 
former expressing what a substance is, the latter expressing what a non-
substance is. In Z.4, Aristotle is arguing that the statement of what a non-
substance is is qualified because of its relation to the subject of which non-
substances are demonstrable attributes. If this is correct, Aristotle is attempting 
to establish a form of dependence of every entity upon substance in order to 
separate the demonstrable attributes from the subjects of scientific knowledge. 
What is crucial is that this dependence applies to the τί ἐστιν of the objects of 
metaphysics and, thus, to the essences signified by their statements.  
Essential Dependence: an entity depends upon a substance 
because the essence of the former is related 
to the essence of the latter. 
To explicate this relation as a causal connection between subject and 
demonstrable attribute,  
Essential Dependence (Z): an entity depends upon a substance 
because the essence of the former is 
caused by the essence of the latter.62 
Since the statement of the τί ἐστιν of non-substances is related to the statement 
of the τί ἐστιν of substance, there are definitions depending upon other definitions. 
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 See Ross (1924: 171-172), Owen (1960: 179ff.), Frede-Patzig (1988: 70-71), Loux (1991: 82-
94), Bostock (1994), Lewis (2013: 90-92). See Section 1.1.1. 
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 See Section 1.1.1. 
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Correspondingly, there are essences depending upon other essences; the former 
are the essences that are related to the essence of substances, while the latter 
are the essences of substances. To say that non-substances possess a qualified 
definition is to say that their essence depends upon the essence signified by an 
absolute definition. This is the essence of the substance to which the non-
substances are related. 
     On this score, Aristotle is able to infer the liberal view: essence belongs to 
substance primarily and to other entities secondarily. This conclusion can be 
achieved only if we separate substances from non-substances in terms of 
essential dependence. Its major contribution is to better ground metaphysics; for 
the demonstrative science of the totality of entities consists of both the knowledge 
of substances and the knowledge of non-substances. The point is that a 
substance is known by an immediate definition because its τί ἐστιν is absolute 
(not related to a substance), while non-substances are known by derivative 
definitions because their τί ἐστιν is qualified (related to a substance). In this way, 
Aristotle effectively establishes the Analytics’ distinction between objects of 
knowledge. Substances are the primary objects of metaphysics; for they 
represent the subject of demonstrations (i.e. A-objects). Non-substances are the 
secondary objects of metaphysics (i.e. B-objects); for they represent the 
demonstrable attributes of substances. The definition of non-substances is then 
the demonstrative definition that is grounded in the definition of their subject. To 
use the example of physics, the definition of eclipse (which is a per se attribute 
of a celestial body) is the demonstrative definition that is grounded in the definition 
of the moon. In a nutshell, substance holds primacy over the other entities insofar 
as its definition holds primacy over the demonstrative definitions in metaphysics. 
If this is correct, we can conclude that the liberal view does not supersede the 
austere view. In both contexts, Aristotle conceives his essentialism in order to 
ensure the primacy of substance: if substance is essence, then substance is 
primary. The liberal view, however, is more functional to grounding a 
demonstrative science; for it ensures the primacy of substance by separating its 
primary definitions from the other definitions within metaphysics. 
     At this point, we are in a good position to clarify the nature of non-substances. 
Since non-substances are demonstrable attributes, these must be per se 
accidents and per se properties characterizing the genus of substance. In other 
words, non-substances are the objects of metaphysics whose existence and 
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nature is inferred from a demonstration about substance. Although substances 
are to be identified with the sensible substances, namely bodies (e.g. moon), non-
substances cannot be identified with the demonstrable attributes of sensible 
substances, namely motions (e.g. eclipse); for these are objects of physics and 
not of metaphysics. Metaphysics must be concerned with the per se attributes of 
substance qua substance, whereas physics is concerned with the per se 
attributes of sensible substance qua sensible substance (perhaps, the per se 
attribute that signifies the quantity of a substance could be its unity). Whatever 
these can be, Z.4 provides us with a map of the attributes of substances. For the 
definitions of non-substances will differ from one another according to their causal 
relation with substance. How can we spell out the causal relation that obtains 
between a non-substance and a substance? In all likelihood, the answer is given 
by the procedures of addition and subtraction. After the separation between 
definitions in the liberal view, these procedures turn out to be valid ways to state 
what an object is. The point is that their derivative definition is grounded in the 
immediate definition of the substance to which they belong. 
     The procedure of addition consists of adding what the object is to a substance 
(e.g. pale =def pale human). Aristotle explicitly admits this procedure in Z.5.63 
Addition is necessary to define differentiae and per se properties; for the account 
of such attributes requires a reference to the subject that is such characterized. 
For example, female is a differentia of animal and can be accounted for as only 
by addition to animal; likewise, snub is a property of the snub nose and can be 
accounted for as only by addition to nose (indeed, snub is the nose that is 
concave). In metaphysics, the per se properties can be any non-substance (i.e. 
qualities, quantities, etc.) that characterizes the genus of substance;64 the 
differentiae, instead, can only be qualities that characterize the genus of 
substance. In both cases, these attributes are defined by adding the attribute itself 
to the subject of their characterization. The procedure of subtraction consists of 
subtracting a substance from what the object is (e.g. pale human =def pale). 
Subtraction is necessary to define per se accidents; for the account of such 
attributes does not require a reference to the subject that is characterized, but to 
the cause of the characterization. The case of eclipse can be illustrative of this 
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procedure. Although an eclipse is an eclipsed moon, the astronomer defines it as 
‘loss of light because of the screening of sun by earth’. In metaphysics, the per 
se accidents can be any non-substance (i.e. qualities, quantities, etc.) that 
characterizes a specific substance. The substance is the subject of the 
demonstrable attribute and grounds its existence; the non-substance is the 
demonstrable attribute that is brought about by an external cause. 
3.4 Aristotelian Essentialism Grounding Metaphysics 
Aristotelian essentialism is the doctrine according to which substance is defined 
as essence. At the core of this doctrine, I argued, is the primacy of substance: if 
substance is essence, substance turns out to be primary. The examination of Z.4-
6 then offers a promising solution to ground metaphysics; for the definition as 
essence enables Aristotle to establish a principle that can be credited with the 
primacy of definition. To put it in another way, the genus of substances includes 
those entities that possess and are identical with their own essence; the other 
genera, instead, include those entities that possess an essence only in relation 
to the essence of a substance. Therefore, the principle of metaphysics must be 
the primary substance whose essence grounds the essences of other entities. 
This picture becomes evident in the light of the correspondence between 
substance and definition. Aristotle himself comes to his central conclusions by 
looking at the statements accounting for the objects of metaphysics. Firstly, he 
infers the identity between a substance and its essence (identity thesis) from the 
fact that there is identity between an object and what is signified by its definiens. 
This is indeed a condition applying to every demonstrative science. If 
metaphysics is a science studying substance and its demonstrable attributes, 
there must be identity between a substance and its essence insofar as a 
substance is object of definition. Secondly, he infers that every substance 
possesses an essence either exclusively or primarily from the possession of a 
definition. In other words, since the statements accounting for substances are 
immediate, while the statements accounting for non-substances are derivative, 
essence is the characterization stated to account for substances; for in the 
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account of a substance there is no reference to other objects but to the substance 
itself. To this end, Aristotle conceives a form of ontological dependence that 
separates substances from non-substances: an entity depends upon a substance 
because the essence of the former is related to the essence of the latter (essential 
dependence). Namely, the essence of the substance grounds the essence of 
other entities. In order to complete the development of essentialism and, thus, of 
metaphysics, Aristotle has to identify substance with the entity that holds absolute 
primacy over any other entity. This is the task undertaken in Z.10-11 with the 
analysis of the constitution of definitions. 
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Chapter Four 
Definition and Primacy (II) 
Aristotelian essentialism is conceived to ground the demonstrative science of 
being by defining substance as essence. This doctrine turns out to be particularly 
promising because the definition as essence ensures the primacy of substance: 
substance holds primacy over other entities insofar as the latter essentially 
depend upon the former. In Z.4-6, Aristotle develops his essentialism through an 
analysis of the statements accounting for entities. An essence is the immediate 
characterization of objects that is signified by their definitions; since substances 
possess immediate definitions, substances possess and are the same as their 
essence. In line with the logical strategy, Z.10-11 complete the development of 
essentialism by examining the constitution of definitions. Aristotle attempts to 
identify the entity that is signified by the definition of a substance. At the centre of 
these chapters is the application of hylomorphism. The definition of a substance 
must indicate either form, matter, or the composite of both. Accordingly, the 
constitution stated makes up an essence and ultimately corresponds to the 
principle grounding the other entities. 
     Chapter Four argues that Aristotle endorses a formalist essentialism: 
substance, if defined as essence, is the form of substances. Since form holds 
primacy over other entities, form grounds other entities just as its immediate 
statement grounds derivative statements in metaphysics. In so arguing, I will 
tackle a long-term debate about what parts of an object are parts of its definition. 
The formalists argue that a definition contains only the formal parts of its object. 
The anti-formalists, instead, admit the inclusion of material parts for specific types 
of object; the definitions of animals, for example, require the inclusion of some 
material parts, while the definitions of mathematicals do not. Different theses 
about the constitution of a definition lead to different theses about essence and 
thus to different solutions to Z. My contention is that in Z.10-11 Aristotle takes an 
absolute view on the problem according to which no material part is part of a 
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definition. More precisely, there is no distinction between types of objects or types 
of matter that applies to his conclusion; therefore, the form exhausts the 
constitution of definitions and is to be identified with substance as essence. This 
treatment does not yield a fully Platonist metaphysics. In Z.11, Aristotle makes it 
clear that matter must be somehow included in the definition of natural objects. I 
shall argue that matter is part of the statement signifying a property. The 
constitution of this statement does not make up an essence, but a per se attribute 
of a substance. The ontological relation between form and matter must be 
understood as the scientific relation between the subject of metaphysics and one 
of its demonstrable attributes. 
4.1 The Riddle of Z.10-11 
The problems treated in Z.10-11 can be reduced to one single question: what 
parts of an object are parts of its definition as a whole? Although Aristotle never 
explicitly formulates this riddle, his main concern throughout the chapters is to 
spell out the constitution of a definition. In metaphysics, to examine the 
constitution of a definition is to examine the constitution that makes up a 
substance defined as essence. This makes of Z.10-11 a salient phase in the 
enquiry into substance; for Aristotle is carrying out a logical analysis that can 
contribute to establishing the principle of metaphysics. His strategy becomes 
evident since the very start: i) a definition is a statement, and ii) a statement 
contains parts, therefore, iii) the correspondence between a statement and an 
object is the same as the correspondence between the parts of the statement 
and the parts of the object (1034b20-22).1 Namely, the enquiry into substance 
has to examine the parts of its definition because these indicate the parts that 
make up the object grounding metaphysics. From this perspective, Z.10-11 
appear to engage with the sixth aporia of book B: whether the principles are the 
genera (τὰ γένη) or the constitutive elements of an object (ἐξ ὧν ἐνυπαρχόντων).2 
                                                          
1
 Aristotle often separates the notion of λόγος from the notion of ὁρισµός. However, this distinction 
is not at work in Z.10-11, which is mainly concerned with the parts of a statement (λόγος) insofar 
as these are parts of the statement accounting for a substance, i.e. definition (ὁρισµός). 
2
 See B#6, 995b27-29 and 998a20-b14. 
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Since the genera are thought to be principles inasmuch as they are elements of 
definitions, Aristotle might be addressing the second horn of the aporia by 
showing that some elements do not hold primacy over other entities.3 That is, 
they do not make up an essence. 
     This introductory framework raises the first question to be addressed in the 
chapters (Q1): whether the definition of the parts of the object is contained in its 
definition as a whole or not (1034b22-24).4 The aporetic character of (Q1) stems 
from the fact that some definitions contain the parts of the whole object, whereas 
some others do not. Aristotle provides two case studies to clarify this point:  
(a) circle – segments; 
(b) syllable – letters. 
In case (a), the segments are not contained in the definition of circle; by contrast, 
in case (b), the letters are contained in the definition of syllable. Nevertheless, 
both segments and letters, says Aristotle, are the parts into which the wholes, 
circle and syllable, respectively divide. 
     In the following lines, Aristotle moves from introducing (Q1) to introducing (Q2): 
whether the parts are prior to the whole (1034b 28). Again, he presents us two 
further case studies: 
      (a1) right angle – acute angle; 
                                                          
3
 The significance of B#6 is defended by Menn (2001), who takes Z.10-11 and 13-16 to address 
each horn. In his view, Z aims to show that there is no further substance–whether partial or not–
existing over and above an object (cf. Section 2.3.2 note 82). Thus, Z.10-16 is an argument to 
discard both Pre-Socratic and Platonist views on principles. My reading can make better sense 
of the significance of definition and its connection with the examination of the essence, whilst not 
neglecting its contribution to establish a principle. 
4
 Literally, Πότερον δεῖ τὸν τῶν µερῶν λόγον ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὅλου λόγῳ ἢ οὔ. Since Aristotle 
focuses on the ‘definition’ of the parts, it might be argued that the problem opens the way to a 
sort of regress: the definition of the parts risks containing the definitions of other wholes, which in 
turn contain other parts, and so on (cf. Burnyeat et al., 1979: 78-80). Frede-Patzig (1988: 167-
168) consider the singular case of the term τὸν λόγον to rule out the regressive version of the 
question (Aristotle would have spoken of ‘the definition-s of parts’, indeed). Mensch (1996) 
suggests that the parts of a definition are implicit definitions and not complex expressions (for a 
similar view, see Peramatzis, 2011: 43 n. 4). At any rate, the problem of the regress in the 
definition of the parts would arise if the parts were themselves substances and, thus, essences 
to be stated in definitions. In Chapter Five, I will argue that this possibility is taken into 
consideration in Z.13-14 and raises serious difficulties for the entire enquiry (See Z.13, 1038b16-
23; b30-34; 1039a3-4). 
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      (a2) animal/human – finger. 
In either case, the parts are posterior to the whole to which they belong. To 
paraphrase, right and human are prior to acute and finger, respectively (1034b28-
32). Given the examination of the essence in Z.4-6, it is not difficult to understand 
what sense of priority is at work. Aristotle speaks of priority in definition (τῷ λόγῳ) 
and in being (τῷ εἶναι) in order to introduce the ontological dependence governing 
metaphysics: a part depends upon the whole because the essence of the former 
is caused by the essence of the latter. The priority in definition is understood in 
terms of constitution. Namely, the definition of the whole is constitutive of the 
definition of the parts; for example, right is contained in the definition of acute. 
Therefore, what a whole is is the cause of what a part is insofar as its essence is 
included in the essence of the part.5 Though less straightforward, the priority in 
being is simply another way to cast the priority in definition. Indeed, what the 
whole is grounds the fact that there is a part; for example, what right is is 
presupposed to establish the existence of acute. Therefore, what a whole is is 
the cause of why there is a part.6 
     This is not the conclusion one might expect, though. Since acute and finger 
are parts into which right and human respectively divide, they are expected to be 
the elements contained in the definition of the whole objects; that is, the definition 
of the whole object is expected to state these parts. The crucial point is that 
essentialism commits us to the opposite view. Since the parts are essentially 
dependent upon the whole, the parts are not prior to and are not stated in the 
definition of the whole. Rather, the definition of the parts contains the definition of 
the whole. 
                                                          
5
 It is important to note the strength of this understanding of the priority in definition. What is prior 
in definition is not simply presupposed by but is constitutive of what is posterior. This stronger 
version is already hinted at in Z.1 (cf. Z.1, 1028a31-b1 and Section 1.1.2). The point is that the 
constitutive construal only applies to objects within the same genus of entities (e.g. animal – 
human; colour – white), and not to objects belonging to different genera. Since metaphysics is 
concerned with the first genus of entities, the priority in terms of constitution will be relevant to the 
treatment of substances, while the priority in terms of presupposition will be relevant for the 
treatment of their demonstrable attributes. 
6
 This reading makes sense of how right is ontologically independent of acute, although the 
subtraction of an acute angle from a right angle implies the destruction of the right angle (on this 
problem see Ross, 1924: 196, and Frede-Patzig, 1988: 170). A similar reading of this priority is 
found in Scaltsas (1994b: 85-87) and in Peramatzis (2011: 23-25; 42-44). Peramatzis conceives 
his so-called priority in being as a relation of asymmetric independence that is corresponded to 
by the priority in definition: ‘A is prior to B just in case A is defined without mentioning B, but B is 
not defined without mentioning A’. The priority in being must be distinct from the priority in 
existence and understood as priority in essence. According to Peramatzis, this is the priority 
favoured by Aristotle. 
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     At this point, we are in a good position to see how (Q1) and (Q2) generate the 
riddle of Z.10-11. As recognized by commentators, Aristotle does not seem to 
address different philosophical questions.7 (a1) and (a2) are nothing but other 
instances of (a), i.e. the case in which the parts of an object are not contained in 
its definition. Just as the definition of circle does not contain the segments into 
which the circle divides, the definitions of right and human do not contain acute 
and finger, respectively. It could be said that (a1) and (a2) work as 
counterexamples to (b); for they show that the parts of an object are not prior to 
it and, thus, do not constitute its definition. From this perspective, we can look at 
(Q2) as an alternative formulation (Q1) in terms of priority.8 The treatment of (Q2) 
is functional to the treatment of (Q1) because it examines whether the parts that 
are supposed to constitute the definition of an object are in fact prior to it. In other 
words, (Q2) is aimed at assessing a positive answer to (Q1) through a priority 
test: if the parts of an object are stated in its definition, then these parts must be 
prior to the whole object defined. The interconnection of the two questions 
concurs with our initial insight. The puzzle turns out to concern the constitution of 
a definition because this signifies an essence. The riddle is particularly pressing 
for Z’s enquiry. Since substance is defined as essence, and since essence is 
stated by definitions, we are unable to understand what substance is unless we 
spell out the constitution of a definition in metaphysics, i.e. the definition of a 
substance; for this means grounding metaphysics by establishing its ultimate 
principle.9 The difficulty with this task is that the parts into which a whole object 
divides are not always stated by its definition. 
     For his solution to the riddle, Aristotle resorts to his hylomorphism. In physics, 
a sensible substance is defined as some material substratum with a formal 
organization; the principle grounding this science is indeed nature, which is 
understood both as matter and as form.10 Since Z’s enquiry is focused on sensible 
                                                          
7
 Cf. Burnyeat et al. (1979: 78-80); Frede-Patzig (1988: 166-170); Bostock (1994: 145). Contra 
Ross (1924: 196). 
8
 Two salient signposts confirm this reading. First, at 1035b3-4 Aristotle claims to have illustrated 
the truth and to return to the question to offer better clarification of it (cf. Frede-Patzig, 1988: 184-
185, although they motivate this claim with different reasons). Second, in the final summary (Z.11, 
1037a21ff.) Aristotle refers only to (Q1). 
9
 More directly, one could say that since the definition of a substance is the statement of an 
essence, we are unable to understand what substance is unless we spell out the constitution of 
its definition. This approach to Z.10-11, however, plays down its connection with Z.4-6. Perhaps 
it confirms the original independence of these chapters. 
10
 See Section 2.1.3. Cf. Phys. I.7, 190b9-191a22; II.1, 193a9-193b5. 
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substances, the principle of metaphysics is likely to correspond to one of the 
principles of physics. The treatment of the riddle is meant to spell out the 
constitution of a definition in metaphysics in terms of matter and form. The answer 
will indicate substance as essence and, thus, the principle of the totality of 
entities. Whereas modern metaphysicians have seldom tackled the riddle, 
commentators have debated about the answer given by Aristotle.11 Roughly, they 
split into two broad camps: i) those arguing that the definition of a substance 
contains only its form, henceforth formalists; ii) those arguing that the definition 
of a substance contains its matter in the case of sensible substances, henceforth 
anti-formalists. On the face of it, what is at stake is whether Aristotle considers 
matter to be part of the definition of substances. The philosophical significance of 
this problem is that if matter is found to be part of the definition of sensible 
substances, an essence turns out to be the combination of the form and the 
matter of its object. In a nutshell, the development of an Aristotelian essentialism 
cannot be accomplished unless we clarify the constitution of the primary objects 
in metaphysics, so far exemplified by natural objects. 
     Despite the wide range of positions defended, it is fruitful to distinguish the 
following three theses: 
T.1: The definition of a substance states only its form;12 
T.2: The definition of a substance states its form and some ‘material’ parts;13 
T.3: The definition of a substance states its form and its specific matter.14 
Let me review each of them. 
     T.1 is the traditional version of the formalist view mainly defended by Michael 
Frede. According to T.1, the form is the only element stated in the definition of a 
substance. To illustrate, the definition of human is the statement of the human 
soul. This interpretation rests on two claims: i) form is the only object of definition; 
ii) matter can be implied–though not mentioned–by the definition of the form. The 
fundamental insight of Frede’s thesis is that to define a substance is to define a 
                                                          
11
 In modern debates, it is matter of dispute what parts of an object are parts of its essence, which 
is in fact the final upshot of Z.10-11. I will present some positions below. 
12
 Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: esp. 166-220); Frede (1990); Mensch (1996). 
13
 Cf. Whiting (1991); Deslauriers (2007: esp. 138-156); Peramatzis (2011: esp. 38-54, 173-200); 
Devereux (2011). 
14
 Cf. Aquinas (Expositio: L.9-11); Ross (1924: 194-205); Morrison (1990); Loux (1991: 168-196); 
Bostock (1994: 141-175). 
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form. Thus, although a substance is a sensible composite of form and matter, its 
definition exclusively concerns its formal constitution;15 the matter of a sensible 
substance, by contrast, can be inferred from the fact that some forms can only be 
realized in fixed types of material substratum. For example, since human isdef 
human soul, and since human soul must be realized in a portion of flesh&bone, 
from the definition of human we can infer the material constitution of the 
substance, i.e. flesh&bone. This thesis squares with the general interpretation of 
Z proposed by Frede-Patzig in their commentary: every substance ultimately is 
its form and this makes form the primary substance enquired in Z.16 
Consequently, an essence never includes matter, but is entirely identified with 
the form of a substance.17 
 
     T.2 is an attempt to explain how some reference to matter can be included in 
the definition of a substance. Thus, it can be classified as a version of the anti-
formalist view. According to T.2, the form is the only element stated in the 
definition of a substance and can include parts specifying the material 
organization. This applies to the case of natural objects, such as animals. To 
illustrate, the definition of human is the statement of its human soul and indicates 
some features of its body. For the treatment of the riddle, T.2 is generally based 
on a distinction between types of matter: homogeneous matter (flesh&bone; 
bronze) and functional matter (e.g. hand, leg).18 Whilst Aristotle argues against 
the inclusion of the former, he recognizes the contribution of the latter to 
determine what a sensible substance is. It is important to note that T.2 defends 
the inclusion of a conceptual reference to the material parts and not the inclusion 
of the parts themselves. This fact increases the variety of strategies for the 
defence of T.2. Besides the functional understanding,19 Michael Peramatzis 
                                                          
15
 To paraphrase Frede (1990: 122), a composite substance is definable insofar as it possesses 
a form; ‘for what a composite substance really is is this form’. 
16
 See Frede-Patzig (1988: 40-41). 
17
 A similar approach is found in Lowe (1998: 199-203; 209), who suggests getting rid of the notion 
of matter just as in modern physics. Since a form works as both the criterion of identity and as 
principle of individuation for concrete individual objects, every substance can be reduced to its 
form; for this is its essential status qua entity. 
18
 In his physical works, Aristotle often applies a distinction between the homogeneous parts 
(ὁµοιοµερῆ) and the heterogeneous parts (ἀνοµοιοµερῆ) of a body. Cf. De Gen. et Cor. I.5, 
321b17-22; Met. IV.12, 389b26-28; De Part. An. I.1, 640b20-29. 
19
 Firstly suggested by Whiting (1991: 626-631), this view has been recently defended by 
Devereux (2011), who considers such parts as the formal account of the material parts performing 
biological functions (e.g. hand, leg). 
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proposes to consider the defining parts of an object as ways or modes of being. 
In his view, the constitution of a definition includes both formal (e.g. rationality) 
and material features (e.g. growth, locomotion) and excludes token and type 
items (e.g. chunks of flesh&bone; the kind flesh&bone).20 Similarly, Deslauriers 
takes the material parts of a form as the potential way of being that is actualized 
by the remaining parts; the former is signified by the genus, while the latter is 
signified by the differentia.21 
 
     T.3 represents the standard interpretation of Aristotle’s views on definition. 
According to T.3, both form and matter are stated in the definition of a substance, 
if this is a natural object. To illustrate, the definition of human is the statement of 
human soul and flesh&bone. For the treatment of the riddle, T.3 is then based on 
a distinction between specific matter and individual matter.22 The specific matter 
is the type of matter that is common to the instances of a species and generally 
corresponds to the proximate matter; for example, human flesh&bone. In other 
words, the specific matter is the substratum for the realization of a form and is 
included in the definition of composite substances. The individual matter is 
instead the portion of matter that belongs to a particular instance and is subject 
to change; for example, Socrates’ flesh&bone.23. 
 
The common feature of T.2 and T.3 is the endorsement of a distinction between 
types of objects.24 The anti-formalist view consists in separating those objects 
                                                          
20
 This solution is developed within Peramatzis’ interpretation of Aristotle’s ontology, which, he 
claims, separates (A) token and type entities from (B) attributes and ways of being. Individual 
compounds, individual portions of matter, universal compounds and universal portions of matter 
are instances of (A), while essential and non-essential accidents are instances of (B) (cf. 
Peramatzis, 2011: esp. 3-6; 40-54). Admittedly, no passage in the Aristotelian corpus testifies to 
the presence of such a categorial distinction. 
21
 Deslauriers’s interpretation tackles the debate about the genus-as-matter doctrine according to 
which Aristotle explains the unity of definition by taking the genus-differentia structure as a kind 
of hylomorphic composite. For Deslauriers, the inclusion of the material parts is functional to 
ensuring unity. I will return to the problem of the genus-as-matter in Chapter Six. 
22
 This distinction is inspired to the Aquinas’ distinction between materia non signata (i.e. 
common) and materia signata (i.e. particular). See Aquinas (Expositio: L.9, 1467ff.). 
23
 Gill (1989) offers a view along the lines of T.3. Although Gill relies on T.2’s distinction between 
functional matter and homogeneous matter, she concludes that both types of matter are contained 
in the definition of the compound, though not in the definition of the form. In her view, the nature 
of functional matter (e.g. organic body) is identical with the form (e.g. human soul), while the 
nature of homogenous matter (e.g. flesh&bone) is totally independent of form, despite providing 
appropriate conditions for its realization. For a modern defence of the inclusion of matter in the 
essence of objects, see Loux (2006) and Oderberg (2007: 62ff.). 
24
 This approach is perfectly outlined in the anti-formalist reply made by Morrison (1990) against 
Frede’s formalist thesis. Cf. Deslauriers (2007: 144-145); Peramatzis (2011: 44); Devereux (2011: 
169-170). 
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that are essentially enmattered from those objects that are essentially matter-
free. Indeed, there must be a type of matter that is stated in a definition inasmuch 
as some definienda are essentially dependent on it. To illustrate, the definition of 
natural objects contains the form and the matter in which the form is realized; for 
such matter determines the conditions of the realization of the form. The definition 
of mathematicals, instead, contains their form only; for there is no type of matter 
that determines the conditions of realization of the form.25 This conception 
squares with some important texts in the corpus. Aristotle often remarks on the 
distinction between the objects of physics and the objects of mathematics. 
Mathematicals are studied after subtracting matter from sensible objects and, 
thus, turn out to be purely formal in character; by contrast, natural objects 
(especially living entities) are studied with reference to both their form and their 
matter.26 In Z.11, Aristotle attacks Socrates the Younger and in doing so further 
clarifies this distinction. Socrates’ comparison between human and circle is 
rejected because it makes the former a purely formal entity. This criticism seems 
to imply some reference to matter in the definition of natural objects. The 
defenders of T.2 and T.3 exploit this distinction to conclude in favour of an anti-
formalist answer: the definition of a substance has to state some type of matter 
that is characteristic of natural objects as opposed to mathematicals. 
     However, it is important to observe some peculiarities of each thesis. 
According to T.2, it is the form of a natural object that is essentially enmattered. 
That is, the form of a substance depends upon the material features expressing 
its organization. Therefore, the constitution of a definition is exhausted by the 
form, which includes both material and formal features.27 According to T.3, it is 
the natural object itself that is essentially enmattered. That is, a composite 
substance depends upon the specific matter that is common to the members of 
its species. Consequently, the constitution of a definition consists of both matter 
and form only if the definiendum is a composite; if the definiendum is a form, the 
constitution of a definition consists of form exclusively. For example, the definition 
of human states the form and the matter of human, while the definition of human 
                                                          
25
 ‘deffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continent sed etiam materiam, 
aliter enim deffinitiones naturales et mathematice non different’ Aquinas (De Ente: 2.14-17). 
26
 The key passages are Physics II.2 (193b31-194a12), On the Soul II.1-2, Metaphysics E.1 
(1025b30-1026a10), Z.11 (1036b21-33), and H.2 (1043a11-26). 
27
 Thus, T.2 agrees with T.1 that the definition of an object contains only its form, but it disagrees 
on the characterization of such a form. 
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soul states only the form of human.28 Since Z’s enquiry is focused on sensible 
substances, substance as essence must be identified with the form and some 
type of matter, which is either constitutive of the form (T.2) or constitutive of the 
composite (T.3). In light of this, it is not difficult to understand the anti-formalist 
strategy for the treatment of the riddle: the constitution of a definition is 
established on the basis of a distinction between types of objects. In order to put 
this strategy into effect, the defenders of T.2 and T.3 endorse a distinction 
between types of matter. The inclusion of matter in the definition of an object 
requires that we specify the type of matter on which the object essentially 
depends. Since the substances mainly examined in Z are the substances studied 
in physics, the constitution of a definition must include some ‘material’ element. 
     In the remainder of this Chapter, I intend to defend a version of T.1 and to 
show that Aristotelian essentialism leads to a formalist solution to Z. My strategy 
is as follows: since a distinction between types of object presupposes a distinction 
between types of matter, I shall argue that no distinction between types of matter 
applies to Aristotle’s conclusion in Z.10-11. Consequently, the defenders of anti-
formalist views are not allowed to admit any material element in the definition of 
a substance, whether natural or not. On the contrary, the definition of a substance 
states only its form and this is the constitution that makes up a substance defined 
as essence. Put it in another way, I will defend the absolute character of 
Aristotle’s conclusion: the constitution of a definition always consists of the formal 
parts, independently of the nature of the definiendum. The material parts are all 
and only the parts that are not stated in a definition, whereas formal parts are all 
and only the parts that are stated in a definition. Therefore, although the 
substances studied in metaphysics are prima facie natural objects, the definition 
of substances is the definition of their forms and states the parts of their forms. 
4.2 Parts, Wholes, and Definitions 
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 Thus, T.3 agrees with T.1 that the definition of a formal object (i.e. the form of a natural object 
or a mathematical) is the statement of a form only, but it disagrees on the definition of a composite 
object.  
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Starting from 1034b34, Aristotle reconsiders the relation between the whole and 
its parts in terms of form and matter. His argument is thought to give an answer 
to (Q1). Although the discussion lasts until 1035b3, Aristotle’s solution emerges 
in the very middle. 
For this reason, (a) the definition of circle does not contain that of the segments, 
while (b) the definition of syllable does contain that of the letters; for the letters 
are parts of the definition of the form, and are not matter of the syllable, whereas 
segments are in this way parts as matter on which the form is realized. (1035a9-
12, Bostock’s translation slightly modified) 
διὸ ὁ µὲν τοῦ κύκλου λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τµηµάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει 
τὸν τῶν στοιχείων·  τὰ µὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου µέρη τοῦ εἴδους καὶ οὐχ ὕλη, 
τὰ δὲ τµήµατα οὕτως µέρη ὡς ὕλη ἐφ’ ἧς ἐπιγίγνεται.
 
Aristotle returns to the cases of circle and of syllable in order to clarify why the 
statement of the parts is contained in the definition of the latter but not in that of 
the former. The difficulty is solved as follows: if the parts constitute the material 
substratum on which the form of the object is realized, these are not stated in the 
definition of the whole object. To illustrate, (a) since the segments are the matter 
on which the form circle is realized, the segments are not stated in the definition 
of circle. On the contrary, (b) since the letters are not the matter in which the form 
syllable is realized, the letters are stated in the definition of syllable. These 
observations do not simply clarify whether the parts of an object are parts of its 
definition; it is indeed plain that the parts are included. They also show us what 
parts are to be stated. As suggested by commentators, Aristotle’s answer 
consists in separating case (a) from case (b) through an opposition between 
‘material parts’ and ‘formal parts’.29 What is interesting to note is that the concept 
of formal part is equivalent to the concept of non-material part (a11); thus, 
Aristotle seems to suggest an absolute separation: whatever is not among the 
material parts of the object is a formal part, while whatever is not among formal 
parts is a material part.  In so arguing, no distinction between types of matter 
applies to the argument; for it suffices to establish whether a part is material or 
not to establish whether it is included in a definition. In the absence of a distinction 
between types of matter, Aristotle cannot be committed to any distinction between 
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 Cf. Bostock (1994: 148-149). 
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definienda. Rather, he is bound to endorse an absolute view: the definition of an 
object states only its non-material parts. These are the parts of the form and 
exhaust the constitution that makes up an essence. 
     Things are not so easy, though. The defenders of T.2 and T.3 could reply that 
Aristotle does not introduce any distinction between types of matter because he 
is concerned with the definition of formal objects. Namely, circle and syllable 
exemplify those objects that are not essentially enmattered; for their forms can 
be realized in any type of matter (e.g. bronze, stone, ink etc.).30 With the definition 
of natural objects, Aristotle will introduce the type of matter on which the object 
essentially depends. Clearly, the defenders of T.2 argue that the statement of 
material parts is excluded because the forms of circle and of syllable are not 
characterized by those material features that determine what each of them is. 
The defenders of T.3, instead, argue that the statement of material parts is 
excluded because circle and syllable are not characterized by the specific 
material substratum that allows the realization of their forms. Admittedly, two 
elements confirm that Aristotle has here in mind the definition of the forms of 
these objects. At a11, the letters are explicitly said to be ‘the parts of the definition 
of the form’ (τοῦ λόγου µέρη τοῦ εἴδους); at a12 the segments are said to be the 
parts on which circle is realized (ἐφ’ οἷς ἐπιγίγνεται). More or less explicitly, it is 
the form of circle that is the subject of Aristotle’s reasoning. Therefore, the 
possibility of an anti-formalist answer to the riddle is still open. Since the 
distinction between types of objects presupposes a distinction between types of 
matter, we need to examine whether Aristotle’s argument relies on a review of 
material elements. If it were so, the answer given at 1035a9-12 should be 
downgraded to an explanation of the cases of circle and syllable only. 
     In the reasoning preceding our passage, Aristotle implements his hylomorphic 
conception of substances by focusing on the ambiguity of ‘part’. His strategy is 
pretty clear: once the sense of ‘part’ that is relevant to the discussion is isolated, 
it should be possible to answer (Q1). Indeed, the inclusion of the parts in the 
definition of an object may well depend on what the term ‘part’ means. To this 
effect, the discussion, says Aristotle, must not consider what is part as ‘measure 
of quantity’, but what is part as a ‘constituent of substance’ (ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ οὐσία ὡς 
µερῶν). Namely, there is a sense of ‘part’ (µέρος) that amounts to the sense of 
                                                          
30
 For T.3 these objects need only to be forms, while for T.2 these must be the forms of non-
natural entities. 
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‘constituent’ (ἔκ τινος) and is the sense according to which form and matter could 
be parts of a substance. After all, Aristotle has already remarked that the 
constitution of a definition corresponds to the constitution that makes up a 
substance; for a substance is promisingly defined as essence and an essence is 
stated by a definition. On this point, Aristotle advances the following hypothesis: 
(I) in one sense matter is part of something, whereas (II) in another sense matter 
is not part (1035a2-3). Therefore, matter is not part of a whole in every sense of 
‘part’. The point is that there is no way to disentangle these senses except by 
separating the material parts from the non-material parts. Again, such a 
distinction seems to commit Aristotle to an absolute conclusion. There is no 
distinction between types of matter that applies to the argument. Simply, the 
material parts are those parts that do not constitute a substance because these 
are the parts that do not constitute its definition as a whole. 
     However, the examples listed in the text give us a different insight into the 
reasoning. Rather than relying on the ambiguity of ‘part’, Aristotle appears to rely 
on the ambiguity of ‘whole’. To illustrate, whereas flesh is not part of concavity, 
it is part of snubness; for, unlike concavity, snubness is the whole of which flesh 
is a material part. Likewise, whereas bronze is not part of the statue as form, it is 
part of the statue as composite; for the statue as composite is the whole of which 
bronze is a material part. Accordingly, the distinction between material parts and 
non-material parts can be understood with reference to the senses of ‘whole’. 
Since matter is not part of a whole in every sense of ‘whole’, the constitution of a 
definition is spelled out by separating the composite ‘whole’ from the formal 
‘whole’. The defenders of T.2 and T.3 look at this overarching distinction as a 
piece of evidence in favour of an anti-formalist answer to the riddle. Since 
Aristotle is committed to a distinction between wholes, he might explain the case 
of (a) circle and the case of (b) syllable with reference to their formal character. 
Basically, the inclusion of matter in a definition is relative to the type of whole, i.e. 
the type of object, of which matter is part. 
     How is the distinction between wholes and the distinction between parts 
connected within the argument of Z.10? While insisting on the sense of 
constituent part of substance, Aristotle does not refer to any sense of whole. The 
defence of anti-formalist theses can be then accomplished only if the sense of 
‘constituent part’ is subordinate to a distinction between senses of ‘whole’. In 
Metaphysics ∆, Aristotle devotes chapters 24 and 25 to the treatment of the 
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notions of ἔκ τινος and µέρος, respectively.31 In the review of ∆.25, there is only 
one sense of ‘part’ that is clearly meant to apply to form and matter: ‘part is that 
into which something divides or from which something is constituted, this being 
either a form or what possesses a form (i.e. composite)’ (1023b19-20). 
Remarkably, Aristotle employs the notion of ‘constituent’ to illustrate the sense of 
‘part’ at issue. In doing so, he makes reference to a distinction between wholes. 
The idea is that something is part insofar as it constitutes either a form or a 
composite. Therefore, this sense of ‘part’ encompasses two senses according to 
which something is a constituent: constituent of the form and constituent of the 
composite. Aristotle illustrates the distinction between these two senses of 
‘constituent’ in ∆.24. 
In another sense, the form is constituted by its parts, as for instance a human is 
constituted by biped and a syllable by letter. This is indeed different from the way 
the statue is constituted by bronze; for a composite substance is constituted by 
sensible matter, but also the form is constituted by the matter of the form. 
(1023a35-b2, Kirwan’s translation modified)32 
τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ µέρους τὸ εἶδος, οἷον ἅνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ δίποδος καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ 
τοῦ στοιχείου·  ἄλλως γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ ἀνδριὰς ἐκ χαλκοῦ·  ἐκ τῆς αἰσθητῆς γὰρ 
ὕλης ἡ συνθετὴ οὐσία, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ εἴδους ὕλης.
 
Aristotle opposes the material sense of constitution to the formal sense of 
constitution.33 To illustrate, a lump of bronze constitutes the statue because it is 
the sensible constituent into which the composite statue divides, i.e. its matter; 
by contrast, the letters constitute the syllable because these are the formal 
constituents into which the syllable divides, i.e. its form (1023a35-b2). As 
                                                          
31
 For a detailed analysis see Menn (2001: 110-115). 
32
 Unlike Kirwan (1993), I translate of ἔκ τινος with ‘being constituted’ rather than with the 
expression ‘out of’. Also, at b2 I refer ἀλλὰ καὶ to the fact that, contrary to what one may expect, 
the form too is subject to being constituted.  
33
 Literally, Aristotle talks about ‘sensible matter’ as opposed to the ‘matter of the form’. Some 
defenders of T.2 take this passage as the proof of the presence of material features in the form 
(cf. Peramatzis, 2011: 50-54). This is an over-interpretation of Aristotle’s claim. Firstly, Aristotle is 
here contrasting two types of constitution; thus, the ‘matter of the form’ is likely to mean the sum 
of the constitutive elements making up a form as opposed to the sum of those making up a 
composite. This analogical use of the hylomorphic notions is found elsewhere in the corpus (cf. 
De Cael. IV.3, 310b14-15; 311b12-15; De Part. An. I.3, 649a25; Metaph. ∆.6, 1016a25-28; ∆.28, 
1024b6-8; I.8, 1057b37-1058a25). Secondly, since this type of matter is the unique constituent 
mentioned by Aristotle to illustrate the constitution of the form, it can hardly signify a type of matter; 
for the form cannot be constituted by material parts only (cf. H.3, 1043b10-14). Thirdly, none of 
the examples of ‘matter of the form’ provided by Aristotle corresponds to the material features of 
T.2. 
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expected, Aristotle associates the distinction between constituents with the 
distinction between wholes; for the material constitution and the formal 
constitution pertain to the composite and to the form, respectively. However, this 
does not mean that the distinction between parts is subordinate to the distinction 
between wholes. It is worth noting that the two distinctions yield equivalent 
domains. In Aristotle’s reasoning, it is only the material constitution that is 
ascribed to the composite whole, whereas it is only the formal constitution that is 
ascribed to the formal whole. If the same result obtains whatever is separated, 
the distinction between parts does not depend on the distinction between wholes. 
There is one more remarkable fact we can infer from the passage. In analysing 
the senses of ‘constituent’, Aristotle is concerned not with the parts of a definition, 
but with the parts of a whole. Thus, the distinction between composite whole and 
formal whole contributes to clarifying whether the constitution is material or 
formal. But this does not mean clarifying whether the constitution of a definition 
is material or formal. That is, Aristotle is not separating the composite whole from 
the formal whole to separate two types of definiendum. 
     The application of the notion of ‘constituent’ in the argument of Z.10 follows 
the approach outlined in ∆.24. The distinction between parts does not depend on 
the distinction between wholes because they yield equivalent domains. For this 
reason, Aristotle can easily shift from one to the other: the material parts make 
up the constitution of the composite wholes; the formal parts make up the 
constitution of the formal wholes. To be the material part of an object is to make 
up the constitution into which a composite whole divides, whereas to be the 
formal part of an object is to make up the constitution into which a formal whole 
divides. The key point is that the inclusion of matter concerns the constitution of 
an object and not the constitution of a definition.34 In other words, the concept of 
‘whole object’ is not equivalent to the concept of ‘definiendum’; for there are whole 
objects that are not definienda. Aristotle makes this clear starting from 1035a25. 
The material constitution is the reason why composite objects (συνειληµµένα) 
undergo a process of dissolution; for example, snubness and bronze circle 
dissolve insofar as they divide into flesh and bronze, respectively. On the 
                                                          
34
 Lines 1035a22-23 seem to speak against this conclusion and to include matter in the definition 
of some objects, but they can hardly be reliable. Not only is the text clearly corrupted (the verb 
ἐνεῖναι does not take the genitive, as reported by the β-reading), but his final remark is likely to 
be a later addition with illustrative purposes. On this point see, Jaeger (1917). For the presence 
of interpolations for didactic purposes, see Primavesi (2012: 424-456).    
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contrary, formal objects do not undergo such a process insofar as they do not 
divide into material parts. If this is correct, there is no distinction between types 
of objects of definition applying to the argument. Therefore, Aristotle ends up 
giving an absolute answer to the riddle: all and only material parts are not parts 
of a definition. In case (a), the segments are not parts of the definition of circle 
because they make up a material constitution. In case (b), the letters are not parts 
of the definition of syllable because they make up a formal constitution. It could 
be said that the constitution of a definition always includes the formal parts just 
as the form is the sole whole that is object of a definition. 
     Does the same conclusion obtain in the case of substances? The defenders 
of anti-formalist views may indeed reply that the definition of a substance states 
both formal and material parts because substances are natural objects (at least 
those studied in Z). Namely, sensible substances essentially depend upon their 
material substratum. The point is that Aristotle discarded the inclusion of matter 
for concrete wholes, such as individual human and statue. These objects are 
subject to change and, thus, indefinable. However, the introduction of some 
general concept of matter would turn the distinction between wholes into a 
distinction between definienda. For the defenders of T.3, the introduction of 
specific matter is necessary to define composite substances as opposed to formal 
substances. For the defenders of T.2, the introduction of some material features 
is necessary to define the forms of sensible substances as opposed to the forms 
of mathematicals. 
     In order to conclude in favour of T.1, we need to show that the argument of 
Z.10 applies to substances as much as it does to any object of definition; that is, 
independently of the fact that substances are natural objects. Thus, there is no 
distinction between types of definienda. At 1035a17-20, some observations may 
confirm my hypothesis. 
i) If human and line are divided; 
ii) human divides into flesh&bone, and line divides into halves. 
iii) flesh&bone and halves are material parts; 
Therefore, 
iv) flesh&bone and halves are not part of the definitions of human and line. 
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Aristotle compares the case of a mathematical, line, to the case of a natural 
object, human. This comparison is meant to clarify the new understanding of the 
cases of circle and syllable. In the previous lines, Aristotle points out that the 
material constitution of a mathematical can be identified with either its intelligible 
constituents (e.g. the semicircles of a circle) or its sensible constituents (e.g. the 
lump of bronze of a bronze circle). This implies a distinction between intelligible 
matter and sensible matter.35 If Aristotle bases the deduction on this assumption, 
we can conjecture that flesh&bone of human are equated to any sensible 
constituent of a natural object. Likewise, the halves of line are equated to any 
intelligible constituent of a mathematical. The key point is that Aristotle concludes 
that neither flesh&bone nor halves are stated by a definition. 
     This not only does show that Aristotle does not rely on the distinction between 
intelligible and sensible matter to infer his conclusion. More importantly, it also 
testifies that he does not take into consideration any other distinction between 
definienda for his answer to the riddle. The case of human is particularly 
illustrative in this regard. Indeed, human exemplifies a substance and, thus, one 
of the objects of definition in metaphysics. The salient point is that the constitution 
of this substance does not include its material parts (i.e. flesh&bone) and, 
consequently, these material parts are not stated in its definition. Aristotle is not 
opposing the form human to the composite human as if they were two types of 
definienda. Rather, he is opposing the form human to the composite human in 
that the former is substance and object of definition and the latter is not.36 
Therefore, the definition of a substance states only its form, whose constitution 
makes up substance as essence. 
     This argument is particularly effective on T.3. Since flesh&bone of human are 
compared to the halves of line, they are regarded as the repeatable constitution 
that is common to the instances of a kind. Arguably, flesh&bone exemplify the 
specific matter of human. In order to establish his conclusion, Aristotle does not 
                                                          
35
 Aristotle is perhaps anticipating his observations at 1036a9-12. Roughly, the intelligible matter 
is peculiar of mathematicals (or of formal objects) and must be understood as product of division 
(e.g. the segments of a triangle). For this reason, it is contrasted with sensible matter of bodies, 
which is a principle of their motions. Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: 195-196) and H.6, 1045a33-36. 
36
 Thus, I agree with Ross (1924: 197) who identifies human with the human soul. However, he 
argues that the σύνολον at a20 is any whole containing matter: i) the intelligible individual (e.g. 
circle); ii) the universal compound (e.g. Human); iii) a sensible individual (e.g. Callias, a bronze 
circle). In his view, Aristotle still includes matter in the definition of these composite objects. But 
in the passage, Aristotle specifies that matter is part of these objects, not of their definition. Cf. 
Frede-Patzig (1988: 177). 
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separate the specific matter from the particular matter; he simply excludes the 
matter of human inasmuch as it is not a formal part and, thus, is part neither of a 
definition nor of a substance. Nevertheless, Aristotle may still have in mind a 
distinction between functional and homogeneous matter. This leaves open the 
possibility of his commitment to T.2. Admittedly, the material constitution 
excluded by definition is precisely the homogenous type of matter in which a form 
is realized (e.g. flesh&bone, bronze, etc.). Aristotle could then separate the 
material features indicated by functional parts from both the homogeneous matter 
of natural objects and the intelligible matter of mathematicals. 
     This possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. There is nonetheless an 
interesting feature in the deduction above. In order to infer (iv), it suffices to show 
that (iii) flesh&bone and halves are the material parts of human and line, 
respectively. This means that Aristotle is able to infer (iv) by giving an absolute 
character to his argument. In other words, for each object it suffices to separate 
the material parts from the non-material parts in order to give its definition. Since 
Aristotle has not explicitly introduced any distinction between types of matter 
applying to his argument, the unique alternative premise by which we can replace 
(iii) is: 
iii*)      flesh&bone and halves are not formal parts; 
(iii*) indeed presupposes that the definition of any object corresponds to the 
statement of a form. Accordingly, the definition of a substance states only its form 
and its constitution is exhausted by formal parts. From this perspective, we can 
better appreciate the opposition at 1035a11-12, on which the argument of Z.10 
is clearly built. The material constitution is not simply contrasted with the formal 
constitution. Rather, it is contrasted with the constitution of the definition of the 
form. Basically, the material parts that constitute a whole are disjointed from the 
parts that constitute a definition. The fundamental insight is that the whole that is 
constituted by material parts is not a definiendum and, accordingly, is not a 
substance; for substances are the primary definienda in metaphysics and are 
identical with the essence signified by their definitions. 
Definition and Primacy (II) 
 
163 
 
4.3 The Priority Test 
If the parts of an object are stated in its definition, then these parts must be prior 
to the whole object defined. This is the priority test that Aristotle undertakes with 
(Q2). Earlier, I pointed out that the notion of priority introduces the ontological 
dependence governing metaphysics and is understood in terms of constitution. 
An entity is prior to another entity because the definition of the former is 
constitutive of the definition of the latter. Namely, the latter essentially depends 
upon the former. Since the parts of a definition indicate the parts that make up an 
essence, the parts stated must be prior to the whole object.37 The priority test 
represents the second step in the treatment of the riddle. Having proposed an 
answer in terms of hylomorphic notions, Aristotle confirms its validity by testing 
the priority of the defining parts over the whole. Accordingly, if Aristotle endorses 
a formalist view on the riddle, the formal parts will be the sole parts to pass the 
test. On the contrary, if Aristotle endorses an anti-formalist view, some type of 
material parts will also be prior (i.e. T.2’s material features or T.3’s specific 
matter). 
     If my reconstruction of the argument of Z.10 is correct, the priority test 
demonstrates that the definition of a substance states only its form (T.1). 
Whereas the formal parts are always prior to the whole, the material parts turn 
out to be posterior. In this section, I will argue for the posteriority of the matter 
on the basis of its essential dependence upon substance. In accordance with my 
overall strategy, I contend that no distinction between types of matter or types of 
definiendum applies to the argument. Therefore, Aristotle comes to defend an 
absolute conclusion: the matter of a substance is essentially posterior. 
                                                          
37
 It could be argued that the priority test clashes with the identity thesis. Since the parts of a 
definition are the parts of the definiens, and since there must be identity between the definiens 
and the definiendum, the parts cannot be credited with priority over the whole. To avoid this 
consequence, Peramatzis (2011: 27ff.) plays down the identity in definition which would 
undermine the irreflexive character of the notion of priority: an object cannot be prior to itself. 
Nowhere does Aristotle speak of the irreflexive character of priority. As noted in Section 1.2, 
Aristotle holds that the parts of a definition (i.e. genus and differentiae) are prior to the definiendum 
and that there is one single object signified by the totality of these parts and the definiendum. I 
find it more reasonable to say that the parts of a definition are prior to the whole defined if 
separately taken; for example, animal and rational are prior to human, in that each of them is 
constitutive of the definition of human. In addition, it must be noted that Z.10-11 are concerned 
with the priority of the parts inasmuch as it is illustrative of the constitution of a definition and, 
thus, of what substance is. This priority might clash with the identity thesis if the parts turns out to 
be substances themselves. This possibility, I will show, is taken into consideration in Z.13-16 and 
will lead to the failure of Z’s enquiry. 
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Conversely, the form of a substance is essentially prior to other entities and is 
ultimately identified with the principle of metaphysics.  
     At the beginning of the test, the relations of priority and posteriority are not 
saturated by any term. Namely, Aristotle does not make explicit what the parts 
must be prior or posterior to.38 Provisionally, we can address the priority and the 
posteriority of the parts with respect to the whole defined. After all, that is the 
initial formulation of (Q2). 
The parts of the definition, into which the definition is divided, are prior–all or 
some of them. I) the definition of acute angle is not part of the definition of right 
angle, but conversely, for the definer of acute angle makes use of right angle: 
acute angle is indeed <defined as> what is less than right angle. The same is 
true of circle and semicircle, since semicircle is defined by reference to circle; 
and similarly finger is defined by reference to its whole, as such-and-such part of 
human. II) Thus, those parts that are material, and into which something is 
divided as into matter, are posterior; whereas those that are parts of the definition 
and of the substance according to definition, are prior–all or some of them. 
(Bostock’s translation modified, 1035b4-14) 
ὅσα µὲν γὰρ τοῦ λόγου µέρη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὁ λόγος, ταῦτα πρότερα ἢ πάντα 
ἢ ἔνια·  ὁ δὲ τῆς ὀρθῆς λόγος οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ὀξείας λόγον, ἀλλ’ <ὁ> τῆς ὀξείας 
εἰς ὀρθήν·  χρῆται γὰρ ὁ ὁριζόµενος τὴν ὀξεῖαν τῇ ὀρθῇ·  “ἐλάττων” γὰρ “ὀρθῆς” 
ἡ ὀξεῖα. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ἡµικύκλιον ἔχουσιν·  τὸ γὰρ ἡµικύκλιον 
τῷ κύκλῳ ὁρίζεται καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὅλῳ·  “τὸ” γὰρ “τοιόνδε µέρος ἀνθρώπου” 
δάκτυλος. ὥσθ’ ὅσα µὲν µέρη ὡς ὕλη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὡς ὕλην, ὕστερα· ὅσα 
δὲ ὡς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια. 
In section (I), Aristotle takes up the test with the case studies introduced at the 
outset of Z.10: (a) circle is prior to semicircle; (a1) right angle is prior to acute 
angle; (a2) human is prior to finger. This is not surprising; for these cases call into 
question the statement of the parts in the definition of the whole. Rather, they 
suggest that the whole is stated in the definition of the parts and, thus, prior to 
them. A valid answer to the riddle–whether formalist or anti-formalist–must then 
explain away these controversial cases. In section (II), Aristotle tells us how to 
perform the priority test in terms of form and matter. His hylomorphism enables 
him to show that each case study in fact illustrates the priority of the parts. 
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 Cf. Z.10, 1035b4-6; b12; b14. 
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     Let me go into the details. The reason why (a) circle is prior to semicircle, (a1) 
right angle is prior to acute angle, and (a2) human is prior to finger is that the 
definition of what is prior is constitutive of the definition of what is posterior. To 
illustrate: 
a) semicircle =def half of a circle; 
a1) acute =def angle less than right; 
a2) finger =def such-and-such a limb of a human. 
In a nutshell, the definitions of semicircle, acute, and finger require a reference to 
circle, right, and human, respectively. The latter are in fact parts of the definitions 
of the former. This notion of priority introduces the essential dependence. To 
illustrate, the essence of semicircle depends upon the essence of circle because 
the essence of circle is constitutive of the essence of semicircle.39 This means 
that the definition of circle grounds the definition and the existence of semicircle. 
Thus, the priority ascribed to the wholes (circle, right, and human) is still the 
priority of the parts of the definition. Correspondingly, the posteriority ascribed 
to the parts into which the wholes divide (semicircle, acute, and finger) is the 
posteriority of the wholes defined. 
     Does the hylomorphic treatment of the riddle work with the priority test? At 
1035b11-13, Aristotle recalls the twofold opposition between senses of ‘part’ and 
senses of ‘whole’. The material parts are the parts into which an object divides, 
while the defining parts are the parts into which a substance divides. Again, the 
point is that the material parts are not constitutive of a definition. Likewise, the 
whole object dividing into material parts is not a definiendum. If Aristotle endorses 
a formalist view, the defining parts are all and only the parts of a form; for their 
statement does not require any reference either to the material features or to the 
specific matter of a sensible substance. The priority test will confirm this 
conclusion if such material parts turn out to be posterior to the substance defined. 
It is possible to develop two arguments for the posteriority of the matter. 
                                                          
39
 This form of dependence is close to the essential dependence subscribed in modern 
metaphysics: an entity X depends upon an entity Y iff Y fixes the identity of X. This can be 
understood as ‘the essence of Y is constitutive of the essence of X’ (cf. Fine, 1995b) or as Y 
performs a function that makes X what X is (cf. Lowe, 1997: 147-151).   
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     A first argument draws on the absolute character of Aristotle’s argument. In 
other words, there is no distinction between types of matter according to which 
some matter is prior to the substance defined. As suggested by the text, 
semicircle, acute, and finger are instances of material parts that are not stated in 
a definition. More precisely, semicircle and acute are parts of mathematicals (i.e. 
circle and right); thus, they exemplify the intelligible matter excluded from the 
definition of line above.40 Finger, instead, is a part of a natural object (i.e. human); 
thus, it exemplifies the sensible matter excluded from the definition of human. For 
one thing, this aligns finger with a functional part of human; like arm, finger is a 
part performing a function within a whole natural object. For another thing, this 
aligns finger with the homogeneous matter of human; like flesh&bone, finger is a 
material element into which the whole natural object divides.41 Overall, the idea 
is that a definition includes the statement of neither functional nor homogeneous 
matter. In other words, there is no conceptual reference to some material part 
that is constitutive of the definition of the whole object. That Aristotle has in mind 
statements and not concrete material parts is clear from his application of 
homonymy. If a material part is severed from the whole object, what the material 
part is is stated homonymously; once severed, a material part is a mere chunk of 
matter, despite retaining its name. For example, if a finger is severed from a 
human, the essence of finger can be stated only homonymously (1035b23-25).42 
Aristotle takes the homonymy of the part to be a sign of its posteriority. Basically, 
the essence of a material part can be stated–even homonymously–only with 
reference to the essence of the whole; thus, the material part is posterior to the 
whole object insofar as the essence of the former depends upon the essence of 
latter. What is relevant to us is that this argument applies both to the statement 
of functional parts and to the statement of homogenous parts.43 Since the 
performance of the priority test is not relative to the type of matter tested, Aristotle 
is committed to an absolute argument: matter is always posterior to the whole 
object defined, and the whole object defined in metaphysics is substance; 
therefore, matter is always posterior to substance. 
                                                          
40
 Cf. Z.10, 1035a17-21. 
41
 Cf. Z.10, 1035a18-21. 
42
 Cf. Z.11, 1036b31-32. 
43
 See Met. IV.12, 389b31-390a4, in which Aristotle makes it clear that homonymy applies to 
different material objects (hand, corpse, flesh&bone, flute), despite it being more evident for those 
objects whose functions are immediately evident. Cf. De Gen. et Cor. I.5, 321b17ff.; De Gen. An. 
II.1, 734b24-37. 
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     A second argument draws on the constitutive understanding of Aristotle’s 
priority. In other words, since the definition of substance is constitutive of the 
definition of matter, matter is always posterior to the substance defined. Within 
his essentialism in Z.4-6, Aristotle appears to endorse a hierarchy of objects of 
metaphysics.44 The basic level of this hierarchy is occupied by substances, which 
are the primary objects possessing an essence absolutely; the higher levels are 
occupied by non-substances, which are the secondary objects possessing an 
essence derivatively. Non-substances essentially depend upon substances 
because the essence of the latter grounds the essence of the former (e.g. the 
essence of moon grounds the essence of eclipse). In Z.10-11, Aristotle is 
concerned with the basic level of the hierarchy; for he intends to spell out the 
constitution of a definition in metaphysics, i.e. the definition of a substance. 
Accordingly, if the definition of a substance is constitutive of the definition of some 
parts, such parts essentially depend upon the substance defined; that is, such 
parts are not the defining parts of a substance. To illustrate: 
a2) finger =def [part of hand [def part of arm [def part of …[def human]]]] 
The definition of finger states the definition of hand; and the definition of hand 
states the definition of arm and so on until the definition of human, which is a 
substance. Thus, the definition of human is constitutive of the definition of finger. 
Consequently, finger essentially depends upon human. The key point is that 
every instance of matter essentially depends upon a substance. Consider T.2’s 
material parts. Growing, for example, is thought to be a material feature that is 
part of the definition of animal. However, it is the definition of animal that is 
constitutive of the definition of growing; for growing is a per se attribute of the 
genus of animals, which is studied by physics and its subordinate sciences. To 
put it in general terms, what matter is depends upon what a substance is because 
the definition of the latter grounds the definition of the former. 
     The same result can be inferred indirectly. If the definition of a material part is 
part of the definition of a substance, the definition of the substance turns out to 
be regressive. To illustrate:  
                                                          
44
 See Section 3.3. On this point, see also Loux (1991: 94-104; 236ff.). 
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If human =def [animal, plus two arms, etc., body], 
Then,  
human =def [animal, plus two arms [def limb of human [def animal, plus two 
arms, etc.] etc., body]; 
Basically, if the definition of a substance states some material parts, the definition 
is regressive in that this definition will be stated in the definition of the parts 
themselves. This means that the essence of the matter will be constitutive of the 
essence of the whole substance, despite the essence of the whole substance 
being constitutive of the essence of the matter. In fact, any statement of the 
material parts of an object must be referred to the substance defined. 
Correspondingly, matter represents an entity that is essentially dependent upon 
a substance; for what the substance is is constitutive of what matter is. Therefore, 
matter is always posterior to substance. 
     The priority test confirms that the defining parts of a substance are all and only 
the parts of a form. More precisely, the constitution of a definition is exhausted 
by the formal parts that make up a substance as essence; by contrast, the 
material parts are never stated in a definition and, thus, do not make up a 
substance as essence. This conclusion follows from the posteriority of the 
material parts; namely, matter essentially depends upon a substance because 
the essence of the latter is constitutive of the essence of the former. From this 
perspective, the definition of a material part is akin to the definition of coupled 
objects, like snubness; for its definition requires stating the subject that is 
materially characterized.45 What is remarkable is that this subject is nothing but 
the form of a sensible substance. At a lower level of discussion, this marks the 
endorsement of a formalist answer to the riddle. At a general level, this marks the 
endorsement of a formalist solution to Z’s enquiry: the form of sensible 
substances is substance defined as essence. In metaphysics, the definition of a 
form represents the definition of a substance and, thus, the immediate statement 
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 A similar suggestion is found in Gill (1989: 114-116; 128-138). Gill maintains that the definition 
of natural objects faces the difficulties of the definition of coupled objects highlighted in Z.5; for 
their definition entails a repetition of the term. However, she does not take this to point to a 
formalist view on definition in metaphysics. 
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grounding derivative statements about other entities. Ultimately, the form of 
sensible substances is then the principle of metaphysics.46 
     There is, however, a certain ambiguity looming over the priority test. At 
1035b22-23, Aristotle tells us that in one sense matter is posterior, while in 
another sense matter is prior to the composite. This ambiguity could weaken the 
formalist answer to the riddle and admit cases in which some objects essentially 
depend upon their material parts; consequently, the constitution of a definition 
may include some type of matter. To avoid this consequence, it suffices to remark 
that the posteriority of matter is not established in relation to the composite, but 
in relation to substance, i.e. form. In other words, since the whole to which some 
material parts are prior is not a definiendum, the priority of matter does not imply 
its inclusion in the definition of a substance. But what does Aristotle mean by 
crediting matter with priority over the composite? Plainly, there are different 
options available. The ambiguity might concern the senses of: 
1) matter; 
2) composite; 
3) priority. 
If Aristotle is separating different senses of ‘matter’, he is likely to have in mind 
the corresponding senses of ‘part’ and ‘whole’.47 Basically, the distinction may 
concern (1a) the concrete material parts and (1b) their repeatable version. To 
illustrate, flesh&bone could indicate either the material elements constituting a 
human or the specific matter of human. The priority of matter is not ascribed to 
the parts into which a composite divides, but to the parts into which the definition 
of a composite divides; thus, the specific matter of human is prior to the composite 
human, which is defined as human soul plus flesh&bone. This reading would then 
agree with T.3 on the inclusion of matter in the definition of a composite, though 
such a definition would not be the definition of a substance. 
     If Aristotle is separating different senses of ‘composite’, the distinction may 
concern (2a) the composite as form and (2b) the composite as union of matter 
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 See Z.10, 1035b14-16, in which Aristotle explicitly identifies the substance logically conceived 
(κατὰ τὸν λόγον) with the form of a given body. 
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 Frede-Patzig (1988: 187-188) limit themselves to saying that parthood is already a form of 
priority. However, they are not clear as to whether this form of priority entails their inclusion in a 
definition. 
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and form. To illustrate, human could signify either human soul or the composite 
of human soul and flesh&bone. Again, this reading would agree with T.3 on the 
inclusion of matter in the definition of a composite. According to options (1) and 
(2), some matter is prior to the composite because the composite essentially 
depends upon this matter. That is, what matter is is constitutive of what the 
composite is. 
     If Aristotle is separating different senses of ‘priority’, the priority of matter over 
the composite will not be relevant to metaphysics. Indeed, a single notion of 
matter could not introduce the essential dependence of the composite upon its 
material parts. The argument of Z.10 has repeatedly ruled out this possibility. In 
this case, Aristotle might be thinking of the priority of the parts from which a 
composite comes into existence and into which it dissolves.48 This sense of 
priority is not relevant to metaphysics; for generation and corruption are types of 
change studied by physics. While physics studies sensible substances (i.e. 
bodies) qua sensible substances, metaphysics studies substances (i.e. bodies, 
in particular) qua substances. 
     Be that as it may, Aristotle takes an absolute view on the constitution of a 
definition in metaphysics. The definition of a substance states only the form and 
its parts make up a substance as essence. The priority test confirms the formalist 
answer by showing the posteriority of matter: every type of matter is posterior to 
substance insofar as the former essentially depends upon the latter. Despite 
being somehow prior to the composite, the priority of matter does not mark its 
inclusion in the definition of a substance. Arguably, some material parts are to be 
stated in accounting for a composite. This issue, I will show, is at the core of 
Z.11’s discussion.49 
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 For a distinction of senses of priority see Ross (1924: 198-199), Gill (1989: 128), and Loux 
(1991: 174-175). 
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 There is a last interesting aspect of the priority test. For three times, Aristotle claims that the 
priority pertains to ‘all or some’ of the formal parts (ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια). While the first two relations 
are not saturated, the third relation establishes that ‘all or some’ of the formal parts are prior to 
the composite (b18-19). In this regard, Aristotle argues that some material parts are simultaneous 
to the whole because they represent the location of the form (Z.10, 1035b25). For example, heart 
and brain are those parts of an animal the elimination of which would cause the death of the 
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4.4 Identifying Matter: Socrates’ Comparison 
The rejection of Socrates’ comparison is undoubtedly the strongest piece of 
evidence in favour of the anti-formalist views. In this passage from Z.11, Aristotle 
counters the equivalence between mathematicals and natural objects and 
suggests the inclusion of matter in the definition of the latter. If matter is part of 
the definition of substances (which are indeed natural objects), matter makes up 
the constitution of a substance as essence. This insight is traceable in other texts 
in which Aristotle endorses a distinction between types of definiendum. In Physics 
II.2, Aristotle makes it clear that natural objects are defined in the way of 
‘snubness’. Since the physicist studies natural objects and their motions, her 
definitions state an essence only if they specify the matter undergoing change; 
snubness is indeed the concavity realized in a nose. Mathematicals, by contrast, 
are defined in the way of ‘concavity’. Since the mathematician studies the limits 
of natural objects and is not concerned with their motions, her definitions state an 
essence by abstracting from the matter (194b31-a12). Roughly, the same point 
is made in his overview of theoretical sciences in Metaphysics E.1. Some 
definienda are essentially enmattered, while some others are essentially matter-
free. Consequently, the study of natural objects, which is conducted by physics, 
requires accounting for a sensible substance in terms of form and matter.50 
     At the outset of Z.11, Aristotle resumes his previous discussion by positing 
(Q3): what parts are parts of the form, and what parts are not, but are parts of the 
combined whole (1036a26-28). A few lines below, Aristotle reformulates (Q3) as 
follows: what parts are parts as matter, and what parts are not (1036a29-30). In 
the previous sections, I showed that Aristotle can easily shift from a distinction 
between parts to a distinction between wholes. The central task of Z.11 is outlined 
in view of the absolute opposition between the parts into which the form divides, 
                                                          
animal; for it would not be ensouled anymore (cf. Ross, 1924: 199; Frede-Patzig, 1988: 188; 
Deslauriers, 2007: 142, n. 24). Things are less clear with the first two cases (b5-6; b13-14). Here 
the ‘all or some’ clause is more likely to concern the priority of the formal parts over the whole 
substance, i.e. the form itself. On the assumption that the parts of a form are its genus and 
differentiae, Ross (1924: 198) conjectures that the last differentia is in fact simultaneous to the 
form (cf. Loux, 1991: 172-175). This is the view advocated by Aristotle at Z.12, 1038a19, but in 
Z.10-11 this understanding of the defining parts is not explicit. Frede-Patzig (1988: 186-187) and 
Bostock (1994: 153) propose an interesting alternative. Since Aristotle is talking of the parts of a 
soul, he might have in mind the faculties of nutrition, perception, locomotion and reasoning 
described in his On the Soul; therefore, the totality of the faculties is in fact equivalent to the whole 
soul they constitute. Both these possibilities are indeed compatible with my formalist answer to 
the riddle. 
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 See E.1, 1025b30ff. 
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the formal parts, and the parts into which the composite divides, the material 
parts. In what does this discussion then differ from that of Z.10? Aristotle tells us 
that, since definition pertains to form, a failure in separating these parts is a failure 
in defining an object.51 Accordingly, the purpose of Z.11 is not to answer the 
riddle, but to ensure the correctness of the process to identify the parts of the 
definition.52 
     The significance of such a process emerges in a much debated section. 
Aristotle introduces some case studies, each of which, presumably, points to a 
level of difficulty in performing the separation: 
x) Any circle is realized in either bronze, or stone, or wood etc.; 
y1) Every circle is realized in bronze (hypothetical); 
y2) Every human is realized in flesh&bone (actual). 
(x) exemplifies those cases in which a form can be realized in different types of 
matter. To illustrate, mathematicals, like circle, are reproducible in a wide range 
of material substrata. There is no particular difficulty in this case; for the formal 
parts can be easily separated from the material parts. Problems arise with (y1) 
and (y2). Arguably, Aristotle equates these cases to illustrate the difficulty at issue 
in Z.11: some forms are always and only realized in the same type of matter.53 
To illustrate, for the form of human there is only one type of material substratum, 
flesh&bone. The process of separation is then hindered by such a fixed sensible 
realization; for the formal parts cannot be immediately distinct from the material 
parts. 
     In view of (y)’s cases, Aristotle considers two alternatives: 
I) The matter in which a form is realized is in fact a formal part; 
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 If a definition pertains only to a form, and if the parts of an object can be either formal or material, 
the parts of a definition are the parts of a form. This is in line both with T.1 and with some versions 
of T.2 (cf. Devereux, 2011). According to Peramatzis (2011), instead, Aristotle ontologically 
separates the definiendum, the form of sensible substances, from the definiens, the formal and 
material ways of being of the form. 
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 Contra Burnyeat et al. (1979: 93-94), who suggested that Z.11 is an early version of Z.10. 
Alternatively, Bostock (1994: 173) argues that Z.11 is a reconsideration of the argument of Z.10 
in which Aristotle takes into account the definition of the species, a composite resulting from form 
and universal matter. I shall return to this point. 
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 For the debate concerning this section of Z.11, see Chiaradonna (2014). 
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II) The matter in which a form is realized is a material part, but is 
impossible to be separated. 
Basically, the problem is to establish whether the substratum of the (y) cases is 
among their material or their formal parts; that is, for example, whether 
flesh&bone are parts of the composite human or parts of the form human. On the 
face of it, option (I) means rejecting the conclusions of Z.10, whereas option (II) 
means reconsidering the separation between form and matter for certain objects 
in metaphysics.54 
     The (y) cases are very likely to correspond to the objects studied by physical 
sciences. In Z.8, Aristotle points out that their generation implies a τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε 
characterization: an object is this form in this matter. A bronze sphere, for 
example, results from the form of sphere in a lump of bronze.55 However, in Z.11 
Aristotle does not seem to be concerned with the generation of natural objects, 
but with the definition of their forms; for these are identified with the substances 
studied by metaphysics. The point is that the forms of natural objects are 
exclusively realized in a given type of matter. To put it in another way, Z.11 does 
not puzzle over the inclusion of matter into the definition of a substance; rather, it 
puzzles over the material character of those parts in which a form is realized. To 
tackle this problem means either (I) acknowledging their formal character (T.2), 
or (II) confirming their material character in spite of our incapability to identify 
them (T.1). 
 
From this perspective, the endorsement of T.3 appears to be a 
remote possibility. What is relevant to us is that Aristotle has not rejected his 
conclusion about what parts are parts of a definition. The remainder of Z.11 is 
indeed aimed at reconsidering what parts are to be identified with those contained 
in the definition whenever this is not evident. 
     After his introduction, Aristotle reviews some incorrect approaches to the 
problem. For sake of brevity, I am not going to examine the positions held by 
these thinkers, who are generally identified with some Platonist philosophers. It 
suffices to say that they fail in separating the material parts because they 
assimilate the case of mathematicals to the case of natural objects; to illustrate, 
they separate the lines from the form of the triangle just as they separate the 
flesh&bone from the form of human. What is wrong with this procedure? A first 
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answer could be that Platonists exceed in removing parts from a definition. In 
other words, they eliminate some formal parts, which indeed make up a 
substance as essence. This reading concurs with T.2; there are some parts of a 
form that are mistaken for material parts as they indicate material features of the 
form.56 A second answer could be that natural objects cannot be assimilated with 
mathematicals because their forms hold different relationships with the 
corresponding material parts. This reading seems to admit the endorsement of 
T.3. Basically, natural objects are composites resulting from matter and form and, 
thus, both formal and material parts are to be stated in their definition. Therefore, 
the form and its specific matter make up a substance as essence. 
     The criticism of Socrates’ comparison is to be addressed against this context. 
In the passage, Aristotle complains about the consequences of the Platonist 
approach and focuses on the separation of matter. 
Now, we said that there is some difficulty concerning definitions and why this is 
so. For this reason, it is superfluous to reduce everything in this way and to 
remove the matter; for some objects presumably are one thing in another or 
certain things in such a state. And the comparison about the animal, which 
Socrates the Younger used to draw, is incorrect; for it is misleading and makes 
one suppose that there could be a human without his parts, as there can be a 
circle without bronze. But this is not the same. For an animal is a sensible entity 
and cannot be defined without motion, nor therefore without a certain state of its 
parts. (Bostock’s translation partially modified, 1036b21-30) 
Ὅτι µὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν τὰ περὶ τοὺς ὁρισµούς, καὶ διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαν, εἴρηται·  
διὸ καὶ τὸ πάντα ἀνάγειν οὕτω καὶ ἀφαιρεῖν τὴν ὕλην περίεργον·  ἔνια γὰρ ἴσως 
τόδ’ ἐν τῷδ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ὡδὶ ταδὶ ἔχοντα. καὶ ἡ παραβολὴ ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῴου, ἣν εἰώθει 
λέγειν Σωκράτης ὁ νεώτερος, οὐ καλῶς ἔχει·  ἀπάγει γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ 
ποιεῖ ὑπολαµβάνειν ὡς ἐνδεχόµενον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνευ τῶν µερῶν, ὥσπερ 
ἄνευ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τὸν κύκλον. τὸ δ’ οὐχ ὅµοιον·  αἰσθητὸν γάρ τι τὸ ζῷον, καὶ ἄνευ 
κινήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι, διὸ οὐδ’ ἄνευ τῶν µερῶν ἐχόντων πώς. 
The very content of the comparison is not known to us.57 Generally, it rests on 
the assumption behind Platonist metaphysics: the case of human can be 
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 According to Devereux (2011: 177-178), Aristotle considers two types of failure: (1) to eliminate 
formal parts thinking that they are material (Platonists); (2) to include material parts thinking that 
they are formal. Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: 205-206). 
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 Almost nothing is known about Socrates the Younger. He was a mathematician who was close 
to Plato’s Academy and is the interlocutor of the Eleatic Visitor in the Statesman. See also Theaet. 
147c; Soph. 218e. 
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assimilated to the case of circle. The comparison, says Aristotle, makes one 
believe that the existence of a human without parts is as possible as the existence 
of a circle without bronze. First of all, it is unclear whether the comparison applies 
to the forms or to composites. According to T.3, human and circle are composites 
resulting from a form in a certain type of matter. Aristotle is then rejecting the 
separation of those material parts upon which a whole composite essentially 
depends; these are the specific matter that guarantees the realization of the form 
of natural objects.58 Consequently, the definition of such substances must include 
both formal and material parts. According to T.2, human and circle are forms 
realizing in material substrata. Thus, Aristotle is rejecting the separation of some 
material parts upon which a whole form depends; these are the material features 
that indicate the organization and the functions of the form of natural objects. 
Although the definition of substances includes only the parts of a form, some of 
these parts signify the material characterization of the form defined.59 
     Be that as it may, Aristotle seems to endorse an anti-formalist answer to the 
riddle: the constitution of a definition consists of form and some material parts, 
whenever these parts determine the realization of the form, as with natural 
objects. In order to defend T.1, Michael Frede proposes to apply the comparison 
to the two types of form and to reconsider the criticism in three main aspects:60 
i) The criticism is focused on the possibility of definition; 
ii) Matter is implied by but not stated in the definition; 
iii) The comparison is invalid and not firmly rejected. 
Firstly, Frede understands the rejection in modal terms. Accordingly, Aristotle is 
not concerned with the definition of natural objects, but with the conditions for 
their definability. The possibility of defining an animal is actualized by the 
availability of some parts to perform a certain function. Parts like hand, leg and 
arm are necessary to the existence of a natural object, but are not constitutive of 
its essence, which is purely formal.61 Secondly, Frede resorts to Aristotle’s 
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 Cf. Loux (1991: 175-176); Gill (1989: 126-138). 
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 Cf. Deslauriers (2007: 145-146). 
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 See Frede (1990: 118-122). 
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 Contrary to all manuscripts, Frede suggests emending αἰσθητόν with αἰσθητ<ικ>όν in order to 
highlight the function of perception that is peculiar to animals and requires material support (cf. 
Frede-Patzig, 1988: 210-211). For some criticism of this emendation, see Granger (2000). Cf. De 
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psychology to argue that the definition of the form of natural objects entails their 
matter. In On the Soul II, a soul is described as a hierarchical set of functions 
(nutrition, perception, memory, etc.) and some of these enable us to infer the type 
of matter that is ‘ensouled’.62 Finally, since the largest portion of Z.10-11 leads to 
a formalist conclusion, Frede limits the criticism to the validity of the comparison 
itself. In other words, the target of Aristotle’s argument is unlikely to be the 
formalist answer to the riddle and should be rather identified with the 
consequences following from the comparison.63 
     Unfortunately, Frede’s interpretation is too speculative to be effective against 
T.2 and T.3. The problem is that the rejection of Socrates’ comparison is explicitly 
connected with the subtraction of matter operated by Platonists; this implies that 
some material parts are to be stated in the definition of some objects. In order to 
defend T.1, I will show that Aristotle does reject the comparison and yet does not 
admit the inclusion of any material part in the definition of substances. My 
contention is that Socrates’ comparison misconstrues the relationship between 
form and matter. The matter of a natural object is a property of the form and, thus, 
must be part of a statement that signifies a composite characterization. For this 
reason, the separation of material parts from human, if assimilated to the 
separation from circle, is incorrect; for human can be defined as human soul 
realized in such flesh&bone. This is not the definition of human. It is a derivative 
statement signifying a property of human and grounded in the immediate 
definition of its form. 
     Let me start with some general observations. The criticism levelled by Aristotle 
concerns the definitions and is summarised by the charge of incorrectness (οὐ 
καλῶς). Now, the incorrectness is one of the main criteria applied in the Topics 
to evaluate definitions. The schemes in book VI are indeed centred on either the 
essentiality or the correctness of the statement. This is already very remarkable: 
if some material parts are parts of a definition and, thus, make up an essence, 
Aristotle would not charge the statement with incorrectness but with non-
essentiality. There are two sources of incorrectness that can be relevant to the 
criticism in Z.11: a) the statement is obscure (µὴ σαφῶς); b) the statement is 
obtained through some superfluous procedure (περίεργον).64 The addition of 
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 See De An. II.2, 413a21-b11. 
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 Against this interpretation, Burnyeat (2001: 40, n. 74) points out that the expression οὐ καλῶς 
indicates the full rejection of the thesis. 
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 See Top. VI.1, 139b6-18. 
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something is superfluous if its subtraction does not prevent one from still stating 
what an object is; for example, the addition of ‘capable of learning’ to ‘rational 
animal’ is superfluous because, if subtracted, the remainder still indicates what 
human is. The subtraction of something is superfluous if the remainder no longer 
indicates what the object is; for example, the subtraction of ‘number’ from ‘number 
that moves by itself’ is superfluous because the remainder does not indicate what 
soul is anymore.65 
     Before addressing the comparison, Aristotle explicitly argues that the 
subtraction of matter operated by Platonists is superfluous (1036b22-24). What 
he has in mind is that the remainder of the statement accounting for an object 
does not indicate what the object is; for there are objects of definition that are 
‘one thing in another or certain things in a certain state’ (τόδ’ ἐν τῷδ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ὡδὶ 
ταδὶ ἔχοντα). As already said, the τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε characterization is traditionally 
ascribed to natural objects and, thus, marks the separation of these definienda 
from mathematicals.66 However, if Aristotle is separating two ways to account for 
different objects, the τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε clause does not simply specify the 
characterization of the object, but the statement accounting for it. The question 
we need to answer is whether such a statement is a definition of a substance. If 
so, the subtraction of matter invalidates the definitions of the primary objects in 
metaphysics (either the forms [T.2] or the composites [T.3]); namely, the 
constitution that makes up a substance as essence turns out to consist of form 
and matter. 
     There is more than one reason to rule out this possibility. Firstly, the statement 
accounting for a τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε is not an immediate definition. An immediate 
definition is indeed the statement accounting for a τόδε τι, which in metaphysics 
corresponds to the definition of a substance; for the objects that are τόδε τι are 
only substances.67 On the contrary, the statement accounting for a τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε 
must be a derivative definition; for it can be mediated by another statement. What 
are the objects of these derivative definitions? Arguably, these are non-
substances whose existence and nature is grounded in the existence and nature 
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 See Top. VI.3, 140a33-b15. Of course, the second example assumes Xenocrates’ definition of 
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 The τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε is indeed regarded as the structure of the species. See Aquinas (Expositio: 
L.11, 1506); Loux (1991: 147-154); Bostock (1994: 162-163); Devereux (2011: 181) (Devereux 
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of a substance just as their statements are grounded in a definition. In Z.10, 
Aristotle takes into consideration the case of a composite that is a generalized 
version of individuals; for example, human and horse are generalized versions of 
Socrates and Bucephalus (1035b27-31). This composite is not a substance and 
thus the constitution of its definition does not make up an essence; rather, it 
results from ‘this definition and this matter taken universally’. In other words, its 
characterization is signified by the addition of matter to the definition of a 
substance. This definition does not account for a τόδε τι, but for a τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε. 
This means that the object at stake in the criticism of Z.11 is a non-substance 
whose definition signifies a composite characterization. Therefore, the object that 
is τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε is a per se attribute of a substance. 
     In sum, the criticism of the Platonist approach to definitions does not mean the 
endorsement of any anti-formalist view. Aristotle is not remarking on a distinction 
between definienda to include some material parts in the definition of substances. 
The subtraction of matter is superfluous and yields incorrect definitions because 
there are objects that are defined as a form in a certain material substratum. 
These are not substances, but per se attributes. Indeed, the definition of a per se 
attribute is a derivative statement that must be grounded in the immediate 
definition of a substance, which is still the statement of a form. If this is correct, 
Aristotle does reject Socrates’ comparison without admitting the inclusion of 
material parts in the definition of a substance. 
     This conjecture is confirmed by the final lines of the passage. At 1036b29-30, 
Aristotle argues that an animal cannot be defined without motion and ‘without the 
parts being in a certain way’ (ἄνευ τῶν µερῶν ἐχόντων πώς). For this reason, 
human cannot be compared to circle. According to the defenders of T.2 and T.3, 
these lines establish that some material parts make up the essence of sensible 
substances. Indeed, Aristotle often refers to the idea of motion and change to 
separate the objects of physics from the objects of mathematics.68 Since motion 
is not relevant to substances in metaphysics, the rejection of the comparison can 
be better understood with reference to the second idea in the claim: an animal 
cannot be defined without some parts being in a certain way. Is this a reference 
to a per se attribute of a substance? A first thing to note is that the nature of these 
parts is not absolute, but qualified in a certain way. In Z.4, I argued, Aristotle 
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refers to definitions of non-substances as qualified statements insofar as what a 
non-substance is is always related to what a substance is.69 It is then reasonable 
to think that the statement of these parts is the definition of a non-substance and, 
thus, signifies a per se attribute of a substance. The example offered in the 
following lines can be very illustrative. Aristotle tells us that hand is defined as a 
part of human as long as it is ensouled (1036b30-32). As already seen, the 
essence of hand, finger and other material parts depends upon the essence of 
the whole human; once dead or severed, the essence can only be stated 
homonymously.70 The statement of the material parts signifies a characterization 
that, despite being identical with the object, is not its essence. In sum, the matter 
of a substance is a per se property. Whatever is a material part of an object, it 
is proper to the object and its essence is grounded in the essence of the object. 
For example, human is characterized by the property of having hands, and animal 
is characterized by the property of having flesh&bone. 
     At this point, it is not difficult to see why Aristotle rejects Socrates’ comparison. 
Natural objects cannot be assimilated to mathematicals because their forms hold 
different relationships with the corresponding material parts. Consequently, the 
subtraction of matter cannot be performed in the very same way, as Platonists 
do. The key idea is that in metaphysics there is a demonstrable relationship 
between matter and substance; for matter is a per se attribute that belongs to the 
genus of entities that is the subject of metaphysics, sensible substances. The 
definition of this per se attribute is a derivative statement that is grounded in the 
immediate definition of a substance; indeed, it is obtained by addition and 
signifies a composite characterization. From this perspective, my discussion of 
Z.11 develops the general insight of Frede’s argument for T.1. The incorrectness 
of the comparison does not concern the definition of substances, but the 
equivalence suggested by Socrates. The matter of a substance is indeed implied 
by the form insofar as the definition of the former is grounded in the definition of 
the latter; namely, a chunk of matter essentially depends upon a form. 
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 See Section 3.3.2. 
70
 Devereux (2011) and Peramatzis (2011: 45-54) take the example to show that some ‘material’ 
parts are parts of a definition just as the letters are parts of the syllable and are distinct from the 
formal component, i.e. the arrangement. However, the idea of arrangement is alien to Z.10-11 
and is introduced only in Z.17. Moreover, their reading misses the key point in the example: a 
material part essentially depends upon a form. See Frey (2007), who argues that the attribution 
of functions to material parts always requires the reference to the unitary function of the whole to 
which the material parts belong. Accordingly, the application of homonymy is sensitive to the 
primacy of the unitary functions. 
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Accordingly, Aristotle is still committed to a formalist answer to the riddle: the 
definition of substance states only the form. That is, the formal parts are the parts 
that make up a substance as essence. 
4.5 The Primacy of Substance 
The enquiry into substance leads to a formalist essentialism: substance, if defined 
as essence, is the form of sensible substances. This doctrine enables Aristotle to 
ensure the primacy of substance and thus to establish the principle of 
metaphysics. Since the form holds primacy over the other entities, the form is the 
entity grounding the other entities. Correspondingly, its definition is the statement 
grounding the demonstrations within metaphysics. This conclusion is reached 
through a logical strategy: firstly, Aristotle separates the statements accounting 
for substances from the statements accounting for non-substances (Z.4-6), and 
then he examines the constitution of the statements accounting for substances; 
that is, the constitution of definitions in metaphysics (Z.10-11). In order to 
understand what substance is, the enquiry has to focus on the parts of a 
definition; for these are the parts that make up an essence. In doing so, he resorts 
to his hylomorphism to establish the following conclusion: the definition of a 
substance states only its form and never its matter. 
     In Chapter Four, I have been defending this formalist essentialism against 
anti-formalist views. In particular, I have argued that Aristotle endorses an 
absolute conclusion according to which there is no type of matter that can be 
included in the definition of a substance: the parts of a definition are all and only 
the parts of the form. This thesis is confirmed by the absolute priority ascribed to 
the formal parts and the absolute posteriority ascribed to matter. The material 
parts are always posterior insofar as they essentially depend upon a substance; 
namely, the definition of the substance is constitutive of the definition of its matter. 
Hence, the constitution of a definition is exhausted by the formal parts that make 
up a substance as essence. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Aristotle does 
admit the inclusion of matter in accounting for natural objects, like animals. There 
are indeed definitions that signify composite characterizations of the object and, 
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thus, state both the form and the matter; these, however, are not definitions of 
substances. Since the composite characterization is signified by addition, these 
definitions turn out to be derivative statements accounting for per se attributes of 
substances. I suggested that these statements account for the material parts of 
a substance and indicate one of its properties. For this reason, Aristotle rejects 
the Platonist approach to the separation of the material parts from objects; if the 
separation of matter is equally performed on natural objects and mathematicals, 
we will miss the relationship between substance and one of its demonstrable 
attributes; that is, the scientific relationship between form and matter. 
     The formalist essentialism of Z.10-11 is not the end of Z’s enquiry. Nor is it 
Aristotle’s final word about the constitution of a definition in metaphysics. My 
analysis suggests that those texts in which Aristotle admits the inclusion of matter 
concern either the definitions grounding other sciences (e.g. Physics II.2, On the 
Soul II.1-2),71 or derivative definitions in metaphysics (e.g. Metaphysics E.1, Z.11, 
H.2). However, if some difficulties prevented the form of substances from 
grounding other entities, its immediate definition could hardly ground derivative 
statements. In the next two chapters, I will argue that the criticism against the 
definition as universal leads Aristotle to dismiss his formalist essentialism: the 
form of sensible substances is not what substance is just as its statement is not 
the definition grounding demonstrations within metaphysics. At a lower level of 
analysis, his criticism invalidates the formalist answer to the riddle; at a general 
level, his criticism marks the failure of Z’s enquiry. For there is no way to define 
any substance and to establish the principle of the totality of entities. 
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 My reading concurs with the contextual interpretation advocated by Frede (1990: 129). 
Devereux (2011), instead, defends a chronological interpretation according to which the texts in 
which Aristotle admits the inclusion of specific matter are earlier than Z.10-11. It is very 
unconvincing, though, that these two chapters can be later than Aristotle’s views in book E. Cf. 
Section 2.1.2, note 16. 
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Chapter Five 
Definition and Unity (I) 
Substance must show the primacy and the unity that pertain to a definition. 
Primacy amounts to the immediacy of a definition. Nothing is the cause of 
substance just as no other statement mediates a definition. Unity amounts to the 
oneness of a definition. Substance is one object just as a definition is one 
statement and not a plurality of terms. Aristotelian essentialism, I have argued, 
ensures the primacy of substance through its definition as essence: if substance 
is essence, substance holds primacy over the other entities. Accordingly, the form 
of substances is identified with the principle investigated in Z; for every entity 
essentially depends upon a form. The next two Chapters are concerned with 
unity. Chapter Five analyses some of the difficulties raised by the criticism of the 
universal in Z.13-16; Chapter Six explores the renovated treatment of substance 
given in Z.17. My contention is that Aristotle is indirectly led to dismiss his 
formalist essentialism because it fails to ensure the unity of substance. 
Consequently, Aristotle is compelled to submit a demonstrative definition to 
envision the principle of metaphysics: substance is the cause of other entities 
insofar as it explains why something is something else. On the one hand, this 
marks the failure of Z; the principle is not established by examining sensible 
substances, which turn out to be derivative objects of metaphysics. On the other, 
this marks the contribution of Z. Its results allow the enquirer to define sensible 
substances and to focus the investigation on some suprasensible substance. 
     At the end of Z.13, Aristotle posits a dilemma according to which if substance 
is compounded neither of universals nor of substances, then substance is 
uncompounded. In what follows, I shall discuss the significance of this dilemma 
for the unity of substance. Since the possibility of establishing the principle of 
metaphysics is equivalent to the possibility of articulating a constitution of parts 
that make up a substance as essence (Z.10-11), Aristotle has to avoid the non-
composition of substances and to ensure their unity. Given the difficulties raised 
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in Z.13-14, there is no way to accomplish this task; indeed, if a substance is 
credited with a constitution from either universals or substances, the substance 
turns out not to be one. Remarkably, this unity is not the individual status of 
particular substances (e.g. Socrates), but the unity of an essence and, 
correspondingly, the unity of definition. Thus, the final outcome is that there is no 
entity–either universal or particular–that can be signified by the statement 
grounding the demonstrations within metaphysics. This conclusion prevents 
Aristotle from endorsing any solution to Z’s enquiry, including his formalist 
essentialism. 
5.1 A Dilemma in Z’s Enquiry 
Chapter 13 of Metaphysics Z is almost exclusively known for its criticism of the 
definition of substance as universal. At the end of its battery of arguments, 
Aristotle introduces the following dilemma.  
But the result holds a difficulty. For if it is not the case that A1) a substance can 
be compounded of universals, because it signifies a this-such (τοιόνδε) and not 
a this-something (τόδε τι), or that A2) a substance can be compounded of 
substances in actuality, B) every substance would be uncompounded; 
consequently, there would not even be a definition of any substance. (1039a14-
19, slightly modified translation)1 ἔχει δὲ τὸ συµβαῖνον ἀπορίαν. εἰ γὰρ @1 
µήτε ἐκ τῶν καθόλου οἷόν τ’ εἶναι µηδεµίαν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλὰ µὴ τόδε 
τι σηµαίνειν, µήτ’ ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνδέχεται ἐντελεχείᾳ εἶναι µηδεµίαν οὐσίαν 
σύνθετον, ἀσύνθετον ἂν εἴη οὐσία πᾶσα, ὥστ’ οὐδὲ λόγος ἂν εἴη οὐδεµιᾶς οὐσίας. 
ἀλλὰ µὴν δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἐλέχθη πάλαι ἢ οὐσίας. 
In fact, it is possible to reconstruct two dilemmas from the passage.2 One puzzle 
takes into consideration what type of constitution characterises substances: 
either (A1) the constitution from universals, or (A2) the constitution from 
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 All translations of Z.13 are from Gill (2001: 237-239) 
2
 Cf. Lewis (2013: 192-195). 
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substances.3 Although Aristotle speaks of ‘constitution from ‘substances in 
actuality’, there is no reason to weaken his claim. As will be clear in Section 5.3.1, 
the constitution from substances fails regardless of whether substances are in 
actuality or in potentiality; for the nature and the existence of something in 
potentiality is always relative to the nature and the existence of something in 
actuality. For example, the nature of the leg of a human is relative to the nature 
of the whole human. This marks their ontological dependence upon something in 
actuality and thus prevents them from constituting a substance; that is, to make 
up what substance is. Rather than weakening his argument, Aristotle speaks of 
‘constitution from substances in actuality’ in order to strengthen it. If the 
constitution at stake corresponds to what the substance is, it cannot be exhausted 
by elements that are ontologically posterior.  
     Let me return to the dilemma. Importantly, (A1) and (A2) represent two horns 
of a single thesis (A): substances are compounded; that is, they are characterized 
by some type of constitution. Thus, the dilemma opposing (A1) to (A2) stems from 
one horn of the larger dilemma in which thesis (A) is opposed to thesis (B): 
substances are uncompounded. In sum, we can formulate the two dilemmas as 
follows: 
General Dilemma: whether a substance is (A) compounded or (B) 
uncompounded. 
Specific Dilemma: whether a substance is compounded of (A1) universals 
or (A2) substances. 
Whereas the specific dilemma assumes the composition of a substance, the 
general dilemma questions it. 
     It must be pointed out, though, that Aristotle is concerned with one puzzle only. 
Given the dismissal of both (A1) and (A2), the passage is explicitly focused on the 
general dilemma and appears to suggest the endorsement of (B). The problem 
with the non-composition of a substance lies in its consequences: if substances 
are uncompounded, then it is impossible to define them. Since substance is the 
genus studied by metaphysics and the definitions of substances ground the 
demonstrations of their per se attributes, the impossibility of definitions means 
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 Aristotle literally says substance cannot be compounded of (A2) substances in actuality. I will 
return to this formulation in Section 5.3.1 below. 
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the impossibility of the science of being. If this is correct, the treatment of the 
dilemma could represent a turning point in the development of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics; for it could sentence the failure of Z’s enquiry.4 
5.1.1 The Significance of the Dilemma 
Commentators have often underestimated the content of the final lines of Z.13.5 
The dilemma is traditionally regarded as a ‘dialectical stratagem’ which can be 
functional to the Aristotle’s argument in different ways. A possibility is to connect 
the dilemma with an in-depth attack on Platonist metaphysics.6 At the start of 
Z.14, Aristotle suggests that the theory of Forms can be rejected on the basis of 
the foregoing argument; if this involves the dilemma, its goal is to offer a 
springboard for Z.14’s criticism. Along these lines, it is also common to connect 
it with a positive discussion in hylomorphic terms.7 The function of the dilemma is 
to prepare the introduction of the notions of form, matter, and composite; this 
rhetorical move enables Aristotle to strengthen his metaphysics and to contrast it 
with other views. Be that as it may, the widespread assumption is that Aristotle is 
already equipped to deal with the difficulties raised by the dilemma. 
     Some observations at 1039a21-23 concur with this reading. In some way, 
says Aristotle, there can be definitions, whilst in some other way there cannot be. 
This distinction weakens the conceptual difficulty triggered by the dilemma and 
leads to a deflation of its significance; for it is still possible to define substances 
and, thus, to ground metaphysics. The preamble of Z.15 is thought to expound 
this insight. There, Aristotle separates two senses of substance: form and 
composite.8 Accordingly, the possibility of definitions is limited to the statement 
of the form; by contrast, the statement of the composite does not correspond with 
any definition at all. This reading fits well with the formalist essentialism outlined 
                                                          
4
 While Burnyeat argues that Aristotle tackles the impossibility of definition and, consequently, is 
able to remove the dilemma, Lewis (2013: 192-195; 225-226) and Gill (2001: 255-260) suggest 
that Aristotle is primarily concerned with the non-composition of substances, of which the 
impossibility of definition represents only a derivative difficulty. They indeed identify Aristotle’s 
solution with the treatment of unity in H.6.  
5
 Some exceptions are Charles (2000: 283-294) and Menn (2001). 
6
 See Frede-Patzig (1988: 265) and Lewis (2013: 224-226; 240-42). 
7
 See Burnyeat (2001: 50-52) and Halper (1989: 131-132). Cf. Galluzzo (2013a: 125). 
8
 Cf. Frede-Patzig (1988: 263); Burnyeat (2001: 53-54). Ross (1924: 211) admits that the problem 
is not fully solved. 
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in Z.10-11. Since the definition of a substance contains only formal parts, the 
science of being can be grounded in the statement of the form and not in a 
statement of a composite. Yet, nothing in the argument of Z.15 is concerned with 
the dilemma. In separating the form from the composite, Aristotle opposes an 
ingenerated and incorruptible subject of definition to individual objects.9 Indeed, 
the problem treated in the chapter is not the constitution of substances, but the 
impossibility of defining composite individuals, like Socrates and Bucephalus; for 
these are liable to change and, thus, not an object of scientific knowledge.10 
Moreover, it is dubious that the distinction of Z.15 could match with the distinction 
of Z.13. When Aristotle prompts his solution to the dilemma, he has in mind two 
‘ways’ (τρόπον) to define a substance and not necessarily two objects (1039a21-
23). As already noted, there is only one object that is substance and primary 
definiendum: the form of sensible substances. If Aristotle intends to overcome the 
dilemma by considering different ways to account for the form, the treatment of 
individuals in Z.15 can hardly be helpful.11 From this perspective, the tendency to 
underestimate the dilemma is also indicative of another philosophical 
assumption: the immunity of the form to the criticism of Z.13. Since form is still 
substance and is not classified as universal, it must be definable. The point is that 
the dilemma calls into question its definability and, potentially, its immunity. 
     Undoubtedly, the impossibility of defining substances sounds like a striking 
conclusion. One of the chief theses posited in Z’s enquiry is that definition and 
essence belong to substances either exclusively or primarily.12 Metaphysics is 
indeed the demonstrative science in which the definitions of substances ground 
the derivative definitions of non-substances; for the essence stated by the latter 
is caused by the essence stated by the former. Within the totality of entities, 
substances are the primary objects of definition and knowledge. By Aristotle’s 
own admission, the conceptual difficulty raised in Z.13 clashes with essentialism. 
If substances are not definable, they do not possess any essence; consequently, 
essence fails to account for substance and fails to be identified with the principle 
                                                          
9
 Remarkably, Aristotle literally separates between σύνολον and λόγος. If the first λόγος refers to 
individual composites, the term λόγος may encompass the senses of form and of composite 
outlined in Z.10-11; both of them are indeed objects of knowledge and stated in a definition.  
10
 See Z.15, 1039b28-1040b7. 
11
 Contrary to the reconstructions of Burnyeat (2001) and Halper (1989: 136-138), the distinction 
of Z.15 does not weaken the criticism of universals at Z.16, 1040b17-24. This passage leaves 
open the possibility that the form is either i) particular, thus, indefinable, or ii) definable and, thus, 
compounded of either universals or substances. 
12
 See Section 3.3. 
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of metaphysics.13 This, however, is only the surface of the problem. Indeed the 
conceptual difficulty undermines the very possibility of metaphysics. Since 
substance is the genus of entities on which the remaining entities depend, if 
substances are not definable, then no other entity will be. In other words, it is 
impossible to define any entity unless its definition is grounded in the definition of 
a substance.14 What matters to us is that the scientific project of metaphysics 
risks failing in the absence of the definitions of substances; for the demonstrative 
knowledge of the totality of entities must be grounded in the statements 
accounting for its primary objects. 
     Arguably, to overlook the significance of the dilemma means overlooking the 
significance of the impossibility of definition in Aristotelian science. In the 
Analytics, the possibility of definition is pretty much equivalent to the possibility of 
demonstrative knowledge; for it corresponds to the possibility of establishing the 
principles grounding the demonstrations about a specific subject-matter.15 For 
example, the impossibility of the definition of animal and, thus, of its inferior 
genera prevents the enquirer from conducting demonstrations of their per se 
attributes; that is, from developing the demonstrative science of biology. 
Certainly, the treatment of this sub-species of Meno’s paradox helps Aristotle to 
illustrate some issues of his theory of science.16 Nevertheless, it is optimistic to 
consider Z.13’s dilemma as a rhetorical device before having explored its impact 
on the project of metaphysics. 
     To sum up, let me recall some crucial steps of Z’s enquiry. In order to develop 
his essentialism, Aristotle drives his examination from entities to statements. This 
logical turn is found in Z.4 and orientates much of the enquiry. Z.10-11 completes 
the development of essentialism by examining the constitution of a definition in 
metaphysics. Since definitions are the statements of an essence, the parts stated 
in a definition are expected to be the parts that make up a substance as essence. 
What is salient to see is that the possibility of defining a substance can be reduced 
to the possibility of articulating its constitution. With the logical turn, Aristotle is 
bound to identify the principle of metaphysics with whatever is signified by the 
definitions of substances. On the one hand, this move enables him to develop his 
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 See Z.13, 1039a19-20. 
14
 See Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 on the possibility of the science of being. 
15
 See, for example, An. Post. II.7. Cf. Section 1.3.2. 
16
 On this point see Bronstein (2016: 79-63). 
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essentialism; on the other, it compels him to engage with the problems of the 
composition of substances. The dilemma wedges between these issues: if 
substances are found to be uncompounded, there will be no definition of 
substances and, consequently, no derivative definition of any other object of 
metaphysics. 
5.1.2 Composition and Definition 
I intend to argue that not only does the dilemma trigger a salient difficulty, but 
sentences the failure of Z’s enquiry, because there is no way to ensure the unity 
of substance. Basically, if substance is the principle of metaphysics, it must be 
definable. That is, it must be possible to signify its constitution; but, every type of 
constitution undermines the unity of substance. Therefore, it is impossible to 
establish the principle of metaphysics. 
     In order to argue for this point, it is useful to go into the details of the dilemma. 
It should be clear by now that Aristotle relies on a twofold correspondence:  
Definability : (A) Composition = Indefinability : (B) Non-composition. 
The endorsement of (B) implies the impossibility of defining substances insofar 
as it prevents us from signifying the constitution that makes up a substance as 
essence. Conversely, the endorsement of (A) implies the possibility of defining 
substances insofar as it signifies a constitution to be stated in a definition. There 
is a couple of things to note. Firstly, since the endorsement of (B) directly leads 
to the failure of Z’s enquiry, (A1) and (A2) are the types of constitution that, 
allegedly, enable the enquirer to ground metaphysics. Basically, a solution to Z’s 
enquiry can be found only if we admit the composition of substances and, thus, 
the possibility of signifying their parts. Secondly, since the dismissal of (A1) and 
(A2) entails the endorsement of (B), Aristotle seems to take them to be exhaustive 
of any type of constitution. In other words, substances can only be compounded 
of either universals or substances. This can be made more evident if we think 
that the concept of universal is equivalent to the concept of non-substance. As is 
shown by Aristotle, if no universal is a whole substance, the universal could be 
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understood as a defining part; this means making it either a substance or a non-
substance.17 
     Given this framework, I will show that both the constitution from universals and 
the constitution from substances are to be rejected because they undermine the 
unity of substance. If a substance is compounded of universals, its unity is 
undermined by the pluralization of its constitutive universal; namely, substance 
cannot be one object signified by a definition, but is many different objects. If 
substance is compounded of substances, its unity is undermined by the 
regressive unity of each constitutive substance; namely, substance cannot be 
one object, but it is a regressive sum of other substances. Therefore, since no 
substance is ensured the unity of the principle of a demonstrative science, there 
is no way to solve Z’s enquiry and to ground metaphysics. If this is correct, 
Aristotle turns out to dismiss his formalist essentialism indirectly. Substance 
cannot be defined as essence and identified with form because this requires 
either to indicate the parts that are stated in a definition, or to indicate the very 
same object. In the first case, the composition of essence and form undermines 
the unity of the principle; in the second case, the non-composition of essence and 
form undermines the knowability of the principle.18 
     My argument rests on the idea that the unity of substance is to be conceived 
as the unity of definition. In his criticism of universals, Aristotle does not oppose 
the unity of an individual (e.g. Socrates, Callias) to the unity of species and 
genera (e.g. human, animal). Although every individual possesses a kind of 
numerical unity that can be contrasted with the unity of common items, this is not 
at stake in the argument of Z.13-16; for an individual must be credited with 
accidental unity, which does not pertain to the principle of a demonstrative 
science. Rather, the unity of definition represents a form of numerical unity that 
must be presupposed for substances; for there must be one single object that is 
signified by their definition.19 It could be said that a universal is not simply the 
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 Cf. Section 5.2.1 below. 
18
 The indefinability following from the non-composition of substances is a subcase of Antisthenes’ 
criticism of definitions: if the definiendum is uncompounded, and if definiens is compounded, each 
part in the definiens will not signify any part of the definiendum. Consequently, the definiendum 
can only be described for what it is like (ποιόν) and not for what it is (τί ἐστιν). Cf. H.3, 1042b23-
32. 
19
 See Section 3.2 and 5.2.1 below. For a similar suggestion, see Burnyeat et al. (1979: 113). 
Bostock (1994: 204) thinks that the unity of definition is relevant to the final dilemma exclusively 
and does not take it to be the counterpart of a problem about substance. 
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characterization that is repeatable for many objects, but the characterization that 
is not one and the same as its object. 
5.2. No Substance is Compounded of Universals 
At the start of Z.13, Aristotle advances two arguments to reject the definition as 
universal. The core idea is that substances cannot be credited with the characters 
of whatever is so defined. Since a universal is common (κοινόν) to a plurality of 
objects and a predicable quality (ποιόν/τοιόνδε) of an object, no universal is 
substance; rather, this definition leads to identifying the principle of metaphysics 
with some generic entity, like Platonic Forms and, perhaps, the δεύτεραι οὐσίαι 
of the Categories.20 That said, Aristotle observes that if no universal is substance, 
then universal might still be one of its parts. 
But is it the case that although the universal cannot be substance in the way 
essence is, it is present in it, as for example animal in human and horse? 
(1038b16-18, slightly modified translation) 
ἀλλ’ ἆρα οὕτω µὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐνυπάρχειν, οἷον 
τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ; 
 
Clearly, the possibility of the constitution from universals rests on the main results 
achieved in Z’s enquiry: the endorsement of essentialism and the treatment of 
the constitution of definitions.21 
                                                          
20
 The concept of universal can be understood in different ways and, thus, to conceal different 
targets of Aristotle’s criticism (cf. Galluzzo, 2013b). In general, Aristotle speaks of καθόλου 
λεγόµενα and understands it as a predicate belonging to many subjects and, thus, common to a 
plurality (cf. De Int. 17a37-b3; An. Post. I.4, 73b25-a3; De Part. An. I.4, 644a24-28; Metaph. B.4, 
999b34-1000a1). Just as per se λεγόµενα, it can be taken both as the statement of these 
predicates and as the characterization signified by the statement (if this exists). Cf. Section 5.4 
below. 
21
 Gill (2001: 243-244) takes these lines to introduce a Platonist reply to the foregoing criticism (in 
particular, b16-19 is a reply to b15-16, and b19-23 is a reply to b9-15). Similar suggestions are 
found in Woods (1967) (who revised his position in Woods, 1991) and in Burnyeat et al. (1979: 
118). I agree that Aristotle is trying to restore the idea of substance as universal, though this might 
imply its immediate rejection. 
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     First of all, the definition as universal is contrasted with the definition as 
essence.22 The implicit idea is that if a substance is a universal, then the universal 
also turns out to be an essence; but this is unacceptable within essentialism. We 
can then conjecture that the initial criticism plays on the characters which not only 
do prevent universals from being substances, but also from being essences. To 
deny that universal is substance is to deny that universal is substance as 
essence. What is more interesting is that the constitution from universals is meant 
to be the constitution of a definition. Since substances are their own essences, 
the parts of a substance are the parts that are stated in its definition; for a 
definition is the statement of an essence. Thus, to say that the universal is part 
of a substance as essence is to say that the universal is part of a definition. In 
other words, despite not being signified by the whole definition, the universal can 
still be signified by one of the defining parts. For one thing, this move is in line 
with the logical strategy inaugurated in Z.4; after having separated the statements 
accounting for substances (Z.4-6) and examined their constitution (Z.10-11), 
Aristotle considers the details of their nature. For another thing, the discussion 
turns out to be relevant to the treatment of the sixth aporia; while Z.10-11 
discusses and rejects the primacy of the material elements, Z.13-16 discusses 
the primacy of the genera stated in definition.23 In considering the constitution 
from universal, Aristotle is then conceding the possibility that universals are 
among these defining parts; namely, the formal parts that make up a substance 
as essence. 
     Although Aristotle is never explicit about them, it is reasonable to believe that 
the defining parts he has in mind are the genus and the differentiae; for these are 
the predicates that signify the essence of an object by separating it from any other 
definiendum. Animal and rational, for example, are the parts of the definition of 
human and signify its essence. If the universal has to be among these parts, it is 
tempting to identify it with the genus, which represents the primary element in the 
definition and the subject of its own differentiae.24 What matters to us is to 
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 This is another proof against Burnyeat’s non-linearity. See Section 2.2. 
23
 See Sections 2.2 and 4.1. The treatment of B#6 in Z.10-16, however, is incorporated into the 
general plan of examining different accounts of substance and to endorse a formalist 
essentialism. For a different reading, see Menn (2001: 120-125). 
24
 Some commentators attempted to defend the immunity of the form and the species by taking 
the genus as the unique target of Z.13-14’s criticism. See Owen (1966); Woods (1967); Rapp 
(1996b). According to Bostock (1994: 197-198; 204-207), some of the arguments of Z.13 used to 
be part of an early draft exclusively addressing the genus. The final version, instead, extends the 
criticism to the species.  
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understand the problems faced by a definition constituted of universals, whether 
these are genera or not. For these correspond to the problems faced by a 
substance compounded of universals. 
5.2.1 The Pluralization of the Genus (I) 
The analysis of the constitution from universals emerges from Z.14, which 
consists of a direct attack on Plato’s theory of Forms. Remarkably, Aristotle 
claims to be concerned with the difficulties for those who credit Forms, which are 
assumed to be substances, with a constitution from genera and differentiae.25 
Again, the possibility of the constitution from universals follows from an 
examination of definitions; for the genus is a defining part that is stated in the 
definition of two distinct objects (1039a28-30). As in the example given in Z.13, 
animal is stated in both the definition of human and the definition of horse. The 
difficulties faced by this conception of substance are expounded in the following 
passage.  
If then the animal is one and the same in horse and in human, as you with 
yourself, (1) how will this one be one in separated entities, and why will the animal 
be separated from itself? Moreover, (2) if it participates in two-footed and in 
many-footed, there will be an impossible consequence; for the object that is one 
and a this-something will possess opposite attributes. If it is not the case [that 
animal participates in two-footed and in many-footed] when one says that animal 
is two-footed or footed, what sort of way will this be? (1039a33-b5, Bostock’s 
slightly modified translation) 
εἰ µὲν οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τὸ ἐν τῷ ἵππῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ σὺ σαυτῷ, πῶς 
τὸ ἓν
 
ἐν τοῖς οὖσι χωρὶς ἓν ἔσται, καὶ διὰ τί οὐ καὶ χωρὶς αὑτοῦ ἔσται τὸ ζῷον 
τοῦτο; ἔπειτα εἰ µὲν µεθέξει τοῦ δίποδος καὶ τοῦ πολύποδος, ἀδύνατόν τι 
συµβαίνει, τἀναντία γὰρ ἅµα ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τῷδέ τινι ὄντι·  εἰ δὲ µή, τίς ὁ 
τρόπος ὅταν εἴπῃ τις τὸ ζῷον εἶναι δίπουν ἢ πεζόν; 
 
     Let us start with the first argument. Aristotle holds that if the genus is one and 
the same part of which different objects are compounded, then the genus turns 
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 See Z.13, 1039a24-26. It is interesting to note that the concept of differentia is alien to Plato’s 
theory of Forms and perhaps coined by Aristotle. This may be a clue that his criticism has a wider 
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out not to be substance. To illustrate, if animal is one and the same part in both 
horse and human, then animal is not a substance. In a nutshell, the genus is not 
ensured the unity which it is assumed to possess, but is pluralized by its presence 
in the constitution of distinct substances.26 It is worth noting that Aristotle is 
rejecting the genus as substance and not as part of a substance. Thus, he is likely 
to rely on the initial criticism of Z.13: since the genus is universal, some of its 
features prevent it from being a substance. More precisely, Aristotle has in mind 
the opposition between the common character of universals (κοινόν) and the 
proper character of substances (ἴδιον).27 A genus is common to the plurality of 
objects to which it is universal; by contrast, a substance is proper to one single 
object of which it is essence. 
     The majority of commentators, I noticed, understand the proper character in 
terms of particularized existence in individuals and the common character in 
terms of the sharable existence of genera and species.28 In assuming that the 
genus animal is the same entity in human and horse, the Platonist metaphysician 
is ascribing the numerical unity of individuals to a generic entity. I think there are 
reasons to resist this interpretation. It is important to see that Aristotle infers the 
proper character of substances from the identity thesis of Z.6.29 To illustrate, 
i) A substance is one and the same as its essence (identity thesis); 
ii) A substance is the one single object of which it is the essence; 
iii) A substance is never common to a plurality of objects; 
iv) A substance is always proper to one single object, i.e. itself. 
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 The argument is reminiscent of Plato’s Parmenides 131a-b, in which Parmenides points out 
that one whole Form (e.g. Beauty) cannot be participated in by its own instances (e.g. the beautiful 
things) on pain of separating the Form from itself. However, whereas Plato seems to be 
concerned with Forms’ spatio-temporal conditions of existence in particulars, this is not evident 
in Aristotle, who focuses on the relation between a genus and its species. Cf. Phil. 15a-b. 
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 See Z.13, 1038b10-15. 
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 See, for example, Ross (1924: 210-211), Halper (1989: 120ff.), Loux (1991: 214-217), Lewis 
(2013: 196.ff.). 
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 Loux (1991: 227-235) and Lewis (2013: 201-210), among others, recognize that the ‘ἴδιον 
argument’ is based upon the identity thesis of Z.6. In their reconstructions, Aristotle is indeed 
showing that the object of which universals are meant to be substances is the plurality to which 
they are universal. On the contrary, the object of which forms are meant to be substances is an 
individual. Besides assuming the distinction between substance and substance-of (for my 
criticism see Section 2.2.2), their reconstructions neglect the definitional import of the identity 
thesis: a substance must be one and the same as its essence, namely as what is signified by its 
definition. Alternatively, other commentators play down the strength of the identity implied by the 
notion of property and understand it in terms of one-to-one correlation (see, for example, Bostock, 
1994: 191-193). 
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A substance is one of those objects that are identical with their essence: a primary 
object in metaphysics. Consequently, it is always proper to the same object and 
never common to whatever possesses a different essence. Hence, the proper 
character is the hallmark of substances insofar as they are essences. This entails 
two things. Firstly, since the identity thesis is to be understood as the identity 
between a definiendum and its definiens, the proper character is not simply the 
hallmark of substances, but also that of the statement accounting for them, the 
definition. Secondly, since the opposition between characters denies that 
universals are substances as essence, Aristotle turns out to be opposing the 
statement of a universal to the definition, which is the statement of an essence. 
     On this score, we can suggest that the proper character does not indicate the 
individual(-ized) existence of substances. Rather, it indicates the requirement of 
identity that must be fulfilled by the statements of properties and essences. In 
the Topics, to state something proper (ἴδιον) to an object is indeed a necessary, 
though not sufficient, condition to state a definition.30 For example, while ‘capable 
of learning’ and ‘rational animal’ are proper to human, ‘animal’ is not; for it is part 
of different statements, i.e. the definitions of human, horse, and all its inferior 
genera. In the development of metaphysics, a substance must then be proper 
just as a definition must be the statement of a proper characterization of an object. 
In the light of this, we are now able to make sense of Z.14’s argument against the 
genus. The genus is not rejected because it lacks the unity of individuals, but 
because it lacks the unity of a primary object of science. This corresponds to the 
unity of definition and is the oneness of the object signified by the statement of 
an essence. Since the genus is one and the same part in distinct substances, it 
cannot preserve their unity and, thus, fails to be substance itself. 
     What matters to us is whether this argument implies any difficulty for the 
substances compounded of genera. For this would be a reason to dismiss the 
constitution from universals. It is not difficult to infer that the impossibility of 
ensuring the unity of the genus undermines the unity of the substance. If a 
substance is compounded of universals, such as genera, these will make up a 
substance as essence and, thus, will be among the parts stated in its definition. 
Consequently, there must be identity between substance and the totality of its 
parts, just as there is identity between the definiendum and the totality of the 
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predicates in the definiens. However, since the genus makes up the essences of 
distinct substances, the unity of each substance will clash with the unity of other 
substance; for both of them will be one and the same with the totality of their 
parts, among which the genus is included. To illustrate, the unity of human 
clashes with the unity of horse because each of them is one and the same as 
animal plus its own peculiar parts. Therefore, these substances are not ensured 
unity because each of their definitions does not signify one single object. In other 
words, the constitution from universals undermines the unity of a substance 
insofar as the latter is pluralized by the former. 
5.2.2 The Pluralization of the Genus (II) 
Let us move to the second argument. Aristotle holds that if the genus participates 
in its own differentiae, the genus turns out to possess opposite characterizations. 
Therefore, the genus is not substance. To illustrate, if animal participates in its 
differentiae, then animal is characterized as both biped and many-footed. 
Arguably, Aristotle is still relying on his starting premise: that the genus is one 
and the same part of which different objects are compounded. Thus, despite still 
being focused on rejecting the genus as substance, the argument is meant to 
address the genus as part; indeed, genera and differentiae make up the 
constitution of Platonic Forms, which are cases of substance. If so, this treatment 
of the genus amounts to the treatment of the constitution from universals. 
     In general, Aristotle’s argument is along the lines of his previous criticism. The 
genus is not ensured the unity which it is assumed to possess, but is pluralized 
by multiple and contrasting characterizations (1039b3-4). At the core of this 
reasoning is the idea of ‘participating’ (µεθέξει). Basically, the contrasting 
characterizations of the genus follows from the participation in its own 
differentiae. This technical notion, I have already remarked, indicates the relation 
between a definiendum and the elements of its definition; for example, human 
participates in animal and in biped, which are parts of the statement of what 
human is.31 To participate in either a genus or a differentia means being defined 
in terms of these elements; correspondingly, the essence signified by a definition 
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consists of the elements signified by the genus and the differentia, which are the 
elements in which the object participates. It is then worth noting that the difficulty 
raised in the passage concerns the genus as substance inasmuch as it concerns 
the genus as object of a definition. In other words, Aristotle is opposing the 
statement accounting for a universal to the statement accounting for a substance, 
i.e. definition. 
     Once this framework has been clarified, the whole argument sounds quite 
familiar. The difficulty faced by the genus is triggered by missing a dialectical 
requirement: the differentia must never be predicated of the genus. In Topics VI, 
Aristotle examines this and other requirements in order to introduce some 
schemes to reject definitions. A definition can be rejected either if the differentia 
(or the species defined) is predicated of the genus, or if the genus is predicated 
of the differentia.32 The key point is that if the genus is defined in terms of its own 
differentiae, its statement fails to be a definition; for it is pluralized by the opposite 
predicates. For example, the definition of animal is pluralized by the statement of 
aquatic and terrestrial, which are meant to account for what animal is. In sum, the 
predication of the differentia undermines the unity of definition in that it prevents 
the definition from signifying one single object. What is remarkable is that Aristotle 
takes this scheme to be effective against Platonist thinkers, who assume the unity 
of genera.33 If the argument of Z.14 draws on the dialectical difficulties analysed 
in the Topics, we can conjecture the corresponding consequences for Plato’s 
metaphysics. The participation of the genus in its own differentiae undermines 
the unity of the genus in that the latter is pluralized by the former. In other words, 
since the essence signified by the definition is pluralized by the contrasting 
characterizations signified by the defining parts, there is no one single object 
signified by the definition. Therefore, the genus fails to be a substance because 
it is not ensured the unity of the primary objects of metaphysics. 
     The second argument in the passage also generates difficulties for the 
substances compounded of genera. Thus, it contributes to dismissing the 
constitution from universals. Just as above, the impossibility of ensuring the unity 
of the genus undermines the unity of the substance. If a substance is 
compounded of universals, such as genera, these will make up a substance as 
essence and, thus, will be among the parts stated in its definition. However, since 
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the genus participates in its own differentiae, the definition of a substance will 
import every differentia in terms of which its genus is defined; hence, the definition 
will not be ensured unity because the statement will be pluralized by the 
contrasting predicates of its genus. For example, the definition of human will not 
be ensured unity because the statement will be pluralized by aquatic and 
terrestrial, biped and many-footed etc. belonging to animal. Correspondingly, the 
essence signified by the definition will not be ensured unity because such a 
characterization will be pluralized by the contrasting characterizations signified 
by the defining parts. Therefore, the constitution from universals undermines the 
unity of a substance insofar as the latter is pluralized by the pluralization of the 
former. 
 
The arguments above lead to dismissing the thesis that (A1) substances are 
compounded of universals. The central idea is that if a universal is part of a 
substance, the constitutive universal pluralizes the constituted substance. 
Therefore, no substance is ensured the appropriate unity. This is established in 
the light of the corresponding unity of definition: the statement of a substance as 
essence is either the statement of a pluralized entity or the statement of 
contrasting characterizations. Hence, there cannot be one single object that is 
the principle of metaphysics just as there cannot be one single object that is 
signified by a definition. In order to ground the demonstrative science of being, 
the enquirer is not allowed to credit substances with (A1) a constitution from 
universals. For this undermines the unity that substances are assumed to 
possess. 
 
5.3 No Substance is Compounded of Substances 
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Having dismissed the constitution from universals, we need to examine the 
constitution from substances. There seem to be two routes by which Aristotle 
comes to consider substances compounded of substances. One route is 
suggested in the passage that introduces the constitution from universals in Z.13. 
At 1038b16, Aristotle observes that if no universal is substance, a universal can 
still be one of its parts. These, I have argued, are the parts that make up a 
substance as essence and, thus, are stated in its definition; namely, its genus 
and differentiae.34 In fact, the idea behind this alternative conception is to restore 
the definition of substance as universal. If a universal is among the parts of the 
definition of a substance, the universal itself will be object of definition; thus, the 
universal will be a substance too. The constitution from universals is, prima facie, 
treated as a constitution from substances. This is totally unsurprising. In the 
previous section, I pointed out that the constitution from universals is at the basis 
of the Platonist theory of Forms, which are cases of substance. Consequently, 
the treatment of the universal as part of a substance amounts to a treatment of 
the universal as substance. Aristotle confirms this insight at the beginning of Z.14. 
The genus and the differentia that are stated in the definition of a substance are 
expected to signify each of them a this-something and to be separate substances; 
for example, animal and biped are to signify two distinct substances which make 
up the essence of human.35 
     Another route is to start from the rejection of the universal as part. Basically, 
since no universal, even if taken as defining part, is substance, the constitution 
from universals is equivalent to a constitution from non-substances. However, if 
a substance is compounded of non-substances, the former turns out to depend 
upon the latter; for the essence of the non-substances will be constitutive of the 
essence of the substance. This means that the substance is not primary. Aristotle 
hastens to rule out this possibility: neither the genus nor the differentiae can ever 
be substances because they lack the separate existence that the principle of a 
demonstrative science has; for example, animal and biped are not the causes of 
other entities (e.g. capability of walking) independently of human.36 From this 
perspective, the constitution from substances is treated as the unique alternative 
to the constitution from universals. That is, the theses of the specific dilemma are 
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 See Section 5.2 above. 
35
 See Z.14, 1039a30-33. 
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 Cf. Bostock (1994: 194). See also Z.13, 1038b31-34 (clearly, Frede-Patzig, 1988: 259-260, 
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taken to exhaust the ways in which substances can be compounded and, thus, 
defined in terms of some elements. 
     If this is correct, the examination of the constitutions of substances is likely to 
face those difficulties only envisaged in Z.10-11’s discussion. As suggested by 
some commentators, the inclusion of the definition of the parts in the definition of 
the whole seems to yield some kind of regress: the parts could represent other 
wholes and their definitions could consist of other definitions and so on. What 
matters to us is that the regress can be triggered only if the parts turn out to be 
substances and not simply wholes; for each part will be then credited with a 
constitution from substances. To illustrate, if (i) animal and biped are parts of the 
definition of human, and (ii) animal and biped are substances, then (iii) animal 
and biped are definienda whose definitions state some other substances.37 It is 
then plausible that the dismissal of the constitution from substances will play on 
this general regress. My contention is that the regress is illustrative of the 
impossibility of ensuring the unity of a substance compounded of substances. 
5.3.1 Regressive Unity 
Aristotle advances a direct argument against the constitution from substances at 
the end of Z.13. His conclusion paves the way for the non-composition of 
substances and, thus, yields the final dilemma. 
It is impossible that any substance is compounded of substances present in it in 
actuality; for things that are two in this way–in actuality–are never one in actuality, 
but if they are two in potentiality, they will be one (for example, the double is from 
two halves potentially; for the actuality separates). Consequently, if substance is 
one, it will not be compounded of substances present in it, at least in the way that 
Democritus correctly states. (1039a3-9, slightly modified translation) 
Before any further observation, some words on the use of the notions of actuality 
and potentiality are in order. Roughly, actuality and potentiality are two ways to 
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account for an entity from a teleological perspective; an entity in actuality is an 
entity in terms of its fulfilled nature, while an entity in potentiality is an entity in 
terms of what has the power of fulfilling its nature. For example, the circle is an 
entity in actuality, while the semicircles of which the circle consists are entities in 
potentiality.38 When Aristotle attempts to ground the science of being and to 
overcome its multiplicity, he highlights that his work has to focus on per se being, 
being true and false, and being in actuality and in potentiality.39 Since Z’s enquiry 
is concerned with per se being, which encompasses the totality of entities 
classified in the categories, the occurrence of these notions is a remarkable 
feature of Z.13’s discussion. Plainly, they serve Aristotle to distinguish two types 
of constitution: the constitution from substances in actuality and the constitution 
from substances in potentiality. The distinction, however, is not central in the 
argument. Aristotle keeps addressing the constitution from substances in 
actuality and simply neglects the other possibility. 
     To go into the details, Aristotle holds that if a substance is compounded of two 
substances in actuality, the two substances will not make up one object. 
Consequently, no substance will be one. To illustrate, if animal and biped are two 
substances in actuality of which human consists, animal and biped do not make 
up one substance; thus, human is not one but two objects, i.e. animal and biped.40 
In a nutshell, the constitution from substances in actuality prevents a substance 
from being ensured the unity which it is assumed to possess. What does bring 
about this difficulty? An important clue is given by the notion of actuality. Unlike 
potential objects, an actual object is not accounted for as something other than–
though with the power of being–what it is. Accordingly, its definition is an absolute 
and not qualified statement of what it is; for its nature and existence are absolute 
and not related to anything else. This enables us to reformulate the problem 
foreshadowed in Z.10-11: if (i) the parts of a substance are those stated in its 
definition, and (ii) these parts are objects with an actualized existence that is 
stated by definition, then (iii) the statement of each part will be a definition. The 
statements of animal and biped, for example, are definitions which make up the 
whole definition of human. 
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     Again, we are licensed to understand the unity at issue in terms of unity of 
definition. The whole definition of a substance is not ensured unity because the 
definitions of its own parts are statements accounting for the actualized existence 
of other substances; thus, the constitution of the whole definition makes the 
statement the sum of other definitions. What is salient is that the difficulty raised 
for the constitution of substances corresponds to the difficulty raised for the 
constitution of definitions. Basically, the whole substance is not ensured unity 
because there is not one single object signified by its definition; rather, there is 
the sum of the objects signified by the defining parts. Animal and biped, for 
example, indicate two substances that are constitutive of the whole substance 
defined, i.e. human. From this perspective, the difficulty lies in the regressive 
unity of substances: every substance is the sum of other substances just as its 
definition is the sum of other definitions. Every substance turns out to be a 
plurality of objects each of which is signified by one of its defining parts. But since 
every defining part signifies a substance, each part of a substance will be a 
plurality of objects itself. In other words, the constitution from substances 
undermines the unity of a substance insofar as the latter is regressively derived 
from the former. Hence, no substance is ensured the unity of the principle of 
metaphysics because every definition signifies a plurality objects.41 
     What about a constitution from substances in potentiality? By now, the 
problem with this option should be clear. A potential object is defined as 
something other than what it is, but with the power of being such. Since its 
existence is relative to something else, its definition is a qualified statement. To 
illustrate, the semicircles are the potential entities of which an actual entity, i.e. 
the circle, consists; thus, their potential nature and existence is relative to the 
actual nature and existence of the circle. If this is so, the definitions of potential 
substances are not stated in the definition of a substance; for they do not signify 
the parts that make up a substance as essence. It could be said that the 
constitution from substances in potentiality ought to be rejected because of their 
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 Since the argument is taken to suggest the non-composition of substances and to concur with 
Democritus’ views, Aristotle is likely to be drawing on his analysis of indivisible bodies in On 
Generation and Corruption I.2. The commitment to indivisible bodies follows from the rejection of 
two impossible situations: i) a body is divided into bodies; ii) a body is divided into non-bodies 
(316a14-b16). (i) is impossible because the body would still be divisible; (ii) is impossible because 
the result would not even be a magnitude. This conclusion, however, rests on the correspondence 
between generation/corruption and composition/division, which Aristotle will call into question. 
Arguably, a solution to Z.13’s dilemma is to reformulate the correspondence between 
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posteriority. That is because substances in potentiality still depend upon 
substances in actuality. In Aristotle’s own words, they are not separate.42 
 
The argument above leads to dismissing the thesis that (A2) substances are 
compounded of substances. The central idea is that if a substance is part of a 
substance, the constitutive substances make the constituted substance a sum of 
other substances. Therefore, no substance is ensured unity. This is established 
in the light of the unity of definition: the definition of a substance is the sum of the 
definitions of the constitutive substances. Hence there cannot be one single 
object that is the principle of metaphysics just as there cannot be one single 
object that is signified by a definition; for the unity of a substance is the regressive 
unity derived from its constitution. In order to ground the demonstrative science 
of being, the enquirer is not allowed to credit substances with (A2) a constitution 
from substances. For this undermines the unity which substances are assumed 
to possess. 
5.4 A Threat to Essentialism 
In the previous sections, I gave an analysis of the two forms of composition 
presented in the specific dilemma. I argued that both the constitution from 
universals and the constitution from substances undermine the unity of 
substance. To put it in another way, substance is not ensured the unity pertaining 
to the principle of metaphysics and corresponding to the unity of definition: there 
is one single object that is the principle of a science just as there is one single 
object that is signified by a definition. The (A1) constitution from universals 
triggers the pluralization of the substance because of the common character of 
the constitutive parts. The (A2) constitution from substances triggers a regressive 
unity because of the actual existence of its constitutive parts. Since the specific 
dilemma exhausts the forms of constitution with which a substance can be 
credited, the consequences of the general dilemma loom over Z’s enquiry: if (B) 
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substances are uncompounded, then it is impossible to define them. This, I 
suggested, could sentence the failure of Z’s enquiry. Since there is no entity that 
can be ensured the primacy and the unity of the principle of a science, the 
principle of metaphysics cannot be established. In the remainder of this Chapter, 
I will illustrate how this conclusion obtains independently of Z.13’s criticism and 
marks the dismissal of the most promising solution: the formalist essentialism. 
5.4.1 The Rescuers of the Form 
To my knowledge, no one has taken into consideration the possibility that Z.13’s 
criticism could undermine Aristotle’s essentialism.43 On the contrary, 
commentators offer different solutions to demonstrate the immunity of the form. 
After the discussion of Z.10-11, the principle of metaphysics seems to be firmly 
identified with the form of a substance. The first challenge for this conclusion is 
to understand how the form can escape Z.13’s criticism. At stake is then a version 
of the so-called problem of the universals: whether there is some repeatable 
entity and whether this is a metaphysical principle.44 Within hylomorphism, the 
form of substances represents the cause of what an object is in that it determines 
its material substratum; for example, the human soul is the cause of what a 
human is in that it determines its flesh&bone.45 Since form is signified by definition 
and explains the belonging of an object to a certain kind, it is generally regarded 
as a repeatable element that is combined with definite portions of matter. This 
makes the form a universal entity and, thus, potentially subject to Aristotle’s 
criticism. Nevertheless, since form is established to be substance as essence, 
any difficulty faced by the form would be, at least indirectly, a difficulty for the 
substance as essence. 
     In order to rescue the form, commentators take up two distinct strategies. One 
is to argue in favour of the individual nature of the form. In Z.13-16’s criticism, 
Aristotle simply denies the primacy of universal entities and takes every form to 
be peculiar to a single object. To illustrate, while the species human is not 
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primary, Socrates’ human soul is primary and is distinct from Callias’ and 
Coriscus’ human souls. Accordingly, Aristotle comes to endorse a nominalist 
metaphysics, in which every object is the concretization of its individual form.46 
Another strategy is to defend the compatibility between the universality and the 
substantiality of the form. Basically, the target of Z.13 is not the universal nature 
of the form, but the universal nature of other objects.47 Within this framework, 
Driscoll and Code propose to separate different senses of ‘universal’. While 
genera and species (i.e. the Categories’ secondary substances) are universals 
insofar as they characterize individuals, form is universal insofar as it is 
constitutive of an individual. In attacking universals, Aristotle is then rejecting 
those entities that are ‘shared’ by a plurality of individuals.48 Along the same lines, 
Loux and Lewis insist on the distinction between senses of ‘substance’ in order 
to weaken Z.13’s criticism. Rather than arguing that no universal is substance 
absolutely, Aristotle holds that universals cannot be substance-of the objects to 
which they are universals. Consequently, genus and species cannot be 
substance of individuals, and form cannot be substance of a definite portion of 
matter; nonetheless, the form can be substance of the individual composite 
resulting from the realization of its form in some matter.49 Overall, it is possible to 
defend the immunity of the form on the basis of its relation with matter. Since form 
is individualized by the material substratum, it is not classified as universal; for it 
is a τόδε τι and is not a ποιόν τι, like genus and species.50 
     As shown in my discussion, form risks being subject to the difficulties raised 
in Z.13 independently of whether it is universal or not. Within metaphysics, the 
form is the primary object of a demonstrative science and it is the principle 
grounding the existence of the remaining objects. The point is that within Z’s 
enquiry the form is established to be the principle of metaphysics only if it is 
credited with a constitution; for this makes up the substance as essence that is 
signified by a definition. Once every type of constitution is dismissed, the final 
dilemma triggers a structural difficulty: it is impossible to establish the principle of 
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 For this interpretation see Frede (1987), Frede-Patzig (1988: Einleitung, 48ff.), Irwin (1988: 
237-274), and Witt (1989). Cf. Sellars (1967). 
47
 One more strategy is to identify the target of Aristotle’s criticism with the genus. See Section 
5.2, note 24. 
48
 For this reading see Driscoll (1981) and Code (1984). 
49
 For this reading see Loux (1991: Ch. 6), Wedin (2000: 343-403), and Lewis (2013: 191-222). 
50
 For this view, see Halper (1989: 240-242) and Galluzzo (2013b: 122-130). Cf. Rapp (1996b: 
esp. 174-176) 
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the totality of entities. The threat to Aristotle’s solution does not lie in the concrete 
existence of a repeatable entity; rather, it lies in the existence of a principle to 
ground a demonstrative science. This difficulty is spelled out in terms of the 
impossibility of definition: (i) since a definition is the statement of a form, and (ii) 
since the form cannot be credited with any constitution, (iii) there is no definition 
of the form; for there is no constitution that makes up a substance as essence 
and can be signified by the statement. 
     Undoubtedly, many commentators would reject the idea of crediting the form 
with some constitution. This is nothing but endorsing (B) the non-composite 
status of substances. In this way, the form appears to be ensured the unity that 
pertains to the principles of a science. However, Aristotle warns us against this 
conclusion and it is not difficult to understand the reason as to why he denies it. 
     If a form is assumed to be uncompounded, there are no parts into which the 
form divides. Thus, the constitution of the form is in fact exhausted by one single 
element. Given the logical strategy of Z’s enquiry, we can reformulate this 
scenario as follows: 
F =def (x) iff  ¬ [F =def (x; y; z)] 
F is the definiendum that signifies the form, while (x) is the definiens that signifies 
the constitution of F. The definition of the form is ensured the unity of definition; 
for there is one single object signified by F and (x). Correspondingly, the form is 
ensured the unity of the principle of metaphysics; for its oneness is neither 
pluralized nor regressive. In mereological terms, we could say that the form 
consists of an improper part: there is an absolute overlap between the constitutive 
part (x) and the constituted whole F.51 
     Although the non-composition is a promising way to conceive the concrete 
existence of forms, it can hardly work as a way to reaching the principle of 
metaphysics. The problems with the form become evident in the light of the 
problems with its statement. The statement of the improper part accounts for the 
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 Proper and improper parthood are the key notions of standard mereology. Starting from a basic 
notion of part (i.e. X is part of Y iff everything separated from X is separated from Y), it is possible 
to indicate two senses of part: i) X is improper part of Y iff X is identical with Y; ii) X is improper 
part of Y iff X is identical with Y. See Simon (2000: 9ff.) and Koslicki (2008 15-18) for these notions 
and the theorems grounded in them. For a mereological treatment of Aristotelian issues see 
Haslanger (1994). 
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whole insofar as it indicates an essence; thus, the statement of the improper part 
and the statement of the whole are equivalent descriptions of one and the same 
object. Since the essence indicated by the improper part overlaps with any other 
improper part, essence fails to be the principle of metaphysics. Rather than 
grounding the existence of other entities, the essence turns out to be an arbitrary 
way to refer to the object. Basically, F is one and the same as either (x), or (y), 
etc. From this perspective, formalist essentialism seems to yield a nominalist 
metaphysics the principle of which is unknowable; for it is the entity signified by 
arbitrary descriptions. 
5.4.2 The Mereological Problems of Constitutions 
Z’s enquiry into substance attempts to identify the objective cause of why other 
entities are, and not an arbitrary cause. The core difficulty is that this principle 
can be established only if we articulate its constitution; for this makes up a 
substance as essence. Earlier, I argued that if formalist essentialism is 
incompatible with the non-composition of substance, it must be compatible with 
some kind of composition. This, however, involves a mereological treatment of 
the relations between parts and whole, which brings to light the impossibility of 
ensuring the unity of substance. 
     Since a definition signifies an essence, the treatment of the parts can only 
start from the treatment of the defining parts, i.e. the parts of a definition. In 
Section 5.2.1, I suggested that Aristotle has in mind the genus and differentia of 
the object. In this regard, we need remind that there are two types of definitions 
for two types of objects of scientific knowledge. Whereas derivative definitions 
state the what-it-is (τί ἐστιν) of the secondary objects, immediate definitions state 
the what-it-is (τί ἐστιν) of primary objects. The same distinction applies to 
metaphysics; Aristotle separates the essence signified by the definition of 
substances from the essence signified by the definition of non-substances.52 
What is interesting to see is that Aristotle spells out both these constitutions in 
terms of genus and differentia. In derivative definitions, genus and differentia are 
used to indicate the subject-matter of the science and the cause of its 
characterization; in the definition of eclipse, for example, the loss of light by moon 
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is the genus and the screening of sun by earth is the differentia. In immediate 
definitions, genus and differentia are used to indicate the very cause of the object; 
in the definition of human, for example, the genus and the differentia indicate the 
characterization that is one and the same as human, i.e. rational animal. 
     For the development of his formalist essentialism, Aristotle is concerned with 
the constitution of the immediate definitions. Thus, the form is the whole 
consisting of the parts indicated by its genus and differentia. On pain of 
constituting an arbitrary characterization, these parts must be distinct from one 
another. In mereological terms, the form must consist of proper parts: there is no 
absolute overlap between each constitutive part (x) and the constituted whole F. 
To illustrate:  
F =def (x; y; z) AND (x ≠ y ≠ z) 
Whilst there is no identity between the F and each one of (x), (y), and (z), there 
is identity between F and the totality of (x), (y), and (z). This assumption generates 
the fundamental tension that undermines formalist essentialism: the unity of the 
whole has to coexist with the distinctness of its own parts. Regardless of any 
understanding of its constitution, the form is one single object and is identical with 
a plurality of distinct objects. Although Aristotle rejects the composition of 
substance by dismissing every possible constitution, it is not difficult to outline its 
intrinsic problems. To this effect, it suffices to consider the relation that unifies the 
distinct parts into one single whole. For the primary objects of a science, there 
are at least two possibilities: I) the parts are per se related to one another; II) the 
parts are accidentally related to one another. 
     In the case of a per se relation among the parts, one part turns out to hold 
primacy over the other parts. Consequently, the whole is not ensured unity in 
spite of composition, but unity of non-composition. That is, the form is not one 
single object consisting of distinct parts, but one single object consisting of the 
part that holds primacy over the others. Again, the problem with the form can be 
more evident in the light of the problems with its statement. If there is a per se 
relation between the parts, this can be either per se1 or per se2. Be that as it may, 
the statement of a proper part turns out to be constitutive of the statement of 
another proper part. To use our example, (x) is per se1 related to (y) because the 
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statement of (x) is constitutive of the statement of (y).53 Correspondingly, this 
proper part holds primacy over the other proper parts because the latter 
essentially depend upon the former. This means reconsidering the composition 
of the form; for the constitution indicated by its statement is not identical with a 
plurality of distinct parts, but with one single part. A host of difficulties derive 
follows from this conclusion. The formalist essentialism does not commit us to the 
composition of substance, but to its non-composition; in other words, the essence 
fails to be the principle of metaphysics, because it turns out to be an arbitrary way 
to refer to objects. In a nutshell, since the part that exhausts the constitution of 
the form is not proper, the principle of metaphysics is not articulated into distinct 
parts. Hence, the principle is one and the same as any improper part of the whole 
form. 
     In the case of an accidental relation between the parts, the whole turns out to 
be the sum of other objects. Consequently, the whole can only be ensured the 
accidental unity of its composition. That is, the form is not one single object 
consisting of distinct parts, but a set of essentially independent objects. As with 
the per se relation, the accidental relation firstly obtains between the statements 
of the parts that are constitutive of the definition of the whole form. If there is an 
accidental relation among the parts, then no statement of a proper part is 
constitutive of the statement of another proper part. To illustrate, (x) is 
accidentally related to (y) because neither is (x) defined in terms of (y) nor is (y) 
defined in terms of (x).54 Correspondingly, every proper part is essentially 
independent of the remaining proper parts. The point is that, although the form is 
identical with the constitution from these parts, nothing prevents the form from 
being identical with a constitution from the same parts plus one more proper part; 
for the accidental relation between two proper parts of the form is the same as 
the accidental relation among a proper part of the form and the proper part of any 
distinct whole. What matters is that the form is not ensured the unity of substance 
insofar as its composition is not restricted to any sum of parts. Therefore, the 
formalist essentialism fails to establish the principle of metaphysics because the 
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 That is, there is neither a per se1 nor a per se2 relation between (x) and (y). 
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essence turns out to be equivalent to any accidental relation between the proper 
parts of the form. 
5.5 The Failure of Z’s Enquiry 
Z’s enquiry fails to establish the principle of metaphysics because there is no way 
to ensure the unity of any substance. This conclusion, I have argued, is 
sentenced by the final dilemma of Z.13. Since substances are compounded 
neither of universals nor of substances, substances must be uncompounded. 
Consequently, it is impossible to define any substance. For one thing, this means 
that there is no statement grounding the demonstrations within metaphysics; for 
another thing, this means that there is no entity grounding the existence of other 
entities. The failure of Z appears to be less surprising in the light of the framework 
of the enquiry. Given the correspondence between composition and definability, 
Aristotle is bound to identify the principle of metaphysics with the constitution 
signified by a definition; for this makes up a substance as essence. My analysis 
shows that if a substance is credited with whatsoever constitution, the substance 
turns out not to be one. This oneness is not the numerical unity of individual 
substances; rather, it is the numerical unity of a substance as essence and, thus, 
can be understood in terms of unity of definition: there is one object that is 
substance just as there is one object that is signified by a definition. In Z.13-16’s 
criticism, Aristotle dismisses any type of constitution insofar as it undermines this 
unity. The constitution from universals is rejected because it triggers the 
pluralization of the substance. Since a universal is common to a plurality of 
objects, the constituted whole is not one but the many different objects indicated 
by each constitutive part. The constitution from substances is rejected because it 
triggers the regressive unity of the substance. Since the constituted substance 
turns out to be the sum of the constitutive substances, the unity of the former is 
regressively derived from the unity of the latter. At the end of the day, the enquirer 
is unable to indicate the constitution of any substance. Therefore, she is unable 
to establish the principle of metaphysics. 
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     At this point, Aristotle is led to dismiss his formalist essentialism. Whether 
compounded or uncompounded, the form fails to be the substance defined as 
essence. This indirect conclusion has nothing to do with the spatio-temporal 
existence of a repeatable entity. The difficulty with the formalist essentialism lies 
in the scientific nature of the principle that is supposed to ground metaphysics. If 
uncompounded, the form is the entity indicated by any arbitrary description and, 
thus, is unknowable. If compounded, the form is the sum of distinct entities and, 
thus, is not one. Hence, if substance is defined as essence and identified with 
form, metaphysics is not grounded in the cause of why entities are. Does the 
failure of Z’s enquiry imply the failure of Aristotle’s project to develop the 
demonstrative science of being? The answer to this question is to be found in 
Z.17, in which Aristotle attempts to secure the unity and the definability of 
substances by escaping the dichotomy of composition/non-composition. 
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Chapter Six 
Definition and Unity (II) 
Z’s enquiry, I contend, contributes to the foundation of the science of being 
despite failing to establish its principle. After the treatment of the difficulties raised 
in Z.13-16, Aristotle is able to define only derivative objects of metaphysics: an 
object is such-and-such a thing in virtue of such-and-such a cause. This definition 
does not lead to identifying substance; for it ensures neither the primacy nor the 
unity of the principle of a science. Nevertheless, it leads to identifying the 
remaining entities studied in metaphysics. The separation between substance 
and the other entities is indeed the separation between the immediate definition 
grounding a science and the demonstrative definitions. Accordingly, Z’s enquiry 
fails to ground metaphysics because it does not achieve the knowledge of the 
principle and its immediate definition; rather, it achieves the knowledge of the 
other objects and their demonstrative definitions. There is a salient consequence 
implied by this conclusion: every substance studied in Z is a derivative object of 
metaphysics. For example, human is a derivative object and thus defined as 
‘such-and-such a body because of such-and-such a soul’. Since Z’s enquiry is 
focused on sensible substances, and since sensible substances turn out to be 
derivative objects, we can conjecture that the principle of metaphysics is to be 
established by positing and defining some suprasensible substance. Basically, 
the foundation of metaphysics is linked to the existence of the substance which 
is known by an immediate definition: God.1 
     Chapter Six is concerned with the results achieved by the enquiry and outlined 
in Z.17. I shall argue that Aristotle sets out demonstrative definitions of the 
substances studied in Z for two reasons. Firstly, the demonstrative definition 
enables him to envision the principle of metaphysics: substance is the cause of 
other entities insofar as it explains why something is something else. To envision 
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 This knowledge is not achieved in Z and, perhaps, nowhere in the Metaphysics. For this is the 
knowledge of God as well as the knowledge possessed by God. Cf. A.2, 983a5-7. 
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some object is to achieve an indirect knowledge of it on the basis of the direct 
knowledge of a different object. In Z.17’s argument, substance is envisioned to 
be a certain cause explaining why such-and-such body is human. The enquirer 
does not establish the principle of metaphysis by giving a definition of substance. 
Nevertheless, she understands its causal role on the basis of her definition of a 
sensible substance. In particular, the enquirer comes to the conclusion that the 
principle of metaphysics is signified by the middle-term of a demonstrative 
definition; for it mediates the belonging of some predicate(s) to a subject.  I 
contend that this renovated view is in line with the failure of Z’s enquiry. The 
principle of metaphysics is not identified with the form of sensible substances (as 
advocated in Z.4-11), but with some teleological cause. At the end of Z, both 
sensible substances and non-substances are credited with a derivative 
characterization that indicates the subject characterized and the purpose for 
being so-and-so characterized. Therefore, the principle of metaphysics is a purely 
teleological cause that cannot be established among sensible entities. 
     Secondly, the demonstrative definition enables Aristotle to overcome the 
dilemma of Z.13: it is possible to ensure the unity of substances and their 
definability; thus, it is still possible to develop the science of being. The key move 
is to separate demonstrative definitions from immediate definitions. Since the 
substances under threat are known by demonstrative definition and thus possess 
a cause for their existence (i.e. the fact that there is such-and-such a substance), 
they must possess a cause of their unity (i.e. the fact that there is one substance 
of such-and-such a kind). Basically, a sensible substance is one object and not a 
plurality of elements in virtue of its teleological cause. Aristotle holds that since 
sensible substances and their definitions result from some matter that is in 
potentiality what a form is in actuality, their composition is only apparent. Namely, 
every substance is one object identified with either its matter or its form and 
signified by one unified statement. This solution escapes the dichotomy of 
composition/non-composition and ensures the unity of some of the primary 
objects of metaphysics: sensible substances. Indeed, although sensible 
substances are derivative, they still belong to the first genus of entities. 
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6.1 The Demonstrative Definition of Sensible Substances 
Unity represents a crux in Aristotelian philosophy. Not only is it a much debated 
topic by interpreters, but Aristotle himself constantly procrastinates its treatment. 
Roughly, the problem sounds like this: why is a thing one whole and not a plurality 
of parts?. That amounts to understanding what ensures the unity of anything 
which is divisible into parts and is still defined as one.2 In the logical works, 
Aristotle tends unsurprisingly to shift from the unity of an object to the unity of a 
definition. The problem amounts to explaining why an object is one and not the 
plurality of things indicated in its definition; for example, human is one and not 
the sum of animal, terrestrial, and biped.3 Correspondingly, a definition must be 
one statement and not a plurality of terms (i.e. genus and differentiae) insofar as 
it signifies one object and not many. In the physical works, the problem amounts 
to explaining why an object is one body and not the plurality of bodily parts into 
which it can be divided; for example, a chunk of flesh is one body and not the 
sum of fire and earth.4 
     These versions of the problem are interwoven in the context of metaphysics. 
In the central books, Aristotle is concerned with the unity of substances, which 
are the primary objects of the science of being. Since his enquiry is firstly focused 
on sensible substances, the unity of substance has to match the unity of sensible 
bodies.5 Likewise, since his enquiry shifts from examining entities to examining 
statements, the unity of substance is analysed in terms of unity of definition.6 In 
Chapter Five, I argued that the impossibility of ensuring the unity of substance 
marks the failure of Z’s enquiry: if a substance is credited with a constitution from 
either substances or universals, substance turns out not to be one. Consequently, 
there is no entity grounding the existence of other entities just as there is no 
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 Importantly, Aristotle is concerned with the form of unity that pertains to the objects of definition. 
This means discarding other forms of unity, such as the continuity of a sequence of words (e.g. 
the unity of Iliad). See Z.4, 1030b7-10. 
3
 See De Int. 11, 20b15-22, An. Post. II.6, 92a27-33, and Top. VII.3, 154a4-11. Cf. Metaph. B.3, 
998b11-14. 
4
 See Gen. et Cor. I.8, 326a29-b1; I.10, 327b19ff. Cf. II.7; II.8, 334-b1. 
5
 Again, the difference lies in the fact that unity in metaphysics pertains to substances qua 
substances, while unity in physics pertains to sensible substances qua sensible substances, i.e. 
bodies. Cf. Section 2.1.3. 
6
 According to some interpreters, unity is the central issue treated in Z, if not in the whole 
Metaphysics. See for example Halper (1989), Gill (1989), and Charles (2000) (cf. Section 2.2.1, 
note 37). Menn (2001) proposes considering the treatment of unity in Z.17-H.6 as the solution of 
the sixth aporia tackled in Z.10-16. Quite differently, the centrality of unity in Z.17-H.6 is taken by 
Morel (2015) to supersede Z’s hylomorphism with a conception in terms of potentiality and 
actuality. 
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statement grounding the demonstrations conducted in metaphysics. Thus, a key 
role in the development of metaphysics is likely to be played by the analysis of 
the problem of unity. For Aristotle must ensure the unity of substance and the 
unity of definition by explaining why each of these is one whole and not a plurality 
of elements. 
     The solution is traditionally reconstructed on the basis of two chapters: Z.12 
and H.6.7 I am inclined to think, however, that Aristotle’s argument can be 
understood only in the light of his renovated treatment of substance.8 In the first 
half of Z.17, Aristotle introduces a new definition of the principle of metaphysics 
which implies two major consequences: i) sensible substances are derivative 
objects of metaphysics; ii) the principle of metaphysics is to be established by 
studying some suprasensible substance. Given this conception of sensible 
substances, Aristotle is in a good position to ensure the unity of these substances 
and the unity of their definition; for it suffices to show that the two elements into 
which a sensible substance and a definition divide are one and the same thing: 
the one is potentially what the other is actually. My first step is then to illustrate 
the treatment of substance in Z.17. For one thing, this will help us to understand 
the features of the object and of the statement to which unity pertains. For another 
thing, it will shed light on the results achieved by Z’s enquiry in spite of its failure. 
6.1.1 Substance and Cause 
At the end of Z.16, Aristotle reminds us that no substance is defined as universal 
and no substance is compounded of substances.9 Given my earlier analysis of 
Z.13-14, the first half of the claim marks the end of the examination of the 
definition as universal, while the second half marks the end of Z’s enquiry. Since 
no substance can be credited with any constitution, no substance can be defined; 
therefore, there is no way to establish the principle of metaphysics and to 
accomplish the enquiry. The aporetic character of these lines contrasts with the 
incipit of Z.17. At 1041a6-9, Aristotle tells us that the enquiry requires a different 
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 Cf. Ross (1924: 206; 238); Frede-Patzig (1988: 221-222); Burnyeat (2001); Deslauriers (2007: 
129-138); Code (2010a); Gill (2010); Galluzzo (2013: 111). 
8
 For a similar approach see Charles (2010a). 
9
 See Z.16, 1041a3-5. 
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starting point (ἄλλην οἷον ἀρχήν), which could be illustrative of the suprasensible 
substance too. 
     Commentators have paid much attention to this signpost. After having 
examined the four definitions of substance, Z.17 seems to provide the 
springboard for a new phase of the enquiry that is completed by book H. On the 
more radical reading, the signpost witnesses the negative function of the 
examinations conducted in Z. Basically, Z.3-16 is a dialectical discussion 
designed to test and reject others’ philosophical solutions, especially Plato’s and 
the Pre-Socratics’; Z.17-H, instead, is a presentation of the views advocated by 
Aristotle.10 On the less radical reading, the signpost confirms the provisional 
character of Z’s enquiry and the necessity to organize its content into a genuinely 
scientific knowledge.11 At the core of this new phase is the idea that substance 
is a cause. This premise is taken to introduce a further definition of substance 
besides those listed in Z.3; in particular, it is expected to successfully identify the 
principle of metaphysics. The central point, commentators insist, is that, while the 
other definitions are tentative answers to Z, the definition as cause is presented 
as an indisputable truth.12 Rather than a reputable opinion to be tested, Z.17 
presents us with an argument to directly establish the principle of the science of 
being. 
     There is a couple of things to consider in this regard. First of all, I showed that, 
despite its failure, Z’s enquiry is not conceived to be a negative and dialectical 
discussion of others’ views. Its task is to establish the principle of metaphysics 
through the study of the genus of substances (which prima facie is co-extensive 
with the genus of the entities studied in physics, i.e. sensible bodies). It could be 
said that Aristotle’s primary intent is not to reject others’ views–though in fact he 
does–nor is it to move from a provisional discussion to a scientific argument. 
Rather, he aims to answer what substance is in order to ground a demonstrative 
science.13 Also, it must be pointed out that the idea of substance as cause is not 
a novelty in Z. From the beginning of the enquiry, Aristotle has in mind a univocal 
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 See Rorty (1973: 409), Irwin (1988: 206-207), Lewis (2013: 271-272) for this reading (a similar 
view is held by Menn who denies any positive contribution in books Z-H). For the passages in 
which ‘the fresh start’ seems to separate aporetic phases from genuinely positive discussions see 
Phys. VIII.7, 260a20-21, Eth. Nic. VI, 1139b14, VII.1, 1145a15, Eth. Eud. II.1, 1218b31, and II.6, 
1222b15. 
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 See Bolton (1995: 452ff.), Charles (2000: 283-288), and Burnyeat (2001: 56-57). 
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 See Lewis (2013: 271-272). 
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 Cf. Sections 1.1 and 2.2.2. 
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concept of substance: substance is a cause insofar as it is the entity grounding 
the existence and the nature of the other entities (i.e. non-substances). This 
concept enables Aristotle to elaborate the ontological dependence that drives the 
enquiry and is at work in metaphysics.14 In Z.10-11, for example, the parts of an 
object are regarded as its principles; for they make up the constitution that can 
be identified with its essence (1035a24-b1). In Z.13, Aristotle motivates the 
examination of the universal with the general belief in its status of cause and 
principle (1038b6-8).15 In a nutshell, that substance is a cause is a premise for 
the whole enquiry and is not exclusive to Z.17’s argument. It is then very plausible 
that Aristotle is attempting to relaunch the enquiry in order to avoid a new failure. 
To this effect, he starts with recalling a fundamental premise behind his 
examinations of the four definitions.16 Since the concept of cause unifies all the 
previous definitions of substance, its treatment does preserve the continuity of 
the enquiry in spite of the contrast between the two phases. From this 
perspective, it is not unrealistic to understand the incipit of Z.17 as a word game. 
The ἄλλην ἀρχήν invoked by Aristotle refers both to the start of a new phase of 
the enquiry and to the principle that is to be established. Basically, the enquiry 
can be relaunched only if we restart from the fundamental insight into substance: 
substance is the cause of why other entities are. 
     What then does Aristotle argue in Z.17? With few exceptions, it is commonly 
agreed that the chapter proposes an argument in favour of form.17 The form of 
sensible substances is the principle of metaphysics because it is the cause in 
virtue of which an entity is a certain kind of object. For example, some 
bricks&stones are a house because of their formal arrangement. After the 
criticism of Plato’s Forms, Aristotle endorses again his formalist essentialism and 
concludes the enquiry. As argued in Z.4-11, substance is essence and is 
identified with the form in view of its primacy over other entities; since it 
determines the organization of a material substratum, the form is responsible for 
the existence of the matter and, thus, of the whole composite. This ontological 
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 See Z.1, 1028a30-b2. 
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 In addition, Z.9 (esp. 1034a21-32) offers a wide treatment of substance as cause (see also ∆.8, 
in which ‘cause’ is one of the senses of ‘substance’). For other references see Halper (1989: 145). 
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 Contrary to the Londinenses, there is no reason to doubt about the validity of the introductory 
reasoning. Aristotle is not arguing that substance is cause from its status of principle (cf. Burnyeat 
et al., 1979, 150-151); rather, he assumes that substance is some sort of principle and cause in 
order to relaunch the enquiry. 
17
 See Ross (1924: 224), Halper (1989: 144-154), Frede-Patzig (1988: 307-308), Scaltsas (1994a; 
1994b: 63ff.), Burnyeat (2001: 59-60), Galluzzo (2013: 134), Lewis (2013: 275-280). 
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dependence upon the form leads Aristotle to acknowledge its status of primary 
substance. Within this interpretative line, the explanatory model elaborated in 
the Analytics represents the innovative contribution of Z.17. This is the three-
term structure to deliver a demonstration; the resulting account explains why a 
fact necessarily obtains and, thus, provides an explanation. Aristotle seems to 
apply this model in order to give a formalist solution to Z. Basically, the form 
represents the middle-term that mediates the belonging of a kind-term to a term 
indicating some matter. To illustrate,  
A) human soul belongs to B) some flesh&bone 
C)  human belongs to A) human soul 
C) human belongs to B) some flesh&bone. 
The form of sensible substances is the principle that explains the existence of a 
certain kind of entity. This makes it the source of the substantiality within sensible 
reality and thus the source of the nature of any entity. Whether or not the model 
is applied to deliver a valid demonstration, commentators take Aristotle to offer 
an alternative way to defend the formalist essentialism of Z.4-11.18 
     I shall try to resist this interpretation for several reasons. It has often been 
noted that the form is never explicitly mentioned in Z.17.19 Except for line 1041b8 
(which is likely to be a gloss), Aristotle does not identify substance with any 
hylomorphic principle.20 He simply maintains that the principle enquired in Z is 
the cause of some matter being such-and-such an object; thus, we need to spell 
out the middle-term explaining some facts, such as the existence and the unity of 
a certain entity. Once we realize this point, it becomes reasonable to understand 
the views recalled from the Analytics in separation from hylomorphism. If Aristotle 
were applying the explanatory model in order to submit his formalist essentialism, 
the technical observations about the explanandum and the explanans could 
hardly be relevant to the overall argument.21 Likewise, it would be difficult to 
separate the innovative character of Z.17’s solution from the doctrine of Z.4-11. 
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 Lewis (2013: 281-286) denies the scientific character of Aristotle’s application in that it is not 
meant to account for natural bodies but to account for substance as cause. For a different view 
see Charles (2000: 283-294; 2010). 
19
 See Bostock (1994: 236-247). Cf. Menn (2001). 
20
 On the gloss, see Burnyeat et al. (1979: 154), Frede-Patzig (1988: 317-318), and Menn (2001). 
21
 See Z.17, 1041a10-20; a32-b9. I will analyse these observations in Section 6.1.2. 
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In the earlier version, the form of a sensible substance holds primacy over its 
matter in that the definition of the former is constitutive of the definition of the 
latter; correspondingly, the latter essentially depends upon the former. In so 
arguing, Aristotle clearly holds that the form is causally responsible for the 
existence and the nature of the material substratum. If this is so, this very idea is 
unlikely to be the main contribution of the application of the explanatory model. 
     Our understanding of the argument of Z.17 is tied to our understanding of the 
explanatory model. Indeed, there must be a way to make its application in 
metaphysics functional to the enquiry into substance. In other words, Aristotle is 
not recalling the views of the Analytics to conclude that substance, if defined as 
cause, turns out to be form. Rather, he is assuming that substance is cause in 
order to recall the views held in the Analytics; for these can help us with the 
enquiry to establish the principle of metaphysics, which Z wrongly identifies with 
one among form, matter, and the composite of both. 
6.1.2 From the Enquiry into What-it-is to the Enquiry into Why-it-is 
The application of the explanatory model covers the first part of Z.17. On the 
assumption that substance is cause, Aristotle finds it reasonable to discuss the 
features that pertain to every enquiry (ζήτησις); for a cause can be indicated by 
an enquiry. In doing so, he clearly draws on the views expounded in Posterior 
Analytics II.  
When one enquires into why, one always enquires into why a different thing 
belongs to another. For to enquire into why musical human is musical human is 
either to enquire into what we said, i.e. why a human is musical, or something 
else.22 But to enquire into why a thing is itself is to enquire into nothing at all (…) 
and for all cases there is just one statement and one cause of why a thing is itself, 
e.g. why human is human, or why musical is musical (unless perhaps someone 
will say that a thing cannot be divided from itself, and this is what it is for it to be 
one thing; but this explanation applies to everything alike and is too brief). 
However, one could enquire into why human is such an animal. It is clear that 
this is not to enquire into why one who is human is human. So what one asks is 
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 I refer εἰρηµένον to διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑπάρχει. See Ross (1924: 223) and Frede-Patzig 
(1988: 310-311). 
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why something belongs to something else […]. For example, to enquire into why 
it thunders is to enquire into why a noise is produced in the clouds. In this way, 
what is enquired is why a different thing belongs to another. (1041a10-26, 
Bostock’s translation slightly modified) 
ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ διὰ τί ἀεὶ οὕτως, διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑπάρχει. τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν διὰ 
τί ὁ µουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος µουσικὸς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρηµένον ζητεῖν, 
διὰ τί ὁ ἄνθρωπος µουσικός ἐστιν, ἢ ἄλλο. τὸ µὲν οὖν διὰ τί αὐτό ἐστιν αὐτό, 
οὐδέν ἐστι ζητεῖν (αὐτὸ δὲ ὅτι αὐτό, εἷς λόγος καὶ µία αἰτία ἐπὶ πάντων, διὰ τί ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ µουσικὸς µουσικός, πλὴν εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς 
αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, τοῦτο δ’ ἦν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι·  ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κοινόν γε κατὰ πάντων καὶ 
σύντοµον)· ζητήσειε δ’ ἄν τις διὰ τί ἅνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον τοιονδί. τοῦτο µὲν τοίνυν 
δῆλον, ὅτι οὐ ζητεῖ διὰ τί ὅς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν·  τὶ ἄρα κατά τινος 
ζητεῖ διὰ τί, οἷον διὰ τί βροντᾷ; διὰ τί ψόφος γίγνεται ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν; ἄλλο γὰρ 
οὕτω κατ’ ἄλλου ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούµενον. 
 
 
The central point of the argument is to separate the genuine form of enquiry from 
invalid forms. In Chapter One, I noticed that an enquiry develops into a scientific 
knowledge when the definitional knowledge of the genus (i.e. the principle) 
grounds the demonstrative knowledge of the other objects studied (i.e. the 
demonstrations). More precisely, Aristotle maintains that an enquiry achieves 
either knowledge of what an object is (what-it-is, τί ἐστιν) or knowledge of why 
there is an object (why-it-is, διότι).23 In Posterior Analytics II.8-10, we learn that 
for the secondary objects of science the enquiry into what-it-is is equivalent to the 
enquiry into why-it-is; for in either case, the enquiry investigates the cause in 
virtue of which something exists: the former investigates the cause of the 
existence of the definiendum (if it exists, εἰ ἔστι), the latter investigates the cause 
of the existence of an explanandum (that it exists, ὅτι). To illustrate, the enquirer 
into eclipse must indicate the cause that is stated in the definition of eclipse and 
works as its explanans, i.e. the screening of sun by earth.24 
     Since substance is a cause, we need to conduct an appropriate enquiry that 
will simultaneously achieve knowledge of the what-it-is and knowledge of the 
why-it-is of an object. Aristotle neglects the fact that the definition and the 
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 See An. Post. II.1-2. 
24
 The definition and the explanation of eclipse are the same account: loss of light by moon 
because of the screening of sun by earth. As a matter of fact, the demonstration that is the 
explanatory account of the object is obtained by re-arranging the terms of its definitional account. 
For this equivalence see Section 1.3.2. 
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explanation produced by the enquiry are the same and focuses on the enquiry 
into why-it-is.25 In particular, he separates two ways to conduct the enquiry: (I) to 
investigate why a different thing belongs to another; (II) to investigate why a thing 
is itself. To rephrase it in formal terms, the enquiry investigates the cause of: 
I) why x is y; 
or 
II) why x is x. 
Both these forms of enquiry attempt to establish the cause of a certain fact. The 
fact is the existence of an object that has to be explained, the explanandum (e.g. 
eclipse, thunder, etc.); the cause is the principle that explains the fact, the 
explanans (e.g. screening of sun by earth, quenching of fire, etc.). However, (I) 
is a genuine form of enquiry, while (II) is not. In (II), the explanandum is indeed 
the identity of an object with itself; consequently, there is no cause to be 
established to produce the explanation of the fact. To use Aristotle’s example, the 
existence of musical human cannot be explained by investigating why musical 
human is musical human. Basically, there is no cause to investigate and, thus, 
no explanation to produce. In (I), by contrast, the explanandum is the 
characterization of an object; consequently, there must be a cause that explains 
why an object is so-and-so characterized. To use Aristotle’s example, the 
existence of musical human must be explained by investigating why human is 
musical. 
    Let me reformulate this separation by playing with the correspondence 
between entities and statements. Whereas the statement of an explanandum 
always indicates a predicate belonging to a subject, the statement of the 
explanans indicates the term that mediates this belonging. For example, the 
statement of thunder indicates the belonging of noise to clouds and the statement 
of the explanans indicates the quenching of fire, which causes the existence of 
noise in the clouds, i.e. thunder. If the predicate and the subject stated in the 
explanandum signify one and the same object, there will be no statement of the 
explanans; for there is no term that mediates the identity between two terms. For 
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 I use the term ‘explanation’ to refer to the account that is both a demonstration and, if re-
arranged, a definition (i.e. a demonstrative definition). 
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example, there is no term that mediates the belonging of unmarried man to 
bachelor; for unmarried man and bachelor signify one and the same object. This 
separation leaves room for some interesting remarks about the unity of objects. 
If self-identity were the reason for the unity of an object, every object–either mind-
dependent or not–would be credited with unity. This consequence forces us to 
reject Platonist and Democritean solutions, which are based on the indivisible 
nature of objects: being indivisible is indeed common to everything that is 
assumed to be one and not many. Hence, this solution has no scientific value.26 
     How does the application of the explanatory model contribute to establishing 
the principle of metaphysics? Before answering this question, it is crucial to return 
to the implicit premise of Z.17’s argument: the enquiry into the why-it-is does not 
concern the primary objects, but only the secondary objects of science. Aristotle 
introduces this distinction in Posterior Analytics II.9.27 In the case of primary 
objects, there is identity between the object and its cause; thus, there is no 
explanation for their existence and, thus, no enquiry into the cause; in the case 
of secondary objects, there is no identity between the object and its cause; thus, 
there must be an explanation of their existence and an enquiry into their cause. 
In astronomy, for example, celestial bodies (e.g. moon) are primary objects and 
not subjects of explanatory accounts, while their demonstrable attributes (e.g. 
eclipse) are secondary objects and subjects of explanatory accounts. To put it as 
Aristotle does, the primary objects are known by immediate definition, while the 
secondary objects are known by demonstrative definitions. Indeed, the account 
of a secondary object is the explanation that takes the form either of a 
demonstration or, if its terms are re-arranged, of a definition. On this basis, the 
foregoing observations help us to envision an answer to Z. Since the enquiry into 
what substance is investigates the cause of why other entities are, substance is 
the explanans that is indicated to account for the objects of metaphysics. This 
conclusion is in line with the failure of Z’s enquiry. Although we are unable to 
establish the principle of metaphysics (for we do not answer what genus is, but 
we define other objects studied by the relevant science), we can envision this 
principle by looking at the objects studied by metaphysics. Their existence is an 
explanandum and their account indicates the cause that must be identified with 
substance. 
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 See Z.17, 1041a16-20. 
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 See Section 1.3.2. 
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     The key move to come to this conclusion concerns the objects grounded by 
substance. Having assumed that substance is cause and, thus, having spelled 
out the enquiry into it, Aristotle is able to envision the principle only if he 
reconsiders the objects it grounds. First of all, we noticed that the enquiry into the 
why-it-is presupposes the difference between the object and its cause. Given 
this difference, the object is an explanandum and the cause is the explanans 
investigated by the enquiry. For example, the enquiry into the why-it-is of eclipse 
presupposes the difference between eclipse and the screening of sun by earth. 
This means to rank the object among the secondary objects of science and to 
account for it by demonstrative definition. Whereas this difference is imported by 
the observations on the genuine form of enquiry, another difference enables 
Aristotle to reconsider the objects grounded. It is the difference between the 
object and its characterization. Earlier, I mentioned that the enquiry into the 
why-it-is investigates the cause of the existence of an object. In metaphysics, this 
enquiry investigates the cause of the existence of an entity, either substance or 
non-substance. What Aristotle repeatedly highlights in Z.17 is that the existence 
of an object is to be reduced to the existence of a different object that is so-and-
so characterized; the existence of eclipse, for example, is to be reduced to the 
existence of moon that is eclipsed, namely losing light. The enquiry into the why-
it-is of an object allows to explain the existence of an object (e.g. eclipse) insofar 
as it indicates the cause of the characterization of a different object (e.g. moon). 
Arguably, the difference between object and characterization directly follows from 
the difference between object and cause; if there is a cause for the existence of 
the object, the existence of the object is not simple, but is the result of the 
composition of a different object and an attribute. To use our example, eclipse is 
the result of the composition of moon and loss of light. 
     These differences apply to the objects of science just as they apply to the 
statements accounting for them. In order to account for an object, the statement 
of the explanandum must be first articulated into two distinct terms. Basically, 
since the statement signifies the characterization of a different object, it states the 
belonging of a predicate to a subject; the former indicating the characterizing 
attribute, the latter indicating the object characterized. It is important to see that 
this process is fully accomplished not simply if the demonstrable attribute is 
separated from its subject, but also if the statement of the predicate is already 
part of the whole definition. To illustrate, the statement of eclipse is articulated 
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not simply into moon and being eclipsed, but into moon and loss of light; for 
eclipse is partly defined as a certain loss of light. Thus, the definition of an object 
turns out to be the statement of the belonging of a predicate to a subject plus the 
statement of the explanans that mediates this belonging. 
     In metaphysics, the definition of an entity is the statement of the belonging of 
a predicate to a subject plus the statement of substance, which is the cause 
mediating the belonging. Consequently, the entity defined must be articulated into 
distinct objects just as its statement is articulated into distinct terms. This is not a 
novelty in Z. At the start of the book, Aristotle makes it clear that every entity 
(quality, quantity, etc.) is a characterization of a substance and, thus, one of its 
demonstrable attributes. In the science of being, the explanandum is the 
existence of an entity and, thus, the characterization of a substance; for example, 
an explanandum is the existence of a quality and, thus, the object resulting from 
the quality characterizing the substance. The point is that this object is in fact a 
composite and must be articulated into distinct entities; that is, it must be 
articulated into entities from different ontological categories (such as substance 
and quality). Once we acknowledge that every entity is in fact the two entities into 
which it articulates, we can engage in the enquiry to establish the cause of why 
there is such a composition.28 In other words, the composite character of the 
explanandum is illustrative of the necessity of the explanans. The principle of 
metaphysics is the cause that brings about the existence of an entity and, thus, 
the characterization involving two distinct entities. 
     On the basis of these considerations, Aristotle is able to relaunch his enquiry 
into substance. Rather than enquiring into what substance is, he has to enquire 
into why an entity is such-and-such a thing. The answer indicates the principle of 
metaphysics in both cases. However, whereas the enquiry into what substance 
is directly attempts to ground metaphysics, the enquiry into the why an entity is 
such-and-such a thing indirectly envisions the principle. As a matter of fact, the 
enquiry into the what-it-is, if concerned with a principle, is not a genuine enquiry; 
the enquiry into the why-it-is, instead, is the most appropriate way to indicate the 
cause of the objects of science. Basically, the enquiry into the what-it-is is not 
meant to achieve an immediate definition and to account for the principle of a 
science, but to achieve demonstrative definitions and to account for secondary 
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objects of science. Therefore, Z’s enquiry can be relaunched only as enquiry into 
the why-it-is of an object. The point is that this object is not the principle 
investigated, but a different entity; in other words, its definition is a demonstrative 
definition that results from the statement of the belonging of a predicate to a 
subject plus the statement of the middle-term. It could be said that if no immediate 
definition of substance can be established, it is still possible to posit a statement 
of substance working as middle-term for other statements in metaphysics. 
6.1.3 Two Consequences 
The core of the renovated treatment of substance, I have been arguing, is that 
the principle of metaphysics can be envisioned by examining the explanatory 
account of other objects of metaphysics; this means to examine the 
demonstrative definitions in which substance is the cause signified by the middle-
term. Z’s enquiry can be relaunched because, despite not answering what 
substance is and thus establishing an immediate definition grounding 
metaphysics, it envisions the principle through the demonstrative definitions of 
which metaphysics consists. I shall conclude this section by showing two 
consequences that spring from the argument of Z.17. 
     The first consequence of this argument is that sensible substances are 
derivative objects of metaphysics. More precisely, the substances studied in 
Z are entities whose characterization is not immediate, but derived from a cause. 
I have often remarked that for each science there are two types of objects: the 
primary objects and the secondary objects; the former encompass the genus 
studied and its sub-kinds, the latter encompass the demonstrable attributes of the 
genus. In metaphysics, substances are the primary objects and are the entities 
belonging to the first genus of being (e.g. human, horse, house);29 non-
substances are the secondary objects and are the entities belonging to the 
remaining genera (i.e. qualities, quantities, etc. that characterize a substance qua 
substance and not qua moving substance).30 It is important to note that the 
substances studied in Z, which are the primary objects of metaphysics, are mainly 
sensible substances and, thus, the primary objects of physics. The point is that 
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 Prima facie, the genus includes other entities that are taken to be principles of metaphysics, 
such as Plato’s Forms and Pythagoreans’ numbers. Cf. Section 2.1.1. 
30
 Otherwise, these would be the secondary objects of physics. 
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physics studies these substances qua sensible entities, while metaphysics is 
conceived to study substances qua substances (thus, it admits the possibility of 
non-sensible substances). 
     According to the guidelines of the Analytics, the primary objects of science are 
known by immediate definition because there is no cause for their existence other 
than the object itself. The secondary objects, instead, are known by 
demonstrative definition because there is a distinct cause for their existence. Yet, 
the argument of Z.17 proposes a demonstrative definition for every object studied 
by metaphysics. Namely, the statement of the what-it-is of an entity is the 
statement of its existence plus the statement of its cause. This means to equate 
substances with non-substances. In particular, although substances belong to the 
first genus of entities and are primary objects of metaphysics, they are treated as 
secondary objects and, thus, as non-substances. The definition of house, for 
example, is the statement indicating the existence of some bricks&stones and the 
cause of their arrangement (i.e. either the builder or the purpose of being house). 
What matters to us is that substances and non-substances are equated not 
simply in their definition, but also in the characterization signified. Basically, since 
a demonstrative definition signifies the what-it-is of an object, and since there are 
demonstrative definitions of both substances and non-substances, substances 
and non-substances are credited with an analogous characterization. Rather than 
the immediate characterization pertaining to the primary objects of science, theirs 
is the derivative characterization pertaining to the secondary objects; for it is 
derived from the other entities signified by their definition. The characterization of 
house, for example, is derived from bricks&stones and their arranging cause. 
     This consequence becomes even more evident in the light of the separation 
of these substances from the ‘absolute entities’ (ἁπλᾶ). As already seen, the 
absolute entities are the primary subjects within each genus of entities.31 Thus, 
the knowledge of absolute entities must be separated from the knowledge of the 
other subjects and attributes studied by the relevant science; for the former is the 
knowledge grounding the latter. In other words, the knowledge of absolute entities 
is totally immediate in that it is not grounded in anything else; the knowledge of 
the other subjects and attributes is achieved by assuming the knowledge of an 
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 See Section 3.3.2. Cf. E.4, 1027b27-28; Θ.10, 1051b17-1052a4 (in which Aristotle speaks of 
ἀσύνθετα); De An. Γ.6.  
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absolute entity.32 The argument of Z.17 leads Aristotle to conclude that, unlike 
substances and non-substances so far studied, the absolute entities are known 
by some other form of investigation (1041b9-11). In all likelihood, the immediate 
knowledge of the absolute entity is the knowledge of the principle of metaphysics; 
by contrast, the knowledge of the other subjects and attributes is the knowledge 
of the primary and secondary objects of metaphysics. 
     Once again, Aristotle levels down substances and non-substances on the 
basis of their derivative characterization. Contrary to the principle, substances 
and non-substances can be accounted for as only if their definition states the 
belonging of a term to another as mediated by a middle-term; that is, if the 
characterization signified is caused by a distinct entity. To focus on substances, 
their characterization is indeed derived from some material substratum and the 
causal principle; what human is, for example, can be derived from different 
material substrata, such as this body or this animal, and the human soul 
(1041a20-21; b7). Accordingly, the substances studied in Z are credited with the 
τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε characterization that marks their derivative existence. 
     The second consequence is that the principle of metaphysics is 
established by studying some non-sensible substance. More precisely, the 
principle of metaphysics does not match with any principle of physics, form and 
matter, but with a teleological cause; besides sensible substances, there must be 
some non-sensible substance that is a purely teleological cause. The first half of 
this reasoning can be inferred from 1041a27-32. Aristotle argues that the enquiry 
into the why-it-is of an object takes into consideration two types of causes: the 
teleological cause and the efficient cause. In other words, the definition of an 
object consists of the statement of its existence plus the statement of either 
purpose or the source of some change. To illustrate, the definition of house 
consists of the statement of such-and-such bricks&stones plus the statement of 
its function, being a shelter; the definition of thunder consists of the statement of 
noisy clouds plus the statement of the source, quenching of fire. In so arguing, 
Aristotle specifies that the efficient cause is enquired to account for the generation 
and the corruption of the objects; thus, it is stated in the definitions of sensible 
entities that, as such, undergo change.33 More interestingly, the teleological 
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 On the notion of ἁπλᾶ see also Frede-Patzig (1988: 318). 
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 For this reading see also Ross (1924: 223), who nonetheless takes every cause to be cause 
as essence. Frede-Patzig (1988: 313-314) offers a different interpretation: Aristotle is not 
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cause is enquired to account for the existence of objects; thus, it is stated in the 
definitions of any entity, regardless of whether it undergoes change or not. Since 
metaphysics is not concerned with sensible entities and their change but with 
entities and their existence, we can plausibly say that substance is to be identified 
with a teleological cause. Namely, it is an entity whose existence and nature are 
immediately its own purpose. 
     If this is correct, the argument of Z.17 proves to be in line with the dismissal 
of the formalist essentialism: the form of sensible substances fails to be the 
principle of metaphysics. Firstly, in the definition of sensible substances the form 
is not exclusively indicated by the statement of the explanans. Given its 
constitution from elements (i.e. genus and differentiae), the form is indicated by 
the statement of the explanandum; thus, it turns out to be a material substratum, 
the existence of which has to be explained. For example, the form of human is 
indicated by the statement of such-and-such an animal and this is an 
explanandum as well as the statement of such-and-such a body. Aristotle himself 
often labels the elements of the form as ‘matter’.34 Although this is not a reference 
to the matter that is formally organized, he separates form and matter from the 
very principle of metaphysics; for both of them require an explanation of their 
existence. It must be admitted, however, that the form of sensible substances can 
also be indicated by the statement of the explanans. Whereas the ‘matter’ of the 
form is the explanandum, the form itself is the explanans and is identified with the 
teleological cause of the sensible substance. For example, the form of human is 
indicated by the soul in virtue of which there is such-and-such an animal. The 
reason why the form of sensible substances, despite being conceived as 
teleological cause, is not the principle of metaphysics is that it cannot play its 
                                                          
distinguishing between the efficient cause and the teleological cause, but between these two and 
the essential cause mentioned at a28. On this dispute, see Bostock (1994: 239-242). 
34
 I did remark on the analogical use of hylomorphism in Section 4.2, note 33. A chief passage is 
∆.24, in which Aristotle contrasts sensible matter with the matter of the form; this, I suggested, is 
the constitution into which the form divides, i.e. genus and differentia. However, the tendency to 
equate genus and matter has led some commentators to favour a literal interpretation: the matter 
signifies the genus, while the differentia signifies the form (cf. De Gen. et. Cor. I.7, 324b4-9; ∆.6, 
1016a25-32; ∆.28, 1024b6-9; I.8, 1057b37-1058a2; a23-25; Z.12, 1038a5-9; H.6, 1045a20-35). 
The key insight is that the identity genus-matter allows to support an anti-formalist view on 
definition and to solve the problem of its unity (See Rorty, 1973; Peramatzis, 2011. for less radical 
interpretations see Deslauriers, 2007: 147-156, and Gill, 2010). The analogical reading, instead, 
insists on the potential character and the subject-role played by the genus within definition. 
According to Galluzzo (2017), Aristotle exploits the doctrine of genus as matter to clarify the unity 
of definition in the light of the unity of matter and form. My treatment of unity in Sections 6.2 and 
6.3 will confirm that Aristotle assimilates the elements of form with the material substratum of the 
teleological cause (cf. H.3, 1043b10-14). 
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explanatory role in separation from matter. Since sensible substances are 
accounted fo as by explanation, the purpose of their existence is a cause only if 
there is some material substratum to be accomplished. In other words, the form 
of sensible substances is not an entity whose existence and nature are 
immediately its own purpose. It is the purpose of some material substratum 
whose existence and nature are to be accomplished. 
     At this point, we can conjecture that, if the principle of metaphysics cannot be 
identified with the teleological cause of sensible substances, it must be identified 
with the teleological cause of some other substance. This is nothing but admitting 
the existence of some entity besides the sensible substances studied in Z; this 
entity must be a non-sensible substance and a teleological cause that will ground 
metaphysics. From this perspective, Z’s enquiry helps us to answer the questions 
posited in Z.2: besides sensible substances, there is a non-sensible substance 
that is neither a number nor a Form, but a purely teleological cause; for this will 
be separate, unlike numbers and Forms.35 My hypothesis is that this is the divine 
substance treated in book Λ. God is a purely teleological cause in that its 
existence is immediately its own purpose; that is, nothing is the subject of its 
causal activity but itself. This is not the case with sensible substances whose 
existence is the purpose of some subject that has to be accomplished. 
6.2 Solutions to the Problem of Unity: Z.12 and H.6 
At the beginning of this Chapter, I suggested that since the failure of Z’s enquiry 
is linked to the problem of unity, the relaunch of the enquiry is linked to its solution. 
Arguably, the development of metaphysics presupposes an explanation of why 
every substance and every definition is one thing and not a plurality of elements. 
In view of this, I firstly focused on the argument of Z.17, which leads to envisioning 
the principle of metaphysics through the demonstrative definition of sensible 
substances; this helped us to understand the features of the object and of the 
statement concerned with the problem of unity. Since the principle of metaphysics 
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is not established in Z, the objects and the statements at stake are sensible 
substances and their demonstrative definitions, respectively. 
     Traditionally, Z.12 and H.6 are regarded as Aristotle’s official treatment of 
unity.36 In this section, I shall summarize the solutions expounded in these 
chapters. To start with, it is worth considering a couple of issues challenging the 
interpreters. A capital difficulty is to understand what the problem of unity is about. 
In metaphysics, the unity of an object is the unity of an entity; since the primary 
entities are substances (prima facie, sensible substances), and since entities are 
examined by looking at the statements accounting for them, the unity of 
substance and the unity of definition are in fact entangled. Both in Z.12 and in 
H.6, Aristotle tends to shift from one version of the problem to the other. Consider 
their opening lines:  
The problem I mean is why an object whose statement we call a definition is a 
unity. For instance, let the definition of human be ‘two-footed animal’; then why 
is that this is a unity and not a plurality consisting of two-footed and animal? 
(1037b10-13, Bostock’s translation) 
λέγω δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν, διὰ τί ποτε ἕν ἐστιν οὗ τὸν λόγον ὁρισµὸν εἶναί 
φαµεν, οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον δίπουν·  ἔστω γὰρ οὗτος αὐτοῦ λόγος. διὰ τί 
δὴ τοῦτο ἕν ἐστιν ἀλλ’ οὐ πολλά, ζῷον καὶ δίπουν·  
 
Let us now consider the problem we have already mentioned concerning both 
definitions and numbers, namely: what is the cause of their unity? (1045a7-8, 
Bostock’s translation) 
Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς εἰρηµένης περί τε τοὺς ὁρισµοὺς καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθµούς, 
τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἓν εἶναι;
 
Remarkably, Z.12 is focused on the problem of the unity of the object that is 
accounted for as by a definition. Aristotle makes explicit reference to the 
Analytics, in which the problem is originally outlined.37 H.6 is instead concerned 
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 Aristotle seems to consider metaphysics as the appropriate context for the treatment of unity. 
This, I suspect, can be explained with the epistemic primacy of the science of being. For the 
principles of the other sciences, unity is always assumed and never proved; for every principle is 
grounded in a demonstrative knowledge that is more universal and epistemically prior to the 
demonstrative knowledge it grounds. 
37
 See An. Post. II.6, 92a29-33. 
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with the problem of the unity of definition. This is compared to the problem of the 
unity of numbers that emerges in H.3 in that for every divisible thing there must 
be a cause that makes a plurality of elements one unified thing. Indeed, Aristotle 
intends to undertake the enquiry into such a cause.38 
     Let me give some more details. It is important to insist on the fact that Z.12, 
despite recalling the Analytics, tackles the unity of the object. This shift is in line 
with the logical strategy inaugurated in Z.4. Although the chapter is likely to be a 
later interpolation, it is conceived to contribute to the enquiry into substance and 
its contribution is to explain the unity of an object in terms of the unity of the 
corresponding statement; namely, the unity of substance in terms of the unity of 
definition.39 Given this framework, the argument of Z.12 must be understood with 
reference to the development of the formalist essentialism in Z.4-11. The unity at 
stake is the unity of the form of sensible substances and the parts into which it 
divides are the parts signified by the parts of its definition: genus and differentiae. 
The unity of human, for example, can be ensured by explaining why animal and 
biped are one thing and not many. Therefore, the problem of unity is to explain 
why the parts indicated in a definition make up one unified substance (i.e. form) 
just as the parts of the definition make up one unified statement. What matters to 
us is that in Z.12 the unity of substance is the unity of form and corresponds to 
the unity of definition; for the form is the object signified by a definition and, thus, 
identified with a substance as essence. 
     The converse approach is adopted in H.6. Despite tackling the unity of 
definition, the chapter constantly refers to the unity of substance. The argument 
in the chapter is then unlikely to follow the logical strategy dominating Z.40 Its 
contribution is indeed to explain the unity of the statement in terms of the unity of 
the corresponding object; namely, the unity of definition in terms of the unity of 
substance. Things are more complicated, though. Much of the argument of H.6 
seems to present the unity of substance as the central problem. If so, it is also 
unclear what kind of unity of substance Aristotle has in mind. Since the chapter 
parallels the parts signified by the definition with the form and the matter from 
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 Loux (1991: 267), for example, thinks that the problem of unity can be addressed from different 
viewpoints and, thus, equally applies to definition and to an individual. Whilst I agree on the 
general point, the unity of a particular substance can hardly be equivalent to the unity of a 
definition. 
39
 From this perspective, Z.12 seems to occupy an appropriate position in the book. Cf. Section 
2.3.2. 
40
 The departure from the logical analysis is perhaps signposted at 1045a21-23. 
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which a body results, commentators propose different views about the unity of 
substance. Some hold that the central concern of H.6 is (a) the unity of the form 
of sensible substances;41 others take it to be (b) the unity of the composite.42 
Clearly, (a) guarantees a direct correspondence with the unity of definition treated 
in Z.12; yet, its endorsement clashes with the failure of the formalist essentialism 
and the relaunch of the enquiry in Z.17. Whilst downgrading the centrality of 
definition, (b) offers an overarching model to solve the problem of unity, i.e. the 
translation of hylomorphism into the notions actuality and potentiality. 
    I am not going to challenge this debate directly. My concern is to give a cursory 
analysis of the solutions presented in these chapters and to deal with the problem 
in the light of Z.17. It is then reasonable to preserve the entanglement of the unity 
of substance and the unity of definition; for the enquiry is expected to ensure the 
unity of the entity grounding the other entities as much as to ensure the unity of 
the statement grounding the other statements in metaphysics. In Z.12, this entity 
is the principle of metaphysics and is identified with the form of sensible 
substances; in H.6, this entity cannot be the principle, but some other object of 
metaphysics whose definition must be one.43 
6.2.1 The Solution of Z.12 
It is common to think that Z.12 sets out a Platonist treatment of the problem of 
unity. At 1037b27, Aristotle tells us that his focus will be the definitions obtained 
by the method of division, which, we noticed, is a legacy of Plato’s late dialectic. 
Thus, Z.12 is often regarded as an invalid solution to unity or, at best, a 
preparatory analysis to Aristotle’s official answer in H.6. In particular, 
commentators insist on the contrast between the Platonist model of definition and 
the hylomorphic conception worked out by Aristotle in Z.17-H.6.44 As will be clear, 
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 See Ross (1924: 238-239) and Harte (1996). 
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 Bostock (1994: 280-284), Gill (1989: 138-144; 166ff.), Halper (1989: 179-185), Loux (1991), 
Charles (1994; 2000: 294-308). For a presentation of the debate see Morel (2015: 41-59). 
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 In this regard, my approach is close to Morel’s, who considers the unity of hylomorphism to be 
the focus of H.6. However, Morel (2015: 41-59) argues in favour of two levels of hylomorphism 
(i.e. the level of the composite and the level of the form) which receive a single treatment. My 
analysis will suggest that this distinction is to be replaced with a stronger identity, which makes 
of form and matter different ways to look at one unified entity. 
44
 In particular, since the definitions obtained by division are attacked by Aristotle in On the Parts 
of Animals I.1-3, Z.12 might represent an earlier view still close to Platonist approaches. On this 
point, see Bostock (1994: 183-184) and Code (2010a). In line with his general interpretation of Z, 
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the argument of Z.12 is unlikely to be effective enough to avoid the failure of the 
enquiry. Yet, its limits may not lie in the method of definition employed. In the 
Analytics, the method of division is indeed adopted by Aristotle to formulate 
immediate definitions; namely, the definitions of the primary objects of science.45 
Since substances are the primary objects of metaphysics, and since each of them 
is identified with the form signified by its definition, Z.12 is not meant to advocate 
a Platonist solution. More simply, it follows the logical strategy of Z.4-11 and is 
concerned with the unity of those definitions that are never disputed in science, 
but always assumed. Correspondingly, it is also concerned with the unity of those 
objects that are signified by such immediate definitions. 
    Within this framework, Aristotle tells us that the plurality of the parts that 
undermines the unity of substance consists of the genus and the differentiae. 
These are indeed the parts signified by definitions in metaphysics and, thus, 
making up the form.46 The solution endorsed can be summarized as follows: 
S1: The unity of substance is ensured by eliminating the genus. 
Namely, if the genus is eliminated from the constitution of the substance and from 
the constitution of the definition, then the substance is one unified object and the 
definition is one unified statement. To illustrate, the unity of human is ensured by 
removing animal from the constitution ‘biped animal’. At 1038a5-9, Aristotle 
considers two ways to accomplish the neutralization of the genus as a 
constitutive part.47 One is to remove the genus because its existence is not 
absolute. In other words, since the genus is not essentially independent of its 
forms, the constitution of the definition can be reduced to the remaining 
differentiae. The other is to remove the genus because it is ‘like matter’. Arguably, 
the parallel serves Aristotle to make the same point: the genus is not essentially 
                                                          
Menn (2001) takes Z.12 to be a treatment of the seventh aporia: whether the principles are the 
first or the last genera predicated of indivisible objects (B#7, 998b15-16). 
45
 See An. Post. II.13. 
46
 See Section 4.3, note 49. 
47
 From 1037b14 to b27, Aristotle rules out the possibility of ensuring unity by participation of the 
genus in the differentiae. Remarkably, his arguments play on the dialectical difficulties treated in 
the Topics and anticipate the criticism of Z.13-14: if the genus participates in its own differentiae, 
then i) the genus would possess contrary characterizations, and ii) the genus would be one and 
the same with each differentia (1037b21). See Secti
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independent of its forms, thus the constitution of the definition can be reduced to 
the remaining differentiae.48 
     The final section of the chapter expands upon this solution.49 Once the genus 
is eliminated, the unity of substance and of its definition is achieved only if the 
remaining differentiae are somehow unified. To illustrate, once animal is 
eliminated, the unity of human is achieved only if terrestrial, biped, etc. are proved 
to be one single thing. To this end, Aristotle proposes to organize each definition 
into a string of differentiae. Since a definition separates its object by stating the 
genus and the relevant differentiae, every differentia separates one of the sub-
kinds to which the object belongs. To use Z.12’s example, the definition of human 
amounts to the string of the differentiae that separate human from other objects 
within the genus animal: terrestrial, footed, footed-with-toes, etc. Aristotle argues 
that the last differentia in the string guarantees the unity of the definition; for 
whereas the previous differentiae signify other sub-kinds of the genus, the last 
differentia is the unique term to signify the object defined. To illustrate, while 
footed indicates the sub-kind encompassing bird, horse, human, etc., rational 
indicates human exclusively. From this perspective, the plurality of parts that 
undermines unity is only apparent; for the last differentia exhausts the 
constitutions into which definition and substance respectively divide. To rephrase 
(S1) above: 
S1*: The unity of substance is ensured by eliminating the genus and 
the differentiae that do not indicate the substance exclusively. 
Basically, Z.12’s solution to the problem of unity is to reduce the definition to one 
single predicate and substance to one single entity: the last differentia (1038a19-
20).50 
     It is not difficult to see the limits of this argument. First of all, the last differentia 
is likely to be subject to the criticism levelled against universals; for it is a quality 
(ποιόν) and not a this-something. In Chapter One, I pointed out that the differentia 
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 The parallel between genus and matter is exemplified by the voice (i.e. sound) which is genus 
and matter, while its differentiae produce its species, namely letters. Interestingly, Gill (2010: 105-
107) connects this example with Philebus 17a6-e6. 
49
 Gill (2010) argues that Aristotle is refining the first way to remove the genus, while the second 
way is fully elaborated in H.6. 
50
 Cf. Z.12, 1038a25-26; b28-30. 
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is a predicate that signifies a quality of the relevant genus.51 This means that the 
differentia is a demonstrable attribute studied by a science. Despite being stated 
in definitions and, thus, belonging per se1 to the object defined, the differentia 
belongs per se2 to another subject, i.e. the genus studied by the relevant science. 
If this is so, the differentia turns out to possess one of the distinctive features of 
universals: the qualitative character. Although the last differentia does not 
characterize a plurality, it still lacks the primacy of substance. Therefore, the 
statement of the differentia is not a definition because it is not an immediate 
statement, but is derived from the statement of its subject. Correspondingly, the 
differentia is not a substance because it is not an independent entity, but is 
essentially dependent on the genus. 
     In addition, the solution of Z.12 does not enable Aristotle to overcome the final 
difficulty of Z.13; for it leads to endorsing the non-composition of substances. In 
Chapter Four, I argued that the non-composition of substances is equivalent to 
the impossibility of defining them. For one thing, this means that there is no 
statement grounding the demonstrations within metaphysics; for another thing, 
this means that there is no entity grounding the existence of the other entities. 
Basically, if substance is assumed to be one single part (i.e. its last differentia) 
there are no parts into which substance divides. This makes the substance 
unknowable and prevents its statement from indicating the entity that is the 
principle of metaphysics. At best, it indicates an arbitrary way to refer to its object. 
6.2.2 The Solution of H.6 
Let us turn to the argument of H.6. The problem of unity concerns both substance 
and definition. In particular, the unity of substance is understood either as unity 
of form or unity of composite. For the present time, we can leave aside the unity 
of absolute entities, which is quickly treated at 1045a36-7, and focus on the 
general problem tackled by Aristotle: why is a plurality of parts one unified thing? 
Namely, there must be a cause of why the parts of a definition make up one 
unified statement and, correspondingly, the parts of a substance make up one 
unified object. 
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 This is the categorial distinction introduced to avoid the difficulties about the unity of the genus. 
See Section 1.2.2. 
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     Roughly, the solution is to translate the notions of matter and form into the 
notions of potentiality and actuality. Thanks to this move, says Aristotle, the 
problem simply disappears (1045a24-25). It could be said that there is no plurality 
of parts that undermines unity and, thus, no problem to raise. How can this be 
the case? The idea is that every item results from some matter and a definite 
form; thus, since the matter is in potentiality what the form is in actuality, both 
substance and definition are in fact one unified thing. The problem disappears in 
the case of substances because the matter and the form are one and the same 
entity, the former potentially and the latter actually; for example, the bronze 
sphere is not compounded of a lump of bronze and the shape of sphere, but it is 
its bronze actualized by the appropriate form, sphere. Likewise, the problem 
disappears in the case of definitions. Aristotle seems to suggest that every 
definition consists of some material or potential substratum that is accomplished 
in terms of the formal or actual characterization; for example, the definition of 
circle is one statement because there is some term, such as plane figure, that 
indicates potentially what the other term indicates actually.52 This solution can be 
summarized as follows:  
S2: The unity of definition is ensured by understanding one term as 
matter and the other term as form. 
That is, one term indicates the potentiality of what the other term indicates the 
actuality. 
     Clearly, the solution of H.6 is to illustrate the plurality of parts into which 
substance and definition divide is only apparent. For this attempt, some 
commentators take Aristotle to introduce the analogy between hylomorphism and 
the content of definition. More precisely, he seems to strengthen his parallel 
between the genus and the matter of an object by implying the further parallel 
between the differentia and the form.53 In this regard, it is important to note that 
the parallel does not apply so rigidly. Rather, it shows that every plurality of parts 
can be regarded as a material substratum that is one in virtue of some cause. 
Cases of such a matter are both bodily parts and the parts indicated by a 
definition, i.e. genus and differentiae. To illustrate, the matter of human could be 
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 Cf. H.6, 1045a30-35. 
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 See, for example, Deslauriers (2007) and Gill (2010). 
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either flesh&bone or such-and-such an animal. With his parallel, Aristotle is 
indeed focusing on the cause that makes a plurality of parts one unified thing. 
     Commentators propose a wide range of readings of the solution of H.6. The 
first point of disagreement is whether Aristotle endorses a non-realist view on 
form and matter. Form and matter appear to be nothing but ways to refer to an 
object, by pointing to either its potential or its actual existence.54 Alternatively, 
form and matter are real elements constituting an object. This introduces a 
second point of disagreement: whether the cause of unity is the form or the very 
hylomorphic constitution.55 In the final section of this chapter, I will defend the 
absolute oneness of form and matter in Aristotle’s metaphysics. Although I do not 
wish to deny the scientific realism behind his conclusions, form and matter turn 
out to be, in my view, one and the same object considered from different 
viewpoints. For they indicate one sensible substance, which is credited with the 
derivative characterization signified by its demonstrative definition. 
6.3 Beyond the Dilemma 
My analysis of the renovated treatment of substance showed that, despite the 
failure of the enquiry, the results of Z contribute to the project of the science of 
being. Aristotle is able to envision–though not to establish–the principle of 
metaphysics. On the assumption that substance is the cause of other entities, Z’s 
enquiry turns from investigating what substance is to investigating why something 
is something else. This means setting out demonstrative definitions of the objects 
of metaphysics, in which substance comes across as the teleological cause 
signified by the middle-term. Two consequences are extremely significant. First, 
sensible substances–the entities mainly studied in Z–turn out to be derivative 
objects of metaphysics; for they are credited with the derivative characterization 
signified by their demonstrative definition. Second, the principle of metaphysics 
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 Put it in the terminology from Charles (1994), this is a non-explanatory account of unity. For 
this view, see Sellars (1967), Rorty (1973), Gill (1989: 166ff.). Cf. Scaltsas (1994a; 1994b: Ch. 5)  
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 Some commentators hold that the unity of substance is explained through the form, which is 
the cause of unity (cf. Halper, 1989; Loux, 1991; Galluzzo, 2013; Lewis, 2013). Some others hold 
that this is explained in terms of both form and matter (cf. Bostock, 1994: 287-290; Charles, 1994; 
Morel, 2015: 185-205).  
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must be investigated by studying suprasensible substances; for it must be 
credited with the immediate characterization signified by the immediate definition 
grounding the science. 
     In the remainder of this Chapter, I will show that this relaunch of the enquiry 
means overcoming the dilemma of Z.13 and its final difficulty; that is, to ensure 
the definability of substance beyond the dichotomy of composition/non-
composition. Earlier, we noted that Z’s enquiry ends with the dilemma because 
of the impossibility of ensuring the unity of substance. On the one hand, the 
composition of a substance guarantees its definability but undermines its unity; 
on the other, the non-composition of a substance guarantees its unity but 
undermines its definability.56 To overcome the dilemma means giving a solution 
to the problem of unity. The answer lies in the separation of the immediate 
definition of the principle of metaphysics from the demonstrative definition of 
sensible substances. Accordingly, the unity of sensible substances is explained 
through the teleological cause indicated in their definition. This does not mean 
that sensible substances are one in virtue of something different, as apparently 
suggested in Z.17. With the translation of hylomorphism in terms of actuality and 
potentiality, sensible substances are one in virtue of themselves, just as every 
primary object of science. 
6.3.1 The Argument about Composite Objects 
The second half of Z.17 is taken by both commentators and philosophers to 
endorse a holistic metaphysics. In particular, Aristotle seems to reject the idea 
that an object is just a sum of its parts and to argue in favour of a new notion of 
whole: an object is one unified whole that is something over and above the totality 
of its constitutive parts.57 Within the context of Z, a sensible substance is then 
regarded as a unified whole and not as the sum of material parts; for its form is 
the principle in virtue of which every part of the substance surrenders its identity 
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 See Sections 5.1.2 and 5.4. 
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 See Scaltsas (1994a; 1994b: Ch. 4), who argues that Z.17 is meant to solve the difficulty raised 
in the Theaetetus (201e-206d): form is a unificatory principle that makes substance a whole over 
and above its constitutive parts. On the new notion of whole inspiring Neo-Aristotelian mereology 
see Fine (1999) and Koslicki (2008: Ch. 4). In particular, Koslicki proposes a hylomorphic 
mereology according to which form and matter are two proper parts representing the structure 
and the content of the whole. For some criticism of this view see Oderberg (2014).    
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to the whole. For example, a human is the whole to which every bodily part 
surrenders its identity in virtue of a human soul. Basically, Z.17 proposes a further 
formalist solution that leads to a fresh understanding of genuine substances in 
reality and of their unity. 
     If my interpretation of the relaunch of the enquiry is correct, Aristotle is not 
outlining a holistic metaphysics. His concern is the idea of substance as cause in 
order to develop the demonstrative science of being. Namely, he attempts to 
envision the principle of metaphysics by looking at the cause that makes a 
plurality of parts one unified whole. From this perspective, his argument about 
composite objects is an argument to overcome the dilemma of Z.13. 
However, things that are composite in such a way that the whole is a unity, are 
not like a heap but like a syllable–BA is not the same as B and A–nor is flesh just 
fire and earth (for on dissolution the flesh and the syllable no longer exist, but the 
letters exist and so do the fire and the earth). So the syllable then is not only its 
elements (vowel and consonant) but something else besides (ἕτερόν τι). And 
flesh is not only fire and earth, or the hot and the cold, but something else besides 
(ἕτερόν τι). And this something else cannot itself be an element or composed of 
elements. For if (i) it is an element, the same argument will apply again […]; and 
if (ii) it is composed of elements, then it must be composed of more than one 
element (otherwise it would be that one element) and so we shall apply to it the 
same argument as to the flesh and the syllable. It would seem, then, that there is 
this something else and that it is not an element, and that it is the cause of this 
thing being flesh and that thing being a syllable; and similarly in other cases. And 
this is the substance of each thing, because it is the primary cause of being. 
(1041b11-28, Bostock’s translation slightly modified) 
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἔκ τινος σύνθετον οὕτως ὥστε ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, [ἂν] µὴ ὡς σωρὸς ἀλλ’ 
ὡς ἡ συλλαβή—ἡ δὲ συλλαβὴ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, οὐδὲ βα ταὐτὸ τὸ β καὶ α, 
οὐδ’ ἡ σὰρξ πῦρ καὶ γῆ (διαλυθέντων γὰρ τὰ µὲν οὐκέτι ἔστιν, οἷον ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ 
συλλαβή, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἔστι, καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ γῆ)· ἔστιν ἄρα τι ἡ συλλαβή, οὐ 
µόνον τὰ στοιχεῖα τὸ φωνῆεν καὶ ἄφωνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι, καὶ ἡ σὰρξ οὐ µόνον 
πῦρ καὶ γῆ ἢ τὸ θερµὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι—εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη κἀκεῖνο 
ἢ στοιχεῖονἢ ἐκ στοιχείων εἶναι, εἰ µὲν στοιχεῖον, πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται λόγος (…)· 
εἰ δὲ ἐκ στοιχείου, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ πλειόνων, ἢ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ ἔσται, ὥστε 
πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτου τὸν αὐτὸν ἐροῦµεν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σαρκὸς ἢ συλλαβῆς. δόξειε 
δ’ ἂν εἶναι τὶ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ στοιχεῖον, καὶ αἴτιόν γε τοῦ εἶναι τοδὶ µὲν σάρκα τοδὶ 
δὲ συλλαβήν·  ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐσία δὲ ἑκάστου µὲν τοῦτο (τοῦτο 
γὰρ αἴτιον πρῶτον τοῦ εἶναι) 
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Aristotle considers two cases of composite objects: the syllable BA and flesh. The 
syllable BA is the whole dividing into its letters, B and A; flesh is the whole dividing 
into physical elements, fire and earth. The argument defends the existence of 
something different from the sum of these parts. This, we infer, is the cause of 
the unity of such objects. 
     First of all, it is worth noting that Aristotle is not attempting to prove the unity 
of some objects. The argument rests on a distinction between wholes and 
heaps: whereas the former are credited with unity, the latter are identified with 
the sum of their constitutive parts. To illustrate, a ship is a whole insofar as it is 
one object dividing into some planks; the mere sum of the planks, instead, is a 
heap insofar as it lacks unity. The idea is that if a whole divides into its parts, the 
whole does not exist anymore, while the parts do. If dismantled, a ship does not 
exist, while the planks do. On the contrary, a sum does exist as long as the parts 
do; the sum of the planks exists as long as every plank does. Consequently, there 
must be a further item in virtue of which a whole, such as syllable and flesh, is 
one object. To put it in mereological terms, there must be a principle to restrict 
the composition of a whole to one unified object.58 
     At this point, the argument takes the form of a reductio. The item at stake can 
be either (i) an element (στοιχεῖον), or (ii) a composite of elements (ἐκ στοιχείων). 
If (i), it will be a further part to be added to the composition; consequently, there 
will be a new whole consisting of the original parts plus the new item. To illustrate, 
if the syllable BA were a whole because of the addition of X to the original parts 
B and A, there would be a new whole consisting of B, A, and X. Plainly, (i) yields 
a regressive explanation. If (ii), the item will be a composition of parts; 
consequently, the item itself will be a new whole, the unity of which must be 
explained. To illustrate, if the syllable BA were a whole because of the composite 
of elements XYZ, XYZ itself would be a whole and its unity should be explained. 
Hence, (ii) steps back to the initial question: whether the item explaining unity is 
an element or a composite of elements. 
     Aristotle concludes that if the item is neither an element nor a composite of 
elements, it must be the cause of why the elements are something different. To 
use the previous examples, it is the cause of why B and A are the syllable BA 
and the cause of why fire and earth are flesh. Despite speaking of ‘the cause of 
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being’ (αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι), Aristotle has clearly in mind the cause of unity; for it 
explains why a plurality of parts is one object. This is not surprising if we think 
that the multiplicity of being is mirrored by the multiplicity of unity. To say that 
there is an entity (being/existence) is indeed to say that there is one whole 
(unity).59 But what unity is the argument concerned with? There is a salient detail 
that could help us to answer these questions. Given Z.10-11’s examination, 
Aristotle takes the cause to explain the unity of two types of parts: the formal parts 
and the material parts.60 The formal parts are the parts into which the form divides 
and are exemplified by the letters of a syllable; the material parts, instead, are 
the parts into which the composite divides and are exemplified by the physical 
elements of flesh.61 Remarkably, these are the parts that make up the constitution 
of a substance: the formal parts make up the constitution that is stated by its 
definition, and the material parts make up the constitution that is subject of 
change.62 Whether directly or not, the argument of Z.17 outlines a solution to 
ensure the unity of substance:  
S3: The unity of substance is ensured by enquiring into the cause of 
why its elements are one unified whole. 
To illustrate, the unity of human is ensured by enquiring into the cause of why 
either some bodily parts or biped animal are one unified whole. In one word, the 
cause of unity is substance. As learned earlier, this is the principle of 
metaphysics that is investigated by an enquiry into the why-it-is of an object. The 
argument about composites shows that substance explains why some elements 
are one unified object just as it explains why some matter is such-and-such an 
object. 
     Let me compare the two sections of Z.17. In both of them, Aristotle attempts 
to indicate the principle of metaphysics. The fundamental idea is that substance 
is the cause of other entities. In the first half, substance is assumed to be the 
cause of the existence of other entities insofar as it explains why some matter is 
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such-and-such an object. In the second half, substance is inferred to be the cause 
of the unity of other entities insofar as it explains why some parts are one unified 
whole.63 In so arguing, Aristotle commits himself to the difference between object 
and cause: substance must be something different from the subject existing or 
unified. The cause of existence must be something different from the material 
substratum (e.g. eclipse/loss of light), and the cause of unity must be something 
different from the plurality of elements (e.g. letters). 
     To specify what substance is, we can then play on the correspondence 
between the explanandum and the explanations; that is, between the 
existence/unity of an object and its statement. The key point is that the statements 
of existence and unity of an object follow the same structure: the statement of a 
term belonging to another plus the statement of the middle-term; the former 
stating the explanandum and the latter stating the explanans. The entire 
statement (i.e. explanation) is the demonstration of the existence/unity of an 
object. Thus, the statement of the unity of BA consists of the statement of the 
oneness of BA belonging to B and A plus the statement of the cause. Aristotle is 
then arguing that substance is the principle signified by the middle-term mediating 
a certain fact, such as the existence and the unity of an entity. 
     If this is correct, we can infer two of the results established in Section 6.1 
above. Since substance is the cause explaining the existence/unity of other 
entities, and since the existence/unity of sensible substances must be explained 
by a cause, sensible substances turn out to be derivative objects of metaphysics. 
For they are credited with the derivative characterization signified by the 
statement of their existence/unity. In other words, Aristotle seems to separate the 
principle of metaphysics from the substances mainly studied in Z: whereas the 
principle is signified by an immediate statement, sensible substances are 
signified by a derivative statement. Therefore, they are treated as secondary 
objects of metaphysics. Moreover, since substance is the cause explaining why 
a plurality of elements is one whole, and since every sensible substance (either 
as form or as composite) divide into a plurality of elements, the cause of the unity 
of sensible substances is neither a formal nor a material part. Rather, it is the 
same teleological cause that explains the existence of such-and-such an object. 
Therefore, the derivative characterization of sensible substances consists of the 
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subject characterized (i.e. the subject ‘that exists’ or ‘that is one’) plus the purpose 
for being so characterized (i.e. ‘that is such-and-such a substance’ or ‘that is one 
substance of such-and-such a kind’). 
6.3.2 Ways of Defining 
When the dilemma of Z.13 triggers the impossibility of defining any substances, 
Aristotle appears to weaken this claim in the very next lines. In some way, he 
says, there can be definitions, whilst in some other way there cannot be.64 No 
interpretation of this remark, I argued in Chapter Five, prevents the enquiry from 
failing. Arguably, Z.17 provides Aristotle with the right tools to overcome the 
dilemma and avoid its difficulty. That is, to put into effect the weakened version 
of the claim. 
     Given our analysis above, it is clear that Z.17 establishes the distinction 
between ways of defining prompted in Z.13. The first way of defining is by 
demonstrative definition: the statement indicates the object existing and the 
cause of the existence. This is the way to define the secondary objects of science, 
namely, the demonstrative attributes of the genus studied (e.g. eclipse); for they 
are credited with a derivative characterization. The second way of defining is by 
immediate definition: the statement indicates an object that is cause of its own 
existence. This is the way to define the primary objects of science, namely, the 
genus and the sub-genera studied (e.g. celestial bodies). The crucial point is that 
in metaphysics sensible substances are encompassed by the genus studied, and 
yet are credited with a derivative characterization. Consequently, they are 
assumed to be primary objects of metaphysics and to be known by immediate 
definitions. Nonetheless, they are treated as secondary objects and known by 
demonstrative definitions. 
     In science, every way of defining applies to an object, either primary or 
secondary, and produces a definition, either immediate or demonstrative. 
Aristotle endorses this distinction for the development of his essentialism in Z.4: 
substances possess definition and essence absolutely, while non-substances 
possess definition and essence derivatively. Thus, the former are primary 
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objects, while the latter are secondary objects of science.65 In Z.10-16, he moves 
to examine the immediate definition in metaphysics. In order to secure the 
possibility of metaphysics threatened in Z.13, Aristotle reintroduces the 
distinction. The peculiarity of metaphysics is that some objects, despite being 
primary, are definable only if treated as secondary. These are sensible 
substances, which are the primary objects on which Z is focused. By relaunching 
the enquiry into the principle, we have to accept both the derivative nature of 
sensible substances and the necessity to study suprasensible substances. For 
one thing, this means that sensible substances are definable by a demonstrative 
definition; for this signifies their τόδ’ ἐν τῷδε characterization: a sensible 
substance is such-and-such matter in virtue of such-and-such a cause. For 
another thing, this means that a suprasensible substance is definable by a purely 
immediate definition; for this signifies an absolute entity that cannot be known 
through Z’s enquiry.66 
     To avoid the final difficulty means carrying on with the project of grounding the 
demonstrative science of being. For this is to secure the possibility of defining the 
primary objects and, thus, to establish the principle of metaphysics. This 
possibility imports a solution to the problem of unity treated in Z: why is every 
substance and every definition one whole and not a plurality of parts? If my 
hypothesis is correct, the solutions of Z.12 and H.6 can be understood with 
reference to the solutions outlined in Z.17. Whereas in Z.12 the unity of substance 
corresponds to the unity of the immediate definition grounding demonstrations in 
science, in H.6 it corresponds to the unity of a demonstrative definition. Therefore, 
Z.12 is concerned with the unity that pertains to the principle of metaphysics, and 
H.6 is concerned with the unity that pertains to the objects grounded in the 
principle. Once Z.17 makes it clear that sensible substances are known by 
demonstrative definition, Aristotle is able to separate the unity that Z.12 fails to 
ensure from the unity that H.6 successfully guarantees. In order to ensure the 
unity of sensible substances, it suffices to show that the explanans is one and the 
same as the explanandum; for a sensible substance is one in virtue of the cause 
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signified by the explanans. To illustrate, in order to ensure the unity of human, it 
suffices to show that human soul and the parts into which human divides are one 
and the same thing. 
     I am inclined to think that the argument of H.6 is designed for this purpose. 
The unity of substance is ensured for both sensible substances and for the 
principle of metaphysics. For sensible substances, unity is ensured by translating 
the notions of matter and form into the notions of potentiality and actuality. Since 
a sensible substance results from a portion of matter in potentiality and a form in 
actuality, the sensible substance is one; for the matter is potentially what the form 
is actually. For example, human is such-and-such a body in potentiality and the 
human soul in actuality; thus, human is one because such-and-such a body is 
potentially what the soul is actually. Correspondingly, we are also able to ensure 
the unity of definition. Since the demonstrative definition of sensible substances 
results from some matter (i.e. the explanandum) and a form (i.e. the explanans), 
the demonstrative definition is one; for the explanandum states potentially what 
the explanans states actually. For example, the definition of human states biped 
animal in potentiality and the human soul in actuality; thus, the definition is one 
because biped animal states potentially what human soul states actually. 
Remarkably, the matter and the form treated in H.6 are not fully equivalent with 
the matter and the form treated in Z. The point is that the notion of matter 
encompasses every material substratum into which substance divides; that is, 
both the constitution of the form and the constitution of a composite.67 Likewise, 
the notion of form is to be understood as the teleological cause of an entity; for it 
indicates the purpose of its existence. 
     On the contrary, for the principle of metaphysics there is no cause of unity at 
all. The reason is simple: in the absence of every type of material substratum, the 
principle lacks every potentiality. Namely, it must be a pure actuality. This is the 
unity that pertains to the ἁπλᾶ. It is impossible to establish the cause of the unity 
of absolute entities just as it is impossible to establish the cause of their existence. 
Therefore, the principle of metaphysics, which is one of the absolute entities, 
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exists and is immediately one. Correspondingly, we are able to understand the 
unity of its definition. Since the definition of such a substance is the purely 
immediate statement of the object, the definition is one. In all likelihood, this is 
the definition of the suprasensible substance that must be studied to complete 
the foundation of metaphysics: the definition of God. 
     Aristotle comes to overcome the dilemma of Z.13 and to relaunch the enquiry 
insofar as he ensures the unity of substances and their definability. Basically, he 
escapes the dichotomy of composition/non-composition for sensible substances. 
Strictly speaking, a sensible substance is not compounded; for its constitution is 
potentially what the whole object is actually. To use Aristotle’s words, it is wrong 
to enquire into the difference between the potentiality and the actuality of a 
substance (H.6, 1045b16-23). These are nothing but two ways to take one and 
the same object. Likewise, a sensible substance is not uncompounded; for its 
characterization does consist of distinct entities. The point is that these entities 
are not added to one another and, thus, do not yield any composition. Again, 
these entities are one and the same object taken in different ways. 
     It is not difficult to see that this conception of sensible substances requires a 
non-realist view on form and matter. Since there is no real composite substance 
to make up, form and matter are not special constituents of each natural body. 
Rather, they are alternative notions to refer to one and the same object.68 The 
notion of matter refers to the potentiality of a sensible substance and, thus, 
grounds the demonstrations about its powers; for example, the notion of iron 
refers to the potentiality of axe and, thus, grounds the demonstrations about the 
power of cutting. The notion of form refers to the actuality of a sensible substance 
and, thus, grounds the demonstrations about its activities; for example, the notion 
of rationality refers to the actuality of human and, thus, grounds the 
demonstrations about the activity of thinking. Although neither of them is the 
proper principle of metaphysics, form and matter are still the principles of sensible 
substances. This enables Aristotle to perfectly match the results of Z’s enquiry 
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with the principles of physics. Within the context of sensible substances, 
substance is identified with nature, which is both form and matter.69 
6.4 The Unity of Substance 
The enquiry into substance overcomes the dilemma of Z.13 and guarantees the 
possibility of the demonstrative science of being. This means ensuring the unity 
of substance that is undermined by the constitutions stated in definitions: 
metaphysics is possible because every substance is one unified object signified 
by one unified definition; it is then possible to relaunch the enquiry into the 
principle of a science. Aristotle outlines a solution to the problem of unity in the 
second half of Z.17. The unity of an object is ensured by enquiring into the cause 
of why a plurality of elements is one unified whole. The unity of the syllable BA, 
for example, is ensured by enquiring into the cause of why the letters A and B are 
one syllable. In so arguing, Aristotle considers the types of parts distinguished in 
Z.10-11. The formal parts are the parts into which the whole taken as form 
divides; the material parts are the parts into which the whole taken as composite 
divides. Since sensible substances divide into such parts, we can infer that there 
is a cause of their unity; that is the cause of why either the formal (e.g. biped 
animal) or the material parts (e.g. bodily parts) are one substance (e.g. human). 
     This treatment of unity, I suggested, is tied to the relaunch of the enquiry in 
the first half of Z.17. The key point is that the cause of the unity of an object is 
also the cause of its existence. Thus, the account of both unity and existence is 
an explanation indicating a subject characterized (i.e. explanandum) plus the 
cause for being so characterized (i.e. explanans). In the case of unity, the subject 
characterized is a plurality of parts being one whole; in the case of existence, it 
is a material substratum being such-and-such an entity. Consequently, the 
enquiry into the principle grounding the existence of other entities is the enquiry 
into this very cause: substance. The idea of substance as cause is pivotal in the 
relaunch of the enquiry. Rather than investigating what substance is, the enquiry 
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has to investigate why something is something else. This shift prevents Aristotle 
from establishing the principle of metaphysics; for the enquiry accounts for other 
objects that are known by demonstrative definition. Yet, the demonstrative 
definition of these objects enables Aristotle to envision the principle; for this is 
indicated by the middle-term. This conclusion is in line with the failure of Z. 
Although the enquiry neither identifies the principle nor achieves its immediate 
definition grounding metaphysics, it envisions the principle through the 
demonstrative definitions of which metaphysics consists. There are two salient 
consequences. First, since sensible substances possess a cause of unity and 
existence, they are known by demonstrative definition; namely, sensible 
substances are credited with a derivative characterization consisting of the 
material substratum plus the appropriate cause. Thus, sensible substances turn 
out to be derivative objects of metaphysics. Second, since Z’s enquiry is primarily 
focused on sensible substances, and since sensible substances are derivative 
objects of metaphysics, the principle of metaphysics can be established by 
studying some suprasensible substance, perhaps God. 
     It is important to remark that although sensible substances are somehow 
derivative, they still belong to the first genus of being. Thus, they are primary 
objects of science, while non-substances are secondary objects of science. For 
this reason, Aristotle attempts to spell out the unity of sensible substances and of 
their definition. The solution of H.6 is to translate the notions of matter and form 
into the notions of potentiality and actuality: both a sensible substance and its 
definition result from some material substratum and a causal form. Since the 
former is in potentiality what the latter is in actuality, matter and form indicate one 
and the same thing. This is not the unity of the principle of metaphysics because 
it is derived from a cause. On the contrary, the unity of the principle is derived 
from no cause at all; for it possesses no material substratum and, thus, no 
potentiality. On this basis, Aristotle is able to ensure the unity of sensible 
substances and their definability.  
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Conclusion 
 
The cover of a famous monograph on Z made it popular to compare Aristotle’s 
enquiry to the Mount Everest: every path to the summit is a philosophical way to 
substance. This work has taken a different viewpoint to observe the mountain in 
its entirety; namely, I have engaged with the problems and the arguments about 
substance in the light of the problems and the arguments about definition. The 
fundamental idea is that since substance is the entity grounding the existence of 
other entities, and since a definition is the statement grounding the 
demonstrations within a science, the enquiry into substance corresponds to the 
enquiry into a definition. 
     Therefore, the standpoint of my observation of Z is the theory of definition I 
have outlined on the basis of Aristotle’s logical works. In particular, my analysis 
has focused on two issues concerning definitions: primacy and unity. Primacy is 
the immediate character of the statement that grounds the demonstrations within 
a science and, thus, is not subject of demonstration itself; unity is the predicative 
oneness of the statement that signifies one object. In Z’s enquiry, Aristotle is 
bound to deal with the primacy and the unity of the entity that is signified by a 
definition: substance. Substance must hold primacy over the other entities insofar 
as it grounds their existence. To illustrate, a quality ontologically depends upon 
the substance qualified. Besides, substance must be credited with unity insofar 
as it is one object and not a plurality of elements. A substance is one entity and 
not the sum of the genus and the differentia indicated by its definition. 
     Given this framework, I have argued that every solution to the enquiry 
undertaken by Aristotle can be analysed with reference to the primacy and the 
unity of definition. The treatment of primacy is central in the endorsement of the 
formalist essentialism: substance is defined as essence and identified with the 
form of substances. If every substance is an essence and thus the entity signified 
by its definition, every substance turns out to hold primacy over other entities; for 
the latter essentially depend upon the former. Accordingly, Aristotle identifies 
Conclusion 
249 
 
every substance with the form that is indicated by its definition. The form of 
substances is the principle enquired in Z. The treatment of unity is central in the 
failure of Z’s enquiry: it is impossible to define what substance is and to establish 
the principle of metaphysics. If every substance is credited with the constitution 
indicated by its definition, no substance can be one unified object; for it is 
pluralized by its composite character. Accordingly, Aristotle is compelled to 
dismiss his formalist essentialism. The form of substances is not the principle of 
metaphysics because it fails to be one object and not many. Both primacy and 
unity are at the core of the relaunch of the enquiry that follows the failure: what 
substance is can be envisioned–though not established–by looking at the 
substances studied in Z. Since the substances studied in Z are firstly sensible 
substances, and since sensible substances are derivative objects of 
metaphysics, we are able to make two salient points. For one thing, the enquiry 
has to focus on some suprasensible substance that is credited with the primacy 
and unity of the principle of a science; for another thing, Z’s enquiry successfully 
defines sensible substances in terms of form and matter. I shall close this work 
with some concluding remarks about three aspects of Z: the argument advanced, 
the method adopted, and the metaphysics endorsed by Aristotle. 
The Argument of Z 
The argument of Z is designed to establish the principle of metaphysics by 
answering the question ‘What is substance?’. The solution will enable the 
enquirer to develop the demonstrative science of being. Substance is the first 
genus of being and encompasses the entities that are primary objects of science; 
non-substances are the remaining genera of being, each of which encompasses 
the entities that are secondary objects of science. Every substance is the subject 
of some non-substances, which are the demonstrable attributes studied by 
metaphysics. Accordingly, the demonstrative science of being consists of the 
definitional knowledge of substances and the demonstrative knowledge of non-
substances; for the former is assumed to ground the latter. Since the genus of 
substances, suggests Aristotle, is prima facie co-extensive with the genus of 
sensible substances, metaphysics studies the same primary objects as physics 
(e.g. human, horse, etc.). However, since substances are not studied qua 
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sensible entities but simply qua entities, metaphysics does not study the 
secondary objects of physics (e.g. alteration, locomotion, etc.); for it is not 
concerned with motion, but simply with existence. The goal of Z is to specify the 
entity whose linguistic counterpart is the definition of the genus studied by 
metaphysics. 
     Does the enquiry reach this principle? Does it lead to the foundation of the 
demonstrative science of being? The value of the argument of Z is one of the 
most debated issues concerning Aristotle’s metaphysics. Its difficulty, I have 
already noted, lies in the presence of both positive and negative phases of 
discussion. The aporematic approach seems to dominate the criticism of the 
invalid solutions, such as Z.3’s definition as subject and Z.13’s definition as 
universal. While Z’s enquiry is concerned with testing and discarding the positions 
held by other philosophers (i.e. Pre-Socratics and Platonists), Aristotle’s own 
views might be found somewhere else, perhaps in the analysis in terms of 
actuality and potentiality conducted in H and Θ or in the theology of Λ. On the 
other hand, Z seems to favour the endorsement of a ‘theory of essences’: every 
object is ultimately the essence indicated by its own definition, which is the cause 
of its being what it is. Z.4-11 and Z.17 appear, more or less explicitly, to define 
substance as essence and to identify the principle with the form of sensible 
substances. 
     I have shown that the argument of Z directly endorses the formalist 
essentialism in order to ground metaphysics and indirectly dismisses it in view of 
its limits. Nevertheless, the failure of Z does not automatically mark the enquiry 
as aporematic; for its genuine contribution emerges when we take Z to account 
not for the principle of metaphysics, but for one of its derivative objects. First of 
all, I have argued that Z.4-6’s essentialism is conceived to ground the 
demonstrative science of being. The idea is that substance, if defined as essence, 
is ensured the primacy of the principle of a science. That is, every non-substance 
ontologically depends upon some substance because the essence of the former 
is caused by the essence of the latter. Secondly, I have proposed a formalist 
conception of substance on the basis of Z.10-11’s hylomorphic analysis. Every 
substance is one and the same as its form and is the subject of its matter; namely, 
the form of substances is the principle of metaphysics, while their matter is a 
demonstrable attribute. In so arguing, I have remarked that this formalist solution 
is not Aristotle’s final word in Z. Whereas most commentators refer to other texts 
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to advocate the essentiality of matter, my analysis insists on the provisional 
character of the argument of Z.4-11. Once Z.13-14 show that every substance, if 
credited with any constitution, fails to be one object, the formalist essentialism is 
indirectly abandoned; for there is no way to ensure the unity of the form of 
substances and thus its role as the principle of metaphysics. From this 
perspective, the argument of Z does not simply lead to questioning Plato’s theory 
of Forms and Aristotle’s own views, but also the possibility of grounding 
metaphysics. The point is that among the substances studied in Z, there is no 
entity that can be ensured the primacy and the unity of the principle of a science. 
I have argued that Z.17 is designed to relaunch the enquiry: what substance is 
can be envisioned–though not established–through the definition of the derivative 
objects of metaphysics, such as sensible substances.  For one thing, Z’s enquiry 
reaches a definition of those substances resulting from both matter and form; for 
another thing, it suggests the study of some suprasensible substance for the 
foundation of metaphysics, i.e. God. 
     Within the Metaphysics, the argument of Z is then an active phase of the 
project to ground the demonstrative science of being. Its results are tied to and 
fully developed in other books, such as H, Θ and Λ. This conclusion has no 
chronological implication. Although Z is likely to be the product of an extensive 
revision and, perhaps, one of the latest versions of Aristotle’s positions, its 
enquiry is designed to harmonize with the analyses conducted in the other books. 
In this regard, the relationship between Z and H can be very illustrative. In H, 
Aristotle is concerned with three main issues: the account of sensible substances 
in terms of actuality and potentiality (H.2); a fresh understanding of the notion of 
matter (H.4-5); the unity of definition and substance (H.3, H.6). The outcome is 
the definition of the substance which is found to be a derivative object in Z: the 
sensible substance. In other words, whereas Z fails to state what substance is 
(i.e. to establish the principle of metaphysics) and ends up with defining sensible 
substances (i.e. some primary objects), H explores the characterization of the 
latter and comes to the following conclusion: ‘From what has been said, it is clear 
what sensible substance is and how it is; in one way it is as matter, in another 
way it is as form and actuality, in a third way it is as the composite of both’ (H.2, 
1043a26-28). Remarkably, this three-fold definition of substance perfectly 
matches the definition of nature given in Physics B.1. In physics this definition 
picks the principles, while in metaphysics it concerns only some primary objects. 
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     If this is correct, the goal of H is to show that the derivative characterization 
ascribed to sensible substances does not prevent them from being primary 
objects of metaphysics. To this effect, Aristotle resorts to the notions of 
potentiality and actuality. His first step is to ensure the unity of sensible 
substances (H.6); subsequently, his concern is to prove the priority of the actuality 
(Θ.8). For this will get us closer to the principle of metaphysics: the substance 
that is pure actuality. 
The Method of Z 
The method of Z is the method to establish the principle of a demonstrative 
science. In particular, it must be functional to identifying the entity that grounds 
the existence of the other entities and the definition that grounds the 
demonstrations within metaphysics. Plainly, the debate concerning the method 
of Z is a cast of the debate concerning its argument. Does the enquiry follow a 
scientific method to achieve positive results? Or does it set out dialectical 
procedures to reject invalid solutions? At the beginning of this work, I noticed the 
limits of this dichotomy. On the one hand, Z’s enquiry is conceived to develop a 
fully-fledged science and, thus, cannot represent a scientific argument itself. On 
the other, Z’s enquiry consists in investigating the principle of metaphysics and, 
thus, cannot represent a mere dialectical examination. 
     I have argued that the method of Z exemplifies the procedure followed by 
every pre-scientific enquiry. Namely, the procedure to achieve the knowledge 
grounding the whole science. This is the definitional knowledge of the genus 
studied; for instance, the definitional knowledge of ‘celestial body’ grounds 
astronomy and its demonstrations. The method of Z is to consider different ways 
to define for ‘substance’ in order to ground metaphysics and its demonstrations. 
From this perspective, Z can be compared to other pre-scientific discussions, 
such as Physics B.1 and On the Soul A.1-2 and B.1-2. The science of nature and 
the science of the soul must be grounded in the definitions of ‘nature’ and ‘soul’, 
respectively; for these will be the principles of the relevant demonstrations. What 
is then the method adopted in such contexts? The difficulty lies in the fact that 
scientific principles seem to be always assumed on the basis a superordinate 
science; for example, the principles of geometry (e.g. point) are assumed on the 
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basis of mathematics.  Since metaphysics is the most universal and eminent 
science, its principles must be established on the basis of a direct enquiry. I am 
inclined to think that this procedure is outlined at the end of the Posterior 
Analytics. After having presented the procedures of learning by demonstration 
(A.1-33) and by enquiry (B.1-18), Aristotle sketches the procedure of learning by 
induction (B.19). Its product is the preliminary knowledge to conduct 
demonstrations (i.e. learning by enquiry) and to organize these results into a fully-
fledged science (i.e. learning by demonstration). My hypothesis is that this could 
be the method adopted for the project of the Metaphysics and, thus, for Z’s 
enquiry. 
     Importantly, nothing prevents the enquirer into substance from recalling 
dialectical schemes. The key point is that no scheme is employed for purely 
negative purposes. My interpretation of the notion of λογικῶς can help us to 
understand this fact. This term, I have argued, marks the shift from the analysis 
of entities to the analysis of the statements accounting for them. Basically, in 
order to establish the principle of metaphysics, Aristotle examines the predicative 
relations involved in accounting for entities and, in particular, for substances. In 
a word, definitions are the focus of Z’s enquiry. The application of dialectical 
schemes is then in line with this logical strategy. Our understanding of the 
principle of metaphysics relies on the technical analysis of definition expounded 
in the Topics. This means both to present and to discard the material that can be 
organized into the demonstrative science of being: the knowledge of entities. 
The Metaphysics of Z 
The metaphysics of Z is not a fully developed theory about entities. The enquirer 
does not achieve any definitive conclusion about the principle of metaphysics; 
nor do the results obtained appear to be exhaustive. This is totally unsurprising; 
for the value of Z does not lie in its answers but in its problems. The metaphysics 
of Z is a philosophical exercise in which the enquirer is presented with the most 
significant accounts of being: the theory of the common material substratum (Z.3), 
essentialism (Z.4-6) and its hylomorphic version (Z.10-11), Platonist realism 
(Z.13-14), nominalism (Z.15). To engage with this exercise means engaging with 
some challenging problems in metaphysics: the multiplicity of being, the relations 
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of ontological dependence, the treatment of properties and attributes, the 
mereology and the unity of entities. On the whole, these features witness the 
comprehensiveness of the enquiry into substance, which is in line with the 
comprehensiveness of the first philosophy. 
     Undoubtedly, hylomorphic essentialism represents the most interesting phase 
of this exercise. In modern philosophy, there have been a few attempts to set out 
metaphysical doctrines inspired to Aristotle’s views: the fundamental insight is to 
credit material objects with a core identity, which is the source of every other 
characterization. This principle of identity, which is generally characterized as 
essence, is then the principle to understand the ontological relations among 
objects (e.g. the capability of learning of humans) and their holistic unity (e.g. the 
oneness of a house). I have argued that Aristotle’s essentialism is certainly the 
most promising solution in metaphysics; however, it shows some limits once filled 
with the content of hylomorphism. In particular, I have shown that Aristotelian 
essentialism leads to a formalist understanding of objects: the source of what an 
object is is confined to its form and does not include its matter. For the matter of 
the object essentially depends upon its form. This conclusion raises some 
problems concerning the unity of objects. Basically, it is impossible to ensure that 
an object is one thing and not the plurality of formal elements. 
     The suggestion of Z is that such problems can be avoided with two steps. 
First, we need to acknowledge the derivative character of material objects. Thus, 
our essentialist metaphysics does not provide us with a definitive explanation of 
ontological facts, but needs to be grounded in some other principles. Second, we 
need to translate the notions of form and matter into the notions of actuality and 
potentiality. In other words, the possibility of an essentialist metaphysics for 
material objects is tied to our understanding of the powers and the activities that 
characterize an entity.   
 255 
 
Bibliography 
Primary Sources 
ARISTOTLE 
Categories and On Interpretation = Categoriae et Liber De Interpretatione, 
Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford: 
1949. 
Prior and Posterior Analytics = Prior and Posterior Analytics, a Revised Text with 
Introduction and Commentary by W.D. Ross, Oxford: 1949. 
Topics = Topiques, 2 tom., texte établi et traduit par J. Brunschwig, Paris: 2003-
2007. 
Sophistical Refutations = Topica et Sophistici Elenchi, Recognovit brevique 
adnotatione critica instruxit W.D. Ross, Oxford: 1958. 
Physics = Physics, a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W.D. 
Ross, Oxford: 1939. 
On the Heavens = Du Ciel, texte établi et traduit par P. Moraux, Paris: 1965. 
 256 
 
On Generation and Corruption = De la Géneration et la Corruption, texte établi et 
traduit par M. Rashed, Paris: 2005.  
Metereologica = Météorologiques, 2 tom., texte établi et traduit par P. Louis, 
Paris: 1982. 
On the Soul = De Anima, Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit W.D. 
Ross, Oxford: 1963.  
On Sense = De Sensu, in Parva Naturalia, a Revised Text with Introduction and 
Commentary by W.D. Ross, Oxford: 1955. 
On the Parts of Animals = Les Parties des Animaux, texte établi et traduit par P. 
Louis, Paris: 1957. 
On the Generation of Animals = De la Génération des Animaux, texte établi et 
traduit par P. Louis, Paris: 1961. 
Metaphysics = Metaphysics, 2 vols., a Revised Text with Introduction and 
Commentary by W.D. Ross, Oxford: 1924.  
Nicomachean Ethics = Ethica Nicomachea, Recognovit brevique adnotatione 
critica instruxit I. Bywater, Oxford: 1963.  
Eudemian Ethics = Ethica Eudemia, Recognoverunt brevique adnotatione critica 
instruxerunt R.R. Walzer et J.M. Mingay, Oxford: 1991.  
 257 
 
Rhetoric = Ars Rhetorica, Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit W.D. 
Ross, Oxford: 1963. 
PLATO 
Opera I: Euthyphro, Apologia Socratis, Crito, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, 
Sophista, Politicus, recogniverunt brevique adnotatione critica instruxerunt 
E.A. Duke, W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. Nicoll, D.B. Robinson, et J.C.G. Strachan, 
Oxford: 1995 (1st ed. 1900-1907). 
Opera II: Parmenides, Philebus, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades I and II, 
Hipparchus, Amatores, recognivit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit J. 
Burnet, Oxford: 1900-1907. 
Opera III: Theages, Charmis, Laches, Lysis, Euthydemus, Protagoras, Gorgias, 
Hippia Maior et Minor, Ionis, Minoxenus, recognivit brevique adnotatione 
critica instruxit J. Burnet, Oxford: 1900-1907. 
Opera IV: Clitopho, Respublica, Timaeus, Critias, recognivit brevique adnotatione 
critica instruxit J. Burnet, Oxford: 1900-1907. 
Opera V: Minos, Leges, Epinomis, Epistulae, Definitiones, recognivit brevique 
adnotatione critica instruxit J. Burnet, Oxford: 1900-1907. 
 258 
 
Secondary Sources 
2.1 Translations and Commentaries 
Ackrill J. (1963), Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione. Translations and 
Commentary, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Top.), In Aristotelis Topicorum Libros Octo 
Commentaria, M. Wallies (ed.), CAG II.2, Berlin: Reimer, 1891. 
Aquinas (Expositio), In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Expositio, Cathala 
M.R. e Spiazzi R. (eds.), Roma: Marietti, 1954. 
Averroes (In Metaph.), In Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libros Commentarium, in 
Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, M.A. Zimara (ed.), Vol. VIII, 
Venetiis, 1562-1574 (reprinted in Frankfurt, 1962). 
Barnes J. (1984) (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation, 2 Voll., Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
— (1994), Aristotle: Posterior Analytics. Translation and Commentary, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1st edition 1975). 
Bostock D. (1994), Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H. Translation and 
Commentary, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 259 
 
Brunschwig J. (2003), Topiques, Livres I-IV, Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 
— (2007), Topiques, Livres V-VI, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.  
Burnyeat et al. (1979), Notes on Zeta, Oxford: Sub-faculty of Philosophy. 
Cooper J. (1997) (ed.), Plato: Complete works, Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Frede M. und Patzig G. (1988), Aristoteles Metaphysik Z, Text, Ṻbersetzung und 
Kommentar, 2 Bd., München: Beck. 
Kirwan C. (1993), Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Γ, ∆ and E. Translations and 
Commentaries, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Makin S. (2006), Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Θ. Translations and Commentaries, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mignucci M. (1975), L’Argomentazione Dimostrativa in Aristotele. Commento agli 
Analitici Secondi, Padova: Antenore. 
— (2007), Aristotele: Analitici Secondi. Traduzione e Commento, Roma: Laterza. 
Morel . (2015), Aristote: Métaphysique Èta, Paris: Vrin. 
Rashed M. (2005), Aristote. De la Géneration et la Corruption, Paris: Les Belles 
Lettres. 
 260 
 
Ross W.D. (1924), Aristotle. Metaphysics, 2 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— (1949), Aristotle. Prior and Posterior Analytics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Simplicius (In Cat.), In Aristotelis Categoria Commentarium, C. Kalbfleisch (ed.), 
CAG VIII, Berlin: Reimer, 1907. 
— (In Phys.), In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattruor Priores Commentaria, H. 
Diels (ed.), CAG IX, Berlin: Reimer, 1882. 
Smith R. (1997), Aristotle: Topics I and VIII, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
2.2 Monographs and Articles 
Ackrill J. (1981), ‘Aristotle’s Theory of Definition. Some Questions about Posterior 
Analytics II.8-10’, in Berti E. (1981), 339-358. 
Barnes J. (1969), ‘Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration’, Phronesis, 14.2, 123-152. 
— (1981), ‘Proof and Syllogism’, in Berti E. (1981), 17-59. 
Berti E. (1981) (ed.), Aristotle on Science. Proceedings of the 8th Symposium 
Aristotelicum, Padova: Antenore. 
 261 
 
Bolton R. (1976), ‘Essentialism and Semantic Theory in Aristotle: Posterior 
Analytics II.7-10’, Philosophical Review, 85: 515-544.  
— (1987), ‘Definition and scientific method in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and 
Generation of Animals’, in Gotthelf A. and J. Lennox (eds.) Philosophical 
issues in Aristotle's Biology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
120–166. 
— (1990), ‘The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic’, in Devereux D. et 
Pellegrin P. (1990), 185-236. 
— (1994), ‘Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics as a Science’ in Scaltsas T., 
Charles D., and Gill M.L. (1994), 321-354. 
— (1995), ‘Science and the Science of Substance in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z’, 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 76, 419-469. 
— (2010), ‘Biology and metaphysics in Aristotle’, in Lennox J. and Bolton R. 
(2010), 30-55. 
Bolton R. and Lennox J. (2010) (eds.), Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bonitz H. (1870), Index Aristotelicus, Berlin: Graz. 
Bronstein D. (2016), Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 262 
 
Brunschwig (1990), ‘Remarques sur la communication de Robert Bolton’, in 
Devereux D. et Pellegrin P. (1990), 237-262. 
Burnyeat M. (1981), ‘Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge’, in Berti E. (1981), 
97-139. 
— (2001), A Map of Metaphysics Zeta, Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications. 
Castagnoli L. (2013), ‘Aristotle on Begging the Question’, Logical Analysis & 
History of Philosophy, 15, 90-121. 
Cavini W. (1995), ‘Naming and Argument: Diairetic Logic in Plato’s Statesman’, 
in Rowe C. (ed.), Reading the Statesman, Sankt Augustin: Academia 
Verlag, 123-138. 
Chantraine P. (1968), Dictonnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque, 2 voll., 
Paris: Klincksieck. 
Charles D. (1994), ‘Matter and Form: Unity, Persistence, and Identity’, in Scaltsas 
T., Gill M.L., and Charles D. (1994), 75-105. 
— (2000), Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, New-York: Oxford University 
Press. 
— (2010) (ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— (2010a), ‘Definition and Explanation in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and 
Metaphysics’, in Charles D. (2010a), 286-328. 
 263 
 
Cherniss H. (1944), Aristotle’s criticism of Plato and the Academy, Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press. 
Chiaradonna R. (2014), ‘La chair et le bronze. Remarques sur Métaphysique Z, 
11 et l’interprétation de M. Frede et G. Patzig’, Les études philosophiques, 
110, 375-388. 
Code A. (1984), ‘The Aporematic Approach to Primary Being in Metaphysics Z’, 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 10, 1-20. 
— (1997), ‘Aristotle’s Metaphysics as a Science of Principles’, Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie, 201, 345-366. 
— (2010), ‘An Aristotelian puzzle about definition: Metaphysics Z.12’, in Lennox 
J. and Bolton R. (2010), 78-96. 
— (2011), ‘Commentary on Devereux’, Proceedings of the Boston Area 
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, XXVI, 197-210. 
Crivelli P. (2013), Plato on Falsehood, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dahl N. (2003), ‘On substance being the same as its essence in Metaphysics VII’, 
Ancient Philosophy, 23.1, 153-179. 
Deslauriers M. (2007), Aristotle on Definition, Leiden-Boston: Brill. 
Devereux D. (1990), ‘Comments on Robert Bolton’s The Epistemological Basis 
of Aristotelian Dialectic’, in Devereux D. et Pellegrin P. (1990), 263-286. 
 264 
 
— (2003), ‘The Relation between Books Zeta and Eta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics’, 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, XXV, 159-212. 
— (2011), ‘Aristotle on the Form and Definition of Human Being’, in Proceedings 
of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, XXVI, 167-196. 
Devereux D. et Pellegrin P. (1990) (eds.), Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique 
chez Aristote, C.N.R.S.-N.S.F., Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 
DeMoss D.J. and Devereux D. (1988), ‘Essence, Existence, and Nominal 
Definition in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics II.8-10’, Phronesis, 33, 133-154. 
Driscoll J. (1981), ‘EIDĒ in Aristotle’s Earlier and Later Theories of Substance’, in 
O’Meara D. (1981), 129-159. 
Evans J. (1977), Aristotle’s Concept of Dialectic, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ellis B. (2001), Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fine K. (1994), ‘Essence and Modality’, Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1-16. 
— (1995a), ‘Senses of Essence’, in Sinnott-Armstrong W. (ed.), Modality, 
Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 53-74. 
— (1995b), ‘Ontological Dependence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
95, 269-290. 
 265 
 
— (1999), ‘Things and Their Parts’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61-74. 
Fraser K. (2002), ‘Demonstrative Science and the Science of Being qua Being’, 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, XXII, 43-82. 
Frede M. (1981), ‘Categories in Aristotle’, in O’Meara D. (1981), 1-25. 
— (1985), ‘Substance in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’, in Gotthelf A. (ed.), Aristotle on 
Nature and Living Things, Pittsburgh: Mathesis, 17-26. 
— (1987), (ed.), Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Minneapolis: Minnesota 
University Press. 
— (1987a), ‘The Unity of General and Special Metaphysics: Aristotle’s 
Conception of Metaphysics’, in Frede M. (1987), 81-95. 
— (1987b), ‘Individuals in Aristotle’, in Frede M. (1987), 49-71. 
— (1990), ‘The Definition of Sensible Substances in Metaphysics Z’, in Devereux 
D. et Pellegrin P. (1990), 113-129. 
Frey C. (2007), ‘Organic Unity and the Matter of Man’, Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, XXXII, 167-204. 
Galluzzo G. (2013a), The Medieval Reception of Book Zeta of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, Leiden: Brill. 
 266 
 
— (2013b), ‘Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’, in Galluzzo G. and 
Chiaradonna R. (2013), 209-253. 
— (2017), ‘Genus as Matter in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Reconsideration’, in 
Bertolacci A. and Paravicini Bagliani A. (eds.), La filosofia medievale fra 
antichità ed età moderna. Saggi in onore di Francesco Del Punta, Firenze: 
Edizioni del Galluzzo, 37-71. 
Galluzzo G. and Mariani M. (2006), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book Z. The 
Contemporary Debate, Pisa: Edizioni della Normale. 
Galluzzo G. and Chiaradonna C. (2013), Universals in Ancient Philosophy, Pisa: 
Edizioni della Normale.  
Gill M.L., (1989), Aristotle on Substance. The Paradox of Unity, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
— (2010), ‘Unity of definition in Metaphysics H.6 and Z.12’, in Lennox J. and 
Bolton R. (2010), 97-121. 
— (2016), ‘Method and Metaphysics in Plato's Sophist and Statesman’, in Zalta 
E.N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford 
University Online. 
Goldin O. (1996), Explaining an Eclipse: Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 2.1-10, 
Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. 
Gotthelf A. and Lennox J. (1987) (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s 
Biology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 267 
 
Graham D.W. (1987), Aristotle’s Two Systems, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Granger H. (1981), ‘Aristotle on Genus and Differentia’, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 22, 1-23. 
— (1984), ‘The Differentia and the Per Se Accident in Aristotle’, Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie, 62.2, 118-129. 
Halper E.C. (1989), One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Columbus: 
Parmenides Publishing (reprinted in 2005). 
Harte V. (1996), ‘Metaphysics H6: A Dialectic with Platonism’, Phronesis, 41, 276-
304. 
Haslanger S. (1994), ‘Parts, Compounds, and Substantial Unity’, in Scaltsas T., 
Gill M.L., and Charles D. (1994), 129-170. 
Irwin T. (1988), Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jaeger W. (1917), ‘Emendationum Aristotelearum Specimen’, reprinted in Jaeger 
W. (1960) (ed.), Scripta Minora, Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1-
38. 
Koslicki K. (2008), The Structure of Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kripke S. (1980), Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 268 
 
Lennox J. (1987), ‘Divide and Explain. The Posterior Analytics in Practice’, in 
Gotthelf A. and Lennox J. (eds), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 90-119. 
Lennox J. and Bolton R. (2010) (eds.), Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle, 
Cambridge. 
Lewis F. (2013), How Aristotle gets by in Metaphysics Zeta, Oxford: Oxford 
University press. 
Locke J. (Essay), Essay on Human Understanding, edited by Nidditch P.H., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. 
Loux M. (1991), Primary Ousia: an essay on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z-H, Ithaca-
London: Cornell University Press. 
— (2006), ‘Aristotle’s Constituent Ontology’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2, 
207-250. 
Lowe J. (1998), The Possibility of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Malink M. (2007), ‘Categories in Topics I.9’, Rhizai, IV.2, 271-294. 
Mansion S. (1948), Le jugement d’existence chez Aristote, Louvain: Éditions de 
l’institut supérieur de philosophie. 
 269 
 
Mariani M. (1997), ‘Aristotele e la differenza’, in Fabris A., Fioravanti G., e 
Moriconi E. (eds.), Logica e Teologia. Studi in onore di Vittorio Sainati, 
Pisa: ETS, 3-21. 
McKirahan R. (1992), Principles and Proofs, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Menn S. (2001), ‘Metaphysics Z.10-16 and the Argument-Structure of 
Metaphysics Z’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, XXI, 83-134. 
Mensch W. (1996), ‘Die Teile Der Definition’, in Rapp C. (1996), 135-156. 
Morrison D. (1990), ‘Some Remarks on Definition in Metaphysics Z’, in Devereux 
D. et Pellegrin P. (1990), 113-129. 
— (1993), ‘Le statut catégoriel des differences dans l’Organon’, Revue 
philosophique, 2, 147-178. 
Moraux P. (1968), ‘La joute dialectique d’après le huitième livre des Topiques’ in 
Owen (1968), 277-311. 
Oderberg D. (2007), Real Essentialism, London: Routledge. 
— (2014), ‘Is Form Structure?’ in Novotný D.D. and Novák L. (eds), Neo-
Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics, London: Routledge, 164-80. 
O’Meara D. (1981) (ed.), Studies in Aristotle, Washington D.C.: The Catholic 
University of. America Press. 
 270 
 
Owen G.E.L. (1960), ‘Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle’, 
in Düring I. and Owen G.E.L. (eds.), Aristotle and Plato in the mid-Fourth 
Century, Götenborg: Studia Graeca et Latina, 160-190. 
— (1961), ‘Tithenai ta phainomena’, in Mansion S. (ed.), Aristote et les problème 
de méthode, Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium Aristotelicum, Louvain: 
Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 83-103. 
— (1965), ‘Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology’, in Bambrough R. (ed.), New 
Essays on Plato and Aristotle, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 69-75. 
— (1966), ‘The Platonism of Aristotle’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 51, 
125-150. 
— (1968), Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics. Proceedings of the 3rd Symposium 
Aristotelicum, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— (1968a), ‘Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of the Forms’, in Owen G.E.L. 
(1968), 103-125. 
— (1978-9), ‘Particular and General’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 79, 
1-21. 
Patzig G. (1960), ‘Theologie und Ontologie in der Metaphysik des Aristoteles’, 
Kant-Studien, 52, 185-205. 
Peramatzis M. (2010), ‘Essence and per se Predication in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
Z 4’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, XXXIX, 121-182. 
 271 
 
— (2011), Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Primavesi O. (2012), ‘The Transmission of the Text and the Riddle of the Two 
Versions’, in Steel C. and Primavesi O. (eds.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
Alpha: Proceedings of the 18th Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 387-457. 
Putnam H. (1973), ‘Meaning and Reference’, The Journal of Philosophy, LXX, 
699-711. 
— (1983), ‘Possibility and Necessity’, in Putnam H., Philosophical Papers III, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 46-68. 
Quine W.V.O. (1953), ‘Reference and Modality’, in Quine W.V.O., From a Logical 
Point of View, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 139-159.  
Rapp C. (1996) (ed.), Metaphysik: Die Substanzbücher, Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 
— (1996a), ‘Substanz als vorrangig Seiendes. Z.1’, in Rapp C. (1996), 27-40. 
— (1996b), ‘Kein Allgemeines ist Substanz. Z.13, 14-16’, in Rapp C. (1996), 157-
191. 
— (2016), ‘The Principles of Sensible Substances in Metaphysics Λ.1-5’, in Horn 
C. (ed.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ. New Essays, Boston-Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 87-118. 
 272 
 
Rorty R. (1973), ‘Genus as Matter: a reading of Metaphysics Z-H’, in Lee E.N., 
Mourelatos A.P.D., and Rorty R. (eds.), Exegesis and Argument, Assen, 
393-420. 
Scaltsas T. (1994a), ‘Substantial Holism’ in Scaltsas T, Gill M.L., and Charles D. 
(1994), 107-128. 
— (1994b), Substances and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Scaltsas T., Gill M.L., and Charles D. (1994) (eds.), Unity, Identity and 
Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sellars W. (1967), ‘Aristotle’s Metaphysics: An Introduction’, Philosophical 
Perspectives, III, 73-124. 
Sholz H. (1975), ‘The Ancient Axiomatic Theory’, in Barnes J., Schofield M., and 
Sorabji R. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle. Science, London: Duckworth, 1975, 
50-64. 
Simons P. (2000), Parts: A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Solmsen F. (1968), ‘Dialectic without Forms’, in Owen G.E.L. (1968), 49-68. 
Wedin V. (2000), Aristotle’s Theory of Substance: The Categories and 
Metaphysics Zeta, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 273 
 
Whiting J. (1991), ‘Metasubstance: A Critical Notice of Frede-Patzig and Furth’, 
The Philosophical Review, 100, 607-639. 
Witt C. (1989), Substance and Essence in Aristotle: An Interpretation of 
Metaphysics VII-IX, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Woods M. (1967), ‘Problems in Metaphysics VII 13’, in Moravcsik J. (ed.), 
Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays, New York: Anchor, 215–238. 
— (1974-75), ‘Substance and Essence in Aristotle’, Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 75, 167-180.  
— (1991), ‘Universals and Particular Forms in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’, Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol.: Aristotle and the Later Tradition, 
41–56. 
 
